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Abstract 
The standard interpretation of classical Sämkhya and Yoga includes, and indeed often centres 
upon, the claim that these two Indian philosophical systems (dar arras) are realist and that 
their respective metaphysical schemata (which are extremely similar) constitute accounts of 
how an essentially "material" principle, namely prakrzi, "evolves" into the world or cosmos 
via a series of cosmogonic steps. I argue that this realist-cosmogonic interpretation stems 
from an unduly literal reading of certain passages in the classical texts, and suffers from seri- 
ous shortcomings that prevent it from providing a coherent account of the darSanas in their 
entirety, especially with respect to the crucial relation between metaphysics and soteriological 
praxis. 
As a helpful background to my critique of existing interpretations and presentation of a 
new alternative one, a broad historical overview of the two darganas is given (Chapter 1), plus 
an examination of the relation between them (Chapter 2). This is followed by a survey of the 
applications of "realism"-and its opposing concepts of "antirealism" and "idealism"-in 
(western) philosophical discourse (Chapter 3), which lays a foundation for the discussion of 
the meaning and implications of the imputation of realism to Säipkhya and Yoga. I show, with 
reference to specific examples from the scholarly literature, that this imputation generally in- 
volves a confusion between different types of realism (Chapter 4), and then proceed to argue 
for a non-realist and non-cosmogonic interpretation, in which the metaphysical schema is un- 
derstood to represent a transcendental analysis (in the Kantian sense) of the preconditions of 
experience (Chapters 5 and 6). Finally I explain how existing interpretations have led to seri- 
ous misrepresentations of the soteriological enterprise of Särrpkhya and Yoga, and how this 
enterprise can be far more successfully portrayed-and shown to be integrated with the meta- 
physical theory-by means of my new interpretation (Chapter 7). 
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Bhüsya Yogablzi4ya (attributed to Vyäsa) [This abbreviation occurs occasionally in 
the main text. In parenthetical references and footnotes YB/i is used instead] 
Brhad. Up Brhadürarryaka-upanisad 
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Chünd. Up Chündogya-upanisad 
CPuR Critique of Pure Reason [In referring to this work by Kant I have followed the 
standard practice of denoting its first and second editions by the letters "A" 
and "B" respectively] 
Critique [ditto] 
EIP Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies (general editor, Karl Potter) 
EIP iv Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. 4: Säi pkhya: A Dualist Tradition in 
Indian Philosophy, ed. by Larson and Bhattacharya 
GB/i Gaudapüdabhüsya (of Gaudapäda) 
Grid Bhagavadgitü 
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Maitr. Up Maitrt- or Maitrdyap ya-upanisad 
MBh Mahäbhürata 
MW Monier-Williams' Sanskrit-English Dictionary, 1963 reprint [first published, 
1899] 
SK Sümkhyakürikü (of I§varakrsna) [see also Kdrik4] 
SPBh Sümkhyapravacanabhüsya (of Vijnänabhiksu) 
SS Sämkhyasütra (attributed to Kapila) 
SSV Samkhyastitravrtti (of Aniruddha) 
STV Sümkhyataruvasanta (of Mudumba Narasimhasvdmin) 
Svet. Up Svetüsvatara-upanisad 
TK Tattvakauniudi (of Väcaspatimi§ra) 
TV Tattvavaisaradi (of Väcaspatimigra) 
Webster's WVebster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 
(unabridged), 16th edn, 3 vols (paginated consecutively) 
YBh Yogabhüsya (attributed to Vyäsa) [see also Bhäsya] 
YS Yogasütra (attributed to Patanjali) 
YV Yogavdrttika (of Vijnänabhiksu) 
VII 
Some Remarks on my Use of Italics and Underscoring 
In the literature on Indian philosophy there is no universal standard of practice concerning the 
italicisation of Sanskrit terms. Some scholars invariably italicise them, while others do so very 
sparingly. Although I do not claim to be entirely consistent in my use of italics, I generally 
employ them in the following cases: (a) when a Sanskrit term is being used for the first time in 
the work as a whole, or when it is being introduced at a particular point where it is about to be 
further discussed; (b) when the term (or phrase, etc. ) appears in parentheses to indicate what 
an English term is intended to stand for; (c) when it is the word itself that is being referred to, 
as distinct from the concept for which the word stands; (d) in footnotes, when the original 
version of a sentence or verse that has been quoted in the main text is given. 
In several places, when quoting from the works of other scholars, I have made use of un- 
derscoring as a means of emphasising certain terms or statements. This is to avoid confusion 
when the original passage already contains italicised words or expressions. In those cases 
where the original passage contains no italics, I have myself used italics for the purpose of 




IlE PRESENT WORK is the result of a detailed enquiry into the classical systems (darlanas) 
of Indian philosophy known as Sämkhya and Yoga. My aim has been to develop an in- 
terpretation that takes seriously the claim of these systems to provide a method, or range of 
methods, for the transcendence of suffering and discontent. Many previous attempts have been 
made by scholars to present the philosophies of Särpkhya and Yoga in an intelligible fashion, 
and some of these have made extremely valuable contributions to a general understanding of 
the subject. I am not, however, convinced that any previous interpretation has adequately ex- 
plained the relation between, on the one hand, the schema of metaphysical principles set forth 
systematically in the Sdmkhyakirikü and alluded tö in the Yogasiitra, and, on the other hand, 
the professed soteriological goal of establishing the "self' (purusa) or "seer" (drastr) in its 
own immaculate being. I do not claim to have unravelled all the intricate mysteries of 
S mkhya and Yoga; indeed, it would not be feasible to try to cover every aspect of these sys- 
tems within a single study. I do, however, feel confident that the aspects which I have focused 
upon have been dealt with here in a way that represents a significant advance on much of the 
existing interpretive literature. 
My investigation has brought to light some profound problems with the classical material 
as it is commonly interpreted; and thus my task has been, in large measure, to ask whether the 
common interpretations are justified, and, if they are not, what might constitute an alternative 
and superior interpretation. 
What has come to be regarded as the standard interpretation of Sämkhya and Yoga has 
tended to be influenced by some major assumptions, the most important of which is that the 
two systems hold a realist view of the relation between conscious subjects and the external 
world. I will argue that this assumption is false, and that any interpretation based upon it is 
radically misguided. When the primary texts are examined closely, and considered in view of 
their overall soteriological orientation, it can be seen that the metaphysics of Sämkhya and 
Yoga deals only indirectly with the relation between experiencing subjects and the world of 
external objects. Its immediate concern is the more primary relation between two transcenden- 
tal principles, the combination of which facilitates the emergence of a number of further prin- 
ciples, which are commonly referred to in the secondary literature as lattvas ("thatnesses"), 
but which I (for reasons that will be made clear later, especially in chapters 5 and 6) prefer to 
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call "constituents of experience in general", or "necessary conditions of experience", or sim- 
ply "principles of manifestation". 
It is my view that we have to be very light-fingered when attempting to dress classical In- 
dian systems in the garb of western terminology, and are well-advised not to go throwing high- 
impact terms such as "realism" and "idealism" around willy-nilly. This is not to say that such 
terms have to be avoided completely. They can, in certain instances, be extremely help- 
ful-indeed, from a western philosophical standpoint, indispensable-in clarifying both par- 
ticular aspects and general orientations of philosophical systems. In the case of Sämkhya and 
Yoga, however, I consider neither "realism" nor "idealism" to provide a suitable characterisa- 
tion of their metaphysical stance. This stance has-as I will show-a great deal less in com- 
mon with western forms of realism than it does with (some) such forms of idealism. But it 
would nevertheless be misleading to stress the idealist inclinations of the Indian systems, 
since, as has been suggested, the status of "external objects" is simply not the issue they are 
interested in. It is for this reason that I have entitled my study a non-realist-as opposed to an 
idealist or even an antirealist-i nterpretat ion. 
WHAT THIS STUDY AIMS TO DO 
It needs to be stressed at the outset, then, that what I aim to provide in this study is a fresh in- 
terpretation of classical Sämkhya and Yoga as presented in the Sdmkhyakürikü and Yogasütra. 
The study is therefore primarily hermeneutic in orientation. It addresses the question: What 
are the texts endeavouring to say-what is their meaning? 
It goes without saying that I cannot, and nor can anyone else, know the intentions of the 
texts' authors. We are unable to reach back in time and inject ourselves into their minds and 
thoughts. Indeed, we do not even know whether it is legitimate to speak of "authors" in this 
context, for the origins of the texts we are dealing with are opaque. Clearly the texts have been 
communicated, both orally and in written form, for many hundreds of years, and have un- 
doubtedly undergone modifications along the way. We do not have an Ur-text, in the German 
sense, available to us, and it is not my aim to try to reveal such a text lying beneath either the 
Säntkhyakürikü or the Yogasütra. We must, I think, accept that there is always a certain degree 
of arbitrariness-of historical and cultural contingency-attached to any interpretation of a 
text. We are all unavoidably embedded within a milieu that is informed by myriad historical 
and cultural factors, and so were the authors and redactors of the texts we are engaging with. 
Thus we should dispense with the notion of a pure encounter between an author and a reader: 
the relationship is unfathomably more complex and messy than that. 
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How, then, can I claim, on behalf of my interpretation, that it is an improvement upon pre- 
vious ones? My principal appeal here is to philosophical coherence. I have intimated already 
that there are some serious philosophical difficulties with the most prominent existing inter- 
pretations of Särrmkhya and Yoga. Now, it may have turned out to have been a mistake on my 
part to ask whether a more coherent, and hence philosophically plausible, interpretation were 
possible. I may have been on a wild goose chase. But that was the question I set myself; and I 
soon discovered that, once certain prejudices had been left aside (concerning, for example, the 
supposed realism and cosmological character of Sämkhya metaphysics), a greater degree of 
coherence did begin to emerge, and I started to see parallels with some elements of post- 
Kantian western thought. ' When confronted with two opposing interpretations of a philo- 
sophical theory or system, one of which, after close scrutiny, makes considerable sense, and 
the other of which, after a comparable degree of attention, makes very little sense at all, it 
strikes me as being perfectly reasonable to take the sense-making interpretation more seriously 
than its rival. As the American philosopher W. V. 0. Quine once remarked: "The more absurd 
the doctrine attributed to someone, ceteris paribus, the less the likelihood that we have well 
construed his words" (1969: 304). 
This is the basis of my appeal to coherence: I submit that standard interpretations of 
Särnkhya and Yoga leave the philosophically-minded reader with a feeling of dissatisfaction 
and incomprehension. Not the sort of incomprehension one feels when reading the work of a 
great thinker whose ideas one is not yet ready to grasp fully; but, rather, the feeling that what 
one is reading is the product of a confused mind which has, in large part, failed to see its own 
confusedness. I do not wish to pretend that, on my interpretation, Säinkhya and Yoga emerge 
out of the shadows of confusion into a clear light of transparency. They would be peculiar 
philosophical systems indeed if everything they said fitted neatly into place in the manner of a 
jigsaw puzzle with no rough edges or missing pieces. I do not claim for my interpretation 
complete philosophical coherence; on the contrary, I think it contains some highly problematic 
elements, and I hope that I give due space to the discussion of these (they include, for exam- 
ple, the relation between "misperception" (avidyü) and "aloneness" (kaivalya), the apparent 
multiplicity of the self (purusa), and the concept of "pure consciousness", all of which I dis- 
cuss in Chapter 7). Rather, I put it forward as an interpretation that is enormously more coher- 
ent than its competitors, and which thus provides a context within which the outstanding diffi- 
culties can be more satisfactorily addressed, instead of being written off as merely additional 
unintelligible constituents of a fundamentally unintelligible whole. 
1I shall say a little more about the ways that I draw upon western philosophical themes and ideas in the 
"Methodological remarks" below. 
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Philosophical coherence is not, however, the sole pinion of my claim to have developed an 
improved interpretation; there is a second wing, which could be termed faithfulness to the 
texts themselves. Now, I have already touched upon the fancifulness of hoping to discern an 
authorial intention within the texts. I am extremely reticent about claiming that there is some- 
thing "true" or "correct" or "authentic" about my interpretation, since there seems to be no 
ultimate criterion that could serve to validate such a claim. And yet there is something about 
the process of engaging with a text-of immersing oneself in its language and phraseology, 
and of contemplating what it might possibly be alluding to-that leads one to gain a sense of 
having understood what it is that the text is pointing towards. As a conscientious reader of the 
text, this sense of understanding requires one to adopt an interpretation of the words that, at 
certain times, leans towards literality and, at others, towards metaphor and analogy. When I 
say, therefore, that I feel that my interpretation is "faithful", I do not mean that, in every in- 
stance, I have opted for the most literal explanation of a phrase or passage, though in some 
instances this is so. 2 Rather, I have attempted to get to grips with the meaning and purpose of 
the texts-to view what they say in the context of their overarching soteriological project, and 
to ask, in relation to each statement made within the texts, how this bears upon the system as a 
whole. There is, ultimately, no objective measure of the kind of faithfulness that I am talking 
about. It is up to each careful reader of the Sämkhya and Yoga texts, and of my interpretation 
of them, to discern whether the interpretation I present resonates with his or her own under- 
standing of the material. If it does not, I will be interested to hear why. 
SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 
Chapter 1 gives, as a useful and necessary background to the study as a whole, an historical 
overview of Sämkhya and Yoga. Tracing the genealogies of ideas in Indian philosophy is a 
task fraught with difficulties, and I do not claim to have made any great contribution to the 
accounts that currently exist. One of the main hazards, of course, is the virtual impossibility in 
most cases of providing any definitive chronology of texts and authors; and due to this fact a 
sizable amount of any historical account concerning Indian philosophy is bound to be based 
on guesswork. With regard to certain contentious matters, such as the question of whether the 
2 Examples of places where my interpretation could be regarded as more literal than the standard one in- 
clude my view that the five tanmätras-which are universally agreed to be sound, contact, form or visual im- 
age, flavour, and odour-are sense-contents and not "subtle" elementary particles or "material essences" that 
somehow transmute into physical atoms (see my discussion of the tanmätras and bhütas in Chapter 6). An 
example of where I take the text less literally is to be found in my view that the manifestations of prakrti do 
not represent a chain of ontological causation (as the relevant passages in the SK are usually taken to imply), 
but rather a chain of conditionality, with certain principles being necessary conditions, but not material bases, 
for the manifestation of others (again, this aspect of my thesis is dealt with most fully in Chapter 6). 
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Patafjali to whom the Yogasütra is traditionally attributed is identical to the Pataýijali who 
composed a famous commentary on Pänini's grammar, I have outlined and briefly evaluated 
the alternative opinions; but in many instances I have merely opted for what I take to be the 
most plausible version of events without going into any great detail regarding the evidence in 
favour and against. I hope the reader will agree that, for our present purposes, the chapter is 
long enough as it is, and any further information that is required can be looked for by follow- 
ing up the references provided. 
Chapter 2 endeavours primarily to clarify the nature of the relation between Sämkhya and 
Yoga in their classical forms. An indirect benefit of this endeavour is, however, that some of 
the major themes within the two systems, which were perhaps only mentioned in passing in 
the first chapter, are brought more to the fore. After giving a broad outline of the principal 
scholarly viewpoints on the issue, and noting which of them I consider to be the strongest, I 
then devote a significant proportion of the chapter to a critique of one particular viewpoint, 
namely that of Georg Feuerstein. Despite the controversial and provocative nature of Feuer- 
stein's position (according to which classical Sämkhya and Yoga are separated by a "chasm"), 
no attempt to directly counter this position has, to my knowledge, been made prior to my own. 
Having given due attention to the textual sources, and to the soteriological context that gave 
rise to them, I take the view-contrary to that of Feuerstein-that classical Sämkhya and 
Yoga, though not identical in all respects, are evidently manifestations or expressions of a 
common foundation of theory and practice. Far from rending the two systems apart, the differ- 
ent emphases that they exhibit provide us with complementary elements, which have a mutu- 
ally illuminating effect, and which can therefore be fruitfully examined within the same study. 
Chapter 3 moves away from the Indian systems themselves and takes a look at the crucial 
concept of "realism" as it occurs in western philosophy, along with its two most important 
antonyms, "antirealism" and "idealism". Upon looking into this area one is immediately con- 
fronted with a bewildering medley of philosophical positions and counterpositions, few of 
which appear to apply, or to have had applied to them, the terms we are concerned with in a 
wholly consistent manner. If the chapter can highlight the necessity of clearly defining what 
one means when speaking of realism and its rival concepts, then it will have served an impor- 
tant purpose. I hope that it can, however, also serve two further purposes. One of these is to 
furnish the necessary background for the claim that I make in Chapter 4, namely that the impu- 
tation of realism to Sämkhya and Yoga is thoroughly inappropriate. The other is to introduce 
some of the concepts associated with idealist philosophies, and especially the version of ideal- 
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ism proposed by Immanuel Kant, which will provide useful tools in Chapters 5 and 6 when I 
start to present my alternative interpretation. 
Chapter 4 discusses the issue of what is meant when-as routinely occurs in the secondary 
literature-Sarttkhya and Yoga are described as "realist", and then concludes, as has been 
noted above, that such a description is pernicious. The source of the imputation of realism 
seems to involve three factors. One of these has to be a large measure of ignorance and wrong- 
lheadedness on the part of interpreters concerning the nuances of meaning that pervade the 
philosophical terms they attempt to wield. The second is a lack of careful attention to the sorts 
of entities and relations that the primary texts are actually concerned with. The third is an 
overeagerness on the part of traditional (i. e. pre-modern) commentators to follow their own 
anti-idealist agendas at the expense of diligent textual exegesis, 3 and the willingness of certain 
modern interpreters to assume that these commentators got it right. When combined together 
these three factors generate what appears to be a persistent case for the realism of Sämkhya 
and Yoga. But via an analysis of the relevant claims, both traditional and modern, I show that, 
however persistent its proponents might be, the case itself is very crumbly indeed. 
Chapter 5 continues the task of questioning the standard interpretation of Sämkhya and 
Yoga, and focuses more sharply upon some of the key concepts surrounding the metaphysical 
principle of prakrti. I argue that the relation of manifestation should be prioritised over that of 
material causation with regard to prakrti and the principles that are said to "emerge" from it, 
and support this view with some suggestions concerning a re-interpretation of the so-called 
"doctrine of the pre-existent effect" (satkäryavdda). I further argue that the expression 
"material principle"-which, along with synonyms such as "primordial materiality", is stan- 
dardly applied to prakrti-is in fact inapplicable to either prakrti's manifest or its unmanifest 
aspect, and that it is equally inapplicable to the three "strands" (gunas) which constitute the 
nature of prakrti. While acknowledging the considerable difficulties associated with any at- 
tempt to arrive at a fully coherent interpretation of the gunas, I propose that "necessary condi- 
tions of manifestation" is about as close as we can get. 
Chapter 6 builds upon the critique of the realist interpretation that has been developed in 
preceding chapters and offers a non-realist account of the principles of manifest prakrti. Ac- 
cording to this new account the principles are no longer taken to be more or less "subtle" and 
"gross" material entities in a cosmogonic or "evolutionary" chain of causal transformations. 
Instead they are viewed in synchronic terms as constituents of a transcendental analysis of the 
conditions of experience, which I sometimes refer to as a "transcendental phenomenological 
3 The commentaries of Vyasa and Väcaspatimigra on the ) ogasütra are most pertinent in this respect. 
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analysis". Such terminology, derived largely from Kant and to a lesser extent from Edmund 
Husserl (in his "transcendental" phase), is not intended to imply a direct correspondence be- 
tween the schema of Sämkhya and Yoga and that arrived at by the western philosophers con- 
cerned. Nor is it meant to suggest that the methodology of the Indian systems is equivalent to 
those of Kantian critical philosophy or Ilusserlian phenomenological reduction. I have chosen 
such terminology, rather, to emphasise the fact that, as in the cases of Kant and Ilusserl (and 
other philosophers who have been influenced by Kantian thought), SAmkhya and Yoga are 
engaged in an exploration of the necessary preconditions of experience, and that, although 
their methodological procedures are not made explicit in the classical texts, these must have 
involved some element of transcendental analysis. By "transcendental analysis" I mean, es- 
sentially, breaking down experience into its component parts in order to formulate an inven- 
tory of the constituents of experience in general. In the light of this re-interpretation I examine 
a number of important textual passages, and find that a far more coherent picture of the rela- 
tions between the various principles of manifestation emerges. And, perhaps most important 
of all, it becomes possible to see how the metaphysical schema of Sämkhya and Yoga relates 
to the practice of sustained introspective meditation that forms the basis of these systems' so- 
teriological enterprise. 
Chapter 7 examines the notion that stands as the very goal and crowning glory of the 
Sämkhya and Yoga darganas, namely kaivalya, the "aloneness" of the self or consciousness. 
Interpretations based upon the assumption of the darganas' realism come up against intractable 
obstacles when they attempt to give an account of kaivalya. This is because the relevant tex- 
tual descriptions invariably refer to the discontinuation of all manifest forms and mental ac- 
tivities, and yet maintain that the achieved result constitutes the highest possible kind of 
knowledge; this latter point indicating that kaivalya cannot be a mere shutting of one's spiri- 
tual eyes to an external world that continues to exist in one's absence. I show that, first, none 
of the various realist approaches to resolving the difficulty has been successful, and second, 
despite the persistence of certain anomalies, the overall non-realist approach that I am advanc- 
ing best enables us to take seriously a central claim in the primary texts; this claim being that, 
in relation to the one whose experiences have dwindled to nothing, the manifest world disap- 
pears. Realist accounts cannot explain this disappearance, whereas on my interpretation it is 
explicable by virtue of the fact that experiences are what constitute the manifest world. To 
complete the chapter I propose that, notwithstanding some considerable problems associated 
with the concept of a pure and contentless consciousness, this concept nevertheless retains the 
closest correspondence with the notion of kaivalya of any that is available to us. 
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METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS 
My approach to this enquiry combines four methodological strands, which are as follows. 
(1) First and foremost is a close and careful analysis of the primary textual material, which 
comprises the Samkhyakdrikü and the Yogasütra, traditionally ascribed to I§varakrsna and 
Pataiijali respectively. Although existing English translations of these texts have been useful, I 
have not relied solely upon these. It is only by studying the texts in their original language that 
one can come closest to an appreciation of their poetry as well as their many profound in- 
sights, and to this end I have scrutinised a number of Sanskrit editions of each of the primary 
texts. (Unless otherwise stated, all quotations from Sanskrit texts are my own. ) 
It should also be noted that, at the same time as enhancing one's appreciation of certain as- 
pects of a work, a greater familiarity with it in its original language can dampen the exagger- 
ated awe and respect with which a highly esteemed work of philosophy is often approached. 
Having heard, perhaps, that a text is the work of a single author, and expresses the condensed 
wisdom gleaned from that author's flashes of gnostic inspiration, it can come as a sobering 
surprise to discern signs of, for example, multiple authorship and a somewhat cut-and-paste 
style of composition. Such signs are especially prevalent in the Yogasütra, although I should 
point out that I do not see it as part of the purpose of this study to enter into these composi- 
tional issues in any depth. For the most part, I treat both the Sümkhyakürikü and the Yogasütra 
as textual wholes rather than as more or less loose collections of disparate passages. 
(2) The second strand of my approach is a consideration of secondary sources, under which 
category I include (a) traditional Sanskrit commentaries, (b) pre- and post-classical versions of 
the systems concerned, and (c) more recent interpretive works by scholars from India and 
elsewhere. I have not attempted to be fully comprehensive in my treatment of any of these 
categories, but have, rather, used the texts selectively-though, in my view, fairly and repre- 
sentatively-in order to illustrate particular points that I wish to make with regard to the pri- 
mary sources. 
In contrast to the convention among some scholars, I do not include any of the traditional 
commentaries under the term "classical", but save this designation for the Sümkhyakarikü and 
Yogasütra alone. It strikes me that, since the expressions "classical Sämkhya" and "classical 
Yoga" are generally used to denote particular bodies of doctrine and not merely historical pe- 
riods in the development of these bodies of doctrine, a great deal of confusion can be avoided 
by restricting the application of such expressions in the way that I have done. As soon as we 
allow "classical" to encompass any or all of the known commentaries, it then becomes impos- 
sible to speak of "the viewpoint of classical Sämkhya (or Yoga), " since one would have to 
8 
Introduction 
acknowledge the various and sometimes conflicting viewpoints of the different commentaries, 
certain of which have traditionally been accredited with more authority than others. There is, 
of course, no pure "classical viewpoint" that can shine forth independently of our own inter- 
pretive filters, and the necessity of interpretation also applies to the commentaries themselves. 
If, therefore, one were to perform a rigorous evaluation of the commentarial arguments on 
every point one could easily end up going round in circles without ever reaching the nub of the 
matter. I have endeavoured, therefore, to follow a balanced approach, which neither ignores 
the commentaries nor gets overly embroiled in their internal and polemical wranglings. 
The commentaries that I have consulted are all included in the Bibliography (under 
"Primary Sources", since they are invariably published alongside the primary texts). Of these, 
the ones that I have found most useful, and to which I refer most often herein, are (on the 
Samkhyakdrikd) Gaudapäda's bhüsya and Väcaspatimigra's Tattvakaurrrudt, and (on the 
Yogasütra) Vyäsa's Yogabhäsya and Väcaspatimigra's Tattº'ativaifdradi (which is, strictly 
speaking, a subcommentary on the Yogabhäsya). 
Other than in the historical overview in Chapter 1I make relatively few references to pre- 
and post-classical formulations of Särikhya and Yoga. (There is quite enough to be getting on 
with in the classical texts! ) At certain places I find it useful to mention specific passages from 
the Sämkhyasütra (which is generally agreed to be later than the Sümkhyakürikd) and its 
commentaries (e. g. in the section on the gunas in Chapter 5); but on the whole I limit the dis- 
cussion to the classical material. 
As a background to the enquiry I have familiarised myself with the scholarly literature on 
Sämkhya and Yoga that has been written in or translated into English, from Henry Colebrooke 
and Horace Wilson (1837) onwards, and selective references to this literature will be found 
throughout the present work. The existing interpretations that have been of particular value 
during the course of my research-though I have to admit that only in a very few cases is this 
due to my agreeing with them-are those presented by Surendranath Dasgupta (1922,1924), 
John Davies (1894), Mircea Eliade (1969), Georg Feuerstein (1979a, 1980), Jajneswar Ghosh 
(1977), Gerald Larson (1979,1987), Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1927 u), and Ian Whicher 
(1998). I regard none of these interpretive efforts as completely satisfactory, and thus many of 
my references to them contain a critical element. 
Of the scholars just mentioned, Ghosh is the one whose understanding of Sämkhya and 
Yoga comes closest to my own, but even in his case much of his published work on the sub- 
ject remains within the strictures dictated by the realist assumption. It is principally in the in- 
troduction that he wrote for a book by his guru, Swami Hariharänanda Aranya (first published 
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in 1936, then reissued by Motilal Banarsidass in 1977), that Ghosh begins to develop a more 
convincing articulation of the Särnkhya philosophy. At one place he calls this articulation 
"objective idealism, " and speaks of Sämkhya's world being "the world of experience, as it 
knows nothing of any world or system of objects and events existing in independence of con- 
sciousness" (1977: 3). Due, at least in part, to the necessary brevity of an introductory essay, 
however, Ghosh does not adequately flesh out the pertinent insights that he makes, and seems 
to have nowhere provided a fuller exposition of this viewpoint. Furthermore, the essay has 
been passed over in silence by most subsequent scholars, who appear to have gravitated back 
to a thoroughly realist interpretation. 
A further exception to the general trend is Braj M. Sinha, who has made a comparative 
study of Sämkhya-Yoga and Abhidharma Buddhism with regard to their respective views of 
time. He, like myself, is highly critical of the interpretation of prakrti's sarga ("surge", 
"creation", "manifestation") that takes it to be a process of cosmological evolution; and he, 
again like myself, refers to Sämkhya and Yoga metaphysics as "primarily an attempt at a tran- 
scendental analysis of the facts of human experience" (1983: 17). Despite this highly promis- 
ing statement, however, Sinha continues to refer to Sämkhya-Yoga as a "realistic philosophy" 
(p. 46), without specifying what he means by this, and-due to the constraints of his study's 
parameters-he does not even begin to provide a full exposition of the "transcendental analy- 
sis" he has mentioned. The present study is in part an attempt to rectify this deficiency. 
(3) The third strand of my approach relates to my background in western philosophy. 
While taking care not to try to force uniquely Indian doctrines and models into the conceptual 
moulds of a foreign tradition, I have at several places found certain terms and concepts de- 
rived from western thought to be particularly helpful for drawing out the meanings of the 
Sämkhya and Yoga material. Since I am writing in English for an English-speaking reader- 
ship, and since I cannot extract myself from my European cultural heritage, there is a degree 
of inevitability attached to my using western philosophical tools; but this inevitability does not 
extend to the particular way in which I interpret the Indian systems. This is shown by the fact 
that among the targets of my criticisms of many existing interpretations is what I regard as 
their misapplication of western concepts to Sämkhya and Yoga, including especially such 
concepts as realism and materiality. 
It is in Chapter 3 that western philosophical concerns come most noticeably to the fore, but 
it has been my intention to weave such concerns into the study wherever they can serve use- 
fully to illuminate our understanding of the Indian material. The voice of Kant interjects at 
several places, as does that of Schopenhauer (albeit mainly in footnotes). This is hardly sur- 
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prising, since the study as a whole draws significantly upon Kantian ideas, and Schopenhauer 
represents a confluence of Kant's philosophy and Indian soteriological thought. ' Phenome- 
nology is mentioned at certain places, notably in Chapters 6,7, and 8. Had space permitted, a 
more thorough discussion of Ilusserlian phenomenology-especially in its later 
"transcendental idealist" phase-might have provided a beneficial addition to the study. I 
hope, however, that the remarks that I do make on this theme, though relatively few, are suf- 
ficient to indicate where I consider the points of similarity and difference with Sämkhya and 
Yoga to lie. 
(4) The fourth of my methodological strands could be referred to as "intrapsychic field- 
work". By this I mean practical training in the methods of yoga, including a comprehensive 
range of postural, breathing and meditative techniques, which are geared towards the intro- 
spective realisation of the kinds of mental states described in Sdrpkhya and Yoga philosophy. 
Although teachers of yoga may disagree over the precise methods that are best suited to 
achieve the desired result, there is little disagreement about the fact that, for most students, 
significant results are not easily obtained. "Practice (abhydsa) is the effort [required to gain] 
stability, " says the Yogasütra (1.13). "It becomes firmly embedded [or consolidated (bhümi)] 
when cultivated diligently for an extended period without interruption" (1.14). I would not, 
therefore, claim to be anything more than a novice with regard to soteriological accomplish- 
ment in the discipline of yoga. I have, however, made two trips to India and Nepal amounting 
to a total of fourteen months, during which time I was able to undergo training with a number 
of eminent yoga teachers (as well as some less eminent ones! ). 5 This was sufficient to give me 
some grasp of what yoga sädhana6 comprises, and of the psychological and physiological ef- 
fects it can engender. 
An intimate acquaintance with the practical procedures of yoga is, in my view, an invalu- 
able part of developing an understanding of the systems of Sämkhya and Yoga. These systems 
are, after all, primarily soteriological and only secondarily philosophical or metaphysical. It 
would therefore be untenable to imagine that one could comprehend the philosophy in the ab- 
4"[I]n Kant and Schopenhauer the mainstream of Western philosophy threw up conclusions about the 
nature of reality which are strikingly similar to some of those propounded by the more mystically oriented 
religions or philosophies of the East, yet arrived at by an entirely different path" (Magee 1983: 316). 
My two trips were made, respectively, between July 1993 and February 1994, and September 1999 and 
April 2000. The more "eminent" of the teachers I trained with (though not necessarily well-known in the 
West) include the following: Ram Krishna Das at Pafiupatinath mandir, near Kathmandu (he is also known as 
Dhudhädhäri Bäbä, "milk-drinking holyman", due to the vow that 
he took over twenty years ago to consume a 
diet consisting entirely of cows' milk); Diwakar Sharma (Rishikesh); Kailasnäth (Rishikesh); Jehangir Palk- 
hivala (Mumbai); E. R. Gopalakrishnan (Adyar, Chennai); Yogacharya V. Venkatesha (Mysore); and Neeraj 
Goel at the Kaivalyadhama Yoga Institute in Lonavla (near Pune). 
6Südhana (from'sadh, "to aim towards a goal"): "that which leads to the goal, " i. e. a "path" or regime of 
practice. 
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sence of any familiarity with the soteriological practice. 7 I should make it clear that I am not 
claiming to possess any superior access to the underlying truths of Sämkhya and Yoga by 
means of contemplative insight. I do, however, regard my experience of the discipline of yoga 
as having enhanced my appreciation of the ways in which the theory and practice of the two 
systems cohere and interrelate. 
There is a fifth element in my interpretive approach, but, rather than being a distinct strand 
in itself, it is really the wax that adheres to and maintains the integrity of the four strands al- 
ready mentioned. This fifth element is imagination. I have, to some extent, followed the advice 
that K. C. Bhattacharyya offers in the preface to his "Studies in Särhkhya Philosophy", which 
is that the interpretation of Sämkhya (and, presumably, of Yoga as well) "demands imagina- 
tive-introspective effort at every stage on the part of the interpreter" (1956 t: 127). This de- 
mand does not give the interpreter a license to attribute all manner of fantastic doctrines to the 
classical darganas; rather, it recognises the necessary contribution that imaginative speculation 
must make to an interpretive project if that project is not to be constrained by, but is to venture 
beyond, the limits of existing interpretations. 
7Frits Staal has convincingly argued this point in relation to mystical traditions more broadly (1975: 123 
ff. ). He says, for example, that, "if mysticism is to be studied seriously, it should not merely be studied indi- 
rectly and from without, but also directly and from within" (p. 123). 
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T IME (KALA) is regarded in Indian mythology as the great producer and the great destroyer. 
It consumes everything that it has previously manifested. ' In the case of the histories of 
Sämkhya and Yoga, time has certainly eaten up the source materials that would be required to 
arrive at anything remotely resembling a clear picture of the development of these philosophi- 
cal systems. Yet, despite the paucity of information, there is no option of ignoring the histori- 
cal dimension entirely, for an appreciation of the meaning of any system of Indian philosophy 
entails and demands at least some attempt to comprehend its broader context. Sonne attempt is 
all that can be expected, for the evidence that is available to us amounts to little more than a 
patchwork quilt, with many more holes than patches. 
Several studies exist on the histories of Sämkhya and Yoga, some of which constitute por- 
tions of works that set out to cover Indian philosophy in its entirety, 2 and others of which are 
more singularly focussed upon either Särpkhya or Yoga, or both of these together. 3 I am in- 
cluding here merely a single chapter, in which I shall endeavour to outline the historical in- 
formation that is available to us. This will, of necessity, be a selective summary, but refer- 
ences to more detailed and comprehensive studies will be included both in footnotes and in the 
main text. In this chapter 1 shall stay fairly close to what has become a somewhat standardised 
method of approaching the history of Indian philosophies, which is to focus almost exclu- 
sively upon textual sources, beginning with the major Upanisads and moving steadily forward 
in an approximate chronological sequence. Reflecting the fact that we are interested primarily 
in how the so-called classical formulations of Sämkhya and Yoga fit into a broader context, 
the chapter's three main sections deal with (a) early (i. e. "preclassical") sources, (b) the clas- 
sical texts themselves, along with their respective commentaries, and (c) developments that 
have occurred subsequent to the classical period. In certain places, especially in the second 
section, the chapter will read like little more than a list of texts accompanied by brief specula- 
tions concerning their respective authors and dates. However philosophically uninteresting 
"'There is nothing here in this universe which all-voracious time does not devour, like the submarine fire 
[swallows] the overflowing ocean" (Yogavusisrha 1.23.4, trans. Feuerstein 1974: 49). "Käla pours forth be- 
ings; Kala destroys creatures; everything is subject to Käla, but Kala is subject to no one" (Kirrmapurana 
1.11, trans. Dimmitt and van Buitenen 1978: 230). "Time is surely the conqueror whom no one escapes" 
(Mlahübhürara 6.15.56, trans. van Buitenen 1981: 43). 
2These include: Dasgupta 1922, ch. 7; Frauwallner 1973 1, ch. 6; and Radhakrishnan 1927 n, chs 4 and 5. 
3 e. g. Keith 1949; Johnston 1937; Chakravarti 1975. 
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such lists might appear, they are nevertheless necessary for positioning the classical material 
within a longer trajectory. They will also provide useful reference points for occasions when 
particular texts and authors are mentioned in later chapters. 
The historical theme, incidentally, spills over into Chapter 2, for there I include some re- 
marks on how views of the relation between the Sämkhya and Yoga systems are affected by 
theories of their historical development. I shall also there express an opinion on what I con- 
sider to be the most plausible scenario for the emergence of classical Sämkhya and Yoga. 
EARLY SOURCES 
Särikhya is commonly held to be the oldest of the major systems of Indian philosophy., It is 
not always clear, however, what is meant when this claim is made. It is generally admitted that 
what has come to be known as the classical formulation of Säipkhya, presented in the 
Sän: khyak«rikü of Igvarakrsna, is by no means the earliest or original version of the system; it 
was preceded by, and probably existed contemporaneously with, innumerable other versions, 
all of which bore some family resemblance to one another without, apparently, adhering to a 
precisely stipulated set of doctrines. When the claim of unrivalled antiquity is made, therefore, 
it is rarely meant that Isvarakrsna's Sämkhya is the oldest system of Indian philosophy., it is, 
rather, something far vaguer than that. What is usually meant, I suspect, is that the loose ge- 
nealogical network of "Särnkhya" teachings (including the pre-systematic ragbag of "proto- 
Särpkhya" ideas) can be traced further back into the ancient textual sources-and more par- 
ticularly into the major Upanisads-than can any of the other systems of Indian philosophy. 
The claim is, therefore, highly dubious, for there is no clear evidence that a cohesive Sämkhya 
system existed earlier than other systems. Indeed, there is no definitive evidence to show that 
such a system pre-existed the foundation of Buddhism sometime during the fourth or fifth 
century BCE, or Jainism around the same time. And Vedäntins, irrespective of the particular 
sub-school they belong to, would argue that the Upanisads themselves present a coherent body 
of teachings, which contains Sämkhya elements in places but which subsumes and eclipses 
Sämkhya as a philosophical system. That Sämkhya is the oldest system of Indian philosophy 
cannot, then, be taken as self-evident; it is, rather, a hypothesis, albeit one that tends to be 
4 "Of the different systems of philosophical thought that evolved in ancient India, the Sämkhya is perhaps 
the most important and the oldest one" (Mainkar 1972: 1). "The Sämkhya-Yoga philosophy is perhaps the 
oldest philosophical thought and discipline that has come down to us as a sacred heritage. There may be dif- 
ferences of opinion among scholars regarding the source of the Sämkhya-Yoga philosophy but its antiquity is 
never disputed" (Sen Gupta 1982: ix). 
'An exception is John Davies, who considers the SK itself to be "the first recorded system of philosophy" 
(1894: 101). 
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treated as a proven fact by those who are particularly sympathetic to the claims of Särpkhya's 
advocates. 
In any case, whether some version of Sämkhya is or is not the oldest system of Indian phi- 
losophy, the task of tracing its origins-along with those of its sibling darSana, Yoga-has 
been fruitfully undertaken by a number of researchers. The considerable difficulties involved 
in connecting ideas expressed in different contexts, possibly separated by hundreds of years, 
along with the ubiquitous uncertainties of ancient Indian chronology, have not prevented a 
fairly broad agreement from emerging on the issue of the formation of Sämkhya and Yoga. 
The story of their formation is sometimes presented using a metaphor of gestation or on- 
togeny, according to which the two systems-or, at least, some rudimentary notions that were 
later to be associated with those systems-were conceived alongside a range of competing 
ideas and speculations sometime around the period of the earliest Upanisads. If a date is to be 
put on this period, then it is usually held to be circa 900-600 ßcE, although such dates should 
be understood to be very approximate indeed. 6 Over the course of the early prose 
Upanisads-such as the Chündogyya, Brhaddranyaka, Aitareyya, and Kausitaki-the gestation 
model has it that a number of proto-Sämkliya and proto-Yoga (or "proto-Sämkhya-Yoga") 
ideas continued their development until, in the metrical Upanisads, most notably the Katha 
and SvetäIvatara (both circa 500-200 BcE), they "emerged from the womb" as relatively dis- 
cernable viewpoints. ' 
Typical examples of "proto-Sämkhya" ideas in the earliest Upanisads include the follow- 
ing. Chünd. Up 6.4 speaks of fire, sun, moon, and lightning as all comprising three "forms" 
(riipas)-namely, "light" or "heat" (tejas), which is identified with the colour red; "water" 
(ap), identified with white; and "earth" or "food" (anna), identified with black or the "dark" 
(krsna). These three qualities and their corresponding colours, which are also mentioned in 
Svet. Up 4.5, are clearly evocative of the three "strands" (gu{ias) that are so fundamental to the 
Sämkhya philosophy (see Chapter 5 below). It is also in the Cl nd. Up (7.25.1) that we find 
the earliest use of the term ahamkära. The verse is of considerable interest, suggesting, as it 
does, a conformity or equivalence between the world and the personal ego: "so now the doc- 
trine of the ahamkära: `I am in the nadir, in the zenith, in the West, in the East, in the South, 
in the North, I am all that is here"' (trans. van Buitenen 1957a: 19). Van Buitenen has plausi- 
6The dating of the Upanisads has become bound up with the whole "Aryan invasion" imbroglio, and is 
thus an area of intense academic and political controversy (which I will do my best to avoid here! ). Those 
who deny that the Vedas were composed by a people who had entered India from the north sometime around 
1500 BCE tend to suggest that the first Upanisads are earlier than 900 BCE. See e. g. Feuerstein et al. (1995: 96): 
"The Aranyakas and the Upanishads, by [our] reckoning, should belong to the second millennium B. C. " 
'Chakravarti uses precisely this metaphor (1975: 34). 
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bly postulated a continuity between the act of creation, as depicted in the Chünd. Up (ch. 6) 
and the 13rhacf Up (esp. 1.2.1 and 1.4.1-3), and the concept of aharpkära as it occurs in classi- 
cal Sämkhya: in both cases there is an affirmation-or "formulation", as van Buitenen puts 
it-of oneself as "I" (ahani), which affirmation is also the moment of the world's coming into 
manifestation (1957a esp. pp. 19-21). 
Among the many precursors of later Särrtkhya and Yoga in the Kath. Up is its well-known 
account of the stages through which one passes on the way to the "highest goal": 
Beyond the sense-capacities (indriyas) are their objects (arthas), and beyond these objects is the 
[synthesising] mind (manas); beyond the [synthesising] mind is discernment (buddhi), and be- 
yond discernment is the great self (ütmümahän). Beyond the great self is the unmanifest 
(avyakta); beyond the unmanifest is self (purura). Beyond self there is nothing. That is the desti- 
nation; that is the highest goal (parügati). (1.3.10-11)8 
While the schema of principles presented in these verses, and also a slightly variant schema 
that appears later in the same Upanisad (Kath. Up II. 3.7-8), 9 are clearly not identical with that 
of classical Sarpkhya, their similarities can hardly be ignored. The passages portray a pro- 
gressive transformation of self-identity, leading ultimately to the disclosure of purusa, which 
is of course the explicit goal of Särnkhya and Yoga. That the method used to arrive at such a 
self-revelation is one of sustained introspective meditation is indicated at other points in the 
text. Kath. Up 1.3.13, for example, speaks of restraining speech (vac) and mind (manas), etc., 
"in the tranquil self (Onta-ütman)", while at II. 3.10-11 the "highest state" (paramürn gati) is 
said to be instantiated upon the cessation of sensory and intellectual activity, and the "steady 
holding (dhäranü) of sensations" is explicitly referred to as yoga. 10 
The Svet. Up (6.13) is where we find the first known mention of sdmkhya and yoga to- 
gether. These are said to be mutually important aspects for "knowing the divine (deva)" and 
thereby gaining "release from all fetters" (cf. 1.8), although it is not explicitly stated what the 
two aspects consist in. It is possible that the use of the terms here is similar to that in the third 
chapter of the Bhagavadgitü, where sämkhya is associated with revelatory knowledge (jnäna) 
and renunciation, and yoga is associated with action (karman). The optimum method, as pre- 
sented in the Gftü, is to combine the two aspects by engaging in actions while maintaining an 
attitude of renunciation and non-attachment to the fruits of those actions (3.3-8). Whatever 
8 My translation of the Sanskrit text as given in Radhakrishnan 1978: 625. The Sanskrit text itself reads: 
indriyebhyah parü by arthü arthebhyaf ca param nianah / manasa. s ca pard buddhir buddher alma mahan 
parali 11 mahata?: param avyaktam avyakiat purusah paralh / purusýin na param kinncit sa kastha sc7 parü 
gaiih 11 
4"Beyond sense-capacities is the [synthesising) mind, " etc. 
1°Compare the following statements from the YS: "Yoga is the cessation of mental activities" (YS 1.2); 
"Concentration (dharana) is the binding of the mind (cilia) to a [single) place" (YS 2.1). 
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might be the intended meaning of sümkhya and yoga in the S°vet. Up, the Upanisad's emphasis 
is firmly upon the acquisition of revelatory knowledge, that being knowledge of the "lord" 
(isa, Kara) or "deity" (deva). In certain places this lord is described in a similar manner to the 
purusa of classical Sämkhya, as, for example, "witnessing (süksin), consciousness (cetas), 
solitary (kevala), and without strands (nirgu za, i. e. devoid of any features characteristic of 
phenomenal reality)" (Svet. Up 6.11). Elsewhere, however, the impression is given of the 
lord's performing a more active, controlling role in the world: phenomenal reality (prakrti) is 
his "magic power" or "conjured image" (müyü) (4.10); it is due to his greatness that the 
"wheel of brahman" turns (6.1); and it is he who, "like a spider, covers himself with threads 
from pradhäna" (6.10). Throughout the Svet. Up, the lord is treated far more as a focus for 
reverence and devotion than is purusa in classical Särpkhya, and in this respect it is ostensibly 
far closer to the Mara of classical Yoga. ' 1 
Other points in the Svet. Up that are worth drawing attention to here include the following. 
The name "Kapila" appears at 5.2, and can be identified with the hira, iya-garbha (the "golden 
seed") of 4.12 due to a similarity of symbolism and phraseology between the two verses. In 
both verses, the supreme ruling deity is said to behold a first-born, in the one case named as 
Hiranyagarbha and in the other as Kapila. Although nothing further is said about this person 
or entity in the Upanisad, both names are significant in the traditions of Särnkhya and Yoga, 
Kapila being the legendary originator of the Sämkhya teachings and Hiranyagarbha being the 
initial preceptor of Yoga (according, at least, to certain sources, such as the Ahirbudhnya- 
samhitü-see below). Several verses later (Svet. Up 5.7) we encounter the first known use of 
the conjunct expression triguna ("three strands"), which occurs here as part of a description of 
the individuated person, who is tied to the world of experience and action. The three gunas are 
not separately characterised, but there is no reason to think that it is anything other than the 
well-known Sär khya doctrine that is making an appearance here. 
Concise enumerations of principles, that seem to prefigure the Sämkhya schematic, are also 
present in the Svet. Up. At one place (1.4) an analogy of the parts of a wheel is used, in which 
the wheel is said to have a single circumference, three tyres, sixteen ends, fifty spokes, twenty 
counter-spokes, and so on. Although it is not self-evident what each of these parts is intended 
to represent, several interpreters have offered compatible explanations that relate each of them 
to a particular Sämkhya principle. 12 The following verse (Svet. Up 1.5) employs the analogy of 
flowing water to outline other principles, this time in groups of five: the water has five streams 
""The lord (tsvara) is a special self (purusa-vifqa)" (IS 1.24); "By applying oneself to the lord (Thara- 
pranfdhüna), oneness (samädhi) is attained" ()52.45). 
12 See e. g. Chakravarti 1975: 19-22; Radhakrishnan 1978: 711-12; Johnston 1930: 855 ff. 
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from five sources; its waves are the five "breaths" (prdnas), the "root" of which is the 
"fivefold determination" (pahca-buddhyddi); there are five currents and a formidable flood of 
five "distresses" (duhkhas), which can be further divided into fifty. Again, considerable scope 
for interpretation is left here, but there are clear resonances with, for example, the fifty divi- 
sions of the "phenomenal emergence" (pratyaya-sarga) referred to at Sümkhyakarikü 46. 
Sämkhya and Yoga may, then, have "emerged from the womb" in the Kath. - and Svet. Up, 
but they had not yet, according to the ontogenic model we are working with, matured into dis- 
tinctive and internally coherent systems of philosophy. They were still interfused with other 
pre-philosophical, or theological, elements, which tend to be somewhat loosely referred to by 
interpreters as "Vedäntic". In the present context this latter term refers not to the Upanisads 
themselves but to certain later attempts to systematise the teachings thereof, and especially to 
the attempt made by ýankardcärya, which has become known as the most prominent version of 
"nondualist" (advaila) Vedanta. In any event, the admixture of viewpoints that were later to be 
distinguished as belonging to Sämkhya and Yoga on the one hand, and monistically-oriented 
versions of Vedanta on the other, continues to occur in later prose Upanisads, such as the 
Pras`na and Maiträyaniya (ca. 400-200 BCE), 13 as well as in other texts from similar or 
slightly later periods. 
The Praf Up (4.8) includes a comprehensive list of principles, which tallies very closely 
with that of the manifestations of prakrti in classical Sämkhya. It differs on a few points, such 
as its changing the order of buddhi and ahamkära, and adding three extra principles, namely 
citta (mind, or an aspect thereof), tejas (fire, light, or heat), and präna (vital breath), but in 
other respects it matches well. 
Of all the major Upanisads, the Maitrüyantya (a. k. a. Maitri) displays the greatest affinity 
with the ideas of classical Sämkhya and Yoga. The text relies heavily upon quotations from 
earlier Upanisads and from other sources, and lacks a consistent approach of its own; but 
where it deals with metaphysical and methodological matters the similarity with classical 
Sämkhya and Yoga is often very striking. The self (purusa) is identified with consciousness 
(cetas), 14 and is described as the "enjoyer of food [supplied by] prakrti" (Maitr. Up 6.10). 'S 
Prakrti is said to comprise the "three strands" (triguna) and to exist in both a manifest and an 
unmanifest state (ibid. ). The instructions on yoga practice, and the descriptions of intrapsychic 
experience engendered thereby, are at least as explicit in the Maitr. Up as anywhere else in 
13 Though decidedly not in the Mandakya-upanisad, which is usually similarly dated. 
1° Cf. SK 55: "[... ] cetanah purusah [... ]". 
15 Cf. SK 37: "[... ] buddhi brings about the enjoyment of purusa [... ]"; YS 2.18: "The seen (drfya), being 
of the character of illumination, activity and stability [... ] is for the sake of enjoyment and liberation. " 
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Indian literature. In certain respects they foreshadow elements of the classical system; for ex- 
ample, the Maitr. Up's "six-limbed" (, cadafiga) system of practice resembles the last five limbs 
of the classical "eight-limbed" (astariga) system (YS 2.29 ff). In other ways, they are closer to 
the instructions in hatha-yoga treatises of the Tantric era, especially in passages such as 
6.21-22, where the technique of concentrating vital energy (prüna) in the "gracious channel" 
(susumurä-nüdi) is described along with the various sounds that are heard internally as energy 
ascends through that channel. 16 
Textual sources other than the Upanisads that anticipate themes and concepts of classical 
Sämkhya and Yoga include certain portions of India's immense wealth of legendary and epic 
literature, most notably the Afoksadharma and Bhagavadgtlü sections of the Afahabhürata, but 
also passages in several Purä9as. '7 These works, which are often encyclopaedic in scope, tend 
to be philosophically promiscuous in the sense that, as A. B. Keith notes with regard to the 
Afahäbhärata, they frequently present various and incompatible viewpoints "in immediate 
proximity to one another without any apparent sense of their incongruity" (1949: 36). The 
relevant passages in these works are too numerous to receive a comprehensive treatment here, 
and I must therefore refer the interested reader to more detailed studies that already exist on 
the subject. " I shall restrict my comments here to a couple of fairly general observations. 
The first concerns something that has already been mentioned in relation to the pre- 
classical material as a whole, which is that there tends not to be a clear and consistent distinc- 
tion in the epic and Pauränic literature between the "Sämkhyan" and "Vedäntic" doctrines. 
There is, in particular, a considerable degree of ambiguity attached to the important term 
brahman; which ambiguity is, again, not unique to this branch of Indian literature, but is par- 
ticularly noticeable therein. Brahman is conspicuous by its absence in the Sämkhyakürikd and 
Yogasütra, although it occurs in several commentaries (sometimes-surprisingly and implau- 
sibly-among the synonyms of prakrti, 19 and sometimes in other contexts20 ). In the preclassi- 
cal versions of Sämkhya and Yoga, however, brahman features prominently as a supreme 
metaphysical principle . 
21 This might spur us to question whether they can be counted as ver- 
16 Cf. Ha rhayogapradpika 4.69 if. 
"e. g. Karma-, bfürkandeya-, A'dradr), a-, Padma-, Skanda-, 6 dyu-, and Visnu-purana (see e. g. Dasgupta 
1940: 496-511). Because the dates of the Puränas are uncertain, it is in many cases impossible to say whether 
the references to Sämkhya and Yoga contained in them should be regarded as "pre-" or "post-classical". 
"These include: Chakravarti 1975: 42-64; Keith 1949, ch. 3; Johnston 1937: passim; Edgerton 1944 11, 
ch. 8. 
"See e. g. Gaudapäda, Mäthara, and Paramärtha on SK 22. 
20 Under SK 1, Machara describes Sämkhya as "presenting the knowledge of brahman", thereby implying 
that brahman is identical to the self (purusa). As if the interpretive situation were not already complicated 
enough, the Yuklidipika (on karikä 22) treats brahman synonymously with mahal-and Uvara! 
21 See e. g. MBh X11.218.14, in which, as Chakravarti notes (1975: 26), "Asuri in the assembly of the fol- 
lowers of Kapila is found to explain brahman, who is one and immutable and seen in diverse forms. " 
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sions of Sämkhya and Yoga at all; or alternatively, as at least one provocative writer has done, 
we might wonder whether it is not these earlier texts that represent the authentic doctrine, and 
the so-called classical systems that are out of step. 22 However, as I have noted already in this 
chapter, we are talking here about sets of ideas with certain shared family resemblances (to 
borrow the analogy used in an entirely different context by Wittgenstein (2001 [1953]: §67)), 
not about identical systems of thought, nor even about variant systems of thought with a 
shared "essence" or "core". It remains legitimate to speak of "epic Sämkhyas" and "Pauränic 
Särnkhyas" due to such sets' appearing to be drawn from a common gene pool (albeit one that 
may have been "infected", as it were, by foreign ideas). 
The other observation that I wanted to make on the subject of the epic and Pauränic mate- 
rial is that, while sümkhya and yoga often occur together (thereby indicating an intimate asso- 
ciation between the two), where this is the case the meaning of these terms seems to bear little 
direct relation to the systems of philosophy with which we are chiefly concerned. One in- 
stance of this from the Gila has already been mentioned in the discussion of the Svet. Up 
above. A second instance occurs, again in the GTtä (ch. 5), where the "blessed lord" (sri bha- 
gavän) says to Arjuna: 
Fools (bäläli) proclaim that sämkhya and yoga are separate, not the learned (panditüh). 
Diligently abiding in one of them alone, the fruit of both is won. (5.4) 
The station reached by adherents of sämkhya, that too is reached by adherents of yoga. 
He who sees that sämkhya and yoga are one, he [truly] sees. (5.5)23 
As in the earlier passage (3.3 f. ), the terms samkhya and yoga seem to be used here in the 
sense of "renunciation" and "disciplined activity" respectively. This is further suggested in the 
succeeding verse (5.6), which reads: "But, without yoga, [only] distress (duhkha) is achieved 
by renunciation (samnyäsa) [... ]. Fixed in yoga (yoga-yukta), the sage goes to brahman in no 
time. " If sämkhya is to be considered synonymous with samnyüsa-as I think is implied in 
these verses-then we are faced with two contradictory statements: on the one hand, both 
särpkhya and yoga are declared to be equally successful (and self-sufficient) means of attain- 
ing the sought-after goal, while, on the other hand, it is said that sämkhya can generate only 
suffering in the absence of yoga. We need not dwell upon such contradictions here, however, 
221 have in mind here Daya Krishna's article, "Is Tsvarakrsna's Sä, nkhya-Karika Really Samkhyan? " (first 
published in Philosophy East and Nest 18.3 (July 1968): 194-204, and republished in Krishna 1991, ch. 7). 
13 sä, nkhyayogau prthag büläl: pravadanti na paºulitüh l ekam apy cisthitah samyag ubhayor vindate 
phalam 1/ yat sümkhyaih prapyate sthänam tad yogair apt gamyate l ekam sümkhyam ca yoga, n ca yah 
patyati sa pafiyati // (Grid 5.4-5). A virtually identical statement is made by Yäjºiavalkya at MBh 
XII. 304.2 
(cf. Edgerton 1965: 325). 
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for the immediate concern is merely to highlight the distinctly non-classical employment of 
sd, nkhya and yoga that is exemplified in the Gild. 
Although it is evident that sümkhya does not in the Gild denote any particular metaphysical 
system, and is, in this respect, applied in a way that seems to differ from classical usage, we 
should not leave this discussion without noting the possibility-indeed, the likelihood-that 
the sense of "renunciation" did not fall away entirely from the term in the classical period. 
The Sämkhyakdrikä is not a work that sets out to vindicate the value of worldly activity (as the 
GF/ d, at least in part, tries to do); it starts from the premise that such activity is inherently dis- 
satisfying (SK 1, cf. 55), and concludes with an account of the utter relinquishment of experi- 
ence and of the embodied personality that is its precondition (SK 68). It is, in short, a treatise 
whose guiding principle is the necessity of renunciation. And thus the sense of renunciation is 
relevant to the term sdinklrya both as it occurs in the Gild and as it applies to the classical 
system presented in the Sa, nkhyakärikä (as well as to similar systems). What is different is 
that, in the systematic expressions of the Sämkhya philosophy, in addition to an ascetic orien- 
tation, the term sümkhya implies a particular approach to metaphysics that involves the expo- 
sition of certain principles in enumerated sets. 24 
It is evident that the term yoga is used extremely liberally in the Gild, as it is elsewhere in 
the epic and Pauränic literature. Therefore merely from the fact that, in the Gild extracts 
quoted above, yoga appears to be contrasted with the renunciation that sümklrya stands for, it 
should not be assumed that yoga cannot also, in other contexts, denote a mode of discipline 
that involves letting go of worldly concerns. In the Grid's sixth chapter, for example, a form of 
yoga is described in v hich the practitioner (yogin) "abides in a remote location, alone, con- 
trolling mind and self, free from desires and without `grasping around' (aparigraha, i. e. not 
longing for possessions, etc. )" (6.10). His body and mind are restrained in such a way that ac- 
tivity is kept to the barest minimum; mental attention is fixed exclusively within the "self' 
(atman) (6.18 f. ); all desires "coming forth from ideas (samkalpas)" are to be abandoned 
"without residue" (afesata) (6.24). 25 These sorts of stipulations epitomise the kind of ascetic 
quietism that is so central to the classical Yoga of Patanjali, and are at marked variance to the 
message of actively fulfilling one's social duties that is articulated at other places in the Gild 
24 The following remark of Edgerton's makes a similar point with regard to the Upanisads and the Rfßh 
more generally: "9t appears, then, that Samkhya means in the Upanisads and the Epic simply the way of sal- 
vation by knowledge, and does not imply any system of metaphysical truth whatever" (1924: 32). Edgerton is, 
I think, right to associate sümkhya with salvific knowledge, but he fails to give due emphasis to its sense as 
"renunciation", and this failure is especially noticeable in his translation of the Gild, where he consistently 
(but, in my view, inappropriately) renders sämkhya as "reason-method" (see Edgerton 19441: 33,53). 
25 This last injunction is refined at BhG 18.11, which states that, although actions themselves cannot be 
"abandoned without residue, " it is the person "who abandons the fruits of action [that] is called the [genuine] 
abandoner (tyagin). " 
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(e. g. 1.31 f.; 3.8,35; 18.41 Q. The common thread that seems to run through all the uses of 
yoga in the Gild and elsewhere is the sense of "disciplined action" as distinguished from 
merely impulsive behaviour. This might, then, be regarded as the broad sense of yoga, 
whereas sustained contemplative practice is a narrower, more restricted, sense. 
To conclude this little semantic detour I do not think it impertinent to suggest that, in the 
sätpkhya-yoga duad of the Gitü that I have been discussing, we have a forerunner (or coeval 
variant, depending on one's view of the chronology of the texts concerned) of the two-pronged 
methodology that is central to both Sämkhya and Yoga in their classical forms. The two 
prongs are vairügya and abhyüsa (YS 1.12-16) or (in SK 45) vairügya and aisvarya. Vairägya, 
insofar as it involves letting go of the "thirsting" after phenomenal enjoyment (YS 1.15), 
shares much in common with the Gitü's notion of sümkhya as renunciation. Abhyäsa, mean- 
while, is the assiduous practice required to achieve the transformation of mind that Yoga de- 
mands; and ai9varya ("of 19vara") is the power, self-control and composure necessary to eradi- 
cate obstacles; both terms having, therefore, an affinity with the broad sense of yoga as 
"disciplined action". 
Other textual sites of preclassical formulations of Sämkhya include ancient collections of 
doctrines and laws such as the Manusmrti, treatises on Ayurveda (notably the Carakasamhita 
and Surrutasamhitü), and a section in an early (ca. 100 CE) account of the life of the Buddha 
known as the Buddhacarita of AMvaghosa. An earlier, and somewhat oblique, source is 
Kautilya's Arthafastra (321-296 BCE), which famously names only three philosophical ap- 
proaches (ünviksiki) in its second verse, these approaches being Sämkhya, Yoga, and 
Lokäyata. 26 Once again, we cannot assume that sdMkhya and yoga denote here anything even 
approximating the systems associated with I§varakrsna and Patanjali, and nor can we say ex- 
actly what is meant by loküyata. The latter term is often associated or identified with the phi- 
losophy of Cärväka, which in turn is taken to be a kind of materialism? ' As Debiprasad 
Chattopadhyaya has pointed out, however, loküyata can also be understood to mean 
"prevalent among the people" and, thus, "the philosophy of the people" (1968: 1); 28 and, if it 
is taken in this way, then sümkhya and yoga may, by contrast, stand for those approaches to 
philosophy (or perhaps life more generally) that are not so prevalent, but are, rather, adhered 
to by select groups of initiates. If this were so, then we need not be surprised that other philo- 
16samkhyam yogo lokayatam cell ünviksiki (Arihasastra 1.2). 
27Cf. Radhakrishnan and Moore (1957: 227): "The doctrine [of Carväka] is called Lokayata, as it holds 
that only this world (loka) exists and there is no beyond. " 
28 Cf. Cowell and Gough (1882: 2n. 1): "Lokäyata may be etymologically analysed as `prevalent in the 
world' (loko and 4yata). " 
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sophical or soteriological schools go unmentioned by Kautilya; for the sense of sümkIzya (and 
to a lesser extent of ), oga) could be sufficiently wide here to cover a range of such schools. 
One further contribution to the somewhat perplexing picture of prcclassical Särpkhya and 
Yoga is provided by a treatise belonging to the Pailcarätra sect of Vaisnavism entitled the 
Ahirbudhnya-samhitü ("collection of the serpent-from-the-depths"). The Päticarätra, or 
Bhägavata, sect is generally held to be at least as old as Buddhism (i. e. ca. fourth century ßa), 
although the textual sources associated with it are likely to be considerably later. The Ahir- 
budhnya-samhitd, essentially a work of Tantric Vaisnavism, comprises material that was 
probably composed over a span of several centuries during the first millennium of the Com- 
mon Era. It contains much that would be of interest to a study of Tantric yoga and the appli- 
cation of Särnkhyan concepts thereto, but the reason for mentioning it here is that, in its 
twelfth chapter are included summaries of two earlier works, or bodies of doctrine (tantras), 
which deal with Sämkhya and Yoga respectively. The first of these two summaries (Ahir. 
12.18-30) is of the so-called Sastitantra ("sixty doctrines"), which itself comprises two parts, 
one of thirty-two topics and the other of twenty-eight. The expression sastitantra also occurs 
in Särnkhyakärikü 72, where the claim is made that the seventy kärikds which constitute the 
text's main part cover the topics of the sastitantra but forgo the illustrative examples and ob- 
jections of opponents. The list of topics given in the Ahirbudlinya's summary of the 
Sastitantra indicates, however, some important differences between this latter work and that 
of Isvarakrsna, and it is therefore likely that the Ahirbudhnya's version is not the only 
sastitantra, but is perhaps one of several, which may or may not have shared a common 
source. 
The theory that more than one version of the sastitantra existed is supported by 
Väcaspatimigra's commentary on kärikä 72, in which he refers to an alternative version that is 
outlined in a now unavailable text called the Räjavärtika. 29 This latter version of the 
sastitantra is remarkably-indeed, one might say suspiciously-compatible with Igvarakrsna's 
text, whereas that summarised in the Ahirbud/znya seems closer to the types of Sämkhya pre- 
sented in certain of the Puränas and in some passages of the Afahüblrärata. By this I mean, for 
example, that it includes brahman as the ultimate principle, refers to fakti ("power") appar- 
ently as a synonym of prakrti, and gives a prominent place to "time" (küla) among the major 
principles. 30 
29 Väcaspati includes a list of the sixty doctrines (see Jhä 1896: 113-14). 
30Cf. e. g. Visnu purana 1.2.18 ff. (Upreti 1986); Niradrya purana 1.3. 
23 
klý I'$ 
Metaphysics and Soteriology in Classical Sä nkhya and Yoga 
The other noteworthy summary in the Ahirbudhnya-samhitü is of a work on yoga attributed 
to fiiranyagarbha (Ahir. 12.31-38). As has been pointed out above, Hiranyagarbha appears to 
be identified with Kapila in the 9vet. Up, and although no such identification is made in the 
Ahirbudhnya, the name nevertheless retains an important symbolic resonance. As with the 
Sastitantra, the summary amounts to little more than a list of contents, divided into two main 
parts, the first comprising twelve sections and being on the "yoga of cessation" (nirodha- 
yoga), and the second comprising four sections and being on the "yoga of action" (karma- 
yoga). Chakravarti attributes considerable significance to the fact that the treatise is referred to 
as yogünuidsana (an "exposition of yoga"), which expression also occurs in the opening line 
of the Yogasütra (atha yogünusüsanam: "now, an exposition of yoga") (Chakravarti 1975: 70 
f. ). Furthermore, he draws attention to the use of the term nirodha, which also features promi- 
nently in the Yogasütra's first chapter (1.2,12,51), and to certain other commonalities, such 
as the term arga ("limb", "member"), and references to different modes of meditation, which 
can be with or without an "external object" (bahirtattva). While such similarities are of sig- 
nificant interest, they cannot possibly justify Chakravarti's claim that the Yogasütra, despite 
retaining a certain uniqueness, exhibits a "remarkable dependence" upon the text attributed to 
Hiranyagarbha, and that this dependence "tends to suggest that Patanjali was an adherent of 
the Hiranyagarbha school of the Yoga" (1975: 72). This is, frankly, fantasy. From the evi- 
dence that is available, it cannot even be confirmed whether the yoga treatise summarised in 
the Ahirbudhnya antedates the Yogasütra; and even if it could, the few scraps of information 
that we have about it can hardly tell us the extent to which the Yogasütra's compiler borrowed 
from it. Indeed, just as was the case with the relation between the Sämkhyakärikü and the 
Sastitantra, it is possible that no direct borrowing occurred at all, and that, instead, the two 
"expositions of yoga" (i. e. those of "Hiranyagarbha" and "Patanjali" respectively) are based 
upon still earlier material that has, like much else, succumbed to the ravages of time. 
THE CLASSICAL SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMMENTARIES 
The incomplete nature of the available evidence precludes the possibility of reaching any de- 
finitive judgement on the degree of sophistication and coherence achieved by the preclassical 
forms of Sämkhya and Yoga, and hence it is the classical forms themselves that are generally 
held to represent the fully mature stage of these systems' development. The high status that 
the Samkhyakdrikü and Yogasütra acquired within the Indian philosophical milieu is attested 
to by the significant number of commentaries that have been composed upon them, and which 
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have survived to the present day, and by both the polemical and complimentary references 
made to the classical systems in the works of other schools and traditions. 
Eight early commentaries on the Kürfkü are known to have survived. There is some uncer- 
tainty about the chronological order of these, but one of the first, and perhaps the earliest of 
all, is a Chinese translation of the kärikäs with accompanying Chinese commentary. It is 
agreed that the translation, known in Sanskrit as the Suvarnasaptati ("golden seventy"), was 
made by the Buddhist sage Paramärtha around 557-569 cr, but there is no consensus of opin- 
ion on whether the commentary was authored by the translator or taken from an existing San- 
skrit source. 31 Whatever the facts of the matter might be, knowledge of the approximate date 
of Paramärtha's translation has helped to set a temporal limit to the composition of the Kdrikü 
itself. Now that I have raised this issue of the latter text's date, I shall pursue it a little further 
before coming back to the commentaries in general. 
Owing to the existence of Paramärtha's Chinese translation, the Kdrikü, whether commu- 
nicated by oral or written means, must have been composed prior to 569 cE, and probably at 
least a century or two before this date, since some time would have needed to elapse before it 
could have attained the authoritative status deserving of translation into a foreign language 
such as Chinese. An early limit to the composition of the Kürikü is not so forthcoming, how- 
ever, despite a date of 350 CE having been settled upon by most recent researchers. 32 Much of 
the research has been based on references to two prominent Sämkhya teachers that are said to 
have lived close to the time of I§varakrsna, one being Värsaganya (or Vrsagana) and the other 
being Vindhyaväsa (or Vindhyaväsin). Värsaganya is first mentioned in the Afoksadharma 
(MBh XII. 306.57), but this is merely as a name in a list of Särpkhya teachers. Both individuals 
are mentioned in Paramärtha's biography of the Buddhist teacher, Vasubandhu, with 
Vindhyaväsa appearing as a disciple of Värsaganya. A slightly later Chinese source confuses 
matters by speaking of "Varsaganya" not as a particular person but as the name of a group of 
followers of Kapila which is headed by a man named Varsa (meaning "rain", his being said to 
have been born in the rainy season) 33 This account carries less authority, however, than a 
Sanskrit commentary on the Kärikü known as the Yuktidipikü, which clearly represents 
Värsaganya, Vindhyaväsin and Igvarakrsna as three separate individuals, each of whom has a 
slightly different perspective on Sämkhya 34 Added to this evidence is a reference in the work 
"A brief summary of the scholarly debate on this matter is provided by Larson in EIP tv: 167-69. 
32 e. g. Chakravarti 1975: 158; EIP tv: 13,15,149. 
33 This alternative etymology of "Värsaganya" derives from a work by Kuei-chi, a direct disciple of 
Hsüan-tsang (seventh century CE). It is discussed by Takakusu (1933) and under "Varsaganya" in EIP tv: 132 
f. 
34Cf. EIPtv: 134f. 
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of the Buddhist logician, Dignaga (ca. 480-540 CE), to the Särnkhya advocate Mädhava as a 
"destroyer of Sämkhya" (sümkhya-nadaka), that is, as one whose views are at such variance to 
a standard Satnkhya position that they undermine it. This has been taken to suggest the pres- 
ence by Dignäga's time of a standard Säipkhya viewpoint, which is to be distinguished from 
unorthodox positions such as Mlidhava's; and the most likely candidate for this standard is the 
classical system of Isvarakrsna. In my view, none of this constitutes sound evidence for postu- 
lating 350 CE as the earliest likely date for the Kürikü. The references to Värsaganya and 
Vindhyaväsin in the Yuktidrpikü give no indication of the respective dates of these individuals, 
and the same is true of the references to I9varakrsna himself. Paramärtha's biography of 
Vasubandhu does at least state that Vindhyaväsa lived "nine-hundred years after the death of 
the Buddha" (the Buddha having died, according to recent estimates, around 400 BcE), and 
that this same Vindhyaväsa studied under Vrsagana's (i. e. Värsaganya's) tutelage, thereby 
indicating that the two men were contemporaries. But it would be reckless to assume that 
Paramärtha's principal concern was historical accuracy. It is a common practice in accounts of 
the lives of renowned sages composed by their disciples and admirers for the subject of the 
work to be associated with other eminent figures, whether as friend or opponent, in order to 
enhance the prestige of that subject. Needless to say, it is immensely difficult to determine the 
intentions and historiographical honesty of an author some fourteen centuries after his work 
was composed. In the present case concerning the time-frame of the Samkhyakürikü, then, I 
would concur with the latest date's being around 450 CE, but would be inclined to emphasise 
the insubstantiality of the evidence for any earliest date rather than implying that its composi- 
tion can confidently be narrowed down to a one-hundred year period. If we accept that more 
than one, and possibly a great number, of versions of a philosophical system can exist con- 
temporaneously, then there is no strong reason that I can discern even for assuming that the 
Kürikä belongs to the Common Era. (Of course, scholars like to feel confident, or at least to 
sound as though they feel confident; but in this instance there really isn't much to go on at all. ) 
A few brief remarks need to be made at this juncture concerning the integrity of the 
Kärikü. In comparison with the controversies that surround many texts of similar antiquity, the 
issue of what material belongs and does not belong in it is fairly untroublesome. What appear 
in most editions as the final two kärikäs, numbered 72 and 73, are not mentioned by all com- 
mentators, thus suggesting the possibility that these two are later additions. This is highly 
likely since the last two kärikäs merely laud the text as a whole (SK 73) and propose, as has 
been noted above, that it is a concise exposition of the sastitantra (SK 72). They contain noth- 
ing of philosophical significance, and therefore it is hardly worth speculating about their 
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authorship. The only other kärikä that has been queried is the sixty-third, which happens to be 
absent from Paramärtha's Chinese version. Since there are no other known commentaries from 
which it is missing, my inclination would be to regard this as a quirk of the Paramärtha text 
and not as evidence that what has come to be numbered as kärikä 63 is an interpolation by 
someone other than Igvarakrsna. Suryanarayana Sastri has taken the opposite view on the 
grounds that kärikä 63 is philosophically redundant, merely reasserting what has already been 
stated at kärikäs 44-45; 35 and some other scholars (among them, apparently, Potter and Lar- 
son (EIP Iv: 151)) have taken this suggestion seriously. If kärikä 63 is interpreted in a particu- 
lar way then there is indeed an overlap with kärikä 44. But the emphasis in the two kärikds 
remains very different, the earlier of the two being far more matter-of-fact in its account of the 
"predispositions" or "personal characteristics" (bhävas), whereas kärikä 63 is part of a verita- 
ble crescendo of kärikäs building up to the description of the final separation between purusa 
and prakrti that occurs at kärikä 68. In my view, it is not even certain that the "forms" (riüpas) 
mentioned at kärikä 63 are "predispositions" at all. The "seven forms" by which prakrti is 
there said to bind herself may in fact be seven categories of her manifest aspect, the most 
likely candidates being: (t) mahat, (2) aharpkdra, (3) manas, (4) buddhindriyas, (s) karmendri- 
yas, (6) tanmätras, and (7) bhütas. And, correspondingly, the "one form" by which "she re- 
leases herself for the sake of each purusa" may be prakrti's unmanifest aspect, which is really 
the absence of any form whatsoever. Whatever the case may be, however, there is no reason to 
regard kärikä 63 as dispensible. 
I noted above that eight early commentaries upon the Sümkhyakürikä have survived. So far 
Paramärtha's Suvarnasaptati and the Yuktidrpikü have been mentioned, and the approximate 
date of the former has been placed at 557-569 CE. The respective dates of the commentaries 
are of no great consequence to my main purposes in this study, and therefore in most cases I 
shall simply note the dates that have been most commonly agreed upon without devoting 
much, if any, attention to the respective merits of the arguments supporting them. 
In addition to the Suvarnasaptati, three commentaries are generally placed in the period 
from 500-600 CE. One of these, the Sämkhyavrtti, remains anonymous; and, in the case of an- 
other, the Sämkhyasaptativrtti, because of damage to the one existing palm leaf manuscript, 
we know only that the author's name began with the syllable Afa. Esther Solomon (1974; EIP 
iv: 179) has speculated that the Sämkhyavrtti may be an autocommentary (svopajiiavrtti) by 
I§varakrsna himself, but there is no particular reason for supposing this to be true. The 
Sümkhyasaptativrtti closely resembles a commentary eponymously titled the Matharavrtti, 
35 Suryanarayana Sastri's position is outlined by Mainkar (1972: 33) and in LIP tv (p. 151). 
27 
(4" 
Metaphysics and Soteriology in Classical Sdmkhya and Yoga 
which is usually thought to be a few centuries later (post-800 CE). The latter text is likely to be 
an expanded and slightly modified version of the former. 36 
The fourth of the commentaries held to date from the sixth century, which I have not yet 
mentioned here, is that referred to as the Sämkhyakürikäbhüsya or as the Gaudapädabhüsya 
after the name of its author, Gaudapäda, about whom nothing further is known. His name is 
shared by the author of a well-known series of kärikäs that take the Mün4ükya-upan4ad as 
their starting-point, but there are no significant textual or philosophical similarities that might 
indicate a common authorship. Indeed, the Mündi7kyakürikd (or Gaudapadiyakürikü) is usu- 
ally taken to be a statement of nondualist (advaita) Vedänta, which harbours no sympathy for 
the dualist position of classical Särnkhya. 
The Yuktidipikä, which has been briefly referred to above, is widely regarded as the most 
important of all the commentaries on the Sürnkhyakürika. Larson's enthusiasm is obvious: "No 
other text compares with it in terms of its detailed treatment of Sämkhya arguments and its 
apparent thorough familiarity with the various teachers and schools that preceded Igvarakrsna, 
and it is no exaggeration to assert, therefore, that it is the only commentary on the Kdrikü that 
appears to understand the full scope and details of classical Sämkhya philosophy" (EIP iv: 
227). Such comments are, however, somewhat over-flattering, and Larson admits elsewhere 
(1979: 281) that the value of the Yuktidi-pikü is due more to its historical than its philosophical 
significance. Neither the author nor the date of the commentary are known, but since it quotes 
Dignäga and Bhartrhari, and makes no reference to Väcaspati, it has been placed between the 
early sixth and the tenth century (EIP Iv: 228, citing Pandeya 1967: xv). It was rediscovered 
by scholars as recently as the 1930s, and at least two manuscripts are known to exist, neither 
of them complete, but comprehensive nevertheless. 37 
The two commentaries on the Sämkhyakürikü that remain to be mentioned here are the 
Jayamarigalä38 and the Tattvakaumudi". The author of the first of these is not known, although 
he has been assumed to be a Buddhist due to the inclusion of a benedictory verse to the sage 
(muni) of the loka-uttara-vüdins (which is the name of a Buddhist sect) (cf. Kaviraj 1926; 
Chakravarti 1975: 165). Whether he was, or was not, a Buddhist, there is nothing in the com- 
mentary itself to suggest that he was writing from a Buddhist standpoint. Indeed, the 
Jayamarigala diverges little from the interpretive line taken by the four earliest commentaries 
(i. e. those in the 500-600 CE timeframe discussed above). Certain indications that it relies on 
36 See the respective introductions to the entries on SaTkhyasaptativrtti and Marharavrtti in EIP iv. 
"The Yuktidpika has now been published in several editions. The first volume of a critical edition (edited 
by Wetzler and Motegi) was published in 1998. 
38 Not to be confused with a well-known commentary on the Kämasatra of the same name. 
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the Yuklidipikü, however, combined with Chakravarti's observation that Väcaspati denies (at 
TK 51) a viewpoint that appears only in the Jayamaiigald, has set the date of the latter text 
between the sixth and tenth centuries (Chakravarti 1975: 166-68; ef. Kaviraj 1926). 39 
This brings us to Väcaspatimigra's Tativakaumudi itself, which, as Larson has noted, "is by 
far the best-known text of Sämkhya all over India" (EIP iv: 302). It has survived in at least 
ninety manuscripts, and these were utilised to produce a critical edition in 1967 (edited by 
Srinivasan). V5caspati composed works on several schools of Indian philosophy, and there is 
nothing in the Tattvakaumudt or anywhere else to show that he was especially committed to 
the Sämkhya system. His style is, however, highly accessible, and he provides some helpful 
interpretive suggestions on a number of points. There is an ambiguity pertaining to his dates, 
for the reason that, in his Nyäyasilcinibandlza, he notes that the work was composed in 898, 
but it is unclear whether this date accords with the Vikrama era (which begun in 58 BcE) or 
with the aka era (78 CE onwards). The dispute as to whether V5caspati flourished in the mid- 
ninth or the mid-to-late-tenth century still continues. 
The commentaries upon the Sümkhyakärikü that have been introduced above are generally 
represented as constituting a classical Sämkhya tradition, in which the commentarial authors 
in large measure merely reiterate, and in certain instances expand upon, the exposition given 
in the Kürika itself. As I have explained in the Introduction to this study, I regard this assump- 
tion of a broadly unified classical tradition as misleading, and consider it more helpful to treat 
the commentaries as contributions to a discussion and interpretation of the classical text, 
which remains a site of disputation. The fact that manuscripts of the eight commentaries men- 
tioned above have survived to the present day is perhaps indicative of the relatively high status 
of these particular commentaries; but it is inevitably the case that many others of comparable 
authority are likely to have been lost along the way, and that accidents of history are largely 
responsible for determining what we today take to represent classical Sämkhya and the line of 
interpretation to which it gave rise (just as, of course, such accidents are similarly responsible 
in the case of the Särnkhya and Yoga traditions more generally). For reasons such as this, a 
39Ramakrishna Kavi (1927) alternatively proposes that the composer of the Jayama, ngala was a certain 
(non-Buddhist) named Bankara-ärya, who lived in the fourteenth century and was also the author of the 
Yogasütrabhasyavivarana (which several other scholars (e. g. Hacker 1968; Mayeda 1979) have attributed to 
the renowned Vedäntin taAkaräcarya (see discussion in Halbfass 1991, ch. 6)). There is little, however, to 
support Kavi's claims, and therefore Chakravarti's appears to be the most sober and plausible assessment of 
the available evidence. [As an aside, and since it is illustrative of the kinds of minor confusions that can arise 
in this academic area, it may be pointed out that the author of the introduction to the entry on Jayamadgala in 
EIP iv (p. 271), who i presume to be R. S. Bhattacharya (since the summary of the text that follows the intro- 
ductory passage is by him), mistakenly identifies Ramakrishna Kavi with Gopinath Kaviraj, thereby giving 
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cautious and discerning attitude is, I think, appropriate when dealing with the commentarial 
literature. 
Turning now to classical Yoga, it may not come as a great surprise to hear that there is a 
considerable amount of mystery associated with its origins and founder. The Yoga tradition 
attributes the Yogasatra to a sage named Patafijali, who is traditionally lauded as an incarna- 
tion of the thousand-headed serpent known in Indian mythology as Ananta ("unending", 
"infinite") or Ädidesa (the "initial trace" or "primordial residue"). 40 At least since the time of 
Bhojaräja's commentary (ca. tenth or eleventh century CE) this sage has been identified with 
the Patanjali who composed the famous "great commentary" (Mahdbhüsya or 
Vyükaranarahäbhä; sya) on Pänini's grammatical work, AstadhyüyT, and also with a redactor 
of Caraka's compendium on Ayurveda. Bhoja (or a later interpolator) included in the intro- 
duction to his Rajamürtanda a stanza in which he (Bhoja) is compared with Patanjali on the 
grounds that both of them are responsible for "purifying speech, mind, and body" by compos- 
ing works on grammar, yoga and medicine (Dasgupta 1922: 230 ff. ). A commentary by Cak- 
rapäni on the Carakasamhitä, dating from around 1060 CE, also praises Patanjali for these 
three achievements and explicitly attributes to him the Mah«bhäsya and a revised version of 
Caraka's text (caraka pratisamskria) (Dasgupta ibid. ). Similar benedictory verses have been 
included in manuscripts and published editions of both the Mahübhäsya and the Yogasütra up 
to the present day, and the identity of the three Patafijalis is widely taken for granted by Indian 
practitioners of yoga who are unfamiliar with academic debates. The matter has still not been 
finally settled by scholars, although the general tendency is to reject the identity thesis. 
The view that the author of the Yogasütra also edited and revised the Carakasamhitü was 
seriously questioned by Dasgupta (ibid. ), and I am not aware of any subsequent defence of the 
view. The identification of the "Yoga Patanjali" with his grammarian namesake, however, has 
been a matter of more persistent controversy. J. H. Woods firmly denounces the thesis in the 
Introduction to his translation of the Yogasatra (1914), partly as the result of a comparison 
between the philosophical content of this text and that of the Mahdbhüsya, but also because he 
accepts the view presented in Väcaspati's Tattvavaiddradithat certain sutras contain an attack 
on the "idealist" school of Buddhism known as vynanaväda ("consciousness[-only] view"). 
Taken together, this evidence leads Woods to propose a time-period of 300-500 CE for the 
Yogasütra, considerably later than the second century BCE, which is the period generally 
40A selection of legends traditionally associated with Pataijali were brought together by 
Ramabhadradiksita in his Patanjalicarita, which, according to ýrivatsa Rämaswämi (2000: 28), was com- 
posed "over three hundred years ago" (i. e. ca. 1700 ce or earlier), but which others have placed as "not [... ] 
earlier than the eighteenth century" (Dasgupta 1922: 230). Rämaswämi provides a summary of the legends at 
ch. 2. 
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agreed upon for the Afahübhäsya. 4' Dasgupta, however, carries out his own comparison of the 
texts and concludes that there is nothing in them that indicates a difference of opinion on any 
significant issue (1922: 231 f. ). Furthermore, he cites a number of passages in the 
Afahübhüsya that illustrate an acquaintance with "most of the important points of the 
Sämkhya-Yoga metaphysics" on the part of its author (p. 232). Dasgupta addresses the matter 
of Yoga's supposedly anti-idealist critique, not by reinterpreting the salient sutras, but by pro- 
posing that the fourth chapter ("Kaivalyapada") of the Yogasütra, in which those sutras ap- 
pear, is a later addition to the work by someone other than Patafljali (1922: 229-30). This pro- 
posal may sound suspiciously ad hoc, but, as Dasgupta rightly points out (p. 230), the third 
chapter ends with the expression iti, which is roughly equivalent to the Latin finis, denoting 
the end of a work. It is also notable that the fourth chapter displays certain features that distin- 
guish it from other portions of the Yogasütra; it is, for example, considerably shorter than the 
other three chapters, and yet on the whole it is more philosophically engaging. Furthermore 
(although Dasgupta does not mention this point), the fourth chapter employs a number of im- 
portant terms that either do not occur at all or are used very sparingly in other parts of the 
text 42 It would not be especially surprising if this chapter did turn out to be a later addition, 
for, in my view (which would, on this point, not have been shared by Dasgupta), the 
Yogasütra as a whole comes across as being a compilation of passages from diverse sources 
rather than the unified expression of a single mind. Certain scholars, most notably J. W. Hauer 
(1958), have devoted a considerable amount of effort and attention to the task of breaking the 
text down into its possible constituent parts; but it is difficult to see how any firm conclusions 
can be reached on this matter. 
One major consequence of taking the view that the Yogasütra is in whole or in part a 
compilation of earlier sources is that the debate over whether its author also composed the 
Mahabhüsya is significantly transformed. Woods' approach of looking for similarities and 
dissimilarities of style and content between the two texts, which approach is also taken 
(though with different conclusions) by Dasgupta, becomes virtually redundant; for one is no 
longer comparing the works of single authors, but, instead, the work of one author with that of 
an indefinite number of others, brought together over an indefinite period of time by an in- 
definite number of compilers. Neither the Afahübhüsya nor the Yogasütra claims originality 
41 See Woods 1914: xv if. My own view on the question of whether the YS includes an anti-idealist po- 
lemic will be presented in Chapter 4 below. 
42Those which appear exclusively in the fourth chapter include buddhi (4.21,22), ciii (4.22), ciiigakti 
(4.34), dharmamegha (4.29), and vusand (4.8,24). Prakrii occurs twice there (4.2,3), while its only other 
appearance is as part of the conjunct expression prakrtilaya ("dissolution in (or of) prakrti") at 1.19. Also 
vastu is particularly prevalent in a series of sutras in the fourth chapter (4.14-17), whereas it appears only 
once elsewhere (1.9), its sense of "object", "thing", or "entity" more often being conveyed by arrha. 
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for itself, but rather begins by declaring itself to be an "exposition" (anus2isana) of a pre- 
existing body of teaching. In the case of the Mahübadsya, the teaching being exposited is 
Pänini's work on Sabda ("word", "language"), whereas in the Yogasütra the source of the 
teachings concerned is said to be Mara (the "lord"), or at least this is implied in the statement 
that I9vara was the guru of yogins who have gone before (YS 1.26). The fact that the expres- 
sion "atlia [... ] anuOsanam" occurs in the opening line of both works is remarkable but not 
exceptional. Atha is considered to be an auspicious invocatory term, somewhat analogous to 
om, and as such often appears at the beginning of treatises, especially those composed in the 
sutra format. " It is most often, and most concisely, translated as "now, " but should be under- 
stood in the sense of "And so commences... ". The occurrence in the Ahirbudhnya-samhitd of 
the phrases "great exposition of yoga" (mahadyogdnusüsanam, 12.31) and "exposition of the 
doctrine of yoga" (yogänu. sanam ddstram, 12.38) shows that there has been at least one 
other work, which may pre-date the Yogasütra, that has presented itself as an exposition of 
yoga. As has been noted already, this does not constitute a clear indication that the Yogasütra 
borrowed significantly from the "Hiranyagarbha" text that the Ahirbudhnya-samhitä summa- 
rises, but it should at least make us question whether the Yogasütra's opening line really gives 
us any sound reason to identify its author with that of the Mahübhüsya. 14 
Before moving on from (and regrettably, if unavoidably, leaving unresolved) the issue of 
who might be responsible for the Yogasütra, I should mention what Dasgupta considers to be 
the clinching piece of evidence for the identification thesis we have been discussing. "The 
most important point in favour of this identification", he states, "seems to be that both the 
Patanjalis as against other Indian systems admitted the doctrine of sphota which was denied 
even by Sämkhya" (1922: 238 fn. 1; cf. Dasgupta 1920, Appendix 1). Very briefly, the term 
sphota translates literally as "bursting forth" or "erupting" (cf. "spurt", "spout", etc. ), and may 
be taken to express the idea that the meanings of certain sounds and symbols are already pres- 
ent in the minds of the members of a linguistic community prior to the instantiation of inter- 
personal communicative episodes. Such episodes merely allow, or provide the occasion for, 
the appropriate meanings to "burst forth" in the sense of being revealed or manifested in the 
mind of the "receiving" communicant rather than being conveyed to that mind (cf. 
Näge§abhatta, in Krishnamacharya 1956: 5). Some version of the sphota theory was undoubt- 
edly maintained by the author of the Mahübhüsya, and it would indeed be a matter of some 
"Cf. e. g. Brahmasütra 1.1.1; Pirvamimämsasütra 1.1.1; Vaisesikasütra I. I. I. Cf. also Bankara on Brah- 
masatra I. 1.1: "the word atha, even when used in some other sense, serves the purpose of auspiciousness 
from the very fact of its being heard" (trans. Gambhirananda 1965: 7). 
441 am here questioning Dasgupta's assertion that "unlike any other work" the Mahabhäcya and Yogasütra 
both begin "in a similar manner" (1922: 232, emphasis added). 
32 
An Historical Overview of Sdnikhya and Yoga 
interest to find signs of it in the Yogasütra (although it is difficult to see how such signs could 
win the case for the identification thesis). But it was in any event a false alarm: there is no ref- 
erence to sphota in the Yogasütra; there is merely one sutra (3.17) that commentators have 
typically used as a springboard to embark upon grammatical rambles which, in certain in- 
stances, and most notably in Väcaspati's subcommentary, could be interpreted as imputing the 
sphota theory to Yoga. 43 The sutra itself states that "verbal expression" (. fabda), ` objectual 
content" (artha), and "phenomenal representation" (pratyaya), though commonly conflated, 
can be distinguished by means of sustained meditation (samyarna) upon their difference. 6 It 
adds that such meditation reveals the "speech of all beings" (sarva-bhüta-riüta), which ex- 
pression presumably has symbolic meaning, although it is generally taken literally within the 
Yoga tradition. Whatever the case may be, the mere distinguishing of gabda, artha, and prat- 
yaya from one another falls very far short of an affirmation of the sphota theory, and therefore 
I think we can safely dismiss this "most important point in favour of the identification" of the 
two "Pataiijalis" as fanciful. 
Along with Feuerstein (1979a: 3), among others, I am bound, then, to register my 
"profound ignorance about the historical personality of the author of the Yoga-Sutra, " but un- 
like Feuerstein I would also remain non-committal on the issue of the date of the text, for I can 
see no firm grounds for confidently asserting the Yogasütra to be "a product of the third cen- 
tury A. D. " (or the second century, according to later works by Feuerstein (e. g. 1989: 169 and 
1998: 284)). I will say a little more in Chapter 2 about my own modest speculations on the 
processes by means of which the Yogasütra, and also the Sämkhyakürikü, may have come into 
existence, but for now I can merely report that the current most favoured time period for the 
Yogasütra's composition is 100-300 CE . 
47 
With regard to the Yogasütra's commentaries, one in particular has acquired such an emi- 
nent status that the majority of other known commentaries take the form of subcommentaries 
upon it, and many published editions of the Yogasutra include it along with the original sutras. 
This is the Bhäsya that is universally attributed to Vyäsa (or "Vedavyäsa"). Such a name is 
really equivalent to saying that we have no idea who composed the work, for vyasa literally 
means "arranger" or "compiler" (and, according to Bhärati (2001: Iii), "analysis" as well). The 
term has, however, accumulated a somewhat overburdening weight of legendary associations, 
4s Feuerstein holds Vacaspati to be entirely to "blame for this whole confusion" (1980: 119). 
46 Cf. YS 1.42, where sarirarka-samapatti is defined as a mental state in which gabda, artha and jºiena re- 
main intermixed (samkhrna). Hereji ana can be regarded as serving the same semantic function as pratyaya in 
YS 3.17, i. e. to mean "phenomenal representation"; but it is terminological inconsistencies such as this that 
ought to alert us to the likelihood of the YS's being a composite text. 
47 A very concise summary of the views of various scholars is given by Whicher (1998a: 42). 
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for it is to Vyäsa that the authorship of some of India's most vaunted religious and mythologi- 
cal works has been ascribed, including no less than the Vedas, the Mahäbhürata, the Puränas, 
and the Brahmasütra. In comparison with such esteemed and, with the exception of the last 
mentioned, voluminous material, a commentary upon the Yogasütra appears downright meagre 
and overshadowed. Indeed, it is surprising that it ever managed to become assimilated into the 
inventory of Vyäsa's works; but the name has stuck. It is often referred to simply as the 
Vyüsabadsya, but is also known as the Yoga- or Yogasütra-bhüsya, and as the 
Sämkhyapravacana-bhasya, the Yogasütra itself being widely regarded as an "expression" or 
"verbal presentation" (pravacana) of the Sämkhya teachings. No scholar seriously entertains 
that the author of the Yogabhüsya could be identical with that of the Brahmasütra, or indeed 
with the myriad authors that must have been required to produce the other works traditionally 
ascribed to Vyäsa, but the association of the name with the Yogabhasya is significant because 
it is suggestive of the authority that has been accorded to this particular commentary. Esti- 
mates of its date tend to gravitate towards the fifth and sixth centuries CE. 
Opinions on how useful the Yogabhüsya is in assisting our comprehension of the 
Yogasütra vary enormously. At one extreme there is the view that Vyäsa is a "great Yoga 
authority", whose commentary "illuminates our understanding of Patanjali's thought" 
(Whicher 1998a: 2,28). It has even been speculatively suggested (Bhärat 2001: Iii) that the 
Bhüsya might be an autocommentary (svopajnatikü) by Patanjali himself! At the other extreme 
is the view that the commentary is in many instances, and perhaps in most, an unhelpful dis- 
traction from the genuine meaning of the sutras, and that its author tries to impose upon the 
Yoga material an interpretation unduly biased towards Säzpkhya 48 Between these two ex- 
tremes is a continuum of viewpoints that regard the Bhüsya as being more or less useful in its 
exposition of the classical text. My own view is that both of the extreme positions just out- 
lined are, for separate reasons, unwarranted. The Bhäsya certainly appears, on occasions, to be 
following its own agenda, and thus can be said to be "imposing" certain interpretations upon 
the original text; but to characterise this imposition as Sämkhya philosophy being foisted upon 
an independent Yoga system is highly misleading. Vyäsa's interpretation might lack subtlety 
and sophistication in places, but the Särpkhya viewpoint is already present in the sutras them- 
selves. Moreover, in many instances he furnishes us with extrapolations of the sutras that are 
either perfectly plausible or at least worthy of exegetical consideration. In addition he helps to 
embed the sutras within the broader context of the Sätpkhya and Yoga traditions, especially by 
his insertion of quotations from earlier exponents of related philosophies (whose names we 
«Feuerstein (1979b: 25) approvingly quotes Hauer to this effect, and reiterates the view in the Preface to 
his own major work on classical Yoga (1980: ix-x). 
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sometimes learn only from later subcommentaries, most notably that of Väcaspati). My own 
assessment of the Bhüsya leads me to treat it, along with the other commentaries upon the 
Yogasütra, critically and discerningly, neither ignoring it nor accepting its interpretations as 
unquestionable. 
The Yogasütra is responsible for inspiring innumerable commentaries, several of which, as 
noted above, take the form of subcommentaries upon Vyäsa's Bhüsya. Descriptions and sum- 
maries of these texts can be found elsewhere (e. g. Arya 1986: 9-13; Feuerstein 1998: 
312-15). I shall do little more here than provide a list, along with approximate dates and a 
minimal amount of descriptive comment. 
" Tattvavaifäradf: a subcommentary (ttk«) by V5caspatimigra upon the Yogabhüsya. Either 
ca. 850 or late tenth century cE (the difficulty pertaining to Väcaspati's dates has been out- 
lined above). 
" Rajamürtanda or Bhojavrtti: a commentary upon the Yogasütra by Bhojaräja (a. k. a. ßho- 
jadeva) (1019-1054 CE), which is largely independent of the Yogablzüsya. 
" Kitäb pütanjal ("book of Pataiiijali"): a loose rendering of the Yogastätra plus an unspeci- 
fied commentary into Persian by Al-birüni (eleventh century CE). 49 Al-binäni is also responsi- 
ble for a translation into Persian of a Sätnkhya text, which he ascribes to Kapila. 
. Yogasütrabhäsyavivarana: a subcommentary upon the Yogabhü, rya composed by a certain 
Sankara-bhagavatpäda. The commentator's name has inevitably generated theories that he 
may have been the famous Vedäntin, ýankaräcärya, prior (according to Hacker 1968) to a 
conversion from Yoga to Advaita; but, although such speculations have not entirely been laid 
to rest, the current predominant view is that the vivarana belongs to the fourteenth century 
CE. so 
" Sarvadarfanasamgraha: a major work by the fourteenth-century Vedäntin (in the lineage 
of gankaräcärya), Mädhava, in which sixteen philosophical systems or approaches are sum- 
marised in an order that, unsurprisingly, implies the supremacy of Advaita Vedanta. Although 
not strictly a commentary, the chapter on Yoga provides a fair account of the classical system 
and, in doing so, serves to illustrate the high status that this system held during the medieval 
period. (A separate chapter on the classical Sämkhya of Igvaralcrsna is also included. ) 
. Yogasiddhüntacandrikä: a commentary (bhüsya) upon the Yogasütra by N5r5yanatirtha 
(late fifteenth or sixteenth century CE). A follower of Vallabhäcärya's "pure nondualist" 
(suddhüdvaita) interpretation of Vedanta, Ndräyanatirtha adopts a strongly devotional (bhakti) 
"So loose is the translation that Dasgupta (1922: 233) suspects that it must be based on a non-standard 
version of the 3'S. 
50 Cf. p. 29 fn. 39 above, and also Rukmani (1992: passim) and Leggett (1990: 39). 
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approach to yoga both in this substantial commentary and in his shorter vrtti entitled 
Sütrürlhabodhinr. A significant novelty of both works is the author's relating certain aspects 
of Tantric symbolism (e. g. cakras and kundalinisakti) to the classical Yoga system. 
" Yogavarttika: a subcommentary (vürttika or ttkü) on Vyäsa by Vijnänabhiksu (sixteenth 
century CE), who is also responsible for the more concise Yogasürasamgraha. Vijnänabhiksu 
has a particular philosophical position that he tries to promote through all of his works, includ- 
ing his commentaries. It consists in an attempted synthesis of the major Indian systems of 
thought, with his own interpretation of Vedänta as the umbrella under which the other systems 
are subsumed. 
" Yogdnu. täsanasütravrtti (a. k. a. Pradtpikü or Pradipa): largely a summary of 
Vijnänabhiksu's Yärttika by one of his own disciples, Bhävägane9adiksita (ca. late sixteenth 
century CE). 
" Brhaf and Laghvt two subcommentaries (vrttis) on Vyäsa by Nägegabhatta (a. k. a. 
Nägojibhatta) (ca. late sixteenth century CE), who is well known for his works on grammar and 
Vedänta. Like Vijfldnabhiksu and Bhäväganega, Nage§a makes it his aim to demonstrate that a 
unifying soteriological thread connects the classical Sämkhya and Yoga position with that of 
the principal sources of Vedanta, especially the Upanisads, the Gad, and the Brahniasi7tra. 
Again, however, as in the previous cases, this project tends to involve a suppression of the 
distinctively non-Vedantic elements in the Sämkhya and Yoga material. 
Maniprabhä: a short subcommentary on Vyäsa by Rämänandayati (sixteenth century CE). 
More recent commentaries include, from the eighteenth century, Sada ivendra's Yoga- 
sudhakara; from the eighteenth or nineteenth century, Anantadeva's Padacandrikü, 
Räghavänanda's Pütanjalarahasya, and Rämabhadradiksita's Patanjalicarita; and, from the 
twentieth century, Baladevamigra's Pradipika and Hariharänanda Aranya's Bhüsvati With a 
growing popular interest in certain aspects of yoga in the West, commentaries upon the 
Yogasütra have probably never been so prolifically manufactured nor so readily available as 
they are today. This is not, however, to say that the sharpness of philosophical analysis and 
depth of soteriological understanding conducive to composing such commentaries are always 
as prevalent as might be desired. 
POST-CLASSICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
In order to complete this historical overview it is necessary to say something about the ways in 
which the systems of Sämkhya and Yoga developed subsequent to their classical formulations. 
If any general point deserves to be made here it is that, during the centuries immediately fol- 
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lowing the period to which the Stpkhy'akürikü and Yogasütra have been ascribed, there ap- 
pears to have been a significant growth, or possibly a resurgence, in the loosely affiliated 
panoply of sects and lineages that are generally bundled together under the term "Tantra" or 
"Tantrism". This is important for various reasons, not least of which is the fact that among the 
features that are broadly shared by Tantric schools and traditions are, firstly, an emphasis 
upon bipolarity symbolism and, secondly, the promotion of yogic methods of contemplation 
(though, admittedly, often highly ritualised) as the optimum soteriological approach. 
The bipolarity symbolism adopted by many Tantric groups takes the form of a divine op- 
position between a male and a female deity. In Hindu and Jain traditions, the male deity typi- 
cally represents "knowledge" (jirüna) or "consciousness" (cit), and is, in himself, inactive, 
while the female deity stands for "power" or "energy" (Sakti) and the capacity to act and to 
manifest in any number of forms. For adherents of 8aiva and 85kta sects, the male deity would 
be some version of diva (often in one of his "fearsome" aspects such as bhairava) and the fe- 
male counterpart would be pürvati (or durgd, bhairavi, etc. ), whereas for Vaisnavas the dei- 
ties would be versions of visnu (or närüyana) and laksmi (or närd), an , etc. ). In 
Vajrayäna 
Buddhism, and in Buddhist Tantra more widely, the poles are reversed, the female being static 
"wisdom" or "insight" (praji: ä) and the male being dynamic "compassion" (karunä) (cf. 
Bharati 1965: 200 ff. ) 
There is an obvious parallel between the kind of polarity symbolism just outlined (at least 
in its non-Buddhist varieties) and the encounter between purusa (a passive, masculine specta- 
tor) and prakrti (a dynamic, feminine performer) that is depicted in the Sämkhya material. 
Many who have looked at the issue agree that the parallel is too close to be coincidental; but 
in view of the obscurity that pervades early medieval Indian history, determining a direction of 
influence between Tantra and Sämkhya is hardly a straightforward task. Many historical ac- 
counts of Sämkhya and Yoga give scant attention to Tantra, preferring to stick closely or ex- 
clusively to the less ritualistic and less symbolically elaborated strands of Indian soteriology. 
Scholars with a particular interest in Tantra, meanwhile, have been less reticent about express- 
ing opinions on the relationship. Agehananda Bharati, for example, asserts that the polarity 
symbolism of Tantra "has its philosophical background in the Sämkhya system, " which lie, far 
from uniquely, holds to be "the oldest systematized metaphysical school in India" (1965: 204). 
Others have suggested that many of the principal concepts associated with Sämkhya are so 
widely spread throughout Indian culture that they tend to be drawn upon and assimilated by 
various religious and philosophical groups, including those characterised as Tantric, without 
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there being any identifiable lineage of transmission. 5' A renegade stance is taken by De- 
biprasad Chattopadhyaya, who claims that Tantrism is far older than has generally been as- 
sumed, and that Sämkhya, rather than being a major source of Tantric concepts, is in fact "an 
explicit philosophical re-statement of the fundamental theoretical position implicit in Tan- 
trism" (1968: 362). Chattopadhyaya's broader theory is that Tantrism (and hence Sämkhya) 
has its origin in popular non-Vedic tribal traditions that antedate the Upanisads and are essen- 
tially materialist (1) in orientation (see e. g. 1968: xvi ff. ). This is speculative to the point of 
wanton fantasy, and is strongly influenced by its author's idiosyncratic interpretation of 
Marxist historicism. We need not, however, burden ourselves with such ideological encum- 
brances in order to acknowledge a close relation between Sämkhya and Tantra. 
In many Tantric systems there is an explicit avowal of monism, or "nondualism" (advaita), 
which might appear to contradict the connection with Sämkhya. Such avowals tend, however, 
to occur at the theoretical level without being fully realised in the Tantric symbolism, which 
remains flagrantly dualist. In certain systems, the metaphysical schema of classical Sämkhya, 
comprising twenty-five principles, is embellished in an attempt to form a conceptual bridge 
between the mutually irreducible principles of purusa and prakrti and a monistic absolute. For 
example, in the medieval nondualist gaiva school of Kashmir, which superseded the earlier 
dualistically-inclined gaivasiddhänta and whose most notable exponent was Abhinavagupta 
(tenth century CE), eleven such principles (tattvas) are added, making a total of thirty-six. The 
supreme principle is diva (also called bhairava, paramefvara, etc. ), and all the lesser princi- 
ples are, in some sense, his manifestation. The feminine aspect is said to always accompany 
Siva as his "power" (iak: ), which is expressed as active compassion or "grace" (anugraha). 52 
Thus we see that there is an attempt to affirm the self-sufficiency and pre-eminent authority of 
the absolute Siva while simultaneously enthroning a feminine principle alongside him. This 
manoeuvre is achieved by the use of poetic metaphors that leave the ontological status of Sakti 
profoundly ambiguous. She is "non-different" (avibadga)33 and not to be conceived as 
"separate" (bheda) from 8iva, 54 and yet she is lauded as a goddess (devil in her own right. The 
adorning of the Sämkhya framework with extra layers of symbolic complexity, which is ex- 
emplified well in Kashmiri Saivism but has also occurred in other Tantric systems, tends to 
result in a heightening of emotional evocativeness combined with a dilution and clouding of 
philosophical distinctions. 
"David White takes this view (1996: 20) and quotes Jean Filliozat's remark that "the Samkhyan concepts, 
like those of Ayurveda, are part and parcel of the intellectual baggage common to all Indian thinkers. " 
92 Abhinavagupta, ParatrrIikalaghuvriti, comment on verse I (Muller-Ortega 1989: 87,253 n. 19). 
33 Ibid., comment on verse 9 (Muller-Ortega 1989: 88,254 n. 21). 
34Ibid., comment on verse 1 (Muller-Ortega 1989: 87,253 n. 19). 
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The overlaying of Säipkhya's metaphysical categories with additional symbolic motifs is 
echoed in the ways in which Yoga, as a practical soteriological discipline, is treated within 
Tantric traditions. The well-known eightfold (actäfiga) system outlined in the second and third 
chapters of the Yogasütra is often discernible as an implicit foundation, but in the Tantric 
material far more emphasis tends to be placed upon the application of mantras and visualisa- 
tions as methods of meditation. To some extent, such methods are anticipated in the 
Yogasütra's third chapter (esp. 3.29-34), in which the effects of sustained meditation upon 
certain quasi-physiological energy centres (cakras) and channels (nüdis) are briefly mentioned 
as part of a varied assortment of meditation techniques. But in the Tantric literature can be 
found suggested visualisations of diagramatic emblems (yantras) and pictorial scenes that in- 
volve such rich and intricate complexity and close attention to detail that the pithy half- 
sentences of the Yogasütra appear arid by comparison. " Much of the Tantric material gives a 
particularly strong emphasis to the role of "vital energy" or "vital breath" (prü{za, vüyu) as the 
mechanism of psychophysical transformation, the proposed methodology being to accumulate 
the vital energy within the central "channel" (susuninä-nadir in order to thereby thermically 
stimulate and awaken the still more potent source represented as a coiled female serpent in the 
"root" energy centre (midädhära-cakra). The specific methods for arousing the serpent (who 
is referred to variously as kundal% kundalini, bhz jarigi, etc. ) include those of hatha-yoga 
("forceful yoga"), which primarily concerns the application of strenuous breathing techniques 
and bodily contractions in order to engender a prolonged, and in certain cases indefinite, sus- 
pension of breathing, known as kevala-kumbhaka ("absolute retention") or pränüyänia 
("extended retention of prüna") S6 Pränäyäma is a key component of the classical astänga 
system (YS 2.49-53), and thus there is no obvious incompatibility between Yoga in its classi- 
cal and its Tantric versions at a practical level. The differences consist largely in the ways that 
the goal of the practice is conceived and represented: the classical formulation being to eradi- 
cate mental states and processes in order that consciousness or "the seer" (drastr) can "abide 
in its own nature" (svarüpe 'vasthänam) (YS 1.2-3), whereas, in hatlia-yoga, as in Tantra more 
generally, the goal is represented as a trans-personal union of the feminine and masculine 
poles within the crucible of the human organism. 
55 See e. g. S`ivasamhiid 2.1-4: "Within the body mount Meru is surrounded by seven islands; there are riv- 
ers, seas, mountains, fields, and also guardians of the fields, " etc. (amended version of Vasu's translation; cf. 
Vasu 1996: 16). 
'6 "While the vital breath (prana) remains in the body, death is vanquished. The full containment of the air 
(vayu) is kevala-kumbhaka" (Gherandasamhild 5.89, my trans.; cf. Vasu 1976: 113; the same verse appears as 
5.84 in Digambarji and Gharote 1997: 140). Cf. Harhayogapradt-pi/a 2.71 if. (lyangar 1974: 35-36). 
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Present-day teachers of Yoga, both in the Indian subcontinent and elsewhere, tend not to 
distinguish sharply between the classical and Tantric teachings, combining both of them in 
their pedagogical approach, and also, of course, drawing upon a variety of other sources, such 
as the Upanisads, l3hagavadgitü, and Puränas, etc. It is likely that this tendency has become 
more prevalent since the establishment of printing presses facilitated easier access to a number 
of ancient texts, and that previous generations of teachers may have relied more heavily upon 
the teachings particular to their own lineage. But there are strong indications that a blurring of 
the philosophical uniqueness of Sämkhya and Yoga has been underway for several centuries; 
and the assimilation of the classical teachings into a hotchpotch of Tantric, Vedäntic, and de- 
votional elements is merely one manifestation of this process. The same process is evidenced 
in the attempts of later commentaries on the Yogasütra, such as those by Vijnänabhiksu, 
Bhäväganega and Nägegabhatta, to reconstruct Sämkhya and Yoga in ways that make them 
compatible with a monistic interpretation of Vedänta. 
Subsequent to the Sümkhyakdrikd there have been certain other texts that have endeav- 
oured to encapsulate the salient doctrines of Sämkhya without being mere duplicates of, or 
commentaries upon, the work of I§varakrsna. Most notable among these are the 
Tattvasamdsasütra and the Sümkhyasütra (sometimes referred to as the Sümkhyapravacana- 
sütra). Although anonymous, both works have attracted followers who have declared them to 
be the authentic words of Kapila; and, consequently, minor sub-traditions have flowed from 
them. Owing largely to the absence of any reference to either work in accounts of Sämkhya 
philosophy up to and including Mädhava's treatment in the Sarvadarsanasamgraha 
(fourteenth century CE), they are generally considered to be later than the mid-fourteenth cen- 
tury. This theory is supported by the fact that commentaries upon the two works do not start to 
appear until the late fourteenth century (in the case of the Tattvasamdsasütra) and the second 
half of the fifteenth century (in the case of the Sämkhyasütra). 
The Tattvasamüsasütra is a slender composition, comprising a mere twenty-five sutras, the 
last of which was probably added by the unknown author of the commentary known as the 
Kramadipikä (ca. late fourteenth century). The sutras are extremely short, most of them con- 
sisting of just two or three words, and amount to little more than subheadings, the implications 
of which are left for commentators to fill in. As expanded and interpreted by the Kramadipikü, 
and also by later commentaries such as the Tattvayüthürthyadipana of Bhäväganesa (ca. late 
sixteenth century), the Tattvasamäsasütra offers nothing that significantly differentiates its 
version of Sämkhya from that of I9varakrsna. 
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The Sümkhyasütra is a work of far greater length than the Tattvasamasasütra, and of the 
Sümklryakürikü as well. It comprises a total of 527 sutras divided into six chapters, and much 
of its content is of considerable philosophical interest. The earliest manuscript of the 
Sümkhyasütra also contains a commentary (vrtti) by Aniruddha, which Garbe (1888) has 
plausibly assigned to the late fifteenth century. The other well-known commentary on the 
Sämkhyasütra is Vijflänabhiksu's Sümkhyapravacanasatrabhüsya (ca. 1550-1600 CE), which, 
in common with its author's other works, tends to impose a form of monistic Vedanta onto the 
material that is ostensibly being commented upon, and this tendency makes it hermencutically 
unreliable although not necessarily philosophically insignificant. There are, however, signs in 
the Sdmkhyasütra itself that its author was keen to demonstrate Sdrpkhya's essential confor- 
mity with key utterances from the Upanisads. Crucially, for example, the Upanisadic declara- 
tions of the oneness of the self-which would appear to contradict the Sämkhya doctrine of a 
multiplicity of selves-are interpreted to mean that the multiple selves share a common nature 
(jäti), and to that extent are "nondual" (advaita) (SS 1.154). Although such attempts to har- 
monise the respective pronouncements of Sämkhya and Vedanta are not an entirely novel de- 
velopment, they are carried out here more explicitly than in previous instances. As has been 
noted earlier in this chapter, many of the preclassical versions of Sämkhya and Yoga tended to 
include concepts and phrases that later became more exclusive to the Vedäntic schools, but 
this tendency was probably due to a high degree of conceptual and terminological fluidity, 
rather than to the kind of self-conscious synthesising of ideas that is exhibited in the 
Samkhyasütra and its commentaries. This apparent desire to show Sämkhya's (and Yoga's) 
compatibility with druti, i. e. with the "heard" or "revealed" teachings of the Brahmanic and 
Upanisadic tradition, is absent, on the whole, in the classical texts and in the 
Tattvasamdsasütra. It is likely that such a desire arose due to the religious and philosophical 
hegemony of Vedäntic schools, and especially (from around the eighth century onwards) of 
the Advaita Vedanta associated with Sankaräcärya. 
It is, perhaps, partly because of the apologetic (and hence reactive) character of certain 
portions of the Sümkhyasütra that it has failed to supplant the Sämkhyakarikü as the principal 
exposition of Sämkhya philosophy, although this may also be due to the greater concision of 
I9varakrsna's composition, as well as to the obvious spuriousness of the claims made concern- 
ing the Simkhyastitra's authorship. Whatever the reasons may be, however, it remains the 
case that, in most modern-day presentations and discussions of Särpkhya, it is the 
Samkhyakärikü that is treated as primary, with the Sümkhyasütra being drawn upon, if at all, 
only in a secondary capacity. 
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Before completing this section I should mention that, in addition to Aniruddha's vrtti and 
VijOfinabhiksu's bhäsya, the Sdmkhyasütra has also attracted commentaries from Mahädeva- 
vedäntin (Vrttisära, ca. 1650-1700 CE), and Nägegabhatta (Sämkhyasütravrtti, ca. 1700-1750 
CE), and that further commentaries upon the three main Sämkhya works (i. e. the Kärikä, 
Tattvasamasasütra, and Sümkhyasütra), along with occasional original expositions of the 
Särpkhya teachings, have continued to be written up to the present day. 57 
s' Such works are too numerous to mention here. A fairly comprehensive list of all known Sarpkhya texts 
is given in EIP iv: 14-18. It is worth remarking that a significant proportion of the commentaries composed 
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T 
tIE MODEL of the development of Särpkhya and Yoga that was largely adhered to in the 
previous chapter-and which I have called the gestation or ontogenic model-has be- 
come widely accepted by scholars, though often, perhaps, merely tacitly due to the absence of 
anything more satisfactory. The model radically contravenes the view of the systems' origins 
which is held within the traditions themselves. According to this traditional account the 
Sämkhya teachings (of which Pätafijala-yoga is merely a restatement with a more practical 
emphasis) were born in the mind of an ancient sage named Kapila, who subsequently dictated 
them to his disciple Asuri, from whom a strict pedagogical lineage developed. The last few 
verses of the Sämkhyakürikd testify to this origination story, with Igvarakrsna himself being 
portrayed, not as an innovator and devisor of new ideas, but as a faithful transmitter of an al- 
ready existing body of knowledge. The ontogenic model obliterates this origination story by 
presenting the formation of Sämkhya and Yoga, not as the result of a great sage's revelatory 
intuition, but as a gradual process in which the relevant doctrines begin as vague and often 
mythologically encumbered notions that, over a period of several hundreds of years, acquire 
increased clarity and philosophical sharpness. If Kapila has any place at all in this latter ver- 
sion of events, then it is as someone who-at some unspecified point in the "clarification" 
process-brought a number of doctrines together in an early attempt to form a coherent sys- 
tem. 
Despite the high level of acceptance that it has received, there is a serious problem with the 
ontogenic model outlined above and in the previous chapter. This problem consists in the fact 
that what the model requires us to believe is that a complex and relatively coherent system of 
soteriological philosophy could emerge as the consequence of a series of more or less haphaz- 
ard events in the minds of an indefinite number of protagonists over the course of several 
dozen generations. That such a thing could occur is perhaps not beyond the realms of possi- 
bility, but it is not only highly improbable, it is also entirely at odds with what ordinarily oc- 
curs in the development of a philosophical system. Martin Heidegger noted, with regard to 
ancient Greek philosophy, that "what is great can only begin great", and that something small 
and primitive in its origins can only serve to diminish philosophical thinking rather than to 
enhance it in any way (1961: 15). This need not, and ought not, I think, be taken to mean that a 
43 
Metaphysics and Soteriology in Classical Samkhya and Yoga 
great philosophy must be brought into the world already fully fashioned in every regard, and 
immune to criticism. But there must be a coherent thought behind it; something of an inspira- 
tional quality. Schopenhauer (1966 t: xii f. ) drew a distinction between philosophies that com- 
prise a system of thought and those, like his own, that consist in a single thought. The former, 
lie held, must always possess an architectonic structure, supported by firm foundations, while 
the latter tend to be more "organic" in nature, in the sense that their parts are mutually sup- 
portive. Both kinds of philosophies can be great; for, although Schopenhauer conceived of his 
entire philosophical output as giving expression to a single thought (a conception which is, of 
course, highly questionable), he at the same time considered it to be in large measure a re- 
sponse to the work of Kant, who was the architectonic philosopher par excellence (ibid: xv). 
In any event, the point here is that, whether a philosophy is "architectonic" or "organic"-or 
(as I suspect is most often the case) a combination of these two ideals-it must have a certain 
unity or integrity; and it is hard to see how such integrity could be present in a set of disparate 
notions that have somehow, inexplicably, congealed together. 
My task in this chapter is not primarily to overturn the ontogenic model that I have just 
brought into question, for to do so convincingly would require far more attention to historical 
details than could possibly be given within the scope of this study. My main task is to justify 
my decision to speak about Sämkhya and Yoga, and occasionally about "Sämkhya-Yoga", 
rather than treating these two as completely autonomous philosophies. Such a justification 
will involve outlining a number of more-or-less speculative proposals concerning the histori- 
cal relationship of these two darganas, and to that extent it will warrant some further discus- 
sion of their origin (or origins) and development. But, because the default assumption regard- 
ing the relation between classical Sämkhya and Yoga is still, on the whole, that the two 
darganas are intimately complementary, my task is in large part merely the negative one of 
fending off the assertions of those who deny this intimate complementarity. These assertions 
have traditionally focused upon the place of i9vara in the two systems; or, to be more precise, 
upon his presence in the Yogasütra and apparent absence in the Sämkhyakürikü, which has led 
to Patafljali's Yoga being popularly dubbed sefvara Sämkhya-that is, "Sämkhya with (sa) 
ißvara"-in contrast with Igvarakrsna's so-called nirisvara Sämkhya ("Sämkhya without 
i9vara"). Additionally, from the time that classical Sämkhya and Yoga began to receive schol- 
arly attention in the first half of the nineteenth century, they have also tended to be distin- 
guished on methodological grounds; which is to say that, although the two systems are admit- 
ted to share the same goal of "aloneness" (kaivalya), they are held to expound alternative 
means of achieving that goal, Sämkhya being more rationally oriented in contrast with Yoga's 
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mystical or supra-rational approach. Those who adopt this position regarding the respective 
methodologies of Sämkhya and Yoga rarely go so far as to suggest that the difference has 
given rise to important metaphysical variations. Georg Feuerstein, however, is an exception to 
this rule; or, at least, has portrayed himself as such an exception by championing the right of 
classical Yoga to be seen as "an autonomous dariana with its own characteristic set of con- 
cepts and technical expressions", which "cannot be subsumed under the heading of Sämkhya" 
(1980: ix-x). Although I do not regard Feuerstein's case as particularly strong, and it has not, 
as far as I can tell, won many supporters, it does at least bring together a number of points that 
need to be refuted if my treatment of Särnkhya and Yoga is to remain valid. I shall therefore 
devote a large part of the present chapter to such a refutation, in the course of which I shall 
include a number of remarks that clarify my own position regarding the relation between the 
two dar§anas, and which hint towards the intrinsicality of the relation between the metaphysi- 
cal schema of Sämkhya and the introspective methodology of Yoga, which is a theme that will 
be further explored in later chapters (esp. Chapter 6). 
THE HISTORICAL RELATION 
Not all researchers that have looked at the history of Sämkhya and Yoga have been enticed by 
the ontogenic model. Richard Garbe, for example, did not accept it, and neither did he accept 
the traditional account of a unified and faithful lineage of transmission. He held, rather, that 
the Sämkhya system must owe its origin to the genius of a single mind, in which it was formu- 
lated prior to its incorporation into several Upanisads and portions of the epic and Pauränic 
literature (Garbe 1917: 54-59), but that the ways in which it was so incorporated involved a 
large measure of "contamination" by popular ideas that were foreign to the original 
Sämkhya. ' Underlying Garbe's viewpoint is his thesis that Sämkhya represents a non-Vedic, 
or non-Brahmanic, current within Indian thought, and that it has undergone various attempts to 
assimilate it into the mainstream religious culture (1917: 5 f. ). By calling it "non-Brahmanic", 
what is meant is that Sämkhya was not a product or an expression of the dominant religious 
order, in which salvific power lay in the hands of the priestly elite whose members were enti- 
tled to perform ritual ceremonies. Although the weakness of Garbe's arguments in support of 
this thesis has been persuasively demonstrated by Keith (1949: 58-59), who favours a version 
of the evolutionary story of Sämkhya's development, I think there is good reason for us to 
pause before dismissing the "extra-Brahmanic" proposal completely. Garbe's mistake, in my 
view, is to attribute the unorthodox character of Sämkhya to the influence of the ksatriya 
'Garbe's position is neatly, and fairly, summarised by Keith (1949: 53). 
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varpa, i. e. the Indian social group responsible for governing and militarily defending geo- 
political domains (see Keith 1949: 58). In none of the contexts in which the term sämkhya is 
used does such an influence seem likely. Sämkhya is, on the contrary, invariably associ- 
ated-as, in most instances, is Yoga-with renunciation of possessions and status, and the 
pursuit of transformative insight through quietist contemplation. Such an approach to life does 
not fit easily either with the Brahmanic emphasis upon ritual sacrifice (designed to increase 
personal merit and good fortune but not to engender permanent liberation from experiential 
existence) or with the this-worldly activities and aspirations of ksatriyas. If, however, we are 
to regard the asceticism represented by Sämkhya and Yoga as non-Brähmanic, then there is a 
sense in which the entire Upanisadic tradition is equally non-Brähmanic, since the ideal of the 
sagely renunciant absorbed in profound contemplation, beyond worldly attachment and iden- 
tification, is an image that pervades all the Upanisads, not merely those explicitly or implicitly 
linked with Sämkhya and Yoga. 
Neither wishing to get too deeply embroiled in a discussion of ancient Indian history in 
general, nor to present too crude and simplistic an account, I think I can safely note that the 
line of religious and cultural development from the Vedic Samhitäs (or collections of invoca- 
tory verses) to the systematised philosophies of India is not, in fact, a line at all, but something 
analogous to an immense banyan tree with "new branches and roots forever springing up or 
down as others wither away" (Lipner 1994: 5). 2 Among these branches and roots-and pos- 
sibly forming the main trunk itself-are a number of traditions of ritual worship, whose prac- 
tices are formalised in the Brähmana texts that were appended to the Vedic Samhitäs, and 
which have commonly been taken to stand for "the Brahmanic tradition". Interwoven with this 
tradition, or set of traditions, are various minor traditions and pedagogical lineages, often 
linked to founding preceptors, that tend to be oriented less toward ritual activity and more to- 
ward ascetic and introvertive discipline. These ascetic traditions find their voice in the 
Aranyakas, and even more so in the Upanisads, which have also been appended to the Vedic 
Samhitäs, thereby establishing the fourfold division of the so-called "heard wisdom" (sruti) 
into Samhitä (or Mantra), Brähmana, Aranyaka, and Upanisad. 3 
It is, in my view, with the ascetic traditions in general that Sämkhya and Yoga can most 
plausibly be held to have had their origins, neither as pre-Vedic nor as reactions to Brahmanic 
hegemony, but as lineages that began with a particular individual, and then followed a line of 
2 Lipner uses this analogy to characterise Hinduism in general, and not merely its classical and preclassical 
manifestations; but it is, of course, equally applicable in both cases. 
3 The presence of significantly overlapping and disputed portions of the latter three categories of gruti 
obliges us to regard the fourfold division as merely approximate, rather than as an exact representation of the 
textual reality. 
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descent from teacher (guru) to disciple (tir)ya). Over time, because one teacher can have sev- 
eral disciples, a number of lineages would tend to develop; and in the absence of written texts, 
it is inevitable that interpretive variations would slip into the teachings transmitted along these 
divergent lineages. Similar to Garbe, I consider it likely that the examples of Särpkhya and 
Yoga doctrines found in the Upanisads, Afahübhürala, Puränas, and elsewhere are the result 
of those doctrines' having been borrowed or assimilated from already existing schools or mi- 
nor traditions. The alternative view, which, though rarely explicitly articulated, implies that 
the systems of Sämkhya and Yoga somehow, mysteriously, evolved out of disparate fragments 
gleaned from the various available textual sources, is founded upon a misunderstanding of 
how philosophical systems originate in general and of the traditional process of doctrinal 
transmission in India in particular. 
Before moving on to discuss a selection of views of the relation between Sämkhya and 
Yoga, it is worth mentioning an interesting variation on the "evolutionary" story of their de- 
velopment. This is the proposal, put forward at the end of the nineteenth century by Paul 
Deussen, that Särnkhya and Yoga did indeed come together through a process of gradual 
metamorphosis of Upanisadic thought, but that, far from constituting a progressive integration 
of a number of disparate strands, this process in fact amounted to a "natural disintegration" of 
an originally superior philosophy (1919: 245; cf. 235 ff. ). According to this proposal, the ear- 
liest Upanisads-namely the ancient prose works such as the Brhadäranyaka and 
Ch ndogya-are inspired by an exalted monistic idealism, which, in the subsequent metrical 
and later prose Upanisads, can be seen to descend, via pantheism and cosmogonism, 4 to the- 
ism and eventually to atheism; this last being, on Deussen's view, embodied in the Sdgikhya 
system. The final destination in this abysmal decline is a form of deism, which Deussen at- 
tributes to Yoga. It differs from the "atheistic" Sämkhya only in the respect that, "from con- 
siderations of practical convenience", it appends to that system a personal, yet essentially in- 
active, deity (1919: 238-39). 5 Deussen's approach is useful insofar as it draws attention to the 
variety of metaphysical viewpoints that can be detected within the Upanisads, but his division 
of these viewpoints into a linear schema comprising several discrete stages is over-simplistic, 
and presupposes a level of certainty pertaining to Upanisadic chronology that neither he nor 
any subsequent researcher has been capable of validating. Far worse than this, however, is his 
4 Cosmogonism being the view that the "self" (atman) produces the universe from out of itself and then 
"enters into it as soul" (Deussen 1919: 238). 
3 Deussen presumably regarded the distinction between deism and theism in similar terms to Kant, who 
notes that "the deist represents this being [i. e. God] merely as a cause of the world (whether by the necessity 
of its nature or through freedom, remains undecided), the theist as the Author of the world [who can be con- 
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characterisation of Särnkhya and Yoga as forms of "atheism" and "deism" respectively. Such 
terms, being derived from distinctively Western theological discourse, can be highly mislead- 
ing when applied to ancient Indian systems, unless they are very heavily qualified indeed. 
Deussen is perhaps unique in his attribution of "deism" to Yoga, but "atheism" and "theism" 
continue to be bandied around even in relatively recent works on Sdrpkhya and Yoga, as 
though it were self-evident what these terms mean in an Indian context. 6 I shall, however, 
leave further discussion of this matter until I come to deal with the whole question of the im- 
puted "atheism" of classical Sdrpkhya later in this chapter, and shall turn now to a broad cate- 
gorisation of the alternative conceptions of the relation between Sdrpkhya and Yoga. 
Theories (or, in some cases, pre-theoretical assumptions) regarding this relation can be 
placed into four main categories, which I shall call, respectively, (a) the single system view, 
(b) the divergence view, (c) the grafting-on view, and (d) the separate systems view. 
(a) According to the "single system" view, Sämkhya and Yoga have, from their beginnings, 
constituted not two distinct systems but, rather, two complementary expressions of an essen- 
unified enterprise. The classical versions of these darganas can, therefore, be regarded as tially 
two halves (or aspects, poles, etc. ) of the same system: one half (namely, Sämkhya) gives pri- 
mary emphasis to theoretical matters, and the other (namely, Yoga) is principally practical in 
orientation, but both are harmonised within the compass of a theory-practice unity, which is 
directed towards the common soteriological goal of kaivalya. Chakravarti exemplifies this 
position when, speaking of Sdrpkhya and Yoga, he states that "The former is specially busy 
with the theoretical investigation, whereas the latter deals with the practical side. Speaking 
briefl y, the two systems are nothing but the concave and convex side of the same sphere" 
(1975: 65). 7 Proponents of this view are apt to use the conjunct expression "Sämkhya-Yoga" 
not merely as a shorthand for "Sämkhya and Yoga", but to designate a single system (or 
6The following is a selection of examples: "The main difference between the Sdmkhya and Yoga, as is 
generally known, lies in the fact that the former is regarded as atheistic while the latter is known to be theis- 
tic" (Chakravarti 1975: 65); "The atheism of Classical SAmkhya and the curious theism of Classical Yoga 
must be understood as deviations from a strongly theistic base, reflected in the Upanishads" (Feuerstein 
1998: 265); "The atheism of the SaAkhya is one of its outstanding features" (Surynarayana Sastri 1948: xvi); 
"as a system Sathkhya is atheistic" (Keith 1949: 13 fn. 1); "Since Sänkhyans are atheists, it is not God whose 
existence they are trying to prove but rather purusa and unmanifest prakrtr' (Lusthaus 1998: 465). Larson has 
provided a more thoughtful discussion of the issue, in which he characterises the classical Sämkhya view of 
"the problem of salvation" as "non-theistic" rather than "atheistic" (1979: 125-26). 
7Cf. Zimmer (1953: 280): "These two are regarded in India as twins, the two aspects of a single disci- 
pline. Sankhya provides a basic theoretical exposition of human nature, enumerating and defining its ele- 
ments, analyzing their manner of co-operation in the state of bondage (bandha), and describing their state of 
disentanglement or separation in release (moksa), while Yoga treats specifically of the dynamics of the proc- 
ess of disentanglement, and outlines practical techniques for the gaining of release, or `isolation' (kaivalya). " 
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"sphere", in Chakravarti's metaphor) that combines these two aspects. ' It is a common feature 
of this view, or perhaps a sub-variety of it, that S5tpkhya is seen as the more comprehensive 
side of the partnership, and that Yoga is merely a compartment or "school" to be referred to as 
"Pätafijala-Sämkhya" (see e. g. Dasgupta 1922: 229). 9 In support of this view it is sometimes 
noted that the most important commentators upon the Yogasütra have been unanimous in re- 
garding Yoga as an "exposition" (pravacana) of Sämkhya, and that the very expressions 
"Patalijali's exposition of Sämkhya" (pätai jala sünrkhya pravacana) and "Yoga doctrine" 
(yoga-. tüstra) appear next to one another in the colophons traditionally inserted at the end of 
each chapter of Vyäsa's Bhä; sya (cf. Chakravarti 1975: 73). 
The "single system" view that I have just outlined is often asserted in terms that are suffi- 
ciently vague to leave the precise nature of the relation between classical Sämkhya and Yoga 
undisclosed. When Sämkhya and Yoga are said to be "twins", or aspects of the same "sphere", 
it is rarely, if ever, implied that the Yoga of Pataiyali and the Särpkhya of flvarakrsna per- 
fectly reflect one another. Rather, what is meant-I presume-is that Yoga (of which 
Patanjali's is the principal version) shares enough in common with expositions of Särnkhya 
(of which Igvarakrsna's is the most coherent) for the classical forms of Sämkhya and Yoga to 
be regarded as complementary and not antagonistic. The presence of such vagueness blurs the 
distinction somewhat between the "single system" view and that which I shall now come to, 
namely the "divergence" view. 
(b) The "divergence view" conceives of classical Sämkhya and Yoga as being derived from 
a single system but as having diverged from one another at some point along a more or less 
complicated sequence of transmissions, which "sequence" is perhaps better pictured as a bush 
with multiple branches than as a chain of orderly links. On this view, then, the two classical 
systems are related to one another more as cousins than as twins. This is the view that I take, 
and I suspect that it approximates by far the most common understanding of the historical re- 
lation between classical Sämkhya and Yoga, and that this fact has tended to be obscured by 
the confusing smokescreen of the ontogenic model. Dasgupta subscribes to it in his Yoga 
Philosophy in Relation to Other Systems of Indian Thought, where he supposes that "we have 
lost the original Sänkhya texts, whereas the systems that pass now by the name[s] of Sänkhya 
and Yoga represent two schools of philosophy which evolved through the modifications of the 
original Sänkhya school" (1930: 2). There may not have been any "original Sämkhya texts", 
' Sen Gupta, for example, speaks of "Sämkhya-Yoga philosophy" in the singular (1982: ix, and passim), 
and Dasgupta refers to "the Samkhya-Yoga system" (1922: 222). 
'Some scholars (e. g. Frauwallner and Chakravarti) have speculated that "PdtaBjala-Sämkhya" might be a 
continuation of the school associated with Varsaganya and Vindhyavasin (see EIP tv: 12-13), but such 
speculations are of only tenuous relevance to our present topic. 
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or, at least, not written ones; the teachings may have been passed on orally, which would have 
facilitated relatively easy modification along different lineages. And thus, when they come to 
be written down by scribes within those different lineages, it is hardly surprising that variant 
forms are produced. 
One point, which is often taken for granted but needs to be stated explicitly, is that the 
Sämkhyakürikü and the Yogasütra are clearly composed for different purposes. Both of them 
comprise a number of proclamations presented in condensed formats that are relatively ame- 
nable to memorisation; and both, it is fair to assume, are intended primarily for the instruction 
of initiated disciples by their more learned and experienced mentors. However, while the 
Kürikü is primarily an exposition of the theoretical principles underlying soteriological prac- 
tice, the Yogasütra is to a far greater extent a guide to the practice itself. This significant di- 
remption of emphasis needs to be born in mind whenever claims are made concerning appar- 
ent philosophical discrepancies of the classical darganas. I shall return to this particular issue 
of emphasis later, when discussing the respective methodologies of Sämkhya and Yoga; but it 
is also highly relevant to the third position on the relation between the two darganas, which is 
the "grafting on" thesis. 
(c) This "grafting on" view can, once again, be found in the work of Dasgupta-which fact 
in itself is suggestive of the apparent ease with which certain scholars are able to slide from 
one position to another-although it has been around at least since Garbe's time. In common 
with the first two views, it asserts that classical Sarpkhya is an exposition of a much older 
body of teachings; but unlike those views, it holds that classical Yoga is a far more artificial 
construction, amounting essentially to a collection of technical instructions plus a few ad hoc 
doctrines that have been attached, or "grafted on", to some already existing (presumably pre- 
classical) version of the Sämkhya dargana. Garbe makes the point as follows: 
The metaphysical basis of the Yoga system is Sämkhya philosophy, whose doctrines Patafijali so 
completely incorporated into his system that that philosophy is with justice uniformly regarded in 
Indian literature as a branch of the Sämkhya. At bottom, all that Patafljali did was to embellish the 
Sämkhya system with the Yoga practice, the mysterious powers, and the personal god; his chief 
aim had, no doubt, been to render this system acceptable to his fellow-countrymen by the eradi- 
cation of its atheism. (1899: 14-15) 
The latter remark concerning Patafijali's primary motivation displays an astonishing naivity, 
which has nevertheless been repeated by subsequent scholars. 1° The idea that the "chief aim" 
of the Yogasütra's compiler was to achieve popular acceptability for the Särnkhya philosophy 
'o Macdonell, for example, asserts that, "In order to make his system more acceptable, Patanjali introduced 
into it the doctrine of a personal god, but in so loose a way as not to affect the system as a whole" (1900: 
396-97). 
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is, frankly, preposterous. Leaving this aside, however, the extract exhibits two metaphorical 
descriptions of the relation between Sämkhya and Yoga, the first being that the former system 
is "incorporated into" the latter, and the second being that Yoga amounts merely to an 
"embellish[ment]" of Särpkhya (though, as usual, we arc left uncertain whether it is classical 
Sär ikhya or some broader category that is being referred to). Both metaphors evoke a kind of 
parasitic relationship, with the founder of Yoga making use of Särpkhya to suit his own pur- 
poses. The "grafting" metaphor that I have used to characterise this position as a whole de- 
rives from Dasgupta, who says of Patafijali that he "not only collected the different forms of 
Yoga practices, and gleaned the diverse ideas which were or could be associated with the 
Yoga, but grafted them all on the Särpkhya metaphysics" (1922: 229). The major problem 
with this thesis is that it fundamentally misconstrues the relation between the metaphysical 
principles on the one hand and the contemplative discipline on the other. It assumes that these 
two components-which are, in my view, critical elements of both Sämkhya and Yoga-can 
come into being and be intelligibly discussed independently of one another, when in fact they 
are mutually reflexive and reinforcing. It relies on an exaggerated emphasis on the use of ra- 
tional arguments in the Sümkhyakürikü in order to claim that the metaphysical schema that is 
at the heart of both Sämkhya and Yoga can be arrived at separately from sustained non- 
ratiocinative meditation. This attribution of distinct methodologies to the two systems 
("rationalism" in the case of Sämkhya and "contemplation" in that of Yoga) is a distortion that 
continues to infect studies of them up to the present day, " and, as already noted, I shall be 
returning to it below. 
(d) To complete this fourfold classification, I need to mention the thesis that Sämkhya and 
Yoga began as separate systems and remain so in their classical forms. No one would deny 
that the two systems share a great deal in common, and thus it is at least questionable whether 
they can genuinely and consistently be regarded as entirely separate. For most scholars the 
relevant question is not whether Sämkhya and Yoga are related, but how, or in what ways, this 
relation manifests. However, in Feuerstein's case-although by no means consistently 
throughout his works-there appears to be an almost missionary zeal to distinguish classical 
Yoga from Sämkhya and to declare that the divergent methodologies of the two systems 
(which divergence was, presumably, on this view, present from their individual inceptions) 
has "initiated important conceptual and doctrinal divergencies which further increased the 
chasm between both schools of thought" (1980: 116). 1 shall now discuss in some detail the 
11 Whicher, for example, contrasts classical Samkhya's stress on "theoretical/intellectual analysis" with 
classical Yoga's emphasis on "the necessity of personal experimentation and practical meditational tech- 
niques" (1998a: 53). 
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piece of Feuerstein's work that is most relevant here, inserting, where appropriate, more gen- 
eral remarks that relate back to previous passages in the present chapter. 
FEUERSTEIN'S VIEW OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 
CLASSICAL SAIYIKHYA AND YOGA 
The piece in which Feuerstein most vigorously pushes his assertion of the wide gap between 
classical Sämkhya and Yoga appears as the seventh chapter in his short book, The Philosophy 
of Classical Yoga, the author having made it clear at the very outset of the book that he holds 
the "single most important finding" of his research to be "the fact that Patanjali's system can- 
not be subsumed under the heading of Sämkhya", that "Classical Yoga is exactly what its 
protagonists claim: an autonomous darsana with its own characteristic set of concepts and 
technical expressions", and that the "popular scholarly impression according to which Classi- 
cal Yoga is some kind of parasite, capitalising on the philosophical efforts of Classical 
Sämkhya, is [... ] in need of urgent and radical revision" (pp. ix-x). '2 It is not at all clear, 
however, who Feuerstein has in mind when he refers to the "protagonists" of classical Yoga. It 
is certainly not the authors of the traditional commentaries on the Yogasütra, for these in- 
variably and liberally draw upon Sämkhya sources in order to explain the sutras and generally 
stress, not Yoga's autonomous status, but its continuity with Särpkhya (though, admittedly, 
not necessarily classical Sämkhya). Indeed, one of the things Feuerstein is particularly keen to 
do is "combat the overpowering influence exercised by Vyäsa's scholium" (p. ix), for the very 
reason that he considers Vyäsa to have "superimposed the views of his particular school on 
the philosophy of Patahjali, " rather than having provided a neutral, and thus more trustworthy, 
exegesis (p. 51). Since the other major commentaries either take Vyäsa's bhäsya as their 
starting-point or impose an equally biased interpretation of their own upon the sutras, it is 
doubtful whether any protagonists of classical Yoga fit Feuerstein's description. Even 
Patanjali himself-or whoever is responsible for compiling the Yogasütra-nowhere explic- 
itly declares the "autonomy" of Yoga. 
In any case, notwithstanding the dearth of enthusiasm for his viewpoint from traditional 
sources, Feuerstein holds that he has identified "three areas of contrast between Classical 
12 More recent writings by Feuerstein indicate that his views have not significantly changed since the first 
publication, in 1980, of the work discussed here. These views are, however, often hard to pin down due to the 
presence of ambiguities in his remarks. For example, the statement (2001: xii) that "It is seldom understood 
that Patafljali made his own unique contribution to metaphysics and did not merely adopt wholesale the prin- 
ciples of Sämkhya, as we know it from the Sümkhya-Karikä" could be taken to mean, among other things, that 
Patafijali did not adopt any of the Sämkhya principles, or that he adopted all of them and then added his own 
modifications. It is likely, of course, that Feuerstein means that Patafijali adopted some but not all such prin- 
ciples, but the "merely" confuses the issue. 
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Särpkhya and Pätaiijala-Yoga, " these being: (i) methodology, (2) doctrinal framework, and (3) 
terminology. Of these, he considers the first to be largely responsible for the other two (p. 
112). It is therefore central to Feuerstein's argument that he should be able to provide convinc- 
ing evidence that the methodologies of Särpkhya and Yoga differ significantly from one an- 
other. 
Methodology 
Feuerstein begins by asserting that, "whereas Classical Sämkhya relies heavily on the power 
of ratiocination and discernment, Classical Yoga, like any other yogic tradition, is founded on 
a philosophy which encourages personal experimentation and direct `mystical' verification" 
(p. 113). As has been noted already, he is not at all unique in making this assertion. Indeed, 
assertions to similar effect have become platitudinous in studies of the two systems. Van 
Buitenen has pointed the finger of culpability at Garbe for initiating, or at least consolidating, 
the characterisation of Sämkhya as "a rational system" (van Buitenen 1957a: 15). Garbe sub- 
titled his major work on Sämkhya "a system of Indian rationalism", " and, in another mono- 
graph, stated that, of all Indian philosophies, Särnkhya "claims our first and chief attention, 
because it alone attempts to solve its problems solely by the means of reason" (1899: 29). 14 
Proponents of this "rationalist" interpretation of Sämkhya often encounter an obstinate 
difficulty when they try to contrast this rational methodology with the approach of Yoga. 
What they want to say, it seems, is that Sämkhya and Yoga can be distinguished from one an- 
other on the basis that the former system has been arrived at by purely logical or rational 
methods while the latter is principally, or perhaps exclusively, the result of direct intuition 
obtained in altered states of consciousness. The problem is that, in view of the fact that both 
systems are intended to bring about the same ultimate end, which is expressed as the 
"aloneness" (kah'alya) of the self (puruca) or consciousness (drft) (SK 68; YS 2.25; 3.50,55; 
4.26,34), it seems highly unlikely-indeed, ridiculous-that they could achieve this by fun- 
damentally different approaches. The problem would not be so serious if the kind of knowl- 
edge being sought related merely to some mundane matter of fact, such as whether there is, or 
is not, a cat outside my window, or how long it takes to walk from my house to the post office, 
or even what the circumference of the earth is at its equator. There is in each of these cases 
more than one way of finding out the desired information, some of which will be more valid 
'3 Die Sa, nkhya-Philosophie: Eine Darstellung des indischen Rationalismus (Leipzig: Haessel, 1894; 2nd 
edn 1917). 
"Davies, however, indicates in several remarks that Garbe's view was shared by himself, and thus 
probably by other scholars of the time. He says, for example, of Samkhya that "It is the earliest attempt on 
record to give an answer, from reason alone, to the mysterious questions which arise in every thoughtful mind 
about the origin of the world, the nature and relations of man, and his future destiny" (1894: v). 
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than others, and others of which might be equally valid. In the case of the kind of knowledge 
whose pursuit is the very raison d'etre of Särpkhya and Yoga, however, its acquisition is said 
to involve a transcendence of the very cognitive processes by means of which all other knowl- 
edge, whether empirical or conceptual, is obtained. So utterly distinct is the resultant state 
from our ordinary conception of knowledge that a strong case could be made for denying that 
the term "knowledge" has any applicability to it whatsoever. This issue will be taken up in 
later chapters (esp. Chapter 7); but for now, the most urgent point to stress is that the goal of 
Yoga and Sämkhya, at least as it is described in the classical texts, is a non-ratiocinative (or, 
if one prefers, supra-ratiocinative) state, which cannot possibly be attained by rational means 
alone. 
That the goal of Sämkhya appears to be precisely that of Yoga, and thus consists in a ces- 
sation of mental activities and not an ongoing process of inferential reasoning, is a stubborn 
fact that won't go away. Those who wish to maintain that a major difference exists between 
the two darganas at the level of methodology therefore generally have to simply ignore this 
fact when describing Särpkhya's "rationalism". Radhakrishnan, for example, acknowledges in 
one place that the goal of Sämkhya seems to be a passive state, "which no breath of emotion 
or stir of action disturbs" (1927 It: 314), while earlier in the same chapter asserting, in concord 
with Garbe, that "Sämkhya is a notable attempt in the realm of pure philosophy", whose very 
name indicates "the fact that it arrives at its conclusions by means of theoretical investigation" 
(ibid.: 249). '5 flow a state of complete mental passivity (which, Radhakrishnan admits, 
"seems to be an extinction of individuality" (p. 313)) can be arrived at "by means of theoreti- 
cal investigation" is not explained. Nor is it explained by Dasgupta, who states that "What the 
Sämkhya tries to achieve through knowledge, Yoga achieves through the perfected discipline 
of the will and psychological control of the mental states" (1922: 273). This attempt to asso- 
ciate Särpkhya and Yoga with "knowledge" and "will" respectively-and to distinguish be- 
tween them at least partly on this basis-is surprising, and completely fatuous. Both systems 
are concerned with "knowledge" (viveka, jiäna, v(iJRna, prajhil) in the sense of cultivating an 
awareness of the non-identity of purusa and prakrti, and both of them, presumably, involve 
some directional effort that could be loosely referred to as "will"; it is therefore highly inap- 
propriate to suggest that "knowledge" and "discipline of will" are employed exclusively by 
either dargana. 
"The same expression-i. e. "The Samkhya is held to be the most notable attempt in the realm of pure 
philosophy"-is used by Theos Bernard (1989: 84). And compare Davies (1894: v): "The system of Kapila, 
called Sankhya or Rationalistic, [... j contains nearly all that India has produced in the department of pure 
philosophy. " 
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An alternative, but in my view no less illegitimate, way of trying to overcome the stubborn 
problem mentioned above is to contend that, notwithstanding their apparent equivalence, the 
goals of Särnkhya and Yoga are not in fact the same; or, to be more precise, as represented in 
the classical texts they are the same, but followers of the Särpkhya approach fall short of the 
supreme soteriological terminus, which can be reached only by means of Yoga. A pedantic 
reading of the quotation from Dasgupta in the last paragraph might take its author to be in- 
sinuating such a claim: "What Sämkhya tries to achieve [... ] Yoga achieves" (1922: 273, em- 
phasis added); but Dasgupta probably did not intend to imply by this that Sätpkhya offers a 
less reliable vehicle than does Yoga. Ian Whicher, however, does not merely imply the inade- 
quacy of Säipkhya to arrive at the final destination; he states it explicitly: "Yoga, in its pro- 
gram of purification, goes beyond the position of classical Sdipkhya [... ], which seems to rest 
content with a discriminating knowledge (viveka) leading to a final isolation of purusa or ab- 
solute separation between purusa and prakrti" (1998a: 288). "[Sämkhya's] conceptual means 
of discrimination (viji"räna) is not sufficient [... ] for the aspiring yogin. [... ] In Yoga, immor- 
tality is realized through consistent practice and self-discipline, and is not something to be 
demonstrated through inference, analysis, and reasoning" (1998a: 53). It should be mentioned 
that Whicher's interpretation of the goal of Yoga is somewhat unusual, for he imagines it to be 
an embodied state of indefinite duration in which experience and action has been "purified" 
but not discontinued (1998a: 275 ff. ). This interpretation enables him to portray the goal of 
Sämkhya in a way that, on most accounts, would exactly coincide with that of Yoga while 
maintaining that the latter dargana seeks a loftier destination. Despite the unavoidable conse- 
quence of this view being that the "absolute separation" of purusa and prakrti (and thus the 
cessation of all thought) is achievable by some form of ratiocination, Whicher does not dwell 
upon this point, and thus we are denied an explanation of how thinking can bring about its 
own demise. (Whicher's interpretation of the goal of Yoga will receive further attention in 
Chapter 7 below. ) 
Returning to Feuerstein's case, we find that, without wholeheartedly committing himself to 
the kind of Yogic supremacist position adopted by Whicher, he insinuates the defectiveness of 
Sämkhya by claiming that "adherents of Yoga [... ] feel that the reconditioning of the cogni- 
tive apparatus as achieved by the method recommended in Classical Sämkhya is not condu- 
cive to that complete rupture with the phenomenal which alone is capable of securing emanci- 
pation" (1980: 115). In his account of what "the method recommended in Classical Samkhya" 
consists in, Feuerstein picks out two important terms from the Sümkhyakärikü and interprets 
them in ways that support his overall "rationalistic" characterisation. The two selected terms, 
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or expressions, are vUfidna and tattva-abhyüsa, both of which occur only once in the Kärikü, 
at verses 2 and 64 respectively. Feuerstein doesn't say a great deal about either of them; but 
having defined viii na as "the careful holding apart of the three essential ontological catego- 
ries postulated by Särpkhya"-namely, (t) manifest prakrti, (2) unmanifest prakrti, and (3) 
purusa-he then goes on to say the following about the second of the two expressions: 
Tattva-abhyüsa, which is applied vijiWäna, represents the effort to disrupt the habit of the em- 
pirical ego of identifying with the phenomenal contents of consciousness, so as to re-locate man's 
true identity in the transcendental Self. Man is essentially purusa, and in order to reach Self- 
authenticity he must divest himself of all phenomenal accretions, such as mind, body, external 
property [and] social relations. (1980: 114) 
What Feuerstein successfully highlights here is the centrality of self-identity in Särnkhya's 
soteriological project, its methodology being intended to bring about the cessation of false 
identification. In my view, the elements with which one is to disidentify would be better de- 
scribed as the mental capacities and processes that make phenomenal consciousness possible, 
rather than as simply "the phenomenal contents of consciousness" or "phenomenal accre- 
tions", but, roughly speaking, Feuerstein's description is on the right lines. What remains 
mystifying, however, is why Feuerstein should assume that, for Sämkhya, this "relocation" of 
one's self-identification (which, it could be argued, ends in an abandonment of the sense of 
selfhood altogether) is a "rationalistic" process, when the rational mind is evidently one of the 
"accretions" to be disidentified with and stripped away! 16 
While Feuerstein does not overlook the importance of renunciation and non-attachment 
(vairdgya) in Särpkhya, even this he tries to associate with an underlying rationalism, stating 
that, according to kärikä 45, "vYIiäna must be accompanied by an act of renunciation of every- 
thing that reason-in keeping with tradition-has revealed to be `non-self"' (1980: 114). The 
expression "reason-in keeping with tradition" is somewhat oxymoronic, for, at least in west- 
ern philosophy, reason has tended to be contrasted with tradition, the latter being considered 
to impose dogmatic constraints upon the reasoning process. In view of this fact, we might be- 
gin to question the sense in which Feuerstein is using terms such as "reason" and 
"rationalistic". He confidently asserts of vynüna that it "is by no means synonymous with 
prajºiü or gnostic insight as acquired in samüdhr", but is, rather, "an intellectual act of con- 
tinuously reminding oneself that one is not this body, this particular sensation, feeling or 
thought. " And he adds that "This is the famous nets-neti procedure of the upanisadic sages 
16lt should, further, be added that the expression eka-tattva-abhyasa-meaning "sustained concentration 
upon a single 'that-ness"'-occurs at YS 1.32. The similarity between this phrase and the tattva-abhyasa of 
SK 64 is indicative, in my view, of the overlap between Sämkhya and Yoga practice. 
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applied in the most rationalistic manner possible" (1980: 115). But the technique being re- 
ferred to hardly sounds "rationalistic"; on the contrary, as Feuerstein describes it, it appears to 
involve adopting the very attitude of non-attached witnessing that is a key component of nu- 
merous meditative systems, including that of Yoga. It would seem, therefore, that, whereas 
most people might be inclined to associate "rationalism", in a very broad sense, with the em- 
ployment of logical reasoning skills, Feuerstein finds an even broader use for the term, apply- 
ing it, apparently, to any cognitive act whatsoever. On this basis every stage of Yogic medita- 
tion short of nirbya-sainüdhi would also qualify as "rational iStie,,. 17 
The fact that the approach to soteriological practice taken by Sämkhya involves a trans- 
formative element, and does not consist exclusively in the drawing of logical conclusions 
through a process of reasoning, is tentatively admitted by Feuerstein, who notes that "it is 
feasible that a perpetual distancing of oneself from the contents of consciousness might sooner 
or later induce altered states of awareness, nor is it entirely impossible that this was actually 
intended by I9vara Krsna and his disciples" (1980: 115). What, according to Feuerstein, the 
Särrtkhya approach lacks, however, is any way of dealing with the deeply ingrained "habit 
patterns" or samskdras (which Feuerstein translates as "subliminal-activators"), for these can 
be eradicated only by the kind of intensive meditative discpline that results in samädhi, and in 
asamprajn`dta-sarnüdhi ("samädhi without cognitive support", my trans. ) in particular (p. 116). 
In this connection, Feuerstein states that, "in Yoga, the Sämkhya vijiräna becomes viveka- 
khyäti or the gnostic vision of discernment" (ibid. ). The use of "becomes" is ambiguous here: 
it could be taken to mean that vijiýuna (as used in the SK) and viveka-khyäti (as used in the YS) 
are synonymous; but since Feuerstein has already asserted that vf/tiüna is not to be regarded as 
"gnostic insight" (p. 115), it would be more consistent with his case to assume that, in Feuer- 
stein's view, viveka-khyäti is a step on from vijnäna, even though both expressions are nor- 
mally understood to mean discerning or discriminative knowledge. It is highly likely, how- 
ever, that the two terms in question are in fact synonyms or near synonyms, for the contexts in 
which they appear, in the Sümkhyakürikü and Yogasfitra respectively, indicate that both terms 
stand for a mental state in which the ontological principles, that in ordinary experience remain 
conflated in some way, are known to be distinct. In kärikä 2, as has been noted above, vynüna 
denotes the discrimination between (or, in Feuerstein's phrase, "the careful holding apart of") 
the manifest (vyakta), the unmanifest (avyakta), and the "knower" (flia, i. e. purusa). In the 
Yogasatra, meanwhile, viveka-khyüti is held to be the means of eradicating "misperception" 
(avidyü), and hence "conflation" (samyoga) (YS 2.24-26), and can be understood as the dis- 
'T Nirbija-samädhi is a state of "oneness without seed", i. e. devoid of any trace of identification with the 
manifestations of prakrti. It is referred to at YS 1.51 and 3.8. 
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crimination between the "seer" (drastr, i. e. purusa) and the "seen" (drtya, i. e. prakrti, includ- 
ing its unmanifest aspect). This "discriminating vision", according to sutra 2.27, eventually 
gives rise to praji`iü, a higher form of knowledge or awareness, which, without further expla- 
nation, is said to be sevenfold. Although these latter details are not duplicated in the 
Sümkhyakarika, it is nevertheless evident that for Sämkhya, as for Yoga, discriminative 
knowledge is not itself the final goal but is that which immediately precipitates the achieve- 
ment of that goal. Towards the end of the Kdrikü, for example, we read that the pure and un- 
impeachable knowledge (jirüna) attained through tattva-abhyüsa (lit. "the assiduous practice 
of that-ness") (SK 64) results in the cessation of "effusion" (sarga), i. e. the manifestation of 
pralgti (66), and, upon the eventual exhaustion of the subconscious response-patterns 
(sanzskäras), in the "aloneness" of purusa (68). Such an account of the psychic episodes lead- 
ing up to the release from empirical reality, however embellished with poetic imagery that ac- 
count might be, illustrates, in my view, the close similarity between the respective soteriologi- 
cal approaches of Sämkhya and Yoga, and patently fails to illustrate their "bifurcation [... ] 
into a `rationalistic' and a `mystical' system" (Feuerstein 1980: 113). 
The dogged insistence of a considerable number of researchers in this field that Sämkhya, 
notwithstanding the passages that have just been cited, does not seek to transcend rational 
thought is an extraordinary phenomenon. I can only presume that it derives from a confusion 
regarding the notion of methodology itself. It may seem like a point too obvious to be worth 
mentioning, but it perhaps needs to be noted that the methodology employed in composing a 
text that deals with soteriology is one thing, and the methodology recommended in that text 
for achieving the posited soteriological end is quite another thing. In many works of Indian 
soteriology and philosophy the methodological process by which certain conclusions were 
reached is not explicitly presented; all one tends to get are the conclusions themselves, occa- 
sionally accompanied by illustrative analogies, with reasons and arguments being conspicuous 
by their absence. This is, on the whole, the case with the Yogasütra: it comprises a series of 
assertive statements, unsupported by arguments; and, due to the terseness of the sutra format, 
even its use of analogies is very restricted. 18 The Sümkhyakärika, however, employs both 
analogies and, in a few places, arguments, or at least the rudiments of arguments, to support 
its claims. Being highly condensed, these arguments tend to require some interpretive unpack- 
ing before they can be evaluated; but they are sufficiently lucid to show that a process of rea- 
soning lies behind key Särnkhya doctrines such as the satkürya view of manifestation (SK 9), 
"Rare examples include the analogy of a farmer irrigating a field, which is merely alluded to at YS 4.3, 
and the use of "field" (ksetra) as a metaphor for avidya (suggesting that the other afflictions grow from it) at 
2.4. 
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the existence of an imperceptible subject of experience (17), and the plurality of empirically 
engaged selves (18). It is, almost undoubtedly, the presence of these few attempts to reasona- 
bly justify its assertions that has earned classical Sämkhya its "rationalistic" reputation. Since, 
however, the Kürika contains no statement to the effect that logical reasoning is to be used as 
a means of acquiring the discriminating knowledge necessary for the liberation of purusa, the 
only explanation for the ascription of such a position to Säipkhya is that certain interpreters 
have made a profoundly unwarranted leap from compositional methodology to soteriological 
methodology. In other words, they have assumed that, because rational thinking has been util- 
ised in the process of composing the philosophical text, the same rational approach must 
constitute the mainstay of that philosophy's emancipatory enterprise. 
In some instances, support for the "rationalistic" interpretation has been drawn from the 
etymology of the word sämkhya itself. The term is generally agreed to derive from samkhyä, 
meaning "number", and to have a primary sense of "relating to number, enumeration, or calcu- 
lation" (Larson 1987: 3). Although such a derivation fails to account for the term's being so 
closely associated with renunciation and asceticism, as it tends to be in both classical and 
other contexts, it nevertheless remains plausible due to the prevalence of enumerated princi- 
ples and sets of principles in all systematic formulations of Sämkhya. Radhakrishnan quibbles 
with such an explanation, noting that the "tendency to enumeration is common to all Hindu 
systems of thought", and that "In the early texts, `Samkhyä' is used in the sense of philosophi- 
cal reflection and not numerical reckoning" (1927 n: 249). Both of these points are valid, but 
hardly decisive. With regard to the first, Radhakrishnan need not have restricted his comment 
to "Hindu systems of thought", for Buddhism and Jainism also do their fair share of enumerat- 
ing principles. 19 It is indeed a ubiquitous feature of Indian philosophy per se. But this fact 
does nothing to invalidate the etymology that has been proposed for sämkhya. The fact that 
schools and traditions other than Sämkhya employ enumeration has no, or at most very little, 
bearing upon whether Sämkhya acquired its name because it employs that method, just as the 
fact that there are many species of bird that are black does not make it less likely that the 
blackbird is so-called precisely because it (or, at least, the male of the species) has black 
feathers. In support of his second point-that earlier texts use samkhyä to mean philosophical 
reflection instead of enumeration-Radhakrishnan quotes a verse from the Mahdbhärata 
(XII. 11.934), which reads: "The weighing of the defects and the merits severally, as one at- 
tempts some interpretation, should be understood as samkhyä" (Radhakrishnan's trans., op. cit. 
19 Such enumeration is, indeed, prevalent to an unparalleled extent in the Abhidharma literature of Bud- 
dhism (see Guenther 1974), and is also very noticeable in Jaina texts such as the Tattvarthadhigamasatra (ca. 
third or fourth century CE) (see Jaini 1920). 
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fn. 4). This "weighing"-which is Radhakrishnan's translation here of pramüna-seems, in 
the context of the quotation, to be very much like a calculation, and thus there has in fact been 
no discernible shift from the mathematical connotation ofsamkhyü that was posited in the first 
place. Even if there had been such a shift, however, most interpreters agree that it is not a par- 
ticularly major semantic adjustment to move from numerical reasoning to reasoning in gen- 
eral, and, as Suryanarayana Sastri points out (1948: viii-ix), Sanskrit would not be the only 
language that has a word embracing both meanings 20 In any event, none of this is of great 
significance for the claim of Feuerstein and others that Särnkhya is "rationalistic" in its ap- 
proach to soteriological practice; for, in the light of the distinction I have made between 
"compositional" and "soteriological" methodologies, the association of the term sämkhya with 
reasoning may relate merely to the former (i. e. compositional methodology) and not to the 
latter. 
Before moving on to discuss Feuerstein's further claims regarding the alleged differences 
between Sämkhya and Yoga, I perhaps need to make it clear that I am not trying to maintain 
that the soteriological practice of Sämkhya entirely excludes rational thinking; I merely wish 
to reject what I consider to be the absurd proposal-no matter how many times it may have 
been trotted out-that Sämkhya expects its ultimate goal of self-realisation and the abandon- 
ment of empirical existence to be achievable by means of rational thought alone. The 
Samkhyakarikü, being primarily a theoretical text and not a practical instruction manual, di- 
vulges little about the means by which the transformations in ethical conduct and self- 
understanding it describes are to be engendered. But the fact that the goal to be aimed at pat- 
ently involves purusa's dissociation from all mental processes ought to be sufficient in itself to 
indicate that the proponents of Sämkhya are intent upon the transcendence, not merely the 
culmination or fulfilment, of rational thinking. In my view, there is nothing in the Küriket to 
suggest that the central element of classical Sämkhya's soteriological methodology is not pre- 
cisely the kind of sustained contemplative discipline advocated in the Yogasütra; and the few 
hints that the Kürikü gives us-perhaps most especially the description of tattva-abhyäsa at 
verse 64-can best be understood in relation to Yoga discipline. 21 
20 To illustrate his point he mentions the English terms "count" and "reckon" ("especially in the American- 
ism 'I reckon so, '"), the German "zahlen", and the Tamil "en", all of which can, in certain contexts, be taken 
to mean "think" and, in others, "count" (in the mathematical sense). 
21 Cf. Sen Gupta (1982: 135): "The tattvdbhyäsa, prescribed for liberation embraces yogaprakriyd which 
has been fully discussed in the rogasatra of Patarjali. " Sen Gupta's view is that the soteriological methodol- 
ogy of S3mkhya begins with verbal instruction and "rational reflection", and then progresses toward medita- 
tion and samadhi (see ibid. ). This seems plausible. 
60 
The Relation between the Two Darlanas 
Doctrinal framework 
In view of the insubstantiality of the case for the existence of significant methodological dif- 
ferences between classical Sämkhya and Yoga, Feuerstein's subsequent claim (1980: 116) that 
these differences "initiated important conceptual and doctrinal divergencies which further in- 
creased the chasm between [the two] schools of thought" appears wildly exaggerated. (Have 
we really seen any evidence of such a "chasm"? ) Feuerstein continues, nevertheless, to pro- 
pose "three major points in the doctrinal structure of Classical Yoga which mark it off from 
Classical Sämkhya, viz. theology, ontology and psychology" (ibid. ), and goes on to describe 
these areas more fully. I, too, shall give attention to each of them in turn. 
Theology. Unlike several other prominent interpreters, 22 Feuerstein does not claim that 
classical Sämkhya is atheist, but rather attributes to I9varakr5na "a typical agnostic stance" 
(pp. 116-17). In other words, Feuerstein takes the non-occurrence of the concept of F. vara in 
the Sämkhyakürikä to indicate that the text's composer held a non-committal position on the 
issue of ißvara's existence. 23 In my view, this is an unwarranted speculation, for I do not see 
how the absence of a definite statement on ißvara can be regarded as evidence of any theologi- 
cal position, including agnosticism. It should also be noted that, notwithstanding the frequency 
with which Sämkhya's "atheism" has been declared by others, the classical text itself men- 
tions a "divine" (daiva) realm, which is described as eightfold and an abundance (visäla) of 
"lucidity" or "being-ness" (sattva) (SK 53-54). This realm is contrasted with organic nature, 
which is fivefold and abounds in "darkness" (tanmas), and with the middle or human realm, 
which abounds in "activity" or "energy" (rajas) and on this model is not subdivided. At the 
end of kärikä 54 the proverbial expression "from Brahmd down to a blade of grass" occurs, 
suggesting that the preceding kärikäs have accounted for all relevant types of beings. Since it 
would appear that all of these beings are manifestations of prakrti, none of them can be 
equated with the ißvara of classical Yoga, who is defined as a "special purusa" (purusa-visesa, 
YS 1.24). But, nevertheless, if the pronouncements of kärikäs 53 and 54 are taken seriously, 
then it must be recognised that Sämkhya posits a complex cosmology in which the "higher" 
22 Such interpreters include: Keith (1949: 13 fn. 1); Dasgupta (1922: 258-59); Radhakrishnan (1927 u: 255 
fn. i; Chakravarti (1975: 65); Surynarayana Sastri (1948: xvi). 
Davies, too, declares that, "in refusing to admit that there is anything higher than the individual soul 
which may enlighten or act upon it, he [i. e. Kapila] laid the foundation for a philosophical atheism, or what is 
now called agnosticism" (1894: 53). Cf. Radhakrishnan, who makes the apparently modest claim that 
"Särhkhya is not atheistic in the sense that it establishes that there is no God. It only shows that there is no 
reason for supposing there is one" (1927 n: 317). But not even this much is shown in the SK; it is only in the 
SS and the commentaries upon it that assertions of this kind are made (see e. g. SS 5.1 ff. and esp. 
VijnAnabhiksu's SPBh thereon). 
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levels outnumber the categories of life-forms on earth. And with this in mind it is not unrea- 
sonable to speculate that one or more of these higher realms might be considered to be popu- 
lated by the deities (devas and devis) known to Vedic and post-Vedic (i. e. epic and Pauränic) 
mythology. So in what sense is the composer of the Kürikü to be regarded as "agnostic"? 
Classical Särpkhya does not, of course, subscribe to the belief in a creator god who manu- 
factures the universe out of nothing; neither does it have any affinity with the view, apparently 
taken by some preclassical versions of Sämkhya, that purusa and prakrti are ultimately re- 
ducible to an absolute principle (i. e. brahman), which might-if one wanted to give a relig- 
ious air to a monist metaphysics-be referred to as "God". But then neither does classical 
Yoga hold such views. As mentioned above, Mara is characterised in the Yogasütra as a 
"special purusa", who is free from defilements and actions and the residual consequences 
thereof (1.24). He harbours the "seed of omniscience", is the "guru of even the earliest 
[yogins]", and may be invoked by reciting the syllable om (1.25-28). But he does not consti- 
tute an additional ontological category, and therefore his existence is perfectly compatible 
with the ontology of classical Särpkhya. This leaves us with no basis upon which to assert that 
classical Särnkhya and Yoga differ with regard to theology. All we can say with certainty is 
that, among the contemplative methods outlined in the Yogasütra is that of "applying oneself 
to" (pranidhäna) an eternally perfect "self" known as Mara, and that no such method is men- 
tioned in the Sümk1iyakürikli. In view of the fact that, as has been noted already, the latter text 
is not primarily a methodological treatise, this difference between Sämkhya and Yoga ought 
not, I would suggest, to be regarded as a "chasm". 
Ontology. The situation regarding Feuerstein's "argument" that the ontologies of Sämkhya 
and Yoga are markedly different is somewhat baffling. On page 117 of the chapter that I have 
chiefly been discussing, he refers the reader back to "pp. 112 ff. " for this argument, and states 
that, "As I have tackled this question already, there is no need to repeat myself'. But there is 
no such attempt to "tackle" the question on page 112, nor on any subsequent page. These 
pages deal merely with the methodological issue that I have discussed above. We are therefore 
given no arguments in support of Feuerstein's assertion that the ontologies are significantly 
different. This is unfortunate, since, in my view, the respective ontologies of Sämkhya and 
Yoga share so much in common with one another that the onus surely must be upon those who 
dispute this commonality to show where the divergence lies. Feuerstein's position is further 
undermined by the fact that he, just like most others who endeavour to explicate Yoga's onto- 
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logical schema, appears in several places earlier in the book to assume the identity-or, at 
least, the close similarity-of this schema with that presented in the Sümkhyakürikd. 24 
To illustrate the similarity between the classical Samkhya and Yoga ontologics, I shall here 
give a few examples. Firstly, the "self" is, in both systems, identified with consciousness and 
referred to primarily as purusa. Drartr ("seer") is a synonym of this term in the Yogasi7tra 
(1.3; 2.17,20; 4.23), and this is echoed by the inclusion of drastritva (lit. "seer-ness", i. e. 
awareness) as one of the epithets of purusa at Sümkhyakürikü 19. Both systems agree that 
purusa is unconditioned by mental or physical factors, and that such factors de-manifest when 
purusa's unconditionality is realised. Purusa is given a plural, individuated sense at kdrikä 18, 
and this sense seems to be tacitly accepted at Yogasütra 2.22, in which it is stated that, when 
phenomenal reality has ceased in relation to the self-realised purusa, it nevertheless continues 
in relation to others. 
Secondly, that which is not itself conscious, but which manifests to, or in, consciousness is, 
in both systems, held to comprise three "strands" (genas), which are characterised as lumi- 
nosity, activity, and stability respectively (YS 2.18; SK 12,13). These manifest as a number of 
mental processes and capacities that in turn facilitate embodied, worldly experience. The 
processes and capacities, or forms of the gunas, together constitute a schema of twenty-three 
principles, which is described from kärikä 22 onwards. It is generally accepted that Yoga rec- 
ognises the same set of manifest principles (with, perhaps, some minor differences, which are 
for the most part only terminological), and that the Sämkhya schema can be used to explicate 
the broader categories presented at Yogasütra 2.19 (see Table I below). Indeed, Feuerstein 
himself adopts such an exegetical approach (1980: 29). 
Thirdly, the manifestation of the three gunas as mental processes and capacities is, for both 
Sämkhya and Yoga, dependent upon their being in some kind of relation to purusa. This rela- 
tion is in both cases referred to as samyoga ("conjunction", SK 20,21; YS 2.17,23,25), and is 
held to involve a projection, or imposition, of consciousness onto the inherently non- 
conscious forms of the gunas (SK 20; YS 2.5). According to Sämkhya, as well as to Yoga, our 
entire experiential life supervenes upon a fundamental misidentification, or misunderstanding 
of the nature of the self. 
24 See e. g. Feuerstein 1980: 29-32, where Yoga's "ontological map" is explained in terms of the Sarpkhya 
principles and the satkärya theory is explained with reference to SK 9. Other instances include pp. 
44-45, 
where the typically Särpkhyan exegeses of Vyäsa and Vacaspati are used to explain the term avis'qa as used in 
YS 2.19; and p. 58, where cina is treated as synonymous with the Sämkhya term anlahkarana (cf. my own 
discussion of terminology later in this chapter). 
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Table I 
Table showing how the principles of classical S3mkhya relate to the four "levels of 
[the manifestations of] the gunas" (gurraparvüni) listed at YS 2.19 
Term used in Yogasiütra 2.19 Terms used in the Sämkhyakarikä 
alinga-"unmarked, unmanifest" avyakta-"unmanifest" (SK2, to); or 
mülaprakrti-"root of manifestation" (SK3) 
linganrütra-"mere mark" mahat...... the great" (SK22); or 
buddhi-"discernment, intellection" (SK23) 
avilesa-"unpart icularised" ahamkara-"I-maker, egoity" (SK24); plus 
five tanmütras-"sense-contents or -data" (SK 24,25, 
38) 
viiesa-"particularised" five bhütas-"elements" (SK 22,38); plus 
five buddhindriyas-"sense capacities, sensations" 
(SK26); plus 
five karmendriyas-"action capacities, activities" (SK 
26); pIus 
manas-"organising mind" (SK27) 
The correspondence between the respective ontological categories of Yoga and Särnkhya 
presented in the table above is outlined in Vyäsa's commentary on Yogasütra 2.19, and has 
been accepted, with occasional minor variations, by virtually all subsequent commentators. It 
is evident from the Yogasiitra that the schema is neither an arbitrary construction nor an ap- 
pendage (or "graft") from outside the system as a whole. Rather, it is integral to the practical 
discipline of Yoga, which seems to involve the attainment of heightened states of awareness in 
which the forms or levels of the manifestations of the gunas become sequentially apparent to 
consciousness. The sense in which these forms or levels are "known" in profound states of 
contemplation is extremely difficult to ascertain, and perhaps impossible to grasp outside the 
context of such contemplation itself. The mental states in which they become apparent are re- 
ferred to as samüdhi or sann patti, both of which terms mean "mergence", "coming together", 
"integration", etc. These states are said to be instantiated when the mind (or "memory", smrti) 
becomes so "pure" and devoid of its own form that the "thing (artha) alone shines forth" (YS 
1.43; cf. 3.3). The "thing" that "shines forth" could, in principle, be any of an indefinite num- 
ber of objects of contemplation, but more specifically it will be one of the levels of manifesta- 
tion, or an item from one of those levels. The more fundamental the level that is merged with, 
the deeper (or higher, depending upon one's preferred metaphor) will be the state of samädhi, 
until eventually all manifest forms are rejected, or disidentified with, and purusa realises its 
solitary independence. The means by which one stage of this process of self-understanding 
leads to the next is given scant attention in the sutras, and is hardly better explained in the 
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traditional commentaries, but it would appear that intense and sustained introspective concen- 
tration (abhyüsa) combined with an attitude of non-attachment (varrügya) somehow facilitates 
an unfolding of the various levels. 
Feuerstein refers to the schema of principles as a "map" designed to guide and orientate the 
yogin on his "inward odyssey" (1980: 117). This is a perfectly valid analogy, for it would 
seem that the principles are intended to represent phenomenological factors that are recog- 
nised most vividly and distinctively in states of introspection. In the case of Särnkhya, how- 
ever, Feuerstein's commitment to his "distinct methodologies" thesis obliges him to deny that 
samädhi could play any part in the formulation of what Feuerstein terms its "ontogenetic" 
schema (1980: 117-18). It is, perhaps, the enormity and implausibility of the coincidence that 
would have to be admitted if one were to propose that two virtually identical schemata had 
been arrived at by entirely different methodologies, that compels Feuerstein, in the face of 
considerable evidence to the contrary, to maintain that there are "crucial divergencies in the 
ontological conceptions" of Sämkhya and Yoga (1980: 117). 
Psychology. For the sake of completeness, I shall mention the points that Feuerstein makes 
on the respective psychological concepts of classical Särnkhya and Yoga, and also (in the next 
section) on the general differences in terminology between the two systems, although he in 
fact says very little on either matter (while nevertheless proclaiming their importance). 
Feuerstein's claim that the psychological concepts employed by Särnkhya and Yoga are 
significantly at variance to one another centres exclusively upon his interpretation of the term 
cilia, which he considers to be "parallel" to, but "by no means synonymous with", the 
Sdrpkhya terms liriga and karana (1980: 118). 25 On Feuerstein's reckoning, li, iga "somehow 
lacks the unifying and integrating strength" of cilia. "Whereas cilia is expressive of the dy- 
namic interaction between the psychic structures-and thus is essentially a psychological con- 
cept-li, 3ga fails to convey any sense of dynamism or functional unity; it is primarily a static, 
analytic concept" (ibid. ). These remarks strike me as being subjective responses to, or feelings 
about, the words concerned rather than more neutral observations of their use in particular 
contexts. Such responses can, I think, be at least partially explained by the fact that in the 
Yogasülra cilia is often either accompanied by or associated with vrtti, meaning literally 
"whirl" or "turning". The expression cilia-vrui occurs in the definition of yoga given in the 
second sutra, and also at 4.18. And in other places, where vriti appears on its own (YS 1.4,5, 
41; 3.43), this term can nevertheless be assumed to stand for cilia-vriti, and thus to mean 
"mental states and activities" or "modifications of the mind". 
25 What Feuerstein actually refers to is the "term linga (or karana), " thereby implying that linga and 
karana are interchangeable, which, in the SK at least, they are not (see below). 
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It is curious that Feuerstein should regard liriga and karana as "parallel" to cilia, for such a 
relation is hardly indicated by their use in the Sümkhyakürikü. The closest synonym of cilia in 
that text is antahkaran: a, the "inner instrument" (SK 33), which is said to comprise the three 
aspects known respectively as buddhi, ahamküra and manas. 26 The antahkarana is distin- 
guished from the bühya (-karana) or "outer instrument", which comprises the ten "capacities" 
(indriyas, i. e. the five buddhindriyas plus five karmendriyas). The antah- and bähya-karana 
taken together are referred to as the "thirteenfold instrument" or simply as the "instrument" 
(karana, SK 32). Linga, meanwhile, stands for all the manifest modes of prakrti "from mahat 
down to the `subtle' (siiksnia)" (SK 40), i. e. the karana plus the so-called "subtle elements" or 
tanmütras (which are better understood as the contents of sensations-see Chapter 6). 
In a reference to cilia earlier in his book (p. 58) Feuerstein notes this term's synonymity 
with Sämkhya's antalikarana; and hence it is inexplicable why the same author should, in the 
subsequent chapter that I have been discussing, disregard this fact and compare cilia with 
liriga and karana instead, neither of which terms is claimed by anyone to be synonymous with 
cilia. Feuerstein rightly points out that traditional commentators upon the Yogasütra "employ 
the terms buddhi, anta/ikarana and cilia rather indiscriminately" (p. 58), but in my view, if 
any lesson is to be drawn from this, it is that we should be wary of attaching too much impor- 
tance to minor terminological differences between Sämkhya and Yoga. 
Terminology 
Despite what has just been said, I turn lastly to the final site of divergence proposed by 
Feuerstein, namely terminology. This is another instance in which Feuerstein believes that the 
case has already been conclusively proven by the inclusion of "numerous examples" in the 
main body of the book; and thus he considers it necessary merely to "remind the reader" by 
mentioning "such specific yogic terms as aliiiga, liriga-mülra, asmitä-mütra, avi. sesa, visesa, 
cilia, vrtti and pratyaya which are either absent in the Säq: khya-Kürika or else have an en- 
tirely different connotation" (p. 120). 
The fact that a number of terms are used in the Yogasiatra that do not appear in the 
Sümkhjyakürikü, and vice versa-and that certain terms appear in both texts but with slightly 
different meanings-is not a matter of dispute. But such differences remain trivial if they do 
not coincide with significant conceptual variations. With regard to Feuerstein's list of 
"specific yogic terms" quoted above, the first three items are generally considered to be syn- 
26 Although the three aspects are not named in k5rikA 33, the context makes it clear that it is these three 
that are being referred to. 
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onymous with avyakta, mahat, and ahamkdra respectively, and I can see no reason for doubt- 
ing that this is so. The other terms will be discussed below. 
Avifeca and visesa occur in both the Yogasatra and the Süinkhyakärikü. The meanings of 
these two terms vary a little according to the context in which they appear, but in most cases 
they can be understood as "non-specific" (or "unpart icularised") and "specific" (or 
"particularised") respectively. In the Yogasütra they occur together in only one place, that 
being 2.19, which has been referred to earlier in this chapter. In that sutra, especially as inter- 
preted by Vyäsa, viiesa appears to stand for the five elemental forms (bhütas) plus the sensory 
and action capacities (indriyas) and the organisational or synthesising aspect of mind (manas), 
and avilesa stands for the raw sense-data (tanmütras) plus the notion of individuated selflhood 
(ahamkära). Nowhere in the Kdrikd do we find vifiesa and avileca being used in precisely this 
way, but we do find the tanmätras and bhütas being distinguished from one another on the ba- 
sis that the former are avigesa and the latter are vigesa (SK 38), and this use accords with that 
in Yogasritra 2.19. 
Cilia, as has been noted already, is semantically close to antalikarana, and thus the differ- 
ence between Sämkhya and Yoga in this regard amounts merely, or at least mainly, to a differ- 
ent choice of word. The last two terms in Feuerstein's list, namely vrtti and pratyaya certainly 
feature less prominently in the Sämkhyaküriki than in the Yogasütra; and, in the case of vrtti 
especially, the sense of the term does vary somewhat between the two texts. But these varia- 
tions can be adequately explained as consequences of the texts' different emphases, without 
the need to postulate significant theoretical disparities. In the Yogasatra, with its emphasis on 
psychological transformation by means of meditative discipline, vrlti (as mentioned above) 
stands for a mental modification, operation or state. Five types of modification are outlined 
(YS 1.6-11), namely (i) knowing or veridically cognising (pranidpa), (ii) misperceiving or 
misconceiving (viparyaya), (iii) conceptualising (vikalpa), (iv) sleeping dreamlessly (nidrü), 
and (v) remembering (smrti). Meanwhile, in the Sdmkhyakdrika-which is concerned more 
with clearly delineating the psychosensory principles, and describing their modes of interac- 
tion, than with instructions on how to transform them-vrtti retains the sense of "operation" 
(or "operative activity" or "function"), but is not so insolubly associated with the activities of 
the mind (cilia, antahkarana) as it tends to be in the Yogasütra. Thus we find that, in classical 
Sämkhya, the respective functions of the three "strands" (gullas), the ten "capacities" 
(indriyas), the three aspects of the "inner instrument" (antahkarana), and the "inner" and 
"outer" instruments together (karana), are all referred to as vrltis (SK 12,13, and 28-3 1). This 
is a broader usage of the term than that in the Yogasütra, but not an incompatible one. And 
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since, for Särpkhya as for Yoga, the aim is to extinguish all the activities of the gunas so that 
consciousness may abide in perfect tranquillity, there is no disagreement between the two 
systems that the vlttis are to be dissolved, even though this point is made more emphatically in 
Yoga than in Sämkhya. 
Pralyaya denotes a "content of consciousness", which can be of many kinds. In most cir- 
cumstances, pratyayas are intentional in the sense that they are representations of some object 
or other, but under certain conditions-notably during deep sleep (YS 1.10) and in advanced 
states of meditation (1.18)-a pratyaya, as this term is used in Yoga, can represent the absence 
of any object whatsoever. In the Sümkhyakürikü, pralyaya appears only once, at verse 46, 
where it is conjoined with sarga ("effusion", "emission"). The expression pratyaya-sarga can 
be understood as "the emissive flow of experience" or "succession of phenomenal mental 
contents"; or, in other words, the stream of experiential episodes that each of us encounters 
and which is commonly referred to as "life". In both Yoga and Sämkhya, then, pratyaya 
stands for any mental content or experience. 27 And thus, again, there is no obvious semantic 
disagreement; it is merely the case that the term is used on far more occasions (ten in total) in 
the Yogasütra than in the Sümkhyakärikü. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In the above discussion I have endeavoured to show that the view taken of the relation be- 
tween classical Sämkhya and Yoga by Feuerstein is an extreme and unwarranted one. He 
greatly exaggerates the extent to which the two systems differ, and does so ostensibly in order 
to vindicate Yoga's position as a distinct dargana; that is, as a philosophical system in its own 
right, independent of Sämkhya. But such a vindication is demanded neither from within the 
Yogasüira itself nor by the representatives of the Yoga tradition that flows from that founding 
text. The term yoga is defined in the Yogasütra as a particular mental state-a state in which 
all activity has ceased and consciousness "abides in its own nature" (YS 1.2-3)-and the em- 
phasis throughout the sutras is upon ways of achieving that goal. There are, of course, theo- 
retical excursions, but these tend to be relatively brief in relation to the passages in which so- 
teriological practice is the primary focus. The theoretical foundation of Yoga practice is 
Sämkhya philosophy. Not exactly the same version of Sämkhya as is presented in the 
Sägzkhyyakürikü (and thus it is overly simplistic to say that classical Sämkhya and Yoga are 
27lt is worth noting, in anticipation of discussions in later chapters, that there is nothing in the term prat- 
yaya to imply that the mental content must necessarily be a representation of something external to the mind 
itself. 
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two aspects of the same system), but almost certainly a close ancestor of that version. The 
distinction invoked by Feuerstein, and by a considerable number of other interpreters, between 
a "rational" (or "rationalistic") and a "mystical" methodology is highly inappropriate with re- 
gard to these Indian systems. While the Yogasittra may in certain respects come across as the 
more dogmatic of the two texts, the Sünrkhyakürikü is hardly overflowing with tightly rea- 
soned arguments. Both of these works are laconic expressions of a body of teachings whose 
validity derives from their having been (according to tradition) revealed by a divine source or 
at least by a loftily elevated human one, and not primarily from their meeting some generally 
agreed standard of rational enquiry. And, in any case, as I have tried to make clear in this 
chapter, the methodology employed in composing a text, and that recommended for making 
progress towards one's salvific goal, are two separate things. 
It is my view-although I admit it is hard to prove conclusively merely from textual 
sources-that the soteriological methodologies of classical Yoga and Sämkhya are essentially 
the same, which is to say that they both involve prolonged and intense meditative discipline as 
the central component of a radical and systematic attempt at the transformation of self- 
understanding. Rational thinking has a part to play in this discipline, but the fact that the de- 
clared goal of both darganas is to transcend all mental activity and to abide in "aloneness" 
(kaival), a)-in which consciousness remains devoid of content-indicates that rational think- 
ing has to be abandoned at some point. 
I hope, though, that rational thinking has not been abandoned in this chapter, and that I 
have succeeded in justifying my decision to treat classical Sämkhya and Yoga within the con- 
text of the same overall enquiry. I shall, on some occasions, employ the hyphenated expres- 
sion "Sämkhya-Yoga"; not to try to imply that the two darganas are identical or form a unitary 
system, but simply, where they are in agreement upon a particular matter, as an abbreviation 
for "Sämkhya and Yoga". It will be left to the reader to judge whether I manage, in subse- 
quent chapters, to draw fruitfully upon the complementary aspects of the two systems without 
glossing over or avoiding noteworthy discrepancies (both between Sämkhya and Yoga and 
within each of them). 
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3 
"Realism", "Antirealism", and "Idealism" 
in Philosophical Discourse 
C 
LASSICAL sAMKIIYA AND YOGA have routinely been characterised as "realist", both by their 
sympathisers and by their detractors (as well as by ostensibly neutral interpreters). ' 
Sometimes this characterisation is made explicit by the use of the term "realist" (or 
"realistic"), whereas in other instances it remains implicit in the way that certain doctrines are 
presented. Whether explicit or implicit, however, attempts at such a characterisation often fail 
to explain exactly what the attribution of realism entails and why it should be applied to these 
darganas in particular. And on the rare occasions when an explanation of this kind is offered, it 
is not always evident that the writer has more than a rudimentary understanding of the various 
meanings and connotations that have accrued to "realism" over the course of philosophical 
history. 
One of the principal contentions that I am making in this study is that the "realism" of 
Sämkhya and Yoga has tended to be assumed rather than argued for, and that its assumption 
has resulted in the marginalisation, or in most cases the complete ignoring, of alternative (non- 
realist) interpretations of these darganas. More than this, however, I wish to argue that the real- 
ist assumption has resulted in incoherent and implausible interpretations of the philosophies of 
Sämkhya and Yoga, and that a more tenable interpretation can be arrived at if the textual ma- 
terial is looked at afresh without this assumption's encumbering influence. 
If an intelligent discussion is to be had regarding the applicability, or inapplicability, of the 
notion of "realism" in relation to Sätnkhya and Yoga, it is crucial that some degree of clarity 
be obtained concerning the ways in which it has been employed in philosophical discourse; 
and this is what I intend to achieve in this chapter. By "philosophical discourse", I mean to 
include both the western philosophical tradition and the more recently-hatched tradition that 
deals with the interpretation of classical Indian philosophy in the light of western philosophi- 
cal concepts. Since, however, the application of "realism" within an Indian philosophical 
context is, if it is to be at all hermeneutically useful, heavily reliant upon the meanings of that 
term, and terms that are closely associated with it, within the western milieu, it is upon that 
latter milieu that I shall concentrate in this chapter. 
Examples will be given in the next chapter. 
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It will not, of course, be possible to discuss realism without also dealing with alternative 
philosophical positions; indeed, the full implications of a realist position often become evident 
only when it is contrasted with its rivals. Historically, the chief rival to realism within the do- 
main of metaphysics has been "idealism"-and this term has, like "realism" itself, been keenly 
appropriated and liberally employed by interpreters of certain Indian philosophies. A broader, 
though more recently coined, term is "antirealism", which has the purely negative sense of 
being opposed to (some form of) realism. Just as there are many varieties of realism, so there 
are many types of antirealism, idealism being merely one of these, though itself having several 
sub-varieties. 
Debates between realists and antirealists of various kinds continue to flourish within cur- 
rent western philosophy, although idealism is nowadays rarely considered to be one of the live 
options in the debate. This is at least partly due to the fact that idealism is a metaphysical po- 
sition, and Anglo-American analytic philosophy has tended, especially from the end of the 
nineteenth century onwards, to prioritise questions of truth and meaning (semantics) over 
questions of metaphysics. The fact that the term "antirealism" has become so closely associ- 
ated with these semantic issues might provide a possible explanation of why it has gone 
largely unused by interpreters of Indian philosophical traditions; which is not to say that these 
traditions entirely neglect semantic questions, but merely that it is their metaphysical doctrines 
that have more often been focused on in the interpretive literature. 
To attempt in a single chapter a comprehensive survey of realism, antirealism and idealism 
in all their various guises would be wildly ambitious, and I do not propose to make such an 
attempt. Rather, I shall restrict my treatment to those aspects of the subject that I consider to 
be most relevant to the matters that are being addressed in this study as a whole. Relatively 
scant attention will be paid to "semantic" versions of realism and antirealism, since I'm not 
aware that any interpreters of Sämkhya and Yoga make use of the terms in this sense. In the 
early sections of the chapter I shall endeavour to show how diversely the concepts we are 
dealing with here have been interpreted by different philosophers, and to outline some of these 
philosophers' major concerns. I then focus, in successive sections, upon the ideas of Berkeley 
and Kant in particular, each of whom exemplifies in a unique way some of the profound 
complications associated with the concepts of realism and idealism. In the final section I 
summarise some important criticisms and modifications of Kant's philosophy proposed by 
Schopenhauer, and use this as an opportunity to introduce some aspects of Schopenhauer's 
own thought that will furnish fruitful comparisons with Sämkhya and Yoga in later chapters. 
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It is my intention that, having taken a closer look at the invariably controversial nature of 
realist-antirealist discourse in this chapter, we will then be in a stronger position to evaluate 
claims about where in this often bewildering array Särnkhya and Yoga ought to be placed. 
THE DIVERSITY OF REALISMS AND ANTIREALISMS 
One of the points most frequently made by philosophers who have given careful consideration 
to issues concerning realism and its opposing stances is how enormously diverse the range of 
viewpoints is. This diversity relates not merely to different varieties of realism and antireal- 
ism, which may compete within a generally agreed definition of these terms, but, crucially, to 
the very understanding of what is meant by the terms themselves. Thus, "Although there is a 
considerable philosophical literature about realism and antirealism, there is no consensus 
about the meanings of the central terms or criteria for identifying views as versions of realism 
or antirealism" (Miller 2002: 13). "Realism" has been described by Crispin Wright as "a syn- 
drome, a loose weave of separable presuppositions and attitudes" (1993: 3-4); while, in the 
case of "idealism", A. C. Ewing has observed that, "To frame a formula which would include 
all the shades of opinion that have, more often than not, been described as idealist and exclude 
all those that have been, more often than not, described as realist is almost and quite beyond 
human capacity" (1934: 5). 
Despite these considerable difficulties, there are some general remarks that can be made 
about the terms concerned, which may provide us with a point of departure for further discus- 
sion of them without overly circumscribing their meanings. One point that can be made, for 
example, is that the arguments between realists and antirealists of various kinds principally 
hinge upon the question of how minds in general, and the human mind in particular, relate to 
the things that are experienced by them (or it). At a very basic level, the term "realism" de- 
notes a philosophical standpoint which asserts that certain kinds of things (in the case of 
"local" or "departmental" realisms) or the world as a whole (in the case of "global" realism) 
are "real" in the sense that they "really exist" independently of their being cognised (perceived 
or thought about) by a mind or experiencing subject. 
As William Alston has noted, the range of things about which one can be a (departmental) 
realist is extremely broad, and includes "physical objects, events, universals, facts, proposi- 
tions, intentional psychological states, space, time, meaning, God, and so on" (1996: 65; cf. 
2002b: 2; 2002c: 97). Alston further points out that the antirealist positions, which such real- 
isms are opposed to, tend to take one of two main forms, the first being a flat denial that the 
type of entity, or alleged entity, in question has any existence whatsoever, and the second be- 
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ing an attempt to show that the entity is not really what we ordinarily take it to be and can in 
fact be "reduced" to something else. An obvious example of the first variety would be the 
atheist's flat denial of the existence of God (even though we do not normally refer to atheists 
as "antirealists about God"), while an example of the second variety would be the phenome- 
nalist's claim that physical objects are really (i. e. can be "reduced to") "patterns of actual and 
possible sense data" (Alston 1996: 69). 
It could be argued that the "flat denial" position can itself be reduced to the "reduction" 
form of antirealism, since what the atheist (for example) is really asserting is that "God" exists 
merely as a concept, or as a figment of the imagination, and not as a being who is independent 
of human thought. It would, after all, be self-contradictory to assert that a thing, or type of 
thing, has no ontological status whatsoever, including that of being a mere concept. The cru- 
cial distinction, however, is that the atheist holds that God is entirely mind-dependent, 
whereas the reductionist leaves open the possibility that (to stick with phenomenalism as an 
illustration) the patterns of sense-data, which we ordinarily take to be physical objects, do in 
fact derive in some way from something, or some things, outside of one's perceptual appara- 
tus. 
It's at this point that we start to notice the pliability of the concepts of realism and antireal- 
ism. For someone to count as a realist about God (i. e. a theist), all she has to do is assert God's 
existence. Such a person might well, however, be an antirealist when it comes to the proper- 
ties that other theists attribute to God. Indeed, she might hold that we can know nothing about 
God other than that such a being exists, in which case she would be an antirealist in relation to 
all attributions of properties to that being. Let us be clear, however, that, to be an antirealist of 
this kind is not necessarily to deny that God has properties; rather, it is to deny that, whatever 
those properties might be, there is no way in which we can know anything about them. This 
latter position closely parallels the view of physical objects taken by Kant, which is that, while 
the existence of objects as things in themselves is not to be denied, the properties that those 
things possess in themselves cannot be in any way accessible to us, all "outer experience" or 
knowledge of objects being mediated by the very psychosensory equipment we need in order 
for experience and knowledge to be possible. (Kant's philosophy will receive further attention 
later. ) 
THE CONCEPT OF "MIND-DEPENDENCE" 
We have seen already how important the part played by the concept of mind-dependence is in 
discussions of realism and antircalism. In this light, it might be believed that one could clarify 
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the definitions of, and sharpen the distinctions between, the various viewpoints by arranging 
them along a continuum, with the view of complete mind-dependence at one end and that of 
complete mind-independence at the other. On closer inspection, however, this is seen to be 
unfeasible, unless of course one is content to grossly over-simplify matters and thus risk dis- 
torting what usually turn out to be highly complex philosophical positions, which very rarely 
have one generally agreed-upon interpretation, and are even more rarely thoroughly self. 
consistent. Although some simplification is necessary, especially in such a brief treatment as 
the present chapter affords, I shall resist going down the "continuum" path. I shall instead try 
to highlight some of the ways in which the notion of mind-dependence/independence interre- 
lates and occasionally conflicts with other important issues, often to do with the respective 
metaphysical stances of the philosophers concerned. I shall do so by making selective refer. 
ences to some of the notable figures in western (principally modern, i. e. post-sixteenth cen- 
tury, western) philosophy, leaving comparisons with Indian thought until the next chapter. 
Let us, then, be careful to note some of the complications relating to the notion of mind- 
dependence itself. Before we go flinging this term around willy-nilly we need to be clear 
about what is meant by "mind" and what is meant by "dependent/independent" in this context, 
neither of which are straightforward matters. "Mind" can be understood in a number of ways 
according to one's metaphysical commitments, or lack of them. It could be regarded as an 
"immaterial substance", which is how the res cogitans of Descartes and the "spirit" of Ber- 
keley (to give but two examples) are commonly interpreted. For both these philosophers the 
essence and definition of the mind derive from its activities. Descartes famously refers to the 
mind or soul (such terms are largely interchangeable for philosophers of the early modern pe- 
riod) as "a thinking thing" (19671: 190)-which is the usual, and most literal, rendering of the 
Latin expression res cogitans-and includes within his broad concept of "thinking" "not only 
meditations and acts of the will, but even the functions of sight and hearing, and the resolving 
on one movement rather than another" (quoted in Kenny 1968: 69; cf. Descartes 1967 1: 153, 
222; n: 54). Berkeley, similarly, says of "spirit" (which he treats synonymously with "mind") 
that it "is one simple, undivided, active being" which "as it perceives ideas [... ] is called the 
Understanding, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them [... ] is called the IViii" 
(1962: 77; cf. 135; 1944: 295). As descriptions of what the mind does, these statements are 
relatively uncontroversial in the history of western philosophy. More problematic is the char- 
acterisation of the mind as a "substance" that is fundamentally independent of matter. Des- 
cartes's definition of "substance" as "a thing which so exists that it needs no other thing in 
order to exist" (except God) (1967 1: 240) implies that the "thinking substance" known as a 
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mind is capable of existing with or without its being related to the "extended substance" 
known as a body. 2 Berkeley, meanwhile, flatly denies the existence of matter, thereby leaving 
minds as the exclusive occupants of the category "substance". As we will see below, in view 
of the fact that what we ordinarily refer to as physical objects do not go away merely because 
one disparages the concept of matter, Berkeley was obliged to redefine those objects as 
"ideas". These are not themselves substances but, rather, "inert, fleeting, or dependent beings, 
which subsist not by themselves, but are supported by, or exist in minds or spiritual sub- 
stances" (1962: 109). That minds are substances, however, and that they are immaterial, Des- 
cartes and Berkeley would agree upon. 
Notwithstanding this agreement, the legitimacy of the characterisation of mind as an imma- 
terial or spiritual substance is highly questionable. If, as Schopenhauer has argued (1966 1: 
490-91), the concept of "substance" is an unwarranted abstraction from that of "matter", then 
"immaterial substance" becomes an oxymoron. 3 Schopenhauer himself anticipated modern 
physicalism (at least in its functionalist versions) by identifying the mind, or "intellect", as 
"the mere function of the brain, which therefore precedes it just as the stomach precedes di- 
gestion" (1966 u: 214, cf. 233), 4 which view, it must be said, baldly contradicts the assertions 
that he makes, when wearing his "idealist" hat, to the effect that all physical objects (of which 
the brain is one) have the characteristics that they do merely insofar as they are the represen- 
tations that arise in the mind of an experiencing subject. 5 
Further competing conceptions of "mind" include those obtaining within certain grandiose 
metaphysical systems, one example being the Geist ("mind/spirit/psyche") of Hegel, which, 
though notoriously resistant to coherent interpretation, appears to stand for both individual 
minds and, at the same time, a global over-mind that strives, via the historical evolution of 
human thought and institutions (epitomised in the State), "to understand and examine what 
2Cf. John Cottingham's interpretation of Descartes's Sixth Meditation in Honderich 1995: 771 (under 
"res cog! tans"). 
3 "['Substance'] is an exceedingly superfluous concept, because its only true content already lies in the 
concept of matter, beside which it contains only a great void. This void can be filled up by nothing except the 
surreptitiously introduced secondary species immaterial substance; and that concept was formed solely to 
take up this secondary species. Strictly speaking, therefore, the concept of substance must be entirely rejected, 
and that of matter be everywhere put in its place" (Schopenhauer 19661: 491). 
, For an illustrative modern physicalist view, see Daniel Dennett 1991, in which it is asserted (p. 33) that 
"the mind is somehow nothing but a physical phenomenon. In short, the mind is the brain. " 
s See the first book of The World as Will and Representation (in both volumes), of which the following 
statement is typical: "That which knows all things and is known by none is the subject. It is accordingly the 
supporter of the world, the universal condition of all that appears, of all objects, and it is always presupposed 
[... j" (19661: 5). Christopher Janaway has argued (1989, ch. 6, esp. pp. 184 ff. ) that there is a tension but not 
a contradiction between the physicalist and idealist standpoints in Schopenhauer's work. To me, this would 
seem more plausible if Schopenhauer had openly admitted the tension; but as his major work stands, it con- 
tains statements of one sort in some places, and statements of another sort in other places, with apparently no 
attempt to synthesise them. 
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belongs to it, in order to possess and grasp itself in a truer, deeper, more intimate and unified 
manner" (Hegel, in Petry 1970 t: 202). Another example is the Ich ("1", ego) of J. G. Fichte's 
philosophy, which term is, like Hegel's Geist, not restricted to the individual, personal mind, 
but is used to signify something that, although transcendent of space and time, is capable of 
projecting or, in Fichte's somewhat excessively used term, "positing" (setzen) both itself as 
subject and the world in general as object (see e. g. Fichte 1970: 273) 6 
With regard to the concepts of dependence-upon and independence-of mind, or minds, we 
should be clear what is not at issue. When, for example, a realist about physical objects asserts 
that such objects are "mind-independent", it should not be assumed that she is thereby denying 
that those objects can be affected in any way by minds. It would be perfectly acceptable for a 
realist to affirm that one's mind, or certain mental events, are in large measure responsible for 
one's bodily movements (the body, of course, being taken to be a physical object), and that by 
means of such movements a considerable degree of influence is able to be exerted upon other 
physical objects and the environment in general. If our posited realist is also an eliminative 
physicalist (i. e. if she denies that there is anything more to mental facts than neuro- 
physiological ones) then she might point out that, on her view, to say that the mind is respon- 
sible for a bodily action is merely to say that a component of the body itself is so responsible. 
This, however, is a separate matter. The key point here is that the kind of causal relation that 
obtains between bodies (and other physical objects) and minds, in which the former are, or are 
not, affected in some way by the latter, is not at issue, or at least is not the main issue in the 
present context. Rather, what is at issue is what Alston (1996: 74) has called the constitutive 
dependence of something upon a mind, which, as the term suggests, involves that thing's be- 
ing in some way constituted by minds or by the activities thereof. For the realist, the thing in 
question owes none of its essential constitution to minds (although, as we shall see, certain of 
its properties or qualities may not conform to this description), whereas, on the most extreme 
idealist position, the thing is entirely mental. 
THE MENACE OF SCEPTICISM 
Realism, in some form or other, can legitimately be regarded as the pre-philosophical or 
"common-sense" starting-point for our view of the relation between the items we encounter in 
our thoughts and perceptions and the entities that are supposed to correspond to those items in 
the "external world". Indeed, it has been noted that there is a definite "naturalness" or 
6 Hegel, too, speaks of "positing" in a vague way; for example, of God's "positing [... ] his other, the 
living process, the world" (Petry 1970 r 204). 
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"intuitiveness" about the realist position, and that this makes the position hard to break free 
from.? Bryan Magee, for example, has argued that, in order to grasp and appreciate the par- 
ticular form of idealism proposed by Kant and subsequently taken up by Schopenhauer, it is 
necessary to uproot extremely deeply-held "realistic assumptions" that ordinarily colour our 
attitudes and responses to the world (Magee 1983: 106). Magee even suggests that the effort 
required to remove or transform such assumptions is analogous to the rigorous deconditioning 
involved in eastern contemplative disciplines. Such a suggestion echoes to a large extent 
Schopenhauer himself, who regards realism as a "natural and childlike" disposition of the in- 
tellect, which Kant's (and his own) teaching is alone capable of dispelling (1966 1: xxiii-xxiv). 
It might be added that Schopenhauer, being somewhat favourably predisposed towards Indian- 
style contemplative discipline, is likely to have concurred with Magee's analogy, whereas 
Kant himself rejected introspective methods as unreliable, preferring an exclusively rational 
path. 8 
The naivist version of realism would refuse to recognise any distinction between external 
entities and the representations we have of them in perception, our awareness of objects being 
held to be completely unmediated by subjective (or cultural, etc. ) factors. 9 Philosophical or 
scientific considerations, however, immediately bring this naive view into question by point- 
ing up the fact that the process by means of which conscious beings such as ourselves come to 
be aware of objects in their environment involves several steps, and that these steps are of a 
sort that cannot avoid furnishing us with perceptions that represent but do not duplicate (and 
perhaps do not even remotely resemble) the objects as they stand independently of us. It is 
considerations such as this that lead to "scientific realism", according to which, although the 
world as we experience it is not how the world really is, we can nevertheless, by following 
appropriate scientific procedures, come to know how the world really is, i. e. its fundamental 
constituents, the natural laws that govern it, and so forth. Since scientific enquiry is an ongo- 
ing process, in which new theories are constantly replacing outdated ones, it could turn out 
'David flume, for example, speaks of the "vulgar" view (1978: bk 1, sect. 2), while Husserl calls it the 
"natural standpoint" (see e. g. 1931: 107 f. ). However, the view that idealism is counter-intuitive and that real- 
ism is the most popular default position has been rejected by some realists. An example is Samuel Alexander, 
who claims that the realist faces a strenuous uphill task if he is to overcome the inherent attractiveness of 
idealism: "so deeply ingrained and so natural is the self-flattering habit of supposing that mind, in its distinc- 
tive character of mind, is in some special sense the superior of physical things, so that in the absence of mind 
there would be no physical existence at all, that Realism in questioning its prerogative appears to some to 
degrade mind and rob it of its riches and value" (1960: 186). 1 suspect that a brief survey of public opinion on 
whether "in the absence of mind there would be no physical existence" would be enough to indicate that Al- 
exander has got it back to front. 
'"Kant never tires of repeating the point that we have no special access to our minds [... ]. In the Anthro- 
pology, he criticizes introspection as unreliable, unstable, unnatural, and a potential route to lunacy! " (Kitcher 
1990: 6). 
9Cf. Fred Drctske in Ilonderich 1995: 602 (under "naºve realism"). 
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that we never manage to discover the whole truth about the world (i. e. about reality per se), 
whatever the "whole truth" might amount to. The important point for the scientific realist, 
however, is that the truth about reality is in principle discoverable. 
Hilary Putnam (1987: 3-4) makes fun of scientific realism by comparing it with "the Sc- 
ducer in the old-fashioned melodrama", who steals away the "Innocent Maiden" by making 
false promises. On Putnam's comparison, the scientific realist assures the maiden that he will 
save her from the fiendish antirealists ("Idealists, Kantians and Neo-Kantians, Pragmatists") 
who seek to deprive her of the ordinary physical objects with which she is familiar, such as 
"ice cubes and chairs". "But", Putnam continues, 
when they have traveled together for a little while the `Scientific Realist' breaks the news that 
what the maiden is going to get isn't her ice cubes and tables and chairs. In fact, all there really 
is-the Scientific Realist tells her over breakfast-is what `finished science' will say there is- 
whatever that may be. (Ibid. ) 
What is suggested in this amusing parable is that scientific realism ends up leaving us in a 
somewhat precarious position: we can no longer take the physical objects with which we in- 
teract daily to be genuinely real, and yet our judgement about what is real must be suspended 
until science reaches its final conclusion, which, as noted above, could be a long way off (and 
how could we possibly tell how far off it is? ). 
An early version, or perhaps precursor, of scientific realism is found in the philosophy of 
John Locke (1632-1704), who, following Descartes and the "corpuscularian" theories of his 
scientific contemporaries such as Robert Boyle, famously distinguished between the 
"primary" and "secondary" qualities of perceptual objects. Our experience of both types of 
qualities is, on Locke's account, mediated by our sense faculties, the difference between them 
residing in the following fact: that, in the case of primary qualities, one's faculties do not in 
any respect change the qualities, but represent them faithfully to the intellect; whereas, in the 
case of secondary qualities, the representation of them given to the intellect bears no obvious 
similarity to the qualities themselves, despite its being dependent upon them. As examples of 
primary qualities Locke initially identifies "solidity, extension, figure [i. e. shape], and mobil- 
ity" and subsequently adds "number" and "texture" (1975: 135). In the category of secondary 
qualities, meanwhile, he places "colours, sounds, tastes, smells, pleasure and pain, etc. " (1975: 
558). Despite some ambiguity in Locke's use of the expression "secondary qualities", it is 
evident that he holds these to be certain capacities, or "powers", which inhere in external ob- 
jects but which are capable of producing sensations ("simple ideas" in Locke's terminology) 
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of various kinds in experiencing subjects, and it is by the names of these types of produced 
sensation that the so-called secondary qualities are referred to. 
Philosophers and scientists of seventeenth-century Europe were keenly aware of the danger 
(as many of them saw it) of scepticism, in the direction of which the Galilean-Cartesian, and 
later Lockean, distinction between primary and secondary qualities seemed to lead. The reason 
why it might lead to scepticism-i. e. dubiety that there is any external and "objective" world 
whatsoever-is that, if a supposedly external object appears to us to be of a certain colour, and 
to feel and taste and smell a certain way, etc. -and yet, in the light of careful considerations 
about the workings of our sensory apparatus and so forth, the object is understood not to pos- 
sess these characteristics at all-then the question naturally arises whether there is any quality 
that the object appears to have which may not turn out to be a creation of the perceiving sub- 
ject. Some philosophers, such as Pierre Bayle for example, openly embraced the conclusion 
that we have no firm grounds upon which to assert the mind-independent existence of physical 
entities, 1° while many viewed it as nothing less than disastrous, and to be combatted by all 
rational means (cf. Antoine Arnauld in Popkin 1983: 381). 
The modern scientific paradigm has abandoned the distinction between primary and secon- 
dary qualities, at least insofar as these apply to macroscopic physical entities. The solidity, 
extension, shape and motion of such entities are seen as being just as much the products of the 
interaction between subjects and an objective reality as are such things as colour, sound, etc. 
We see and feel a lump of granite, for example, as solid, extended in three dimensions, and 
having a particular shape; but, physical science tells us, the granite is not really solid, and nor 
does it have a tightly maintained boundary that would enable us to specify its shape and de- 
gree of extension. In fact, strictly speaking, there is no "it" whatsoever; there is merely an 
empty space with a constantly changing number of tiny particles whizzing around in it. And 
since no-one really knows where the analysis of those tiny particles will end, the scientists, 
and hence the rest of us as well, are always in the position of aiming in the direction of knowl- 
edge without ever reaching it. (Which point brings us back to Putnam's image of the deceptive 
seducer. ) It is at least arguable, however, that the notion of certain irreducible qualities of 
matter, which together define what we mean by the expression "physical entity", has not been 
10 Speaking of philosophers who accept the primary/secondary distinction, Bayle notes (in his Dic- 
tionaire historique et critique of 1694) that "They were willing to except extension and motion, but they 
could not do it; for if the objects of our senses appear to us coloured, hot, cold, smelling, though they are 
not so, why should they not appear extended and figured, at rest, and in motion, though they had no such 
thing. Nay, the object of my senses cannot be the cause of my sensations: I might therefore feel cold and 
heat, see colours, figures, extension, and motion, though there was not one body in the world. I have not 
therefore one good proof of the existence of bodies" (quoted in Popkin 1983: 380). 
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abandoned entirely; physical science has merely postponed the attribution of those qualities to 
any specific entity until the ultimate (i. e. indivisible) particles of matter are "discovered". But, 
as Kant's Second Antinomy indicates (A434/B462 ff. ), the notion of infinite divisibility is just 
as crucial to the concept of matter as is that of simple (indivisible) parts, by which fact is re- 
vealed a fundamental antagonism at the heart of "matter" as it is conceived of by physicalists, 
and by realists generally-and thus the postponement could be an indefinite one. 
Returning, though, to the situation in the seventeenth century, we can note that the anti- 
sceptics responded to the perceived threat of scepticism in one of two principal ways. One was 
to combine a reaffirmation of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities with an 
assertion of the fundamental reliability of our natural intuitions concerning the externality of 
physical objects; and the other was to abolish the primary/secondary distinction, reducing both 
types of qualities to mind-dependent ones, while contending that mind-dependent phenomena 
can nevertheless possess some kind of objective existence (even though it is not to be regarded 
as a physical existence). The first strategy is roughly that adopted by Descartes and Locke, 
and is a form of realism. The second, having been partially arrived at by Malebranche (1980, 
esp. Appendix), is most closely associated with George Berkeley, and is usually regarded as 
an exemplary form of idealism, although, as we shall see in the next section, this characterisa- 
tion is somewhat complicated by his conception of the role of God. 
God, in fact, figures prominently in the theories of each of the philosophers I have just 
mentioned, though perhaps least so in the case of Locke (as far, in any event, as his epistemol- 
ogy is concerned). Descartes's metaphysics and epistemology-specifically his view that, not 
only is there a material world, but we can have reliable knowledge about it-relies on God's 
being the creator of all things and on His not wishing to deceive us about the things we expe- 
rience. " This is, however, to presuppose that belief in the mind-independent existence of 
physical entities is the immediate corollary of accepting the evidence of our senses to be 
trustworthy. Of course, as has already been noted, we do, qua conscious human subjects, have 
an inherent inclination-or, as Malebranche puts it, a "natural propension" (quoted in Gray- 
ling 1986: 4)-to attribute an external and material reality to the things we wakefully experi- 
ence. But to hold that it must therefore necessarily be the case that those things do in fact exist 
externally and materially is to have faith not merely in the beneficence of a divine creator, but 
also in one's own pre-philosophical judgements about the things one experiences. And since 
11 See e. g. Descartes's Sixth Meditation (1968: 168): 1 must not in any way doubt the truth of these things 
[i. e. perceived objects], if, after having called upon all my senses, my memory and my understanding to exam- 
ine them, nothing is reported to me by any one of these faculties which conflicts with what is reported to me 
by the others. For as God is no deceiver, it follows necessarily that I am not deceived in this. " 
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not all realists (i. e. realists about physical objects) are theists, especially in the late modern 
period, it is perhaps the latter kind of faith that is the more fundamental prerequisite for real- 
ism. 
Malebranche, who has just been mentioned, was highly dubious about the powers of finite 
minds to overcome the gap that had been opened up by Cartesian epistemology between per- 
ceptual representations of objects on the one hand and the (supposedly) physical correlates of 
those representations on the other. And thus, in order to resist the drift towards scepticism, he 
opted for a denial of the distinction between the two sides of the gap, thereby eradicating the 
gap completely and identifying representations ("ideas") with-or as-the things themselves. 
This, essentially, is the idealist move: to deny that the world is beyond the mind ("out there"), 
and to affirm that our experiences are therefore perfectly reliable indicators of how the world 
is, but always with the crucial caveat that it is the world of experience that is being spoken of. 
Now, since Malebranche did not want to go the whole hog and discount the existence of mind- 
independent physical entities altogether, material substance is retained in his metaphysics with 
the precarious status of something "indemonstrable, unknowable and unimportant" (Popkin 
1957: 5; cf. Grayling 1986: 4-5). Its claim to existence becomes still more tenuous when it is 
noted that Malebranche, and Bayle after him, held that, even if there was no matter in the uni- 
verse whatsoever, and all that existed were a multiplicity of finite spiritual beings plus one 
omnipotent and infinite spiritual being (namely God), then the latter's power would be suffi- 
cient to account for all of our thoughts and perceptions (cf. Popkin 1983: 381; Grayling 1986: 
7). Berkeley, it could be said, seized upon such views as these and ran with them, establishing 
a radical anti-materialist philosophy that has extremely important (though far from straight- 
forward) implications for our understanding of realism and idealism. 
BERKELEY'S "THEISTIC REALISM" 
Since our main purpose in this chapter is to get a better grasp of certain key concepts, and not 
to try to achieve a complete understanding of the philosophies of particular individuals, we 
need not worry about whether Berkeley's philosophy is covered in its entirety here. (We can 
be fairly certain that it will not be, although I shall of course do my best not to misrepresent 
it. ) Berkeley is of considerable interest to the present discussion, because his philosophical 
writings, and the various and often conflicting ways in which they have been characterised 
and commented upon, highlight some of the difficulties and complexities connected with the 
relation between minds and "the world". 
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One of the fascinating points about Berkeley is that, while he has been, and continues to 
be, widely portrayed as a philosopher who epitomises the idealist point of view (his philoso- 
phy was labelled by Kant, for example, as "mystical and fanatical idealism" (1997: 45)), upon 
closer investigation it becomes evident that he is perhaps more accurately represented, and 
indeed saw himself, as a realist, albeit a theistic rather than a scientific one. Before focusing in 
on why Berkeley might be viewed as either realist or idealist, or some combination of both, it 
is worth mentioning a couple of other terms which feature prominently in accounts of Ber- 
keley's position, namely "immaterialism" and "phenomenalism". The use of the first of these 
is easily justified, as it was applied to his philosophy by Berkeley himself (e. g. 1962: 252, 
254-55). 12 Berkeley held that the threat of scepticism, that was discussed in the last section, 
could be averted-and a great many seemingly intractable philosophical conundrums dis- 
solved-in one clean sweep by simply abandoning the concept of "matter" as it had been hith- 
erto understood, and replacing it with an "immaterialist" view of experience. According to this 
latter view our perceptions (or "ideas", in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century parlance) do 
not "correspond to" or "represent" external objects, but, rather, are those objects. Berkeley 
rejected the supposition that what we have come to call material entities "have a natural sub- 
sistence of their own, distinct from being perceived by spirits" (1962: 107-08), and instead 
famously asserted the motto "esse is percipi", i. e. the very existence of a thing consists in its 
being perceived (see e. g. 1962: 66-68; cf. 109). His position, then, involves a "reduction" of 
external physical entities to patterns of sense-data (or "phenomena"), and, as noted earlier in 
this chapter, it is essentially to this reduction that the term "phenomenalism" applies. 
It would be difficult to maintain that Berkeley was a full-blown phenomenalist, since nei- 
ther the term nor any precise formulation of the standpoint it denotes were available to him; 
but it has been suggested by some commentators (e. g. Warnock 1962: 36; Fumerton 1995: 
386) that Berkeley was a forerunner for certain more recent philosophers such as Alfred Ayer 
and C. I. Lewis, both of whom took an explicitly phenomenalist stance (see e. g. Ayer 1946, 
esp. 53-54,63-68; Lewis 1946). As an illustration of Berkeley's proto-phenomenalism, 
Fumerton (1995: 386) cites a passage from the Third Dialogue, in which Hylas and Philonous 
are discussing the Biblical creation story, and where Philonous remarks that, had he "been 
present at the creation, [he] should have seen things produced into being; that is, become per- 
ceptible, in the order described by the sacred historian [i. e. by Moses]" (Berkeley 1962: 245; 
my brackets and emphasis). Such a statement can be read phenomenalistically because, in 
12 In the Third Dialogue, for example, Berkeley has Hylas exclaim: "What doubts, what hypotheses, what 
labyrinths of amusement, what fields of disputation, what an ocean of false learning, may be avoided by that 
single notion of immaterialism! " (Berkeley 1962: 254; original emphasis). 
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view of Berkeley's ontology, which allows the existence only of minds (or "spirits") and 
"ideas", Philonous must be understood to be making an assertion about what he would have 
experienced had he been in a specific place at a specific time, rather than (or in place of) an 
assertion about what happened in terms of a supposedly objective sequence of events concern- 
ing mind-independent physical entities. This shift of descriptive emphasis, from "things in the 
world" to configurations of sense-data and possible sense-data-which shift is typical of phe- 
nomenalism-need not necessarily entail idealism; as, in itself, the descriptive shift does not 
imply any commitment to the existence or non-existence of physical objects. In Berkeley's 
case, however, it does appear, at least at first glance, to be allied with idealism; for his claim is 
not merely that supposedly physical events can be equally well described as perceptual se- 
quences, but is, more strongly, that there are no 'physical" events to be spoken of, and that, in 
consequence of this, there is no alternative (if one is not to talk nonsense) except to speak of 
phenomena rather than physical things (and, if we are to continue to use terms such as 
"physical" and "material", they must be redefined and understood phenomenal istically). 
On the mind-dependent criterion, then, Berkeley seems to be proposing an idealist view of 
objects. And since, unlike Kant (who will be the subject of further discussion below), Ber- 
keley denies the existence of any "thing in itself' (in relation to which the items of experience 
are "appearances" or "representations"), he would have to be classed as an absolute idealist. 
An absolute idealist position is, however, highly problematic, as it lacks any element that 
might be used to account for the "commonality" or "sharedness"-in other words, the objec- 
tive, or at least intersubjective, status-of the world we inhabit, which we take so much for 
granted. If the only things that exist are minds and ideas (phenomena), and the latter can only 
subsist in the former, 13 then several awkward questions arise. For a start we might want to 
enquire where these phenomena come from; and secondly: How is it that there seems to be a 
remarkably high degree of continuity both between phenomena that I experience at different 
times (even when separated by intervals of sleep, for example) and between the phenomena 
that I experience and those which the people (minds, spirits) around me report themselves as 
experiencing? Surely, if Berkeley's ontology were true, every mind would have its own unique 
set of phenomena, and hence each of those minds would be closeted in its own solipsistic 
world with no communication between them being possible. 
It is in response to such objections that Berkeley plays his trump card, which is the "God 
card". Berkeley, being a committed theist (a priest, and later a bishop, no less), is able to claim 
13 See e. g. Berkeley (1962: 109): "[ideas] are inert, fleeting, or dependent beings, which subsist not by 
themselves, but are supported by, or exist in minds or spiritual substances. " 
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that the objects we, as finite spirits, ' experience only exist in us so long as we are in fact ex- 
periencing them-which may in many cases be merely momentarily-but they exist in the 
mind of God completely and enduringly. Thus when, in the Third Dialogue, ilylus points out 
to Philonous that, although the doctrine of the niind-dependence of perceptual objects may be 
true, it must surely be admitted to be "shocking, and contrary to the common sense of 
men"-and further adds: "Ask the fellow, whether yonder tree bath an existence out of his 
mind: what answer, think you, he would make? "-Berkeley has Philonous reply: 
The same that I should myself, to wit, that it doth exist out of his mind. But then to a Christian it 
cannot surely be shocking to say, the real tree existing without his mind is truly known and com- 
prehended by (that is, exists in) the infinite mind of God. [... ] The question between the material- 
ists [i. e. those who assert the existence of matter, but not necessarily to the exclusion of immate- 
rial substance] and me is not, whether things have a real existence out of the mind of this or that 
person, but whether they have an absolute existence, distinct from being perceived by God, and 
exterior to all minds. This indeed some heathens and philosophers have affirmed, but whoever 
entertains notions of a Deity suitable to holy scriptures, will be of another opinion. (1962: 225; 
original emphasis, my square brackets) 
Thus we see that the introduction of God into Berkeley's metaphysical schema-or, rather, 
the explicit disclosure of His role in it-radically changes the sense in which perceptual ob- 
jects can be regarded as mind-dependent. No longer are they dependent upon the minds of 
finite individuals in any way whatsoever. Such minds merely provide occasions for objects to 
be experienced by someone other than their divine creator; and, in the absence of those minds, 
the objects would continue to exist anyway, their mind-dependence consisting solely in de- 
pendence upon the mind of God Himself. As rightly expressed by Berkeley, through his 
mouthpiece Philonous, the God-dependence of perceptual objects (along with that of finite 
spirits) is perfectly consistent with Christian doctrine. But, non-theists (and non-Christians in 
particular) might think: Hasn't Berkeley simply pulled a fast one here? Somewhat in the man- 
ner of Putnam's seducer, he has led us down the garden path-only, in this case, a path that 
we believed was going to end with an explanation of how objects can be understood as de- 
pendent (i. e. constitutively dependent) upon the minds of experiencing subjects-only to re- 
veal at the eleventh hour that objects are not really mind-dependent in the sense that we'd 
supposed him to mean at all. They are merely dependent upon the mind and will of God; 
which claim seems to stand well outside the boundary of theoretical philosophy. In my view 
this would be a fair assessment to make of what Berkeley has done. The qualification should 
be added, however, that he has also taught us to question more thoroughly what is meant by 
'4 By "finite", I take Berkeley to mean here that, being creatures of the infinite spirit (namely God), indi- 
vidual spirits can be neither omnipotent nor omniscient. They are, however, immortal in the sense that they 
will persist indefinitely, as long, of course, as God wishes them to persist (1962: 136-37). 
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such terms as "matter" and "material (or physical) entity". One might think that he has merely 
exchanged the Cartesian dualism of minds and material things for a different version of dual- 
ism, comprising two kinds of non-material things, namely minds and ideas. But he has done 
considerably more than that: by entirely rejecting the concept of matter as something external 
to sensory experience, he has pushed open a little wider the door that leads, via a particular 
line of thinking developed in the superlative mind of Kant, to a form of idealism which, unlike 
Berkeley's position, does not turn out to be a kind of theistic realism. '5 And it is to Kant's 
philosophy that I shall turn in the following section. 
KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM AND EMPIRICAL REALISM 
It was the German philosopher Christian Wolff who, in the early eighteenth century, first used 
the term "idealist". "Those thinkers are called `idealists"', he wrote, "who acknowledge only 
ideal objects existing in our minds, denying the independent reality of the world and the exis- 
tence of material bodies" (Psychologia rationalis, sect. 36, quoted in Rescher 1995: 227). 
With such a definition in view, one can appreciate why Berkeley has so often been character- 
ised as an idealist, even though, as we have seen above, any such characterisation must be 
heavily qualified due to his theological commitments. Kant certainly saw Berkeley as being an 
idealist, 16 and since Kant was sharply aware of the solipsistic (and frankly implausible) impli- 
cations of a position that admits the existence only of minds and cognitive and perceptual 
phenomena, he was keen to distance himself from the kind of idealism spoken of by Wolff and 
exemplified (as Kant and many of his contemporaries saw it) by Berkeley. It was, then, to 
Kant's immense dismay that the first edition of his Critique of Pure Reason (1781) was, de- 
spite his efforts to distinguish his own position from those of previous philosophers, taken by 
some reviewers to be proposing exactly the kind of idealism of which he so disapproved. 
Kant's reaction was, first, to compose the Prolegoinena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783), 
which is essentially an attempt to summarise in plainer language the main proclamations of 
the Critique, and secondly, to heavily revise the Critique itself in such a way that it would be 
less likely to be interpreted along lines that Kant held to be mistaken. Especially noteworthy 
in this regard is the insertion into the Critique's second edition (1787) of a section entitled 
"Refutation of Idealism", in which Kant tries to make more explicit than ever what he consid- 
'3The expression "theistic realism" is the view, notes Grayling (1986: 130), "that things may exist inde- 
pendently of the thought and experience of finite minds, their objectivity and independence relative to finite 
minds being explained by the fact that they exist in the mind of God" 
16 See e. g. the opening paragraph of Kant's Refutation of Idealism (3274) and Prolegomena 4: 293 (1997: 
45) already cited on p. 83 above. 
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ers to be wrong with the kind of view that he here labels "material idealism" (B274) and 
elsewhere refers to as "empirical idealism" (A369 ff. ), and thereby to distinguish it more 
definitely from his own "transcendental" or "critical" idealism. '? By way of an entry point 
into a discussion of Kant's own position, I shall outline below the criticisms he makes of al- 
ternative "idealisms". 
Kant defines "material idealism" as "the theory which declares the existence of objects in 
space outside us either to be merely doubtful and indemonstrable or to be false and impossi- 
ble" (B274), and goes on to identify the former view as the "problematic idealism of Des- 
cartes" (which he calls "sceptical' idealism at A377) and the latter as the "dogmatic idealism 
of Berkeley" (B274; cf. A377). Kant appears to be using the term "idealism" here in place of 
the older term "scepticism", and to be portraying Descartes's view as an epistemological 
scepticism, i. e. scepticism about whether we can know that there is an external world, and 
Berkeley's as a metaphysical scepticism, i. e. the straightforward denial that an external world 
exists. They are, in Kant's terms, forms of "material idealism" insofar as they both claim that 
what we ordinarily take to be external material entities are really internal, purely phenomenal, 
ones. Kant's treatment of the two positions is only partial, as it makes no reference to the role 
played by God in each of them; which role, as we have seen, changes the nature of the respec- 
tive positions dramatically, turning Cartesian doubt into Cartesian certainty and Berkeleyan 
idealism into theistic realism. This is not, however, an oversight on Kant's part; it merely re- 
flects his view that the question of whether God exists cannot be resolved by means of specu- 
lative metaphysics, which view entails that to try to prove the objective existence of physical 
entities (in Descartes's case) or of ideas (in that of Berkeley) on the assumption of God's exis- 
tence is an illegitimate manoeuvre. 18 
Kant's critique of Berkeley's view is not contained in the Refutation of Idealism, for he 
considers the view to have been refuted already in an earlier section, which I shall come to in 
due course. With regard to the refutation of Cartesian ("problematic") idealism, meanwhile, 
Kant sees his main task as being to "show that we have experience, and not merely imagina- 
tion, of outer things" (B275). The kind of argument he adopts is, as so often in the Critique, a 
"transcendental" one; which is to say, an argument that begins by noting something (e. g. a 
"All quotations from Kant's CPuR are from Norman Kemp Smith's translation (1965 edition). Regarding 
the letters "A" and "B", see Abbreviations (p. vii). 
'a Kant's principal critique of hitherto arguments for the existence of God are to be found in the third sec- 
tion of the chapter entitled "The Ideal of Pure Reason" (A583/B61I ff. ). His own view, that the 
"transcendental idea" of a supreme unconditioned being is a necessary ground for the possibility of all condi- 
tioned reality (but cannot, on that basis alone, be supposed to exist), occurs in the previous section of the 
same chapter. 
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feature of experience) whose occurrence would be exceedingly difficult to deny, and then pro- 
ceeds to make a case for some other thing's being a necessary condition of it. 
In the present instance, Kant begins with the assertion that "I am conscious of my own ex- 
istcnce as determined in time" (ibid. ). This is a straightforward phenomenological claim about 
the temporal nature of our lives: we consider ourselves to be biographical subjects, as having a 
life-history, which entails that we exist in time; in other words, that time is an objective fea- 
turc of our existence. Kant's second assertion in the argument is principally a condensed re- 
statement of a point that he makes more fully in an earlier subsection entitled "Analogies of 
Experience" (see the First Analogy, A182/B224 ff. ); namely, that temporality (which cannot 
be perceived directly but is a necessary precondition of the changes we experience as occur- 
ring in objects) "presupposes something permanent in perception" (B275). This is so because 
changes cannot occur in abstraction from some thing (a permanent substance) that undergoes 
those changes. The thing, or "permanent", that underlies perceived changes cannot, Kant con- 
tinues, "be something in me, since it is only through this permanent that my existence in time 
can itself be determined" (ibid. ). In the preface to the Critique's second edition, Kant explains 
this point as meaning that the permanent substance "cannot be an intuition in nie"-i. e. a sen- 
sory perception-since such intuitions, being representations of objects, themselves presup- 
pose something permanent, "in relation to which their change, and so my existence in the time 
wherein they change, may be determined" (Bxxxix fn. a; original emphasis). It follows, Kant 
asserts, that my perceiving this permanent substance "is possible only through a thing outside 
me; and consequently the determination of my existence in time is possible only through the 
existence of actual things which I perceive outside me" (B275-76). 
We might, then, paraphrase Kant's argument in the Refutation as follows: 
(i) We are aware of our existence as being temporally determined. 
(it) This is so because we experience representations in temporal terms (i. e. as exhibiting 
temporal characteristics such as duration, succession and simultaneity). 
(iii) Time cannot be perceived directly but is presupposed in any experience of change. 
(iv) Change also presupposes permanence, i. e. a substance to which change occurs. 
(v) No substance can be represented in experience (since all representations, being tem- 
poral, require an unrepresented substance as their ground). 
(vi) Therefore substances must be "external", which is to say, they must exist in space in- 
dependently of ourselves qua empirical subjects. And hence it is correct to say that we 
experience things and not merely our own internally generated representations. 
The argument is controversial, with respect not merely to its validity, but also to how it ought 
to be interpreted. Some commentators have proposed that the position adopted by Kant on the 
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relation between representations and external things contradicts statements that he makes 
elsewhere in the Critique. Kemp Smith (1992: 313), for example, takes Kant's position in the 
Refutation to be a form of realism, according to which our outer representations are of genu- 
inely external objects and are determined by them. This, Kemp Smith points out, is to be con- 
trasted with the view that predominates in the Critique's first edition, viz. that "External ob- 
jects (bodies), " as Kant puts it in the Fourth Paralogism, "are mere appearances, and are 
therefore nothing but a species of my representations, the objects of which are something only 
through these representations. Apart from them, they are nothing" (A370). Other interpreters, 
meanwhile, have denied that the Critique exhibits a lack of coherence and consistency, and 
have referred to it as, for example, "one of the most single-minded and unified works in the 
philosophical canon" (Waxman 1991: 4). 19 I do not propose to try to resolve the controversies 
concerning the Critique in general or the Refutation of Idealism in particular. But I shall at- 
tempt in what remains of this section to sketch some of the key features of Kant's philosophy, 
most particularly the "transcendental idealism" with which he has become almost universally 
associated. 
It is in the first edition of the Critique that Kant explicitly defines his own position as a 
form of idealism, which he calls transcendental (or sometimes "critical" or "formal") ideal- 
ism. In the Prolegomena he betrays some misgivings about his previous use of this expression, 
referring, for example, to "my formerly so-called transcendental, or better, critical idealism" 
(1997: 46); and in the Critique's second edition he removes the passage in which 
"transcendental idealism" was most prevalent (namely, the Fourth Paralogism, at A366-405). 
He cannot, however, be said to have forsaken the philosophical position for which the expres- 
sion stands, for the majority of the first edition remains intact, including references to the 
"transcendental ideality" of space (A28/1344), time (A36/B52), and appearances (A507/13535). 
To anyone who has done as much as to glance at the Critique's Table of Contents, it will 
be evident that Kant has a dazzling number of uses for the term "transcendental", 20 and he 
refers to the grand project for which the Critique is a mere preliminary as "transcendental 
philosophy" (A12-14/B25-28). In the context of Kant's thought it is important to distinguish 
"transcendental" from "transcendent" on the one hand, and from "empirical" on the other. 
Although "transcendental" and "transcendent" are clearly etymologically identical-deriving 
"Waxman does not make it clear whether he is here referring to the first or the second edition of the Cri- 
tique, which fact suggests that he does not consider the changes made in the second edition to have altered 
Kant's position. 
"For example, the two major divisions of the Critique are entitled, respectively, "Transcendental Doc- 
trine of Elements" and "Transcendental Doctrine of Method", and under the first of these are included such 
further divisions and subdivisions as "Transcendental Aesthetic", "- Logic", "- Analytic", "- Dialectic", etc. 
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from the Latin transcendere, "to raise (oneself) beyond"-Kant finds a distinct use for each of 
them. Ile retains the common usage of "transcendent" as meaning "surpassing all possible ex- 
perience", but redefines "transcendental" to mean "that which makes possible, and thus 
(logically) precedes, experience" (cf. Kant 1997: 128 fn. ). Furthermore, whereas, on Kant's 
view, that which is transcendent cannot be known (and hence any claims about it must be re- 
garded as purely dogmatic), that which is transcendental can be known, by means of an en- 
quiry into the necessary conditions of the possibility of knowledge itself. Since, for Kant, 
"There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience" (B1), a significant part 
of this enquiry involves an attempt to establish what factors must be present in order for ex- 
perience to occur. Having asked the question, one can then proceed, via a series of transcen- 
dental arguments, toward a knowledge of the sought-after factors a priori, i. e. "prior to" or 
"independently of' (any particular) experience. 
The distinction between the terms "transcendental" and "empirical" consists in the fact 
that, whereas the latter relates to "that which is experienced or experienceable", the former, as 
we have just seen, concerns "that which precedes experience as its necessary condition". This 
distinction of Kant's enables him to present himself as both an idealist (of a particular kind) 
and a realist (of a particular kind). He is-albeit more explicitly so in the Critique's first edi- 
tion-a transcendental idealist and an empirical realist. Transcendental idealism is defined as 
"the doctrine that appearances are to be regarded as being, one and all, representations only, 
not things in themselves, and that time and space are therefore only sensible forms of our in- 
tuition, not determinations given as existing by themselves, nor conditions of objects viewed 
as things in themselves" (A369). The distinction between the appearances of things 
(phenomena) and the things in themselves is central to Kant's critical (or transcendental) phi- 
losophy. Kant never ventures to doubt the existence of a world of entities outside of human 
minds; but he denies that we can know anything positive about it beyond the mere fact of its 
existence. What appear to us in experience are representations of things, which representa- 
tions are constructed, out of the raw material received via the senses, by our cognitive appara- 
tus. These apparatus-comprising the two "forms of sensibility" (time and space) plus a total 
of twelve "categories of the understanding" (i. e. concepts that are applied to sensations or 
"intuitions")-are, on Kant's view, precisely what enable experience, and hence knowledge, 
to occur; and thus they can never be by-passed, no matter how hard we might try to reach the 
things-in-themselves that stand behind the appearances. 
Kant is an idealist, then, in the sense that he holds that objects as we come to know them 
are always subject-dependent. He calls himself an empirical realist on the grounds that he re- 
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gards the objects of experience as real from the human standpoint. It is because we all share 
that human standpoint that "objective" (i. e. intersubjectively consistent) knowledge about the 
world is possible, although the caveat remains that such knowledge concerns only the world of 
appearances and not of things in themselves. 
Kant contrasts his own transcendental idealism and empirical realism with the 
"transcendental realism" and "empirical idealism" that are exemplified in the philosophies of 
certain of his forbears. By assuming the extra-subjective reality of space and time, the tran- 
scendental realist "interprets outer appearances [... ] as things-in-themselves"; but then, in 
view of the widely-held belief that our experiences are in some way or other mediated by our 
sense-faculties, the transcendental realist is obliged to acknowledge the ideality of the objects 
of experience, and thus becomes an empirical idealist (A369). Kant insinuates that empirical 
idealism is the precarious position in which Descartes, among others, finds himself, the only 
option being (unless one is to forgo belief in an external world) faith that the divine creator 
has ensured the faultless correspondence of our representations to the things they are supposed 
to represent. 
Several commentators have interpreted Kant's critique of Descartes as essentially Ber- 
keleyan, and such an interpretation is in my view largely correct 2' Both Berkeley and Kant 
try to refute scepticism by identifying material objects with our phenomenal representations: 
there is no epistemological gap that has to be bridged, they say, for the world as it appears to 
us is the only world we can know about-and we know about it directly. Where the two phi- 
losophers differ, however, is in their respective responses to the issue of how it is that all sane 
human beings seem to have representations of the saure world. While Berkeley invokes the 
mind of God as an objective and supra-human ground for phenomena, Kant claims that our 
common human (though transcendental) constitution ensures that, although each of us plays a 
constructive role in the production of our representations, we each play an equivalent con- 
structive role. (It is on this point that modern antirealists tend to differ from Kant, arguing that 
human cognitive apparatus vary in relation to historico-cultural and/or evolutionary biological 
factors 22) Kant holds Berkeley's major fault to be the latter's failure to recognise the subjec- 
21 Schopenhauer, for one, regarded the Critique's first edition as Berkeleyan in so far as Kant therein 
"declares the external world lying before us in space and time to be mere representation of the subject that 
knows it" (1966 1: 435). More recently T. E. Wilkerson has claimed that "at least two of Kant's arguments in 
the Dialectic [including the one against Descartes that we are considering] rest squarely on a Berkeleian re- 
duction of objects to collections of perceptions" (1976: 182). 
22 Hilary Putnam's position, for example, has been described (by Alston 1996: 82) as an "updated, relativ- 
ized Kantianism, " according to which "anything we have beliefs or make assertions about exists and is what it 
is only "within" or "relative to" some "conceptual scheme" or "theoretical scheme" of human devising" (Cf. 
Putnam 1987, esp. pp. 20 ff). Richard Rorty also, like Putnam, holds that the a priori concepts which Kant 
ascribes to the understanding are historically contingent, and traces this view to Hegel (Rorty 1982: 3). The 
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tive origin of space and time. And since, on Kant's view, space and time are indispensable 
conditions for the appearance of any external object whatsoever, this failure necessitates the 
attribution of space and time to objects themselves. Kant regards such a position as absurd, 
presumably because it implies that our representations come into our minds pre-formed, and 
gives no account of how they arrive there. If pushed on this point, Berkeley would, no doubt, 
have had to resort to the Deity's omnipotence as an "explanation" of how we come to experi- 
ence spatiotemporal entities; but Kant, regarding this as a retreat from rationality, dismisses 
Berkeley as a "mystical and fanatical idealis[t]" (1997: 45) who has degraded physical objects 
to "mere illusion" (CPuR B70-71). 
In a brief summarial treatment such as this, this is about as much of Kant's philosophy as 
we can hope to cover. Several of the themes introduced here will re-emerge in later chapters 
(indeed, that is one of the principal reasons for their being brought up here at all); but now I 
shall turn to Arthur Schopenhauer, who, while maintaining a "sincere and deep reverence for 
Kant", was not afraid to point out what he regarded as the "weaknesses and mistakes" of 
Kant's philosophy (19661: 417). 
SCIIOPENHAUER'S CRITICISMS AND MODIFICATIONS OF KANT 
Schopenhauer inherited from Kant the distinction at the heart of transcendental idealism, 
namely that between the world of phenomena-that is, the world as it appears in our represen- 
tations-and the thing in itself. This distinction he considered to be "Kant's greatest merit" 
(1966 1: 417). He finds Kant's arguments for the distinction unsatisfactory, however, and in 
developing his own case performs some major sugery upon, and fires some sharp criticisms at, 
the Kantian philosophy. 
The chief difficulty with Kant's assertion of the existence of things in themselves, which 
difficulty Schopenhauer was not the first to point out, 23 is that it is based on the assumption 
that the manifold of raw sensory material which constitutes the content of our intuitions can- 
not manifest spontaneously of its own accord, but must be derived from something outside us; 
in other words, every sensation must have an extra-mental cause. This assumption is highly 
problematic in view of Kant's firm conviction that causality is one of the categories of under- 
standing; i. e. is something that the understanding brings to our conception of objects, and can- 
not therefore be legitimately attributed to that which is independent of all subjectivity 
relevance to mysticism of the "cultural constructivism" typical of Putnam and Rorty (and exemplified in par- 
ticular by Steven Katz) will be discussed in Chapter 7 below. 
2' Schopenhauer was preceded by, for example, G. E. Schulze in his Aenesidemus (acknowledged by 
Schopenhauer at 1966 t: 436; cf. Gardner 1999: 330). 
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(namely, the thing in itself) (Schopenhauer ibid.: 436,502). Unlike certain other philosophers, 
such as Fichte and Schelling, who sought to overcome this problem of transcendental idealism 
by jettisoning the concept of the thing in itself altogether, Schopenhauer thinks it can be sal- 
vaged via a different route. He takes our awareness of ourselves as willing, i. e. as performing 
acts of will by means of bodily action (the body being the "objectivity of my will" (ibid.: 103, 
cf. 108 ff. )), to be different in kind from all other modes of awareness (ibid.: 110); the differ- 
ence being such that, whereas all other awareness or experience involves a relation between 
subject and object mediated by the subject's perceptual capacities, the awareness of will dis- 
closes one's innermost nature, and along with it the innermost nature of the entire phenomenal 
reality (ibid.: 1I1 ff. ). In short, then, Schopenhauer identifies the will (which has to be under- 
stood in an extremely broad sense24) with the thing in itself, and effectively ends up abandon- 
ing his own oft-repeated principle of "no object without subject" (ibid.: 434; n: 202; etc. ) by 
claiming that everything, including the subject of experience, is a mere manifestation, or ob- 
jectification, of the will. 
A secondary error that Schopenhauer attributes to the Kantian thing in itself is its supposed 
plurality. Kant frequently speaks of "things in themselves", thereby implying that there are 
several, perhaps innumerable, such items; but Schopenhauer points out that numerical proper- 
ties can be ascribed only to things existing in time and space, 25 and that since the thing in it- 
self always remains unaffected by these two forms-which apply only to phenomena-it can- 
not rightly be said to be multiple. Neither, strictly speaking, can it be regarded as singular; but 
since, in order to refer to it at all, we have to give it some numerical quantity, the concept of 
singularity is more appropriate than any alternative, as long as we remember that it is "not one 
as an object is one, for the unity of an object is known only in contrast to possible plurality" 
(19661: 113). 
A further-and probably the most significant-criticism that Schopenhauer makes of 
Kant's philosophy concerns Kant's view of perception, and more particularly the role of the 
understanding (Verstand) in perception. Essentially, Schopenhauer regards Kant's view on 
this matter as deeply confused. In certain places Kant seems to elevate sensations to the level 
of perceptions, thereby radically under-emphasising the importance of the understanding; 
24 q have greatly extended the range of the concept `will'. [... ] Will used to be recognized only where it 
was accompanied by cognition and where, therefore, a motive determined its expression. But I say that any 
movement, shaping, striving, being, that all these are manifestations, objectivizations, of the will, in that it is 
the in itself of all things, i. e. that which remains of the world if one disregards the fact that it is our imagi- 
nation" (Schopenhauer, Unpublished manuscripts, t: 353 [written in 1816], quoted in Safranski 1989: 205). 
25 It would be more accurate to say time and/or space, for numerical designations ("singular", "dual", 
"plural", etc. ) can apply to items in a series that is temporal but non-spatial, and to items in an atemporal spa- 
tial environment, as well as to those that are both spatially and temporally conditioned. 
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whereas in other places he implies that the understanding is indispensable for experience, 
while characterising the understanding in an unduly complicated and intellectualised manner. 
Schopenhauer holds Kant's view of the understanding as a faculty concerned exclusively with 
thinking (i. e. conceptualisation) to be seriously mistaken, and maintains that Kant's twelve 
"categories of the understanding" ought to be dramatically pruned and reduced to one, namely 
causality. According to Schopenhauer, the sole function of the understanding is not concep- 
tualisation at all-that is reserved for reason (Vernunft) (ibid.: 439)-but, rather, the 
"referring" of sensations to their cause or respective causes, by which is meant the regarding 
of each sensation as an effect of a sense-organ's coming into contact with some external en- 
tity. "In this way the cause presents itself in space and time (forms of pure intuition or percep- 
tion) as object of experience, " i. e. as a representation (ibid.: 444-45). A full assessment of 
Schopenhauer's revisions in this area would require a far more detailed discussion than can be 
provided here; but as an illustration of the advantages that his account of perception yields 
over that of Kant, we might consider the case of animal perception. On Schopenhauer's the- 
ory, no problem is encountered when awareness (or experience) of external objects is ascribed 
to non-human animals, for although the understanding is crucial for such awareness to occur, 
its being merely a pre-rational faculty prevents the need to endow animals with ratiocinative 
capacities. On Kant's theory, however, since the understanding is taken to be a rational fac- 
ulty, there seems to be no way in which awareness of external objects can be admitted to be- 
long to animals without also attributing to them the power of conceptual thought. Of course, 
there would be no problem if, as Kant seems to do, we were to allow sensations alone to count 
as perceptions (or "intuitions"); but as, in my view at least, Schopenhauer has convincingly 
shown the necessity of causality (i. e. the referring of sensations to a cause) in perception, 
Kant's position fails to account for the perceptual capacities of non-human animals, which 
capacities can hardly be denied to exist. 26 
One additional point concerning Schopenhauer's view of Kant's philosophy should be 
made here, which is not so much to do with a criticism as with a difference of orientation be- 
tween the two philosophers. It has become a commonplace-indeed, a cliche-to characterise 
Schopenhauer as a pessimist, whereas Kant is not at all regarded in the same way; and this 
difference stems largely from the men's respective attitudes to the empirical world. Kant ap- 
preciates the fact that we cannot have access to the world as it is in itself, but he does not con- 
ceive this epistemic limitation as necessarily problematic; rather, it is simply an inevitable 
consequence of our being the kinds of experiencing beings that we are in the kind of world 
26 Schopenhauer makes reference to animal perception at various places, e. g. 1966 t: 439,448,454. 
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that we inhabit. Schopenhauer, however, stresses the defective nature of our knowledge, char- 
acterising it as delusory and frequently comparing the Kantian world of "appearance" or 
"phenomena" (or "representation") to the Vedäntic concept of ?n yti, 27 which term, in 
Schopenhauer's day as in our own, was most commonly translated as "illusion". lie views the 
world of experience as a trap to be escaped from, and as utterly pervaded by pain, anguish and 
suffering for all sentient beings, including, and most especially, ourselves. 28 Schopenhauer is 
perfectly aware of the similarity between these features of his outlook and aspects of certain 
religious and philosophical traditions of India (he explicitly mentions Buddhism and Vedänta, 
but he also knows of Sämkhya29). And very much in common with such traditions he con- 
ceives of the final end and justification of existence as involving what he refers to as a 
"surrender" or "denial" of one's embodied nature as a willing and desiring organism, and a 
complete transcendence of everything we would ordinarily count as experience (see esp. 1966 
1: 410-12). 
This soteriological thread in Schopenhauer's philosophy will be woven into the discussion 
of kaivalya ("aloneness", "liberation") in Chapter 7. For now, however, we can leave this 
overview of realist, antirealist and idealist streams within western philosophy, and direct our 
attention in the next chapter toward the relevance-or lack thereof-of these terms to the 
philosophies of Sämkhya and Yoga. 
27"Man [... ] is captive to delusion, and this delusion is as real as life, as the sensory world itself, indeed it 
is one with it (the maya of the Indians)" (Unpublished manuscripts t: 104 [written in 1814], quoted in Safran- 
ski 1989: 202). Cf. e. g. 19661: 8,17. 
28"[E]ssentially all life is suffering" (1966 1: 310); "The ceaseless efforts to banish suffering achieve 
nothing more than a change in its form" (ibid.: 315); "as the phenomenon of the will becomes more complete, 
the suffering becomes more and more evident. [... ] [I]n proportion as knowledge attains to distinctness, con- 
sciousness is enhanced, pain also increases, and consequently reaches its highest degree in man; and all the 
more, the more distinctly he knows, and the more intelligent he is" (ibid.: 310). 
29For references to Buddhism and Vedänta, see e. g. 1966 1: 356,381 if. Schopenhauer comments on 
Sämkhya at 1974b it: 399-400. 
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O WING TO THE CENTRALITY of debates about realism and idealism (and other forms of an- 
tirealism) in western philosophical discourse, it is only natural that these concepts 
should have also figured prominently in the encounter between western and Indian philo- 
sophical traditions. During the course of this encounter-which has taken place and gathered 
considerable momentum particularly over the last two centuries-the attempts to interpret 
classical Indian philosophies within a semantic and linguistic framework that will be intelli- 
gible to an educated western audience has led both western and Indian scholars to ascribe 
various forms of realism and idealism to those Indian philosophies. There is nothing especially 
novel or surprising about such attempts, for in certain respects it is merely a continuation of a 
common tendency to apply modern philosophical terminology to older systems, whether they 
be European or non-European. In the interpretation of ancient Greek philosophy, for example, 
scholars are generally quite happy to speak of the "realist" and "idealist" inclinations of cer- 
tain thinkers, even though such terms were not available to those thinkers in the ways in which 
we now use them. Similarly, as was shown in the last chapter, it is possible to discuss whether 
Berkeley's philosophy is a form of idealism or realism, despite his not having framed it in 
precisely these terms himself. As the discussion of Berkeley's philosophy also showed, how- 
ever, the ascription of idealism or realism to any particular position is not necessarily a 
straightforward task. Indeed, it could-and often does-turn out that, upon a superficial 
glance, the philosophy in question appears to be one thing, but after more careful scrutiny it is 
revealed to be quite another. Or that, in certain respects it is one thing, and in other respects 
something else. This was certainly the case with Berkeley's position; and the chances of devis- 
ing an overly simplistic, or perhaps even completely topsy-turvy, interpretation of a philoso- 
phy are, I think it is fair to assume, multiplied several times over when the philosophy con- 
cerned originated within a cultural context as far removed from the modern West as is that of 
ancient India. 
The project of interpreting classical Indian philosophies in terms of western philosophical 
concepts ought not, then, to be taken lightly, but neither need it be viewed as a project doomed 
from the outset. Sanskrit, after all, is an Indo-European language, and as such shares a consid- 
erable amount in common with ancient Greek and Latin, and hence with the modern European 
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languages that derive largely or in part from those sources. It need not, therefore, be assumed 
that translation from classical Sanskrit into European languages is an impossible task. Nor 
should we take it as granted that the respective developments of philosophy in Europe and 
India have been entirely separate. Although definite evidence of cross-cultural communication 
is scarce, the significant number of parallels between certain aspects of classical Indian and, 
for example, Greek thought have long been commented upon by scholars who have a knowl- 
edge of both traditions. ' Indeed, so marked are some of these parallels that more than one 
scholar has proposed that some communication of ideas between Europe and India-perhaps 
via Persia-must have occurred in the ancient world? Whatever the historical facts of the 
matter may be, it would be as misleading to project an aura of unapproachable mysteriousness 
onto the philosophies of classical India as it would to treat them as immediately accessible and 
transparent. 
I am not, therefore, of the opinion that the employment of terms such as "realism" and 
"idealism" in the interpretation of Indian philosophies is necessarily inappropriate. Such terms 
may in certain instances constitute valuable tools with which we can work to define the posi- 
tions of Indian thinkers and systems in ways that are meaningful to ourselves (as scholars) and 
to a western audience. Other such terms would include "monism", "dualism", "pluralism", 
"materialism", "mentalism", "ontological", "epistemological", "phenomenological", and a 
host of others, some of which have close Sanskrit analogues and others of which do not. I am, 
however, of the view that it is very easy (and tempting) to impose a category such as realism 
or idealism upon an Indian system in such a way that places unwarranted limitations upon that 
system, and hence upon our understanding of its nuances, details, complexities, and perhaps 
internal tensions and inconsistencies. I hold, further, that such impositions have been unfortu- 
nately typical of attempts to characterise several Indian systems, and that this has created a 
great deal of confusion concerning these systems, and also concerning the philosophical terms 
1 See e. g.: William Jones 1799 (Works in): 236; Colebrooke 1873: 436 ff.; Garbe 1899: 32-56 and 1917: 
113-37; Keith 1949: 75-77. 
'Examples are really too numerous to mention, although to illustrate the point the following may be 
noted: the belief in metempsychosis (evident in Pythagorus, Empedocles, Plato, and Plotinus, amongst oth- 
ers); the Pythagorean doctrine of five elements; Epicurus's assertion that "nothing is created from what does 
not exist. For everything would be born from everything without the need for seed" (trans. O'Connor 1993: 
21; cf. SK 9, SS 1.78; cf. also Empedocles in Wright 1981: 172); and Empedocles' emphasis on freeing one- 
self from "impurities [... ] of birth" by means of asceticism (Tawney, quoted in Garbe 1899: 35). With refer- 
ence to these kinds of examples, Garbe declares that "The historical possibility of the Grecian world of 
thought being influenced by India through the medium of Persia must unquestionably be granted" (1899: 38; 
original emphasis). Schopenhauer, however, claims to discern a significant difference between the respective 
life-goals promoted in ancient Greek and Indian philosophies: "The former (although with the exception of 
Plato) has for its object the ability to lead a happy life, vita Beata; the latter, on the other hand, the liberation 
and salvation from life generally, as is directly expressed in the very first sentence of the Sanikhya Karika" 
(1974b u: 313). 
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themselves. In many instances it would appear that the interpreter-whether western or In- 
dian-is not sufficiently familiar and confident with the subtleties and semantic variations in 
the uses of "realism" and "idealism" to employ such terms effectively and in a way that is 
hermeneutically illuminating rather than concealing. The inevitable result is not only that a 
biased and possibly incompetent assessment is made of the system immediately concerned, 
but also that it is placed in a false relation, whether of compatibility or conflict, with other In- 
dian systems, and hence that a radically distorted picture of the whole philosophical milieu is 
painted. 
There are many examples of Indian systems that have commonly-and in some cases rou- 
tinely-been characterised as either realist or idealist. The systems that are typically placed in 
the idealist category are, in the Vedic (vaidika) or "orthodox" (äslika) traditions, Advaita 
Vedanta (the most notable version of which being that of Bankara) and, in the Buddhist tradi- 
tions, Yogäcära/Vijnänaväda (most prominently associated with Vasubandhu). Those typically 
regarded as realist are more numerous, and include the non-Vedic Cärväka, Jainism, and the 
non-Mahayana Buddhist schools, and, of the orthodox darganas, Nyäya, Vaigesika, and Pürva- 
mimämsd, as well as Säipkhya and Yoga. 
Interestingly, some scholars have endeavoured to place the various systems into orders of 
rank that represent a kind of punctuated progression from the most pluralist, realist and mate- 
rialist at the bottom to the most monist, idealist and "spiritual" at the top. Such an approach 
can be traced at least as far back as the Sarvadarsanasa» igraha of Mädhava (fourteenth cen- 
tury CE), 3 and a version of it was promoted as recently as the twentieth century by Sarvepalli 
Radhakrishnan. Both Mädhava and Radhakrishnan saw the Advaita Vedanta of 9ankara as the 
supreme achievement of Indian philosophy, with the other systems representing less perfect 
stages of philosophical development. These latter systems may serve the purposes of persons 
of a more or less primitive intellectual disposition but cannot fulfil the elevated aspirations of 
the "strong-minded (uttamädhikäri)" (Radhakrishnan 1927 ii: 770). Such accounts ought, I 
think, to be viewed simply as sectarian assertions of the supremacy of Advaita Vedanta over 
all other systems, rather than as plausible descriptions of a genuine intellectual evolution in 
Indian thought. Despite the fact that the actual historical situation is far more complicated than 
such hierarchical models suggest, a similar model has been employed by certain scholars in 
the case of Buddhism, with "Yogäcära-Vijnänaväda Idealism" being regarded as "the last 
3 The San'adarsanasamgraha's English translator, E. B. Cowell, writes in his Preface that "The systems 
form a gradually ascending scale, -the first, the Chdrväka and Bauddha, being the lowest as the furthest re- 
moved from the [Advaita] Vedanta, and the last, the Sätkhya and Yoga, being the highest as approaching 
most nearly to it" (Cowell and Gough 1882: viii; my square brackets). 
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great creative synthesis of Buddhism", and as occupying a "position in that tradition [... ] 
comparable to that of the Advaita Vedanta in the orthodox Hindu tradition" (Murti 1975: vii). 
There are in this case sound reasons to hold that the Yogäcära viewpoint was formulated rela- 
tively late in the historical development of Buddhist schools, but any implication that it there- 
fore stands victorious as the crowning glory of Buddhism would be ludicrous. 
A comprehensive investigation of the diverse attributions of realism and idealism to vari- 
ous Indian philosophies would undoubtedly prove a fruitful project. Here, however, our atten- 
tion will be more exclusively focused upon Sämkhya and Yoga. I shall endeavour in this 
chapter to root out and examine the principal reasons for the remarkably widespread assump- 
tion that these two darganas can legitimately be described as realist. The first half of the 
chapter includes a broad survey of instances in which such an assumption has been made, as 
well as a close analysis of a passage that illustrates the kind of muddled thinking which often 
accompanies the assumption. The chapter's second half deals with a particular section of the 
Yogasiutra's fourth pada, which section is frequently cited as evidence of Yoga's (and 
Sämkhya's) realism. I discuss in detail the two most important sutras in this section, and con- 
clude that rumours of their inherent realism have been much exaggerated. 
THE STANDARD INTERPRETATION OF SAI IKHYA AND YOGA 
(AND SOME OF ITS SHORTCOMINGS) 
Probably the best way of trying to understand why Sämkhya and Yoga have so frequently 
been assumed to be realist is to begin by outlining the main features of what can be regarded 
as the standard interpretation of these philosophies. Although there are inevitably minor 
variations between the versions presented by different interpreters, there exists a widely ac- 
cepted set of core views, which can be summarised as follows: 
1. Sämkhya and Yoga are metaphysically dualist. They hold that reality comprises two mu- 
tually fundamental entities (or "substances" or "principles"), which are most commonly re- 
ferred to as purusa and prakrii. 
2. Purusa is the principle of subjectivity or consciousness. Only in its presence can experience 
take place. There is a multiplicity-indeed, an infinity-of purusas, which in themselves 
are numerically distinct even though, since they are simple and devoid of qualities, they 
cannot be qualitatively distinguished. 
3. Prakfti is the principle of objectivity and materiality. It comprises three co-essential con- 
stituents or, more literally, "strands" (gums). When the strands are undisturbed and are in 
mutual balance or equal tension with one another, prakrti remains unmanifest (avyakta). 
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When, on the other hand, they are disturbed and out of balance, prakrti becomes manifest 
(vyakta). 
4. The disturbance of the gunas occurs due to the "presence" or "proximity" (sannidhüna, TK 
20) of purusa, and therefore this presence may be regarded as a "catalyst" that stimulates or 
"excites" the gunas into action, even though purusa itself remains passive 4 There was 
never a time, however, when purusa and prakrti were not compresent, and thus the gunas 
must be held to have always been active, although it is possible for the compresence or 
"conjunction" (samyoga) of purusa and prakrti to end, and thus for an equilibrium to be 
established between the gunas. 
5. The manifestation of prakrti consists in a series of "real transformations" (Feuerstein 1980: 
32; Organ 1975: 211), which together form an evolutionary process. The whole of empiri- 
cal reality-i. e. the cosmos or "world"-is produced by this process. By "real transforma- 
tion" it is meant that the world is not constitutionally dependent upon purusa, even though 
it could not have manifested without purusa's presence and, indeed, manifests solely "for 
the purpose of purusa" (purusärtha). 
6. The "purpose of purusa" is twofold: it comprises, on the one hand, having experience or 
"enjoyment" (bhoga) of the world, and, on the other, transcending experience and abiding 
in a state of self-contained "aloneness" (kaivalya). Since experience is inherently dissatis- 
fying and distressing, the former purpose must be regarded as subordinate and auxiliary to 
the latter. 
7. The goal of kaivalya is achieved through the attainment of a self-revelatory discerning 
knowledge. For Sämkhya this knowledge is arrived at largely or exclusively by rational 
thinking, whereas for Yoga it is attained by means of supra-rational meditation (sarnyanra, 
dhyünra). 5 
8. Although kaivalya does not involve any ontological change in purusa, it does involve the 
"dissolution" of manifest prakrti into its unmanifest source, which (because the manifesta- 
tion is "real") can only be regarded as an ontological change. 
With respect to the issue of realism, the two most important points in the above summary 
are numbers 1 and 5, although these cannot be considered in isolation from the others. Point 1 
4 , It should be noted [... ] that purusa is not a direct cause of the appearance of the manifest world. The 
purusa is simply present, and this presence functions as a kind of catalyst in releasing the casual [sic! ] process 
of transformation in the mülaprakrli" (Larson 1979: 173; cf. 191; 1987: 49). "Prakrii is dynamic, self. 
efficient, and self-contained, but it is not self-sufficient since it acts only when catalyzed by the presence of 
purusa" (Organ 1975: 211). "[T]he development of prakriti can occur only through the excitation of pu- 
rusha" (Reese 1996: 675). "9t is the transcendental influence of purusa that rouses prakrti from her slumber 
at the advent of a new cycle of creation" (Chakravarti 1975: 229). [My underscoring in all quotations. ] 
51 have disputed this supposed methodological distinction in Chapter 2 above. 
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is important because it proposes that there is something that exists in addition to conscious- 
ness/purusa, and thus may be regarded as an assertion of the reality of that thing, namely 
praklti. Point 5 pushes this assertion further and claims that not only is the metaphysical (i. e. 
non-empirical) ground of phenomena real, but so is the world of phenomenal items itself. I 
shall now say a little more about each of these points in turn. 
The interpretation of the purusa-prakrti dualism has tended to be heavily influenced by the 
mind-body dualism of certain western philosophies, the most paradigmatic of which is that of 
Rend Descartes. For Descartes, since a substance is that which requires nothing else in order 
to exist, strictly speaking the only genuine substance is God. 6 However, as was noted in 
Chapter 3, less strictly we can regard as substances those things that depend for their existence 
upon nothing other than God; and this definition allows in, on Descartes's view, res cogitans 
("thinking things", minds) and res extensae ("extended things", bodies, material objects) 
(Descartes 1985 1: 210). 
Interpreters of Särnkhya and Yoga are generally very reluctant to speak of purusa as a 
"substance". This is probably because, in spite of the fact that expressions such as "spiritual 
substance" and "immaterial substance" have a long history in western philosophy, there re- 
mains a sneaking suspicion that "substance", if not a precise synonym of "matter", at least 
implies it (cf. Schopenhauer's remarks quoted on p. 76 fn. 3 above). No such qualms need in- 
terfere with the characterisation of prakrti, however. To this, the term "substance" is freely 
applied, ' although far more common are expressions that involve "matter" or "nature". The 
majority of translations of Sämkhya and Yoga texts, for example, render prakrti and its syno- 
nyms by "primordial matter" (Jhä 1896) or by equivalent terms such as "primordial nature" 
(Larson 1979), "primal nature" (Suryanarayana Sastri 1948), etc. And in commentarial or 
critical literature written in European languages we frequently find talk of such things as "the 
Unmanifested or primal matter" (Davies 1894: 17), "primal virgin matter" (Zimmer 1953: 
225), "primitive matter" (Garbe 1899: 10; Macdonell 1900: 391), and "sheer materiality" 
(Larson 1980: 307). All such terms are presumably intended to accord prakrti the status of 
being an ultimate and self-existent substance in something approximating the Cartesian sense. 
Thus, although no interpreter would be reckless enough to equate purusa and prakrti with 
6"By substance we can understand nothing other than a thing which exists in such a way as to depend on 
no other thing for its existence. And there is only one substance which can be understood to depend on no 
other thing whatsoever, namely God" (Descartes 1985 1: 210 [Principles of Philosophy 1.51 ]). 
7"[Praklti] is a blind unconscious force, or rather a primal substance" (Davies 1894: 105 fn. 2). "For 
Saipkhya the apparent subject (namely, internal awareness in terms of buddhi, ahainkara, manas, and so 
forth) is really substance (maloprakrtl as triguna)" (Larson 1987: 71). "Prakrti is the fundamental substance 
out of which the world evolves" (Radhakrishnan 1927 n: 266). [It should be noted, however, that Rad- 
hakrishnan denies that praklti is to be regarded as straightforwardly "material" (ibid.: 261-62,274). ] Cf. Eli- 
ade (1969: passim, esp. 19 ff. ), who frequently renders prakri as "Substance" (with a capital "S"). 
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Cartesian minds and bodies, the basic picture of a metaphysical- or substance-dualism is held 
to be common to both philosophies. 
While discussing dualism here, it is appropriate to note that, in order to declare a philoso- 
phy realist, it is not essential to demonstrate that it is dualistic. Physicalism (or materialism), 
for example, is monist in the sense that it proposes that everything, including supposedly 
"mental" things and events, can in some sense be reduced to (i. e. explained in terms of) physi- 
cal things and events; and yet physicalists invariably regard themselves as realists, since they 
hold that the objects we generally take to be external to our minds would continue to exist 
even if our minds (or brains) were annihilated 8 
Conversely, it is not necessary for a philosophy to be monist in order for it to be idealist. 
For example, although Kant would not wish to commit himself to either a monist or a dualist 
metaphysics (as to do so would, on his view, be to overstep the boundary of reason), it is nev- 
ertheless possible to conceive of a metaphysics that combines an affirmation of the unknow- 
ability of the thing-in-itself with a denial that consciousness can be reduced to that thing. In 
later chapters I shall propose that this is in fact very close to the stance taken by Sämkhya and 
Yoga. But a good deal of background interpretive work will need to be done first. 
The claim of Särpkhya and Yoga that purusa and prakrti are co-ultimate ontological prin- 
ciples is not, in itself, a sufficient basis upon which to assume that these darganas take a realist 
position. It entails, of course, that they are at least realist about purusa and prakrti-i. e. that 
they regard at least these two things as real-but this is a very minimal sense of realism. After 
all, everyone has to be a realist about something (cf. Kirk 1999: 168). As Descartes pointed 
out in his Second Meditation (1968: 102 ff. ), the very act of doubting the existence of things 
requires the existence of a doubter (and even if one refuses to grant this, the existence of the 
doubt itself cannot be denied); therefore a complete scepticism ends in self-contradiction. The 
minimal sense of realism that has just been attributed to Sämkhya and Yoga is not entirely 
trivial, however, since it is a necessary precondition for the more interesting kind of realism 
that is asserted in point 5. 
What we have in point 5 is the assertion of an ostensibly more familiar form of realism, 
which consists in the claim that "the world"-which we have experiences of and thoughts 
about-does not depend upon purusa for its existence, but is produced out of unmanifest 
Some philosophers have distinguished between materialism and physicalism on the grounds that, 
whereas the former stands for material monism, the latter admits scientific entities that are not strictly 
"material", such as energy and natural laws (see e. g. A. D. Smith 1993: 225-26). I'm not convinced by this 
distinction, and nor, it would seem, are most materialists and physicalists, who tend to use the terms inter- 
changeably and view their position as monistic. (Whether they are strictly monist is a question that cannot be 
pursued here. ) 
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prakfti via a process of material changes or evolutions. Arthur Macdonell voices this interpre- 
tation when he states that, for Särpkhya, "The world is maintained to be real, and that from all 
eternity; for the existent can only be produced from the existent" (1900: 391); and it is echoed 
in Mircea Eliade's comment that "For Sämkhya and Yoga, the world is real (not illusory-as 
it is, for example, for Vedanta)" (1969: 9; original emphasis). The contrast with Vedanta-by 
which term is often meant, as in this last case, the Advaita Vedanta of S`ankara-is a relatively 
common feature of claims concerning the realism of Sämkhya and/or Yoga. A. B. Keith in- 
vokes it when he writes that "nature [prakrti] is essentially other than spirit [purusa]: it is not, 
as in the Vedanta, a production of ignorance, but is as real as spirit itself" (1949: 89); 9 and so 
does Anima Sen Gupta when, with particular regard to the "living being" (jivabhäva) or hu- 
man personality, she asserts that, whereas for Advaita Vedanta "It is purely imaginary" (the 
sole reality being "the undivided consciousness or Brahman"), according to Sämkhya the 
components of the living empirical self (such as buddhi, aharihkära, etc. ) "are as real as con- 
sciousness" (1982: 86). As one further example we might mention John Davies' discussion of 
the Sdrpkhya view of perception, in which he notes that Kapila (whom Davies treats as re- 
sponsible for the classical Sämkhya philosophy) "accepted our sense-perceptions as represent- 
ing a real external world, which exists in itself, and not merely as a projection of our sensa- 
tions or thoughts", and adds that "The Veddntist doctrine, that the material world is only 
ma}yä, or illusion, was not held by him" (1894: 103). Later in this chapter I shall draw atten- 
tion to some statements made by S`ankara which show that he did not consistently hold the 
empirical world to be illusory; but for the time being we need to add some clarity to the claim 
that Sämkhya and Yoga regard it as "real". 
In the first sentence of the above paragraph I noted that, according to point 5, "the world" 
does not depend upon purusa for its existence. In a western philosophical context, it would be 
common to describe realism as the view that the world does not depend for its existence upon 
the mind (or upon our cognitive apparatus or perceptual equipment, etc. ). 10 In the cases of 
Sämkhya and Yoga, however, it cannot be described in this way, since what is meant by "the 
world" is not at all what is normally meant by this expression in western philosophical par- 
lance, and neither of course is purusa equivalent to "mind", "cognitive apparatus", and so 
forth. This point is crucial, for it not only highlights the inappropriate and misleading nature 
of the expression "the world" when applied to manifest prakrti, but also-as I shall show in 
9The quotation continues: "though it is only under the influence of union with spirit that it [prakrti] 
evolves itself. " 
"Typically this would imply the human mind, but there is in principle no reason to exclude the minds of 
other conscious species or, as we saw in the discussion of Berkeley in Chapter 3, the mind of God. 
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the following two chapters-ultimately undermines the whole realist interpretation as it is 
generally formulated. 
The expression "the world" can, of course, simply mean "everything that exists, " i. e. the 
whole of reality. In that case, with regard to Sämkhya and Yoga, it would encompass both 
pral: rti and purusa. In discussions of realism and antirealism, however, "the world"-as noted 
in the last paragraph-commonly stands in opposition to the cognising subject or "mind". 
When we ask, in such discussions, whether the world is mind-independent, we are clearly not 
including "mind" within "the world", for it would be unintelligible to ask whether the mind is 
independent of itself. Nor can we be including mental states, contents, faculties, etc., for these, 
too, could not intelligibly be thought of as mind-independent (cf. Alston 2002b: 1). When, 
however, Gerald Larson (or any other interpreter of Sämkhya or Yoga) says that "The purusa, 
which is consciousness, witnesses every level of the manifest world, and the manifest world 
does what it does because of or for the sake of purusa" (1979: 176), the expression "the mani- 
fest world" must not be regarded as excluding the mind and its contents. On the contrary, it 
must be regarded as referring primarily to the mind and its contents, and only secondarily to 
anything that exists outside it. For no serious interpreter of the darganas concerned-even one 
who insists that everything to do with prakrti is in some sense "material"-would deny that at 
least the majority of prakrti's manifest forms is psychic or psychosensory in nature; and a 
small number of interpreters, of which I am one, would claim that they are all of this kind. '1 
Purusa, meanwhile, can indeed be regarded as consciousness, just as Larson so regards it in 
the quotation above. This assessment is supported by purusa's being identified with cetana 
(SK 55), which is best translated as "consciousness", and (at SK 19) with such states as "seer- 
ness" (drasftva, cf. YS 1.3) and "witnessing" (säksitva), which latter term the quotation from 
Larson also alludes to. Yet purusa is clearly not the kind of experiencing subject that is nor- 
mally contrasted with "the world" in western philosophy. Although many varied conceptions 
of such a subject exist in the western tradition, the most prevalent of these include its being 
complex and active, i. e. possessing a range of faculties (capacities, powers) by means of 
which it is able to engage with the world-to perceive it, think about it, and make voluntary 
decisions to act in it, often in ways that have ethical implications. 12 Indeed, in western par- 
lance, "subject" and "self' (and in earlier times "spirit" and "soul") have often been used in- 
11 Others who take some version of this view include Jajneswar Ghosh in his Introduction to Aranya 1977 
(though noticeably not in his earlier Sämkhya and Modern Thought (1930)), and Braj M. Sinha (1983). 
'2"[A] self is conceived to be a subject of consciousness, a being capable of thought and experience and 
able to engage in deliberative action. More crucially, a self must have a capacity for self-consciousness" (E. J. 
Lowe, in Honderich 1995: 816, entry under "self'). Cf. Thomas Reid (1941: 203): "Whatever this self may 
be, it is something which thinks, and deliberates, and resolves, and acts, and suffers. " 
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terclhangeably, or virtually interchangeably, with "mind" and "person", thereby bolstering an 
assumption that the subject of experience must possess the kinds of properties that are typi- 
cally attributed to minds, such as those of being able to undergo certain "states" (both inten- 
tional and nonintentional) and hold certain contents (perceptual and conceptual). Especially 
since Kant, it has been widely accepted that the mind (and hence the subject) must be active, 
as experiences and knowledge could not possibly arrive in our minds already fully formed. 
Whether one holds that one's perceptual and conceptual knowledge of the world more-or-less 
accurately represents the way the world actually is (as in realism) or bears no resemblance to 
that world whatsoever because a spatiotemporal realm of objects cannot exist independently 
of an experiencing subject (as in idealism), it cannot plausibly be denied that our perceptions 
and conceptions are in some sense constructed by us (Berkeley's suggestion that they are 
somehow given to us by God strikes us as naive at best, and meaningless as worst). 
In Särpkhya and Yoga, however, purusa is neither complex nor active, and yet it is the 
"experiencer" or "enjoyer" (bhoktr, SK 17). Several of the capacities that, in western philoso- 
phy, have tended to be ascribed to the subject-such as forming concepts, making judgments, 
remembering things and events, initiating action-are, in Särpkhya and Yoga, placed very 
firmly within the domain of prakrti. Even the very notion of being a self-an ego or "I" 
(aham)-is a function of the essentially nonconscious prakrti (SK 22,24). All that is left for 
purusa seems to be a non-attached, undiscriminating, bare "witnessing". Indeed, it cannot even 
be held to properly perceive anything, since to perceive an object involves distinguishing that 
object from the world in general, and this distinguishing or discriminating capacity belongs to 
(or is) buddhi. " In both Sämkhya and Yoga, perception (drsta, pratyaksa) is one of the three 
modes of valid cognition (pramüna), which is itself a "mental modification" (cittavrtti) and 
thus cannot be attributed to purusa (see YS 1.2-7). It is therefore difficult to determine exactly 
in what sense purusa can be regarded as an "experiencer". The term drastr, meaning "seer" 
(the one who sees), is used synonymously with purusa in the Yogasütra (1.3; 2.17,20; 4.23), 
which suggests an ability to see or perceive in some way. And in that text, as well as in the 
Sümkhyakdrika, the whole process of prakrti's manifesting is said to be for the dual purpose of 
purusa's "experience" (bhoga) or "seeing" (dar(an) on the one hand, and its "liberation" 
(apavarga, kaivalya) on the other (YS 2.18, SK 21). But, as mentioned above, we also find in 
both texts statements that identify purusa with the more abstract quality of "seer-ness" (SK 19) 
13 The crucial term here is adhyavasaya, with which buddhi is identified at SK 23, and which constitutes 
part of the definition of "perception" (drgta) at SK S. Adhyarasöya may be translated as "ascertainment" or 
"determination". Cf. Zimmer (1953: 320): "buddhi is the faculty of what is known as adhyatiasaya, i. e., 
'determination, resolution, mental effort; awareness, feeling, opinion, belief, knowledge, discrimination, and 
decision. "' 
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and "mere seeing" (drfimütra, YS 2.20, cf. 2.25), which terms imply an attempt to disassociate 
purusa from any particular experiences, and to characterise it as a kind of background aware- 
ness-something "within which" particular phenomenal events can occur. 
The concept of purusa seems to require, then, that we distinguish between, on the one 
hand, the processes and operations that make any experience or cognition possible, along with 
the experiences and cognitions themselves-all of which fall within the category of 
prakrti-and on the other hand, the fundamentally nonempirical (and hence transcendental) 
"pure subject"-the "subject that is never the object" as Ghosh puts it (1977: 2,21)-which, 
analogically speaking, can be said to "illuminate" mental events, or to provide the conscious 
location in which those events can manifest ("come to light"), but which cannot be said to 
cognise them itself. 
The view I have just proposed is philosophically provocative, for it suggests that there can 
be something we might identify as "pure consciousness" or "pure subjectivity" distinct from 
any content of thought or perception. It is also to some extent interpretively controversial, for 
although there is ample textual evidence to support a "pure consciousness" interpretation of 
purusa, there exist some important elements of Sämkhya and Yoga philosophy (in addition to 
those recently mentioned) that militate against it, or at least muddy the interpretive waters. 
Principally I have in mind here the following two doctrines. First, the notorious purusa- 
bahutva or "multiplicity of purusas" doctrine (SK 18), which, by proposing that there are in- 
numerable purusas individuated by their involvement with distinct spatiotemporal life-forms, 
seriously undermines purusa's transcendentality. Second is the doctrine that the 
"combination" (samyoga) of purusa and prakrti, which generates manifestation and experi- 
ence, is itself the result of a primordial "misperception" or "deceptive knowledge" (avidyä) 
consisting in a lack of discrimination between purusa and prakrti (YS 2.24-25). It might be 
thought that this absence of discrimination can be attributed to buddhi, but this is problematic 
for two reasons, one being the fact that buddhi is itself a manifestation of prakrti (and thus 
cannot be held responsible for initiating the manifesting process), and the other being the fact 
that it is purusa's realisation of its distinctness from the whole of prakrti (including buddhi) 
that brings an end to prakrti's manifestation, thus implying that the critical locus of discerning 
knowledge is purusa and not buddhi (cf. SK 64-68). These are awkward points for any inter- 
preter of Sämkhya and Yoga to try to deal with, and it may be that no entirely satisfactory in- 
terpretation can be arrived at. I shall argue in Chapter 7 that the apparent contradictions in the 
concept of purusa stem from a genuine tension in our very experience of being conscious, 
rather than necessarily from any philosophical laxity on the part of the darganas concerned. 
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For now, however, we must postpone any attempt to resolve these difficulties, and instead cast 
our attention back to the issue of the alleged realism of Sämkhya and Yoga. 
Enough has, I hope, been said to indicate that, if it is to be proposed that Sämkhya and 
Yoga are realist with respect to the manifest forms of prakrti, this must be acknowledged to be 
a very different kind of realism from that which we most often encounter in western philoso- 
phy. It must involve the claim, not that the spatiotemporal objects of our experience exist "out 
there" in the world independently of our cognisance of them, but rather that those spatiotem- 
poral objects and our mechanisms of knowing about them exist independently of what virtu- 
ally all interpreters would agree is in some sense a pure, unconditioned "self' or 
"consciousness". 
Owing to the peculiar and uncommon nature of this philosophical position, one might ex- 
pect to find frequent and lengthy explanations of precisely why the term "realism" provides an 
appropriate characterisation of it in the writings of those interpreters who regard it as so ap- 
propriate. Such explanations are not, however, to be found; indeed, what we come across in- 
stead is either a complete absence of explanation or else half-explanations that leave a high 
degree of ambiguity concerning the nature of the imputed realism. Francis Catalina, for ex- 
ample, says of Yoga that it "is a realistic, mystical and scientific school of thought", and adds 
that "it is realistic in its insistence upon the reality of the phenomenal world and that a normal 
evaluation of the perceptions of the sense be made" (1968: 138). By "a normal evaluation of 
the perceptions of sense", I can only presume that Catalina means an evaluation that judges 
these perceptions to correspond to objects that exist independently of them; which claim, 
combined with that of the "reality of the phenomenal world", strongly implies that the realism 
being referred to involves the relation between perceiving subjects and an external world of 
objects, rather than that between pure consciousness and the psychophysical complex of 
prakrti. Of course, many interpreters of Yoga believe that it does affirm the independent exis- 
tence of physical objects in time and space, and they base this belief upon the contention that a 
string of statements in the fourth chapter of the Yogasiütra presents an attempt to refute the 
Buddhist vijiiänavädin's "mind-only" (citta-mütra) doctrine. I will come to this supposed 
"refutation" in the next section. The important point to be made here, however, is that the 
statement quoted from Catalina above leaves us with no clear understanding of what is meant 
by his assertion that Yoga is "realistic". 
A similar problem of ambiguity is exemplified in certain passages from the work of Anima 
Sen Gupta, who has written several books on Sämkhya and has contributed to the Särpkhya 
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edition of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. " It should be noted that Sen Gupta re- 
gards classical Sämkhya and Yoga as a single system, and thus when she speaks of one or the 
other it may generally be assumed that she is referring to both. '5 (This accounts for the fact 
that, in the remarks that are to be discussed in the next section, she treats the Yogasütra and its 
commentaries as representatives of classical Särnkhya. ) "The philosophy of Sämkhya", she 
declares, "is not merely a dualistic system; it is also a realistic and rationalistic system", and 
then goes on to explain what she means by a "realistic system": 
A realistic system, as we know, is a system which believes that the object of cognition is different 
from and independent of cognition. In the opinion of a realistic philosopher, the object of valid 
cognition (pramäjfana [sic16 ]) is never non-existent or unreal (asat). It is only the object of an er- 
roneous cognition which can be regarded as asat in some sense or other. (1982: 2) 
As in the case of Catalina cited above, Sen Gupta is here talking about the relation between 
objects and our cognition of them, not about the relation between prakrti and purusa as cor- 
rectly understood. Indeed, she seems, in the above definition of realism, to have completely 
overlooked the fact that, according to Sämkhya and Yoga, the cognitions and the objects 
themselves are on the same side (i. e. the pralcrtic side) of the dualism between purusa and 
prakrti, and that therefore to discuss the relation between them is to say nothing about the role 
of purusa. Elsewhere Sen Gupta acknowledges the fact that the cognition and the thing cog- 
nised are both manifestations of prakrti (or of the three gunas-which amounts to the same 
thing); but she then goes on to confuse the issue more than ever by attempting to contrast the 
Sarpkhya position with idealism. The passage is worth quoting at some length since it high- 
lights the way in which the distinction between the purusa-prakrti relation and the cogni- 
tion-object relation is often blurred in accounts of Sämkhya's and Yoga's "realism": 
[The] gunas [... ] form the realistic setting of the Sämkhya school. Knowledge and its objects 
belong to the realm of genas which are totally independent of the purusa. An idealistic system 
holds that in the acquisition of knowledge, consciousness contributes every item and that the ob- 
ject of knowledge is convertible into consciousness. The classical Sämhhya, however, holds that 
the stuff of which the object of knowledge is composed is radically distinct from consciousness 
and is also independent of it. The whole world, therefore, rests on a principle which is as eternal 
and independent as the spiritual principle. Thus, according to Sämkhya, both matter and spirit are 
equally real, although matter, being an obstacle in the path of liberation, is of inferior value. (Sen 
Gupta 1982: 66; my underscoring) 
"Her most notable works include The Evolution of the SamimlUrya School of Thought and Classical 
Sdrhkhya: A Critical Study (see Bibliography). 
1' Often she uses the hyphenated form "Sämkhya-Yoga", as in the following statement: "The 
Sämkhya-Yoga philosophy is perhaps the oldest philosophical thought and discipline that has come down to 
us as a sacred heritage" (1982: ix). 
16 The correct spelling is pramc7jAina. 
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This is a very confusing passage, and I will not endeavour to unravel all of its tangled knots. 
The main thing I wish to point out is the highly ambiguous-indeed, multivalent-use of the 
term "consciousness". For example, in the assertion that for the idealist "consciousness con- 
tributes every item [in the acquisition of knowledge]", "consciousness" would seem to mean 
"the cognising subject" or "mind". When, however, it is added that on such a view "the object 
of knowledge is convertible into consciousness", "consciousness" is now being used to mean 
the cognition itself. (By "is convertible into", I take Sen Gupta to mean "is reducible to" or "is 
(numerically) the same as"). This slide from one sense of "consciousness" to another sets a 
precedent for the further slide that occurs between the third appearance of the term 
"consciousness" and the expression "spiritual principle". The third occurrence of 
"consciousness" could be read in either of the two ealier senses; and yet when Sen Gupta goes 
on to assert that "The whole world, therefore, rests on a principle which is as eternal and inde- 
pendent as the spiritual principle", she has assumed a quite different meaning for the term 
"consciousness" in the preceding sentence, namely the pure consciousness that we associate 
with purusa, which is not at all straightforwardly equivalent to the sense of a "cognising sub- 
ject" and is in no measure equivalent to that of the cognition itself. By means of this subter- 
fuge (which is almost certainly due to philosophical carelessness rather than witting decep- 
tion), Sen Gupta is able to show that the dualism between "matter and spirit" (i. e. prakrti and 
purusa) is equivalent to, or at least implied by, a realist position concerning the existence of 
physical objects, when in fact, as I hope has been adequately demonstrated already in this 
chapter, the two positions are by no means equivalent. "Of course, " we might say, "purusa is 
not the source of cognised objects. It is perfectly incapable of contributing anything to such 
objects, since it is simple, aloof, and pure. " But-to reiterate the point I have been trying to 
make-this says nothing about the relation between the objects and the cognising subject, 
which latter principle may in some way involve purusa (i. e. as the source of "illumination", 
which is "reflected" (pralibimba, TK 5) in buddhi) but which very definitely also involves the 
multiple capacities, or processes, or modes, of manifest prakrti. 
One major problem is that many scholars seem to look at the doctrine that the psychosen- 
sory faculties, in so far as they do not derive ("emerge", "emanate", "arise", etc. ) from purusa, 
are "independent" of it, and then assume that it follows as a natural corollary that external 
objects must be independent of cognition. As I think the above example from Sen Gupta 
shows, this assumption turns largely upon a muddle over the respective senses of "cognition" 
and "consciousness" in the context of Sämkhya and Yoga. And as I will show in the next 
chapter, it also depends upon a particular materialist interpretation of the relation between the 
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various modes of prakrti's manifestation, which interpretation turns out upon close inspection 
to be thoroughly incoherent. My own view-which I shall argue for particularly in Chapter 
6-is that there is no reason to assume that any of the manifest principles is an external object 
in the materialist sense, and that what is commonly taken to be the cosmological or cosmogo- 
nic schema of Särnkhya and Yoga is better thought of as a synchronic analysis of the cognitive 
capacities and forms (in a Kantian sense) that make cognition possible. As I hinted earlier, 
however, there is a reason (in addition to muddled thinking) why Yoga, and Sämkhya along 
with it, have been considered to be realist about external objects, and this relates to a section 
in the Yogasütra which I shall now discuss. 
YOGA'S ALLEGED REFUTATION OF BUDDHIST IDEALISM 
It is a series of sutras in the Kaivalyapäda, i. e. the fourth (and final) chapter of the Yogasütra, 
that is commonly held to contain a polemic against the so-called vyiidnav da of the Yogäcära 
school of Mahäyäna Buddhism (see e. g. J. H. Woods 1914: xvii-xviii, xl-xli; Leggett 1992: 
xv-xvi). This Buddhist school is estimated to have flourished in India from the fourth to the 
twelfth century CE (T. E. Wood 1991: ix), and is championed by such figures as Maitreya, 
Asanga, Vasubandhu, and Sthiramati. It is particularly well known for its doctrine (vüda) that 
all phenomena, including what we ordinarily refer to as "physical objects", are reducible to 
mental phenomena, which in turn are reducible to mind or consciousness (vyi. äna), and hence 
that "consciousness is the sole reality" (Chatterjee 1975: 45). It may thus be regarded as a 
form of "absolute idealism" (ibid.: xii, and passim). " 
The series of sutras in question begins at 4.14 and continues through to 4.22 (or 4.23 ac- 
cording to Woods 1914: xli). Although there is no explicit mention of the vijildnaväda in any 
of these sutras, the traditional commentators from Vyäsa onwards have taken them to be po- 
lemical in nature, and have used their commentaries upon them as an opportunity to express 
their own opposition to the vijildnaväda. Modern scholars have, on the whole, accepted the 
traditional interpretation of the sutras, and have used them as evidence both of Yoga's (and, 
indirectly, Sämkhya's) alleged realism and for the date of the Yogasütra's being not earlier 
than the third or fourth century CE. 18 Regarding the latter claim, Woods proposed in 1914 that, 
although we cannot be certain that the version of the viji dnaväda "attacked by the [Yoga-] 
"The idealist interpretation of Yogäcära Buddhism has been challenged by some scholars (see e. g. Ko- 
chumuttom 1982 and Lusthaus 2002). Such disputes, though of considerable interest in themselves, need not 
detain us here. 
"Keith, for example, asserts that "the Yoga Sutra seems to attack the doctrine of the Vijilanavadins, and 
[... ] therefore it is probably not older than the third century A. D., and probably is younger" (Keith 1949: 66). 
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Sutra must be the idealism of Vasubandhu", the probability that it is "is great" (xvii-xviii). 
This supposition is based almost entirely upon the fact that Väcaspati's commentary refers to 
a vii änavüdin, which Woods thinks is unlikely to be anyone other than Vasubandhu (p. 
xviii). Woods shows no sign of having considered the fact that, even if Väcaspati was refer- 
ring to Vasubandhu, there remains no reason to suppose that the original sutras also had this 
particular Buddhist in mind. However, notwithstanding what I would describe as the ex- 
tremely sketchy nature of this evidence, it has become commonplace to assume that the sutras 
are indeed criticising Vasubandhu. 
As I noted in Chapter 1, Surendranath Dasgupta challenges Woods' assessment of the 
Yogasütra's likely date, but not on the grounds that Woods has attached undue significance to 
Väcaspati's commentary. Rather, Dasgupta claims that the whole of the Kaivalyapäda is an 
interpolation, and that it cannot therefore be used to place a limit on the antiquity of the other 
three chapters (1922: 229-30; cf. my other remarks on this issue on p. 31 above). 
If Dasgupta is right, and the Kaivalyapäda is a later addition to the Yogasütra, then even if 
it did contain passages that are pro-realist and anti-idealist this fact would not be sufficient to 
conclude that the Yoga dargana as a whole is metaphysically realist. Since, however, it is un- 
likely that the issue of the Yogasütra's textual integrity will be conclusively resolved one way 
or the other, it is worth asking the question whether the series of sutras that purportedly argue 
in favour of realism do in fact expound such a position. Probably the most important of the 
sutras to consider are 4.14 and 15, as it is these two that attract the most vociferously anti- 
idealist rhetoric from the traditional commentators, and which have been cited by some mod- 
ern scholars as most explicitly exhibiting Yoga's realism (see e. g. Sen Gupta 1982: 2 ff. ). Let 
us, then, examine each of these two crucial sutras in turn. 
With regard to the first of the sutras to be considered here, I shall begin by giving my own 
close reading before attending to the commentaries of Vyäsa and Väcaspati. I shall also in- 
clude some discussion of the critique of the vijfldnaväda that occurs in Sankara's commentary 
on the Brahmasütra. This is in order to highlight the similarity between the respective posi- 
tions of Väcaspati and Sacikara on this issue, and to thereby cast serious doubt upon the as- 
sumption that Väcaspati's commentary expresses something essential or unique to Yoga and 
Sämkhya. 
Sutra 4.14 consists in the following brief statement: parinüma-ekatvüd vastu-tattvmn. A 
literal translation would be: "From the oneness of the modification, [comes] the `that-ness' of 
an object. " Owing to the fact that the preceding sutra (4.13) designates the "strands" (gunas) 
as the "essential nature" (atman) of those forms that are either "manifest" (vyakta) or "subtle" 
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(süksma, i. e. not immediately perceptible), the expression parinüma-eka: va may be taken to 
stand for the unity or integrity of the modifications or transformations of these strands. Vastu- 
tattva, meanwhile, can be understood as the existence of an object (literally, its "that-ness"), 
but also as the essence or nature of that object (which we might call its "what-ness"). In order 
to comprehend the meaning of the sutra as a whole, it needs to be noted that the process 
termed parinänza is that by which the irreducible strands are held to bring into being the 
modes, or manifestations, of the "seeable" (drfi), a, prakrti). These modes, at least on my inter- 
pretation (which will be developed more fully in Chapters 5 and 6), are the very constituents 
of experience, i. e. the factors that, in combination with one another, produce phenomenal epi- 
sodes that are presented to consciousness (purusa). 
If the modification of the gunas is understood as the process by means of which experience 
occurs, then to interpret vastu-taltva as meaning the existence of an object independently of its 
being perceived or cognised makes no sense. Only if vastu-tattva is taken to mean the nature 
of an object as experienced does the object's relation of dependence upon the modifications of 
the gunas become intelligible. In this light, the sutra can be interpreted as saying that the exis- 
tential continuity and qualitative coherence of an empirical object are due to the coherence 
and integrity of the factors that give rise to that object. There is nothing profound or surprising 
about this statement; it merely reiterates the familiar doctrine that empirical reality is pro- 
duced by the gunas. 
Interpreters who have already assumed in advance that the sutra is a statement of realism 
will, no doubt, object to the emphasis that I am placing upon the purely empirical (or phe- 
nomenal) nature of the products of the gunas, and will simply reaffirm that, since these prod- 
ucts ought to be understood as real material entities, and not as mere appearances, the sutra 
amounts to an assertion of realism. Chapter 6 will, I hope, make it clear why I consider this 
objection to be misguided. For now, it must suffice to say that, on my understanding, the 
gunas do not constitute a physical reality that exists independently of any experiencing sub- 
ject. They constitute, rather, the co-essential and irreducible conditions for anything's becom- 
ing manifest and, hence, the conditions of the possibility of what appears as an external and 
publicly-accessible domain of physical objects. Whether this interpretation is, or is not, found 
to be acceptable, however, now that we have some familiarity with the sutra being dealt with, 
we can turn to what the commentators Vyäsa and Väcaspati have to say about it. 
Vyäsa evidently holds that the sutra asserts the object's independence of the subject's 
awareness or knowledge (vyiräna) of it. He refers to an opposing opinion, according to which 
physical objects are unreal in a way that is analogous to the unreality of dream images. The 
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view that Vyäsa attributes to his opponent is as follows: "there is no object (artha) that is un- 
accompanied by cognition (viji äna); there is, however, cognition (jilüna) that is unaccompa- 
nied by an object, as in a dream" (YBh 4.14). 19 This is, briefly stated, the view with which 
Yogäcära Buddhism is associated, i. e. that the objects encountered in consciousness, whether 
in dreams or in the waking state, are merely apparent and have no substantial ground inde- 
pendent of consciousness itself. 20 Vyäsa regards the position as untenable, a mere attempt to 
"conceal (apahnava) the true nature of the object (vastu-svarüpa) [by asserting that] the object 
is a mere fabrication of cognition (jitüna parikalpanü-mätra)" (ibid. ). He does not, however, 
provide any arguments to support his objection; he merely declares that "the object stands pre- 
sented as `this' by its own power" (pratyupasthitam idam svamähatmyena vastu). Sen Gupta 
quotes this statement and elaborates it as "The object of cognition is always revealed in cog- 
nition as something given, as idam, and such a revelation is due to visaya's [i. e. the object's] 
own power of intelligibility" (1982: 3). This would seem to be realism in its most naive form, 
and merely begs the question how any cognising subject is to know that the objects of his ex- 
perience are "given" or "revealed" to him in their authentic nature and are not, in whole or in 
part, constructed through the act of cognition. In short, Vyäsa has missed the point of the 
vijildnavädin's position. What is still more important to highlight, however, is the fact that 
there is nothing in the original sutra to warrant Vyäsa's assertion. Indeed, the assertion seems 
to diverge from the sutra's insistence that the nature, or "that-ness", of the object is due, not to 
its own inherent power, but to the integrity of the modifying activities of the gunas, which on 
my reading are determining factors of the object as experienced and not as a supra-empirical 
entity. 
Väcaspati's gloss on Vyäsa's commentary to sutra 4.14, despite its considerable length, 
amounts to little more than the flat denial of the vijnänaväda that we find already in Vyäsa. 
According to Väcaspati, it does not necessarily follow from the premise that all objects are 
accompanied by an awareness (vedyatva) of them that the object has no existence other than 
its appearance in consciousness. The vijflänavädin's proposal that a perceived object is noth- 
ing other than the perception itself is therefore, on Väcaspati's view, a mere conception 
(vikalpa), which has no power to override our intuitive conviction that the perceived object 
exists independently of its being perceived by us. Neither Vyäsa nor Väcaspati (nor, indeed, 
Sen Gupta, who approvingly refers to both commentaries) denies the central claim of the 
vijiiänavddin, which is equivalent to Berkeley's observation that the existence of things is only 
'91t seems to me that Vyäsa is using vyiiüna and jiiana synonymously here, which is why I have translated 
both terms as "cognition". 
10 See e. g. Vasubandhu, dlanibanapartksa 6, cited in Chatterjee 1975: 45. 
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revealed to us in consciousness; they merely deny the famous I3erkelcyan conclusion that the 
being of a thing is therefore its being perceived (esse est percipi). There is no subtlety in their 
argument; it consists, as I suggested above, in a crude and naive realism, which holds that, 
since the world appears to comprise a range of spatially-extended and temporally-enduring 
physical entities, it must in reality be so comprised. It is an argument hardly worthy of 
Sämkhya and Yoga, which systems, on my interpretation at least, are primarily concerned with 
the analysis and disclosure of psychosensory processes that underlie, as conditioning factors, 
our experiences, including our experiences of supposedly external, physical objects. So if the 
realist assertions of the likes of Vyäsa and Väcaspati are not to be regarded as genuine expo- 
sitions of the original text-or if such genuineness is at least highly questionable-then 
whence did they derive? 
It is well known that Väcaspati was something of a philosophical mercenary in the sense 
that he composed commentaries on several systems and was able to give at least a pretence of 
being favourable to each of them even where their standpoints are at variance to one another. 
He is generally held to have written eight major works (or seven if one regards his 
Nyäyasucinibandha as an appendix to his Nyü), atiärttikatütparyatika), all but two of which are 
commentaries or subcommentaries. In addition to Sämkhya and Yoga, he commented upon 
Nyäya, Pürva-mimämsä, and Vedanta; and it is his subcommentary to ýankara's Brah- 
masatrab1zasya that constitutes his most extensive work, known as Birämatt ("illumination"). 
It is therefore evident that Vdcaspati had a thorough familiarity with S`ankara's Bhäsya even if 
we cannot state categorically that he was a committed Advaitin ("nondualist") himself. With 
this in mind it is interesting to note the similarity between Väcaspati's criticism of the 
Yogäcära vijfiänaväda in his subcommentary to Vyäsa's Yogab/z sya and tankara's own as- 
sault on this viewpoint at Brahmasütrabhäsya 11.2.27-28. 
A rudimentary form of realism is already staunchly asserted in Brahmasütrabadsya 1.1.2, 
where S`ankara declares that "the valid knowledge of the true nature of a thing is not depend- 
ent on human notions. On what does it depend then? It is dependent on the thing itself' (trans. 
Gambhirananda 1965: 16) 21 Then, at 11.2.27-28, he engages in a protracted attack against the 
vijiiänaväda. To discuss this in detail would be a distraction from our main purpose, but I shall 
summarise the most salient points. 
First it should be noted that tainkara, though hardly sympathetic to any rival school, can be 
said without exaggeration to have possessed a particular loathing for Buddhism in its several 
varieties, and to have seized any opportunity that availed itself to unleash his vitriol. Notwith- 
21 na ºastuyäthälmyaji3änam purucabuddlryapeksam / kim tarhi vastutantram era tat 1 
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standing this antagonistic attitude, gahkara provides a very fair account of the vijfiänavädin's 
case. lie notes, interestingly, that according to the vijiiänaväda, although an external object 
may exist independently of consciousness, knowledge of the object cannot arise unless the 
object is presented in consciousness. We therefore, on this view, have no cognitive access to 
the object's inherent nature, but only to the object as cognised, i. e. as an appearance. It is on 
this basis that the vijA5nav5din regards the object (as it is available to us) and the cognition of 
it as identical. What is of particular interest in this version of the vijriänavdda, as presented by 
S`adkara, is the allowance that it makes for the existence of things that are non-cognised or 
non-cognisable; in other words, its admittance of the Kantian distinction between the thing in 
itself and the appearance that arises in consciousness. The vijnänavädin's view is thus trans- 
formed from a straightforward ontological denial of external reality into a more phenomenol- 
ogical position, according to which the only way that objects are available to us is as phe- 
nomenal contents of consciousness and thus any judgement concerning the object "in itself" is 
precluded. 
The important point for us here is not whether tankara's summary at Brahniasütrabhüsya 
11.2.27 does justice to the vijnänaväda; that is a matter for scholars of Yogäcära Buddhism to 
decide. It is, rather, that in the subsequent discussion (at BSBh 11.2.28) Sankara ignores the 
distinction I have just referred to-i. e. that between an ontological denial of a thing and a 
phenomenological agnosticism about that thing's subject-independent existence-and simply 
imputes to his hypothetical Buddhist opponent the ontological denial while proceeding to 
counter this view with a dogmatic realism. This is of interest to us because it exemplifies a 
tendency that is exhibited by other critics of the vijndnaväda, including the Yoga commenta- 
tors Vyäsa and Väcaspati. 
Brahmasfitra 11.2.28 states, with characteristic brevity: na-abhüva upalabdhel: -"not non- 
existent, because of perception. " gahkara takes this to mean, as we might express it in modern 
parlance, that because perception is necessarily intentional, it must be directed towards an 
object that is external to itself, and that, therefore, to hold that the object exists merely in per- 
ception (i. e. has no existence "in itself") is a contradiction. "[I]t cannot be that the very thing 
perceived is non-existent", asserts gahkara (Gambhirananda 1965: 419). 22 But he is, of course, 
wrong; for there are many instances in which we readily admit to having perceived something 
as though it were external to us that later turns out to have been, in whole or in part, mental; 
typical examples being dream images and hallucinations. This is presumably why the 
viji änavädin uses the analogy of dreaming, since it offers such a clear illustration of objects 
22 na copalabhyamdnasyaivabhcivo bhavitumarhatl 
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appearing to us that, when considered outside of the dream, possess no detectable "external" 
ontological ground. At Brahmasülrabhüslya 11.2.29 S`ankara discusses dreams, and proposes 
that their difference from waking experience consists in their being subject to sublation. But 
this merely begs the question how we can know that our waking experiences are not to be 
sublated by some superior, perhaps yet unrecognised, mode of consciousness (which is pre- 
cisely what is advocated in the htundükyakarikd (e. g. 1.7,14) of the Advaitin Gauciapäda and 
in other works of Advaita Vedanta! ). Again, however, despite the astonishing crudity of his 
own assertions and responses, Sadkara portrays the vijiiänavädin's case fairly: 
VUiiänavädin: Well, I do not say that I do not perceive any object, but all that I hold is that I do 
not perceive anything apart from the perception. 
Veddntin: Yes, you do speak like that, since you have no curb to your mouth; but you do not 
speak logically, for something other than the perception has to be admitted perforce, just because 
it is perceived. (Gambhirananda's trans. 1965: 419)x' 
Sankara accuses his interlocutor of talking of perceived objects "as though" they existed 
externally to disguise the fact that he too (i. e. the vijiilänavädin) believes, like the rest of us, 
that the objects he speaks of really are external and self-existent. Sahkara seems to think it is 
enough that the objects we perceive as external should appear to be external in order for us to 
determine that they are in fact external; which is to say that our perceptions of external objects 
more or less accurately represent things as they exist "out there" in an objective spatiotempo- 
ral world. In other words, we encounter in ýankara's Bhüsya the same uncritical espousal of 
realism that we found in Väcaspati's subcommentary on Yogasatra 4.14. Now, since the same 
basic viewpoint is taken in Vyäsa's Yogablrüsya, which text is generally held to have preceded 
tankara, it would be unwarranted to suggest that Väcaspati's position on vijiiänaväda is de- 
rived solely from his immersion in 8ankara's works. However, the similarity between the 
viewpoints of Sankara, Vyäsa and Väcaspati on this matter is, I think, sufficiently close to in- 
dicate that the latter two commentators need not have obtained their opinions from an exclu- 
sively Särnkhya-Yoga context. On the contrary, the realist response to the vijMnaväda would 
appear to have been common currency among various schools, and thus its occurrence in the 
Yoga commentaries need not be taken as strong evidence of its presence in the Yogasütra it- 
self. 
Let us turn now to Yogasiitra 4.15, which reads: vastu-sämye citta-bhedüt tayor vibhaktalz 
panthült. This can be rendered as: "Due to the sameness (i. e. continuity) of the object and the 
23 na kaiicid artham upalabhe iii kirr tu upalabdlziv-)yatiriklam nopalabhe iti braviml bäi ham exam 
bratiisi niraiikufiat üt to ºundasya na tu yuky upelam braviii yala upalabdhhyatireko pi bahid 
arthasyübhyuupagantaiyah upalabdherera 
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dividedness of the mind (citta-bheda), these two are distinct levels. " In some translations the 
expression citta-bheda is taken to mean a multiplicity of minds, and on such a reading the 
sutra presents a version of the "experience of a shared world" argument for the independent 
reality of physical objects. That is to say, if the same object is experienced by several minds, 
the object itself must be independent of any particular mind (and therefore, necessarily, inde- 
pendent of all minds). Sen Gupta ostensibly accepts this interpretation, stating that "one and 
the same object can be presented to many buddhis or cognitions. So, the object cannot be of 
the form of any one of these cognitions" (1982: 3). 24 The terminology here is ambiguous 
however. By "cannot be of the form of any one of these cognitions", I would at first assume 
Sen Gupta to mean "cannot exclusively belong to... ". What she then goes on to say, however, 
is that "one and the same object can arouse different kinds of cognitions in different minds. 
That which arouses different cognitions can never be of the form of any one of these cogni- 
tions" (ibid. ). Thus Sen Gupta has managed (by, it should be noted, following Vyäsa's lead) to 
interpret the sutra as saying the exact reverse of what we might expect. That is, rather than its 
being the sameness of an (experienced) object in relation to several cognising minds that indi- 
cates the mind-independence of the object, this independent status is revealed, according to 
Sen Gupta, by the difference between the various experienced versions of the object (as oc- 
curring in or to different minds). The argument is incoherent since the conclusion does not 
follow from the premise. Why should the fact that several minds, or persons, have different 
experiences of an object constitute evidence in favour of the mind-independence of that ob- 
ject? Surely, what constitutes such evidence is the fact that, despite any (relatively minor) dis- 
crepancies between their respective experiences, the several individuals can all agree that they 
are experiencing the same object. Thus it is what their experiences have in common that is 
crucial, not how they differ. But even this commonality of experience-which is the basis of 
the "shared world" argument-is not decisive in favour of realism; for as Kant has shown, it is 
possible to formulate a version of idealism in which the sharedness of the world is accounted 
for by the uniformity (or at least profound compatibility) of the several subjects' modes of 
experience (i. e. their cognitive apparatus). Therefore neither version of the argument imputed 
to Yogasatra 4.15 is effective in establishing realism with regard to external objects. 
The fact that the argument imputed to the sutra is a failure does not, on its own, prove that 
the imputers have misinterpreted it. It could be that the sutra itself is at fault. But if a close 
examination of the sutra can unearth a more tenable meaning, then this would provide firmer 
24 Cf. Feuerstein (1979a: 134): "Pata>3jali's position is that consciousness and objective reality belong to 
different levels of existence. He points out that the same object is experienced by many consciousnesses 
[... ]. " [it should be remembered that Feuerstein uses "consciousness" to translate circa, not purusa] 
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grounds for discarding, or at least seriously reconsidering, the existing interpretations. So 
what is sutra 4.15 saying? It is undoubtedly saying something about the relation between mind 
(cilia) and its object (vaslu); principally that these items belong to separate panlhans. Panthan 
is a synonym of pathan, both terms being cognate with the English "path" and having, as in 
the case of this English term, the metaphorical sense of a more-or-less systematised approach 
adopted in pursuit of a desired result as well as the literal meaning of a pre-defined route or 
road along which one travels. In the present context, however, most scholars are agreed that 
panthan means a "way of being" or "level (of existence)". 25 This meaning evokes a connec- 
tion with sutra 2.19, in which the levels or divisions (pan-ans) of the "seeable" (drfya) consti- 
tuted by the gunas are listed. It therefore comes as no surprise that the mind and its object 
should be designated as different "levels", for it is precisely an awareness of the various levels 
of manifest reality that followers of Sämkhya and Yoga aim to cultivate. Unmanifest prakrti 
and its twenty-three manifestations can be divided into groups or levels in various ways, and 
the way that is used in Yogasitra 2.19 consists in a fourfold division. The way in which the 
classical Sämkhya principles are generally held to fit into this fourfold schema is depicted in 
the table on p. 64 above. Although it is not necessary to discuss the four divisions in detail 
here, I shall provide an outline of how I consider vastu and cilia to be related to them. 
Whether one interprets vaslu to mean a mind-independent entity or an object as perceived 
(by a conscious subject), it can nevertheless be agreed that it must be dependent in some way 
upon the manifest modes of prakrti and upon unmanifest prakrti; i. e. upon all four levels of the 
"seeable" (drsya) listed in sutra 2.19. According to the standard realist interpretation, the five 
"elements" (bhütas), which are included in the fourth level (vi. tesa: "part icularised"), are the 
immediate material causes of the vastu, while these elements are in turn "caused" by the con- 
stituents of level three, and so on back to level one, namely the unmanifest (aliriga) itself. My 
interpretation differs in so far as I regard the relation bet wween the modes of prakrti as one of 
conditionality rather than material causality. The elements, for example, are dependent upon 
the preceding modes in the sense that they could not exist without them-in other words, they 
are made possible by those preceding modes-but not in the sense that they are materially 
produced by or from them. Nor, in my view, are the elements properly material entities; rather, 
they stand for the forms into which sensory contents (tannzätras) are arranged in order for the 
subject to have experience of an external environment. This non-standard, yet far more coher- 
29 Woods, for example, has "levels-of-existence" (1914: 323); Feuerstein, similarly, has "levels [of exis- 
tence]" (1979a: 134; Feuerstein's brackets); and Prasäda has "ways-of-being" (1912: 290). Chapple and Viraj 
stick with "path" (1990: 113), as does Taimni (1961: 410), although Taimni also lists "way of being" as an 
alternative translation. Leggett's "categories" (1992: 389) is somewhat different, but not inaccurate. 
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ent, interpretation will be presented more fully in Chapter 6. Here all that needs to be said is, 
as I have suggested already, that on both the realist and my non-realist account, the vastu is 
dependent upon the four levels of the "seeable". 
Now, with regard to cilia, in the present discussion I have so far translated this term merely 
as "mind". In certain instances the term can be considered synonymous with the "inner in- 
strument" (antahkarana) of Sämkhya, while in others it is closer to buddhi alone. Indeed, the 
traditional commentators tend to use cilia and buddhi almost interchangeably. In terms of the 
four levels that we have been discussing, buddhi is the sole occupant of level two (linganiütra) 
whereas antahkarana, comprising buddhi plus egoity (ahamküra) and the organising aspect of 
mind (nianas), must be spread over three levels (lingamatra, avisesa, and vilesa). In which- 
ever of these two ways we understand the term cilia, however, it is clear that it must be re- 
garded as belonging to a different level (or levels) than its object, i. e. vastu. 
So if we ask again, what sutra 4.15 is saying, I think some clarity has been added in the 
above discussion to what is likely to be meant by the statement that mind and object constitute 
"distinct levels (of reality)". But this leaves unspecified the reason that is given for their being 
regarded in this way. The expression cilia-bheda is inherently ambiguous, and I don't think it 
is feasible to determine whether the author of the sutra intended to refer to the split between 
the minds of separate individuals or between the different mental states in a single mind. 
Vastu-sümya is less ambiguous (if we leave aside for the moment the question of whether the 
vastu is, or is not, mind-independent), and would seem to denote the spatiotemporal continuity 
of an object. Essentially, I think that what is being said is that, due to the fact that there is a 
general conformity between an external object as experienced by different minds at the same 
time (and/or by the same mind at different times), and yet the minds themselves (and/or the 
various mental states of a single mind) are evidently distinct from one another, the object and 
the mind that perceives it must be separate levels (aspects, modes) of reality. There is no rea- 
son why this interpretation should be controversial. What is (or ought to be) controversial is 
the status of the vastu, and hence we need again to ask the question that I have referred to 
above, namely: In what sense is the vastu dependent upon the (other) manifest modes of 
prakiti? For the answer to this question, however, one must search outside sutra 4.15, and 
therefore this sutra cannot possibly be regarded as an argument for, or even a statement of, 
realism about external objects. 
There is considerably more that could be said about the allegedly anti-idealist section of 
the Kaivalyapäda, but I hope the above discussion is sufficient to show that the interpretation 
of the relevant sutras is by no means cut-and-dried. Contrary to the assertions of some schol- 
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ars, the sutras themselves are not unambiguously realist, although a form of realism can be 
read into them if one has already assumed that this is their author's position. As we have seen, 
traditional commentators such as Vyäsa and Väcaspati do make such an assumption, but the 
eagerness of these commentators to besmirch the vijiänaväda and their general hostility to 
Buddhism (especially in the case of Väcaspati) ought to make us wary. It is likely that philo- 
sophical vendettas are being waged at the expense of accurate exegesis. In place of the tradi- 
tional interpretations, I have put forward alternative readings of the two most crucial sutras, 
which readings are in my view not merely as plausible as the traditional ones, but far more 
plausible; and I anticipate that this plausibility will be enhanced by the fuller treatment that 
my overall interpretation of the metaphysics and soteriology of Sämkhya and Yoga receive in 
the following chapters. 
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The Nature of Prakrti 
S AMKIIYA IS RENOWNED for its metaphysical schema of twenty-five principles (including 
purusa) and for the careful-some would say obsessive' -attention that it gives to the 
enumeration of the individual components of that schema. Yoga is widely held to have added 
a twenty-sixth principle, namely isvara, but to have otherwise adopted the Särpkhya model. At 
the heart of the schema is the claim that the whole of reality can be reduced ultimately to two 
co-fundamental principles, which are most often referred to as purusa and prakrti. The other 
twenty-three principles derive in some way from the "combination" or "conjunction" 
(samyoga) of these two co-fundamentals. The twenty-three derivates are generally described 
as "products" or "evolutes" of pralgti, which "emerge" or "arise" when the equilibrium of the 
three gunas (the threefold constitution of prakrti) is disturbed by the presence (samnidhl) of 
purusa. 
According to the standard interpretation, which I outlined towards the beginning of the last 
chapter, the metaphysical schema amounts to a cosmogony, which is to say that it presents an 
account of the order in which the various entities that make up the cosmos came into being. 
Having been in some mysterious way "stimulated", "catalyzed", "intelligised" or "vitalised" 
by purusa's presence, 2 the gunas proceed to combine in multifarious ways to produce a suc- 
cession of entities, beginning with the most "fine" or "subtle" and ending with the most 
"coarse" or "gross". Since, on the standard view, pral: rti is a material principle, all twenty- 
three of its (or her) evolutes must also be regarded as material. The fact that most of them are 
patently mental or psychosensory in nature is frequently held to be unproblematic, as long as 
the multipurposed and conveniently undefined expression "subtle matter" is applied to them. 
The production of three-dimensional physical objects out of elements whose origin can be 
1 Schopenhauer, for example, writes that "A peculiar feature of pedantry and narrowness in the Samkhya 
is the system of numbers, the summation and enumeration of qualities and attributes. " But adds: "This, how- 
ever, appears to be customary in India, for the very same thing is done in the Buddhist scriptures" (1974b u: 
400)). 
2For examples of the "catalyst" analogy, see p. 101 fn. 4 above. The terms "vitalised" and "intelligised" 
are used mainly by Sen Gupta, who seems to think that they are equivalent, as is evident from the following 
passage: "purusa is intelligising Prakrii by its mere sannidhi so as to make Nature fit for the creation of this 
world. Purusa is not therefore becoming an agent: purusa is the principle of consciousness that vitalize 
Prakrii by its mere existence (1982: 84; punctuation slightly amended, underscoring added; cf. pp. 76,132, 
140). Larson refers to buddhi's being "`intelligized' by consciousness" in a discussion of VAcaspati's reflec- 
tion (pra: ibimba) theory (Larson 1987: 82). 
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traced to the psychic factor of "egoity" (ahamküra), and further to "intellect" (buddhi), is also 
accounted for on the grounds that all these things are material in some sense. They are mate- 
rial (and, of course, "real"), and yet they all dissolve back into unmanifest prakrti when purusa 
realises that it (or he) is not of their nature. 
It is hardly surprising that such a preposterous story-which tends to become increasingly 
incoherent the more closely one examines it-finds little favour among modern philosophers 
(whether in India or anywhere else) and is widely regarded as a mere historical curiosity rather 
than an account of reality that deserves to be taken seriously. 
In the last chapter I challenged the realist assumption upon which the standard interpreta- 
tion of Saipkhya and Yoga is based. In this one I shall prepare the ground for a radical reinter- 
pretation of the metaphysical schema of these darganas by examining some of the principal 
doctrines that underpin it. Such doctrines include (a) the theory of causation known as the 
satkaryavdda, (b) the supposed "materiality" of prakrti, and (c) the analysis of prakrti into 
three constituent qualities or "strands" (gunas). 
CREATION, MANIFESTATION, AND CAUSALITY 
Sümkhyakdrikü 3 distinguishes four kinds of thing, or modes of reality, on the basis of 
whether each is creative or created, or both, or neither. The four modes are as follows. (t) 
Malaprakrti, the "root procreatrix", is by definition creative, though itself/herself uncreated 
(avikrti). (2) The seven principles referred to simply as "the great (mahat) and others" are both 
creative and created (prakrti-vikrti). It can be inferred from later kärikäs that, in addition to 
mahat (which term is used synonymously with buddhi in the Sdmkhyakürikü), the seven prin- 
ciples are "egoity" or, more literally, "I-maker" (ahamkdra), plus the five types of sensory 
content referred to as the tanmütras ("that alone", "merely thats3 ). (3) A further sixteen prin- 
ciples are merely created (vikrti); which just leaves (4) purusa, which is "neither procreative 
nor created. " It has been remarked upon by several scholars that this fourfold division of real- 
ity bears an astonishingly close resemblance to a similar categorisation employed by the ninth- 
century Irish theologian Joannes Scotus Eriugena. 4 The most relevant passage, from Eri- 
ugena's Periphyseon ("On the Division of Nature"), reads: 
The division of nature (divisio nalurae) seems to me to admit of four species through four differ- 
entiae. The first is the division into what creates and is not created; the second into what is cre- 
3"[L]iterally that and that alone" (Digambarji et al. 1989: 25). 
'Ei. T. Colebrooke was probably the first to notice the resemblance (1873 [Ist edn, 1837] 1: 244), and it 
has subsequently been referred to by, for example, Schopenhauer (1974b 1: 64), Radhakrishnan (1927 n: 274 
fn. 1), and Larson (1987: 635-36 n. 47). 
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ated and creates; the third, into that which is created and does not create; the fourth, into what 
neither creates nor is created. (Uhifelder's trans. 1976: 2 [1.441 b-442a]) 
It is not beyond the realms of possibility that this aspect of the Sämkhya philosophy could 
have found its way from India to the royal court in France where Eriugena worked, since 
communications did exist in medieval times between India and Persia and, in turn, between 
Persia and Europe. But whatever the source of Eriugena's quaternary schema may be, the rea- 
son I mention it here is principally in order to draw attention to a further point in the Irish- 
man's philosophy that might have a bearing upon how we interpret Sämkhya. The point con- 
cerns Eriugena's definition of creation as "self-manifestation [... ], self-externalisation, 
revelation" (Moran 1989: 250), none of which terms suggest the kind of separation between a 
divine creator and his creation that is normally associated with Christianity. It is, I want to 
argue, this very notion of creation as self-manifestation that underlies the relation between the 
unmanifest (avyakta, müla-) and manifest (vyakta, vikrti) aspects of prakrti, and it is the mis- 
understanding of creation as productive causation that has led to innumerable confused ac- 
counts of this relation in the interpretive literature. 
The most pertinent kärikäs in this connection are numbers 8 and 9, which deal, respec- 
tively, with the imperceptibility of unmanifest prakrti and the ontological status of its manifes- 
tations. "That", states kärikä 8, referring to the unmanifest or "root-" pral: rti, 
is imperceptible (or ungraspable, anupalabdhi) due to its subtlety, not its non-existence (abhäva). 
It is graspable (upalabdhi) via its effects (käryata). Afahat and the others are its effects and are 
with-the-nature (sarüpa) and without-the-nature (virüpa) of prahrti. s 
As the kärikä points out, unmanifest prakrti is not directly accessible to us, but can be 
"grasped"-i. e. inferred to exist-due to the presence of its "effects". The relation between 
these effects and their underlying "cause" should not, in my view, be understood too rigidly 
here. It is routinely taken, by both traditional commentators and their modern counterparts, to 
be a relation of material causality, which seems to me to be highly misleading. The sorts of 
analogies that are commonly used include the relations between such things as cloth and its 
threads, sesame oil and the seeds from which it is pressed, rice grains and the stalks from 
which they are obtained by threshing, and so on; none of which seems particularly helpful for 
elucidating the case under immediate consideration 6A further analogy of this kind concerns 
am ssauksmyal lad an: rpa/abdhir nablrürät küryalas tad upalabdhelr / mahadadi tac ca kary 
prakrlisarüpam virüpam ca fl 
6 These analogies can all be found in, for example, TK 9. 
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the relation between ajar and the clay from which it is made, and this is exemplified well in 
the following passage: 
A lump of clay is shaped by the potter as ajar. Here nothing that did not exist before comes into 
existence, but there is only change of position in space of the particles of the stuff. Any one who 
could see the clay in minute portions will see that those portions are only rearranged in a particu- 
lar manner in the jar. But those who see the whole and are familiar with the use of ajar, will call 
it a jar and in common parlance may say that a thing that was not in existence before has come 
into existence. In reality, however, there is only a spread of the mass of clay in a particular man- 
ner. 7 
The main problem with analogies such as this is that they describe a relation between two 
manifest spatiotemporal objects, one of which derives from the other in some way due to the 
intervention of a conscious agent. The lump of clay, for example, is not an unmanifest jar-it 
is simply a lump of clay, which can be formed into a jar only by the intentional action of a 
potter. In the case of prakrti and its effects, however, we are concerned with the relation be- 
tween something that is unmanifest on the one hand, and its manifestation or appearance on 
the other. The clay jar analogy is helpful only if we consider that the jar is still, in a certain 
sense, a lump of clay. Independently of our knowledge of what a jar is, and what we can do 
with it, it remains nothing other than such a lump. To this extent the analogy can begin to 
characterise the prakrti-effect relation, but it is a very limited extent. 
The crucial point with regard to prakrti is that it is not, in itself, a manifest object existing 
in time and space. It is defined as being the opposite of that which is, among other things, 
"caused (hetumat), non-eternal (anitya), non-pervasive (avyüpin), [and] active (sakriyü)" (SK 
10), which I take to mean that it is: 
(a) unconditioned; 
(b) eternal (in the sense of being atemporal, not of being continuously enduring 
or "everlasting"); s 
(c) non-spatial (i. e. without dimensions); 
(d) inactive. 
Therefore no comparison or analogy between it and something manifest can do justice to the 
nature of prakrti. It becomes manifest only in the presence (samnidhi) of, or in conjunction 
7This passage is part of an explanation of saikaryavada in an "Explanation of Technical Terms" (Aranya 
1977: 27). The passage was probably written by Aranya's translator and editor, Jajneswar Ghosh, although 
based on Aranya's own views. 
'This reading of the opposite of anitya as "atemporal" (rather than "everlasting"), and of the opposite of 
vyapin as "non-spatial" (rather than "non-pervasive"), is not particularly controversial, although certain inter- 
preters prefer to qualify it by saying, for example, that unmanifest prakrti is "outside of ordinary space and 
time" (Larson 1987: 49; emphasis added). 
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(samyoga) with, purusa; and thus if anything is to be regarded as the "cause" of prakfti's 
manifestation it is this presence, albeit not an active or efficient cause in the way that the pot- 
ter who turns the clay into ajar is active. It would seem, to me at least, to be more plausible to 
say that prakrti is not "turned into" anything; it is merely the case that in the presence of con- 
sciousness prakrti has an appearance, a form, and can thus be said to manifest, whereas in the 
absence of consciousness-or "in itself"-prakrti has no appearance, and remains unmanifest. 
The so-called "effects", therefore, are more correctly termed "manifestations" or "manifest 
principles (or modes, etc. )". The term tattva is frequently used in secondary literature to refer 
to these principles but there is no unambiguous precedent for this in the Sämkhyakürikü or 
Yogasütra. The manifest principles might be said to have a particular quality of tallva ("that- 
ness" or "such-ness")-i. e. the quality of being the things that they are--but I consider it 
misleading to refer to the principles themselves as tattvas, because there is no indication that 
this is the meaning of the term in the passages where it occurs. ' 
The existence of the manifest principles is thoroughly contingent upon the compresence of 
purusa and prakrti, and it is this precarious conditionality that I think the ostensibly paradoxi- 
cal last line of kärikä 8 is grappling with: the manifest principles are similar to unmanifest 
prakrti in so far as they share its "nature" (rüpa), 10 but are dissimilar in so far as, by defini- 
tion, they are manifest and it is not. This issue of the relation between manifest and unmani- 
fest prakrti parallels to some extent that of the relation between the appearance and the thing- 
in-itself in Kant's philosophy. " It cannot, strictly speaking, be a relation of causation-with 
unmanifest prakrti being the "cause" of its own manifest forms-for causation implies tempo- 
ral succession, and that which is unmanifest stands "outside" time. And yet there is certainly a 
sense in which the manifest forms are profoundly and inescapably dependent upon their un- 
manifest ground. It is, in my view, due to this relation of dependency or conditionality that the 
author of the Sdmkhyakärikü uses the terms "cause" (kärana) and "effect" (kür)ya) inter- 
changeably with "unmanifest" (avyakta) and "manifest" (vyakia). 
9Tattva in fact occurs only once in the Sainkhyaktlrikä and only twice in the Yogasatra. The expression 
tattra-abhyäsa ("sustained practice of thatness") at SK 64 is almost identical to the eka-tattva-abhydsa 
("sustained practice of a single thatness") at YS 1.32. It is evident from the context in which these expressions 
occur that they refer to some kind of soteriologically-oriented meditative discipline, but little more can be said 
with certainty. The other sutra in which tattira appears is 4.14, which was discussed in Chapter 4. 
1°Rüpa can also be translated as "form", although this would have to be understood very loosely when 
applied to unmanifest prakrti, since something that it unmanifest cannot, strictly speaking, have a form. 
"Nature" is, therefore, a preferable translation in the present context. 
"Relevant here is the criticism of Kant, voiced by Schopenhauer and others, that his attribution of causa- 
tion to the thing-in-itself is incompatible with his view that causality is a category of the understanding. (This 
was discussed briefly in Chapter 3 above, pp. 92-93. ) 
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Kärikä 9 is commonly regarded as "the locus classicus for the satkdryavüda" (Halbfass 
1992: 56), this being the so-called "theory of the pre-existent effect". The standard view is that 
the kärikä outlines a theory of causation, according to which an effect constitutes not a novel 
creation but merely a realisation or objectification of something that already existed poten- 
tially in its cause. 12 Such a theory would be plausible, of course, only if the notion of cause 
were restricted to material cause. 13 One could propose, for example, that a jar exists 
"potentially" in a lump of clay as one of the clay's possibilities; that is, the clay has the poten- 
tial to take the form of a jar under specific circumstances. It would be far less plausible-and 
perhaps unintelligible-to suggest that the jar exists "potentially" in the potter (or even, more 
precisely, in the action of the potter). The potter's action is the occasion for the clay's becom- 
ing (actualising its potential to be) a jar, but it makes no sense to call it itself a potential jar. 
And for reasons such as this the satkäryaväda is indeed normally taken to be a theory of mate- 
rial causation. 
There is some textual justification for this reading, notably the occurrence of the expres- 
sion upädüna-grahanät among the reasons given for holding the satkärya view in kärikä 9. 
"Material cause" is one of the meanings of upüdäna, although curiously the word's etymo- 
logical derivation is upa-Vda, "to appropriate to oneself" (cf. MW: 213). Grahana means "to 
grasp", both literally and figuratively; and hence the expression as a whole can be translated 
as: "because a material cause is `taken'. " Larson's translation reads "because of the need for 
an (appropriate) material cause" (1979: 258), which is very loose. Suryanarayana is a little 
closer to the mark with "since there is recourse to the (appropriate) material cause" (1948: 23), 
but when one reads his explanation of the kärikä it is clear that his translation has been influ- 
enced in a particular direction by Gaudapäda's commentary. Gaudapäda takes upddüna- 
grahana to refer to the sort of selecting process someone engages in when choosing milk 
rather than, say, water in order to make yoghurt. This accounts for Suryanarayana's insertion 
of the word "appropriate", which is not warranted by the original Sanskrit. Larson presumably 
shares this interpretation since he makes the same insertion. If it was really this kind of selec- 
tion that the author of the kärikä had in mind, however, then it would be a peculiar argument 
to put forward in the present context. It should be remembered that the passage follows on 
from kärikä 8, which we have just been examining and which asserts the knowability of 
prakfti via its manifest "effects". In this light, kärikä 9 would make more sense if it were un- 
12 "Causation as Satkaryavada (the theory that the effect potentially exists before it is generated by the 
movement of the cause) [... j" (Dasgupta 1922: 257). "[T]he theory that the effect preexists in the cause in a 
potential state (satkaryavüda)" (Larson 1987: 43). 
""The effect is in the material cause in a latent form" (Organ 1975: 212). 
128 
The Nature of Prakrpl 
derstood to be elaborating why or how it should be the case that prak; ti can be known (i. e. 
known to exist) in this way, rather than as proposing reasons or arguments for holding that 
effects "pre-exist" in their (respective) material causes, which is how it has typically been 
taken. My own understanding of upüdüna-graha, ia is that it constitutes an observation about 
human psychology, not a claim about the objective necessity of causes. It is not so much that 
there is a "need" for a cause, but rather that we, qua human subjects, are predisposed to as- 
sume the existence of one: we "grasp" (grahapa) the cause in the sense of taking there to be 
one. This reading will perhaps sound more tenable if I explain my interpretation of the ex- 
pression satkärya itself. 
Satkärya, as I have noted already, is generally, in fact these days almost universally, trans- 
lated as either "existent effect" or "pre-existent effect". There is, however, an alternative ren- 
dering of the expression, and this was suggested by John Davies, who was writing in the late 
nineteenth century, before the now standard reading acquired such inert unquestionability. 
"The phrase [satkürya]", Davies writes, 
does not mean `an existent effect, ' but that what is formally existent is necessarily an effect. Cau- 
sality is implied as an absolute condition of all formal being. Asadakaranüt (literally from non- 
existence, non-cause) implies that there is an identity in the terms non-existence and non-cause, 
and that we cannot conceive of formal existence as uncaused: only the unformed Prakriti (Nature) 
is without a cause, having existed eternally. (1894: 30; my underscoring) 
On this interpretation, then, satkürya can be rendered as "that which is [formally] existent 
(sat) is an effect (kürya), " which assertion implies that whatever is encountered as manifest 
(and only that which is manifest can be encountered) must have a cause. Although Davies 
doesn't quite spell out its Kantian implications, the remark that "we cannot conceive of formal 
existence as uncaused" places causality very firmly within the subjective domain, i. e. as 
something that is supplied a priori by the experiencing subject whether it is or is not an in- 
trinsic feature of the objects themselves. 
Again, however, we should pause to remind ourselves that it is not a cause in any straight- 
forward sense that is being talked about here. Rather, it is the unmanifest ground of the mani- 
fest principles. And neither is the sense in which these latter principles are "manifest" a 
straightforward one. As I shall argue in the next chapter, the principles are best understood as 
components in a synchronic schematic of the necessary preconditions of experience, the sote- 
riological project of Yoga being to reveal, firstly, the dependence of these very preconditions 
upon prakrti and purusa, and secondly the total unconditionality of purusa itself. The part that 
the Särnkhya philosophy, and kärikä 9 in particular, seem to be playing in that project is to 
propose that anything which is manifest must, logically, have an unmanifest counterpart (or 
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aspect or ground). "Logically" can here be taken primarily to mean "conceptually", which is 
to say that it is impossible for us to think of manifest entities and events as ungrounded. The 
terseness of exposition and absence of any elaboration of arguments in the classical texts 
leaves it uncertain, however, whether Särnkhya and Yoga drew a distinction between that 
which is apodictic (i. e. impossible to conceive as not existing or not being the case) and that 
which is in fact the case. Although the emphasis of kärikä 9-at least as Davies and I read 
it-is upon the conceptual possibilities of empirical subjects, it would be unwarranted to as- 
sume that a metaphysical claim is not also being made, this claim being that prakrti is in fact 
the ground that underlies the manifest principles. Whether the claim is purely logical or both 
logical and metaphysical, however, we can be sure that Sämkhya and Yoga regarded prakrti as 
being in itself non-empirical-i. e. as standing outside our range of experience-and hence this 
is one of the points upon which these darganas come closest to coinciding with Kant, although 
their insistence that prakrti can be known to comprise three particular tendencies or qualities 
(gunas)-and that it must possess these qualities if it is to have a manifest aspect at 
all--differs somewhat from Kant's contention that nothing positive can be known about the 
thing-in-itself. 
In the favour of the interpretation of kärikä 9 proposed above-according to which it is 
seen as a kind of transcendental argument for the existence of prakrti-is the fact that it lends 
the kärikä a good deal more coherence and continuity with the immediately preceding kärikä 
than it would otherwise have; and these are features that tend to be lacking as much in the 
traditional commentaries as they do in more recent exegetical studies. Furthermore, and 
equally importantly, it absolves classical Sämkhya of the extremely implausible and barely 
intelligible metaphysical claim that effects pre-exist in their causes. 
PRAKRTI AND MATERIALITY 
I have been talking above about prakrti as the "unmanifest ground" of the manifest principles, 
and have tried to steer away from the insinuation that this ground is material in nature. I am in 
agreement with Dan Lusthaus that "matter" is an inappropriate translation of prakrti in the 
context of Sämkhya (and Yoga), 14 but at the same time I am aware of the severe difficulties 
involved in avoiding at least the implication of its being a material principle. Since purusa can 
be defined as empty or "pure" consciousness, it must be prakrti that provides the content-and 
""[Prakrti is often mistranslated as `matter' or `nature'--in non-Sahkhyan usage 
it does mean `essential 
nature'-but that detracts from the heavy Satkhyan stress on prakrtl's cognitive, mental, psychological and 
sensorial activities" (Lusthaus 1998: 463). 
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hence in a very broad sense the "matter"-of experience. Although "content" need not imply 
physicality (think, for example, of the content of a thought or a dream, or a novel), the danger 
of speaking of prakrti as representing matter in this broad sense is that it inevitably gets tan- 
gled up with the scientific usage of the term to denote the physical stuff-divisible into micro- 
scopic particles-of which the whole material universe is composed, and to which (at least 
from the reductive materialist standpoint) every existent thing can be reduced. Some scholars 
have added considerable confusion to the interpretation of prakfti by suggesting that its three 
co-essential components can be compared with certain particles conceptualised in modern 
physics, such as atoms or the sub-atomic constituents thereof 15 Responsibility for such mis- 
guided speculations must in part be apportioned to Vijiänabhiksu, who sought to distinguish 
the gunas as conceived by Sämkhya from those of the Vai9esika dargana by referring to the 
former as "substances" (dravyas), 16 but this hardly excuses the flagrant misappropriation of 
scientific concepts by modern scholars. 
Several modern exegetes have expressed uneasiness about using terms such as "matter" 
and "material" with reference to prakrti, and yet in most instances, probably due in large 
measure to the strength of their realist assumptions, they have gone ahead and used them all 
the same. Radhakrishnan is a slight exception in so far as he prefers the term "substance" or 
"fundamental substance" (1927 n: 266), and declares that prakrti "is not a material substance" 
since it "gives rise not only to the five elements of the material universe, but also to the psy- 
chical" (ibid.: 274). But Radhakrishnan fails to provide any account of what a non-material 
substance might be, and therefore his use of "substance" instead of "matter" amounts more to 
a merely verbal difference than to a clear conceptual one. 
Larson is quite open about the difficulty he has had in finding an adequate translation of 
prakrti in its unmanifest aspect. "It cannot be characterized as `stuff', " he reflects, "for such a 
notion, whether understood as subtle or gross `stuff, ' can only arise when purusa is present. 
[... ] The usual translations such as `nature' or `matter' are useful as general designations, so 
long as they are not confused with our Western notions of nature and matter, which frequently 
's "Perhaps it is not too far-fetched to compare the gunas with the atoms of modem nuclear physics, which 
are described as localisations of fields" (Feuerstein 1980: 35). "The sattva, rajas, and Lamas gunas of this an- 
cient system of thought [i. e. Sdmkhya-Yoga] are essentially similar to the current concepts of the proton, 
electron, and neutron" (Catalina 1968: 127; square brackets and emphasis added). 
16SPBh 1.61: "Sattva and the others [i. e. rajas and tamas] are substances, not specific qualities, for they 
combine and separate, and [themselves possess] levity, mobility, heaviness and other such qualities" 
(sattvadini dravyapi na vaiiesikä gunäh samyogavibhagavattrat laghutiacalatvagurutva7didharmakatv4c ca). 
Cf. YV2.18. 
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imply more than the Särpkhya notion would allow" (1979: 167; emphasis added). " Larson 
finally proposes an expression that even he finds "awkward", namely "`an undifferentiated 
plenitude of being' [... ]-i. e. the simple fact or presence of being apart from consciousness" 
(ibid. ). Such reflections do not prevent him, however, from making liberal use of such phrases 
as "primordial nature" and "primordial materiality" in his major published works on Sämkhya 
(i. e. 1979,1987), nor from asserting elsewhere that "The notion of prakrti in Sänkhya phi- 
losophy implies a closed causal system of reductive materialism-`reductive materialism' in 
the sense that all thinking, fantasizing, imagining, feeling, and willing can finally be reduced 
to a modality or function of sheer materiality" (1980: 307; my underscoring). 
The stipulation that "matter" and "nature" can be regarded as appropriate translations of 
prakrti only "so long as they are not confused with our Western notions" of such terms is a 
peculiar one, for it would seem to suggest that absolutely nothing has been added to our un- 
derstanding of prakrti by the use of such translations. If, in order to act as a substitute for a 
foreign term, a familiar English term has to be radically redefined or so heavily qualified that 
the new meaning attributed to it is entirely different from its usual one, it might legitimately 
be asked whether it wouldn't have been better to stick with the original foreign term. It may 
turn out to be the case that certain terms cannot be translated by any single word or expression 
without generating immense confusion, and in such circumstances I would advocate retaining 
the original term while doing one's best to define its meaning (or range of uses) as clearly and 
comprehensively as possible. 18 The use of inadequate translations places the interpreter who 
uses them in a position of perpetual backtracking, where a requirement is felt to frequently 
apologise for or significantly modify the terms one is using. This tendency is illustrated well 
in the following passage from a study of the concept of prakrti by Knut Jacobsen: 
Prakrtl is not ordinary matter like earth or air. It does not occupy space since space is a product 
of materiality. Prakrti is a substance but matter in the sense of `atoms' [... ] is not the ultimate 
material cause of the world [... ]. The material principle is not mental but also not material in the 
ordinary sense of the word. [... ] Prakrti is material in the sense that it is non-conscious. (1999: 
225) 
17Cf. Jacobsen (1999: 258): "One should not confuse the material principle in Sämkhya and Yoga texts 
with the most common modern Western idea of nature by which nature means the beings and things that exist 
in the natural world. " 
"B. K. Matilal expresses a similar point when he observes that, "If we have a clear understanding of the 
meaning of the philosophic term we are trying to translate, then it is expected that we shall be able to find a 
suitable term in the second language which will `retain' the original sense, provided, of course, such a term is 
available in the latter. But if the suggested term in the second language has certain shades of meaning that are 
not compatible with those of the original term, we should not recommend such a translation. For such an in- 
cautious translation is likely to generate confusion in the minds of those who are unacquainted with the first 
language" (1985: 320). 
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Jacobsen, like Larson (who supervised his research), tries to dissociate his own use of terms 
such as "matter" and "material" from their ordinary uses and ends up by offering a purely 
apophatic definition of "material" as that which is "non-conscious". Although he does not 
explicitly mention Aristotle, the concept that Jacobsen, along with Larson and others, seems to 
be somewhat inelegantly searching for resembles that of Aristotle's prüfe /rfle, which became 
the materia prima of medieval scholastic philosophy. As Ernan McMullin has helpfully noted, 
"the existence of unqualified changes, and of a multiplicity of totally different sorts of sub- 
stances, was for Aristotle a primary fact of our experience. If one is to explain this fact, the 
sort of `underlying nature' required will not be a substantial stuff with recognizable properties, 
but rather an indefinite substratum, the featureless correlate of substantial form" (1963: 7). 19 
Aristotle's form-matter distinction is, then, useful for understanding what certain interpreters 
are trying to get at in their notion of prakrti as "primal matter"; but this is not to say that it is 
genuinely useful in understanding the concept of pralgti itself. The main problem with its 
application to Sämkhya metaphysics is that the so-called manifest principles of prakpti do not, 
strictly speaking, have "form", and nor, therefore, is it possible to conceive of how they could 
have (or be) "matter". Aristotle's definition of matter as "the primary substratum of each 
thing, from which it comes to be without qualification, and which persists in the result" 
(Physics 192a 31)20 is perhaps broad enough to encompass these manifest principles, but it 
cannot so much as hint at their most important feature, which is their capacity to generate ex- 
perience. It is for this reason that I reject the claim made by S. K. Maitra that "The Särnkhya 
theory of experience [... ] answers more nearly to the Aristotelian theory of a monistic becom- 
ing of an original primal matter than to the Kantian dualism of appearance and unknowable 
things-in-themselves" (quoted in Larson 1987: 641 n. 83; my ellipsis). In Sämkhya and Yoga 
the role of the manifest principles is in fact very much like Kant's transcendental conditions of 
experience. They stand for the very capacities and processes in us (qua complex experiencing 
subjects, not the pure consciousness of solitary purusa) that enable experience to arise. They 
include the tanmütras, which constitute the contents (or "matter", in a Kantian sense) of ex- 
perience, and the elemental forms (bhiütas) that are given to those contents in order to estab- 
lish the experience of external objects. But these contents and elements are not things that 
possess matter and/or form; rather, they are the necessary conditions for our having the expe- 
'9 Cf. Peters (1967: 88): "ffyk, a purely Aristotelian term, does not have its origins in a directly perceived 
reality [... ] but emerges from an analysis of change". 
20Trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye in McKeon 1941: 235. 
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rience of formal material entities. Thus to regard them, and the other principles, as being 
themselves formal entities would be extremely misleading. 21 
The interpretation of manifest prakrti that I have begun to put forward here is highly con- 
troversial, and thus requires further elaboration, which will be given in the next chapter. Let us 
stay for a moment, however, with something in Jacobsen's remarks quoted above that is par- 
ticularly troubling from a philosophical point of view. This is the statement that prakrti "does 
not occupy space since space is a product of materiality. " Although Jacobsen is not very ex- 
plicit on this point, what I take him to mean is that since one of the five bhütas, namely üku. ta, 
is normally identified in whole or in part with "space", and since the bhütas are among the 
manifestations of prakrti, prakrti as it is in itself cannot be regarded as existing in space. This 
is a perfectly valid point. But Jacobsen expresses it badly due to his using "materiality" to 
stand for prakrti. The statement that "space is a product of materiality", if it is not to be re- 
garded as completely absurd, requires some considerable justification; and yet such justifica- 
tion is not forthcoming from Jacobsen. The statement's absurdity is due to the impossibility of 
our conceiving anything as being material without at the same time conceiving it as extended 
in space (and enduring over time); which impossibility indicates the logical priority of space 
(and time) over matter. Descartes acknowledges this point when he defines "body" (i. e. any 
material thing) as something "that can be contained in some place and fill a space in such a 
way that any other body is excluded from it" (1968: 104). Kant is able to abstract "matter" 
from space and time by changing its ontological status from thing-in-itself to the "sensory 
manifold"; the latter is still "objective" in so far as it is received by the faculty of sensibility, 
but it need no longer be thought of as spatiotemporal in nature, space and time being provided 
by the sensible faculty itself (CPuR A20-21/B34-35). 22 If, however, matter is taken to exist 
outside our psychosensory apparatus-as it is on a typical realist account-then the concep- 
tual problem of space and time arises. They must be considered to be either real in themselves 
(as was maintained by Isaac Newton for example) or to be merely logical ways of expressing 
the relations in which objects stand to one another (as Newton's opponent G. W. Leibniz as- 
serted). 23 There is no sense in which they can be held to derive from matter. Thus, if Jacob- 
Ben's statement that space does so derive is an accurate portrayal of the Sämkhya view, that 
21 Cf. Kant on "matter" and "form": "These two concepts underlie all other reflection, so inseparably are 
they bound up with all employment of the understanding. The one [matter] signifies the determinable in gen- 
eral, the other [form] its determination" (CPuR A266B322; Kemp Smith's brackets). 
22 "That in appearance which corresponds to sensation I term its natter; but that which so determines the 
manifold of appearance that it allows of being ordered in certain relations, I term the form of appearance" 
(CPuR A20/B34). 
23 A brief discussion of the difference between the positions of Newton and Leibniz on this issue is in- 
cluded in Gardner 1999: 70-71. 
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view can only be regarded as philosophically untenable. If, on the other hand, we do not as- 
sume ab initio that prakrti equals "materiality", then the way is left open to explore more tcn- 
able interpretive possibilities. As the next step in this exploration, let us now turn to the issue 
of prak ti's threefold "constitution". 
THE THREE "STRANDS" OF PRAKItTI 
According to the standard interpretation, in which prakrti is held to be a "material principle" 
(or the "principle of materiality"), its three constituent "strands" (gu«zas) are likewise regarded 
as material in nature. It was noted in the last section that they have been assumed by some 
scholars to be similar, analogous, or even identical to certain particles-atomic or suba- 
tomic-that reside in the theoretical repertoire of modern physical science. The following 
quotation from Feuerstein exemplifies this view: 
The gums can be described as being the ultimate building-blocks of the material and mental phe- 
nomena in their entirety. They are not merely qualities or properties, but actual entities or `teals' 
(S. Dasgupta, 1963) and as such non-distinct from the world-ground itself. They are the indivisi- 
ble atoms of everything there is, with the exception of the Self (purusa), which is by definition 
nir-guna. (1980: 34; my underscoring)24 
There is, however, little textual justification for this "building-blocks" interpretation. Indeed, 
when one examines the key passages in the classical texts %%here the three gunas are character- 
ised, it is hard to imagine how anyone could suppose them to be material atoms at all. 
Yogasatra 2.18 states that the "seeable" (drfya, i. e. prakrti) is "of the nature (lila) of shining 
forth (prakdfa), activity (kriyd), and steadiness (sthiti), " and notes that its twofold purpose is 
"experience (bhoga) and liberation (apavarga)". This characterisation is echoed at 
Samkhyakürikd 13, where the first of the gunas, sattva, is said to be "light" (laghu, i. e. not 
heavy or dense) and, as in the sutra just quoted, "shining forth" or "luminous" (prakätaka); 
the second guna, rajas, is "exciting" (upastambhaka) and "mobile" (cala); and the third, 
lamas, is "heavy" (guru) and "enveloping" (varanaka). Here it is noted that the gunas co- 
operate to fulfil their purpose "like a lamp" (pradipavat, cf. SK 36). 25 The preceding kärikd 
(12) tells us that the gunas' essential natures (dtmakas) are, respectively, "gladness (m: ), 
perturbation (aprfti), and stupefaction (visüda), " and adds that their characteristic functions 
(arthas) are, again, "shining forth (prakafa), engagement (pravrtti), and restraint (niyama)". 
24 Cf. p. 32 of the same work, where Feuerstein notes that the gunas "invite comparison with the 'quantum 
packets' of modem nuclear physics"! (And cf. p. 131 fn. 1S earlier in this chapter. ) 
23 Digambarji et al. (1989: 38) elaborate this point as follows: "lust as oil, a container, a wick, and a flame 
are brought together in such a way that a light is produced, lasts for some time and illumines objects, in the 
same way the three Gunas combine in such a manner that they prove useful for Purugas " 
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Their relation to one another is there said to involve "subjugation (abhibhava), support 
(dfraya), generation (janana), and intercourse (mithuna)". 
So what overall impression is to be gleaned from these various descriptions? In most in- 
stances, contrary to Feuerstein's protestation, the descriptive terms seem to denote qualities or 
properties of objects, and nowhere could they be taken to denote substances (or "reals") or 
material particles. In some cases they have a more subjective and emotional flavour, especially 
the reference to "gladness", etc., at kärikä 12; while in the case of such characteristics as 
"engagement" and "restraint" they could be understood either subjectively or objectively. The 
several references to prakü. ta in the case of sattva indicate that this guna concerns a thing's 
power or capacity to be seen or known. This interpretation accords with Radhakrishnan's as- 
sessment that sattva is the "tendenc[y] to manifestation" (1927 11: 266). The most literal trans- 
lation of sattva is "being-ness"; and if we recall the discussion of satkärya earlier in this 
chapter, we will see that sat can be understood as `formal being/existence", i. e. the existence 
of a thing qua manifest thing. In this light, sattva could be defined as the quality of being 
manifest, or (since manifestation is only possible in relation to a subject) the quality of being 
cognisable. Of course, it goes without saying that the manifestations of prakrti must be im- 
bued with such a quality, for otherwise there would be no sense in calling them 
"manifestations". Furthermore, having defined sattva in this way, we can begin to comprehend 
why the gunas are held to inhere within unmanifest prakrti in a dormant or latent form; or, to 
put it another way, why their dormant condition is held to constitute unmanifest prakrti. Obvi- 
ously, if something is going to become manifest then it has to possess the power or capacity to 
manifest, and yet the very fact of its becoming manifest implies that its prior state is one of 
unmanifestness. This is all fairly platitudinous, but it needs to be said explicitly due to the 
prevalence of the "building blocks" interpretation of the gunas. 
If we now consider the other two gunas, rajas and tamas, we see that the latter is character- 
ised as embodying such qualities as stability, inertia, limitation, and boundedness, while the 
former could be regarded as the very opposite of these, namely instability (or mutability), 
mobility, expansion, and unboundedness. It does not require a tremendous leap of imagination 
to notice that the two tendencies typified by these qualities are both present to varying degrees 
in manifest phenomena, and that there may be something about the interplay between them 
that invariably accompanies manifestation. Davies has said of rajas that it "is rather the cause 
of an impetus than the impetus itself, the moving force rather than the motion" (1894: 38). 
This comes close to my own understanding of the term, although I think it could be expressed 
better as the capacity to move, rather than "the moving force". The descriptions of it that occur 
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in the classical texts seem to me to suggest the quality of something's having energy, which 
implies the capacity for activity and thus motion and change. Presumably the thought behind 
such descriptions is that anything that was completely static (immobile, inert) could not mani- 
fest, for manifestation itself requires some kind of impulse or drive. If, however, there were no 
check on such an impulse-nothing to constrain and limit it-then the motion would be at risk 
of increasing towards infinite velocity in no specific direction (or, in other words, in all direc- 
tions at once), which would inevitably preclude the integration and continuity that is necessary 
for anything to become manifest. And this is where tamas enters the picture, tamas being pre- 
cisely the limiting tendency that prevents disintegration and furnishes any manifest object 
with the congruity or cohesion that must be in place if it is to be an object at all. 
What I think is going on, then, in the doctrine of the three gunas is a kind of transcendental 
analysis of experience. Feuerstein and I are in agreement that the gunas "are experientially 
derived concepts" (Feuerstein 1980: 38), but whereas he means by "experientially derived" 
that the gunas can be objects of immediate perception (albeit in yogically-induced "non- 
ordinary states of consciousness" (ibid.: 39)), my understanding of the gunas is that they are 
held by Sämkhya and Yoga to be the absolutely basic criteria for anything's appearing or be- 
coming manifest, and thus by definition they cannot in themselves be manifest, although their 
necessity can be deduced from the fact that manifestation occurs. It is this deductibility that I 
think is being alluded to when it is said at kärikä 8 that prakrti cannot be perceived directly, 
but only via its "effects" (i. e. manifestations). \Vhat is added to this statement in the doctrine 
of the gunas is that not only can the existence of prakrti be inferred, but something can also be 
known about prakrti's constitution, viz. that it must comprise the three powers of manifest ex- 
istence (sattva), mutability (rajas), and limitation (camas). 
A pertinent statement on this issue of the perceptibility, or non-perceptibility, of the gunas 
is made in a quotation that Vyäsa includes (with apparent approval) in his commentary on 
Yogasütra 4.13. The quotation (which Väcaspati attributes to the Sastitantra) reads: "The ul- 
timate nature of the gunas is not understood by way of perception (drstipatha). That which is 
available to perception is like mäyyd. "26 The expression "like mäyä" (mü}ü-ira) is extremely 
interesting here. )fäyd, of course, is often translated as "illusion", and interpreted to denote a 
generative power which, in its creation, establishes a veil that obscures the underlying reality. 
Väcaspati takes the expression to mean that although what is available to perception is like 
mäyä, i. e. like an illusion, it is not in fact, or not quite, illusory (TV 4.13). To my mind, this 
description resembles Kant's notion of the apparent or phenomenal world, or "the world as 
26gundnürn paramasn rüpam na drscipalham rcchati / yat tu drstipalham praplarn tall mayera 
sulucchakam 11 
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representation" (die Well als Vorstellung) as Schopenhauer famously termed it: it is real in so 
far as it constitutes actual experience-which is to say, it is empirically real-but it cannot be 
held to be real in itself, i. e. transcendentally real. The appearance masks the underlying reality 
but also, paradoxically, reveals it, for it is only through its appearing that reality can be known 
as anything at al1.27 At least, that is the Kantian-Schopenhauerian claim. The claim of 
Sämkhya and Yoga is a little different in that it ascribes to the underlying reality the threefold 
constitution of the gunas. 
I do not mean to imply in any of this that the doctrine of the gunas is perfectly limpid and 
devoid of complications. It is not; and I shall come to some of its complications shortly. The 
main point I wish to emphasise, however, is that the doctrine is not something whose origins 
are so mysterious that we need to attribute them to some kind of paranormal intuition. The sort 
of transcendental analysis that I referred to above is something that, in my view, underlies a 
great deal of the Sämkhya-Yoga philosophy, and not exclusively the guna doctrine. Even 
though the analytical process itself remains undisclosed, and all we are generally given are its 
conchcsions, once the background presence of this mode of reasoning has been acknowledged, 
the internal logic of the systems starts to reveal itself as-if not fully coherent-at least 
broadly intelligible. 
The fact that-as I hope has been adequately shown above-the gunas are patently not 
material entities, or substances, or anything to do with the sorts of concepts that Feuerstein 
and others invoke from quantum mechanics, has significant implications for our understanding 
of prakrti as a whole. For if the gunas, which constitute the very nature of prakrti, are not ma- 
terial, then it makes little sense to impute materiality to prakrti itself, or to make the same im- 
putation to any of prakrti's manifestations. 
Turning now, however, to the problems with the guna doctrine, these must be admitted to 
be considerable. The root problem concerns the gunas' ontological status. I have claimed that 
to interpret them as substances is misleading, but it is clear why such an interpretation is 
tempting; for any alternative-such as capacity, quality, property, power, tendency, 
etc. -seems to require the existence of a substance in order to be realised. If, for example, 
sattva is taken to be the capacity to manifest, rajas the capacity to move or change, and tamas 
the capacity to inhibit movement, then it is unclear how such capacities, or qualities, could 
exist in themselves independently of some thing or entity which possesses them. It makes 
27Cf. Heidegger (1993: 76): "Kant uses the term 'appearance' in this twofold way. On the one hand, ap- 
pearances are for him the 'objects of empirical intuition, ' what shows itself in intuition. This self-showing 
(phenomenon in the genuine, original sense) is, on the other hand, 'appearance' as the emanation of some- 
thing that makes itself known but conceals itself in the appearance. " 
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sense to speak of an object, say an apple, as being manifest (and thus as having the capacity to 
manifest), as undergoing change (and thus as having mutability), and as being relatively stable 
(having the capacity to cohere); but if we remove the apple itself and try to consider the three 
qualities or capacities that were attributed to it on their own, they become curiously abstract 
and ephemeral, and certainly not the sorts of things that can easily (or even with strenuous 
effort) be conceived as fundamental constituents of objective reality. Ultimately I think the 
notion of "constituents" has to be abandoned. The gunas are "constituents" of prakrti merely 
in the sense that prakrti is the collective term for them; the manifestations of prakfti-i. e. 
buddhi, aharpkära, and the rest-cannot, however, be intelligibly regarded as "constituted by" 
the gunas. The gunas are simply not the appropriate items for constituting a psychic or psy- 
chosensory condition of experience, which is on my view what each of the manifestations is. 
The gunas must, therefore, be considered in some other way. 
It is impossible to escape the fact that the gunas are in some sense qualities, but they are 
also conditions; i. e. it is a condition of anything's being a manifest thing that it should possess 
the three qualities for which the gunas stand. What we have, in effect, is a two-tier transcen- 
dental analysis of experience: at one level the manifestations of prakrti (as I shall explain in 
the next chapter) are deduced to be the necessary preconditions of experience (i. e. perception 
and thought), while at a "deeper", more fundamental, level, the gunas are deduced to be the 
necessary preconditions of the manifestations themselves. All of which is really saying little 
more than what I have said already, namely that for anything to manifest-i. e. to appear as 
something-it must possess at least the three gunas. I say "at least" because, although the 
gunas may be necessary conditions of manifestation, they are not the sole qualities possessed 
by buddhi and the other manifest principles. The Sämkhya response to this remark might be 
that it is through the interplay of the gunas-i. e. the relations of "subjugation, support, [etc. ]" 
(SK 12)-that other qualities are generated. But to accept this, one would have to re-subscribe 
to the "constituent" interpretation of the gunas; for qualities cannot turn into new qualities by 
reacting to or combining with their fellows. A more plausible response would be that the 
gunas are the most fundamental, the most primary, of all "primary qualities"; they are the 
qualities that anything-including any additional qualities that a thing might have-must pos- 
sess in order to be counted as manifesting, and without which it would be either nothing at all 
or else pure consciousness (purusa). Still, however, it must be acknowledged that an ontologi- 
cal ambiguity remains in the concept of the gunas, and that we cannot be entirely certain 
whether the originator (or originators) of the concept intended them to be qualities or constitu- 
ents or some other kind of thing that somehow embraces both of these notions. 
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Another of the problems or complications associated with the gunas that I can see concerns 
their relation to time and space. It was noted in the last section that prakrti has been 
held-even by those such as Jacobsen who adopt a materialistic interpretation-to be the 
source of space (and of time as well), and that according to such a view prakrti itself (and 
hence the gunas) cannot be considered to exist in space (or in time). Various statements in the 
traditional literature on Sämkhya and Yoga support this view. With regard to time, Gaudapäda 
comments that, whereas some have said that "time matures beings, time consumes (samharati, 
`takes') the world; time watches while others sleep, time cannot be overcome", Sämkhya's 
reply would be that there are only "three types of things (paddrthas)-the manifest (vyakta), 
the unmanifest (avyakta), and purusa-and time fits into one of these categories, [i. e. ] it is 
manifest" (GB/i 61). 28 The author of the Sümkhyasütra appears to be a little more specific, 
stating that "space (dis) and time (kola) [arise] from äkäga and the others" (SS 2.12). But the 
statement is ambiguous due to the fact that both dis and kala can, in the same way as their 
English equivalents, refer to either a particular space (in the case of dis') or time (in the case 
of käla) or to "space" and "time" in general, i. e. as abstracted from any specific spatial areas 
or temporal periods. The commentator Vijflanabhiksu takes it to be the particular (khanda, 
literally "broken", "fragmentary") kinds of space and time that are being referred to here. He 
concurs with Aniruddha that äkäga, when limited by certain "conditioning factors" (upddhis), 
"is called `space' and `time"' (SSV 2.12, cf. SPBh), but adds that space and time in themselves 
(i. e. in the abstract sense of these terms) are held not to arise from äkä a but to be its source. 
They are in fact, says Vijnänabhiksu, "eternal [... ] specific properties of prakpi" (SPBh 
2.12). 29 Thus what starts off looking like an affirmation of the derivative nature of space and 
time becomes in the hands of the traditional commentators-especially Vij1 änabhiksu-a 
statement of the irreducibility of these principles. Space and time are accorded the status of 
eternal existents, and are thus placed on a par with the three gunas as inherent qualities of 
prakrti. This is all highly dubious, and ought not to be regarded as a definitive account of the 
Sämkhya position. The Sümkhyasütra of course, being a sutra text, tends to leave itself open 
to differing interpretations; but even if Vijnänabhiksu's reading of sutra 2.12 is accurate, it 
need not be taken to represent the classical view on space and time, about which there is, re- 
grettably, no explicit statement in the Sümkhyakürikü or Yogasütra. 
Notwithstanding Vijildnabhiksu's assertion that space and time are "specific properties" 
(gujla-vifesa) of prakrti, the predominant view among scholars is that, according to classical 
2" kälah pacali bhawnl külah samnharate jagat / külah suptesu jägarthi kalo hi duratikramah 
vyaktavyaktapurusah trayal: padärihiäh Lena külo'ntarbhaio'st! / sa hi vyaktalt l 
29nityau you dikkdlau lavakafaprakrtibhatau prakrter gunavidestlveva 
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Sämkhya and Yoga, the terms "space" and "time" do not denote real (mind-independent) 
properties or entities, but refer merely to qualities that are attributed to empirical objects by 
the cognising mind. An important-perhaps the most important-source of this view is 
Vyäsa's commentary on Yogasatra 3.52 (which appears as 3.51 in some editions), in which 
the commentator says of time that, though "devoid of object" (vastu-. ünya), it is "a mental 
construction (buddhi-nirmä za), and follows [i. e. accompanies] the cognition of a word 
(iabda jndna)" The terminology here echoes Yogasütra 1.9, where vikalpa is defined as 
"following word-cognition, devoid of object. s30 Thus, at least on Vyäsa's account, time is a 
rikalpa, i. e. a form of intuition that invariably accompanies cognitions but which has no mind- 
independent existence. This appears to be an undiluted proclamation of what Kant would call 
the transcendental ideality of time. But if one looks at the commentary on sutra 3.52 as a 
whole, it becomes apparent that Vyäsa is not quite making such a proclamation. Instead he is 
proposing a kind of atomic theory of time, according to which time is, in reality, nothing other 
than a succession of indivisible momentary units (ksana) and it is merely our ordinary view, 
wherein time is conceived in terms of artificial durations such as hours, days and nights, that 
is a mental creation. The moments are genuinely existent, and follow one another in a proces- 
sion; and it is to such a procession of moments, says Vyäsa, that the yogin refers by means of 
the term "time" (YBh 3.52). 
Thus, although the respective views of Vijýiänabhiksu and Vyäsa on time seem to be con- 
siderably different from one another, they have in common the fact that two types of time are 
distinguished-one of which is merely empirical and the other of which has a subject- 
independent (transcendental) reality. And the same distinction is made by Viji änabhiksu in 
the case of space. Again, however, we cannot be sure that such a distinction was endorsed by 
the classical darganas. I noted earlier in this chapter that the description of prakrti at 
Sümkhyyakärikä 10 can be interpreted as proposing that the characteristics of prakrti include its 
being "unconditioned, atemporal, and non-spatial". It is only manifest prakrti that is "non- 
eternal" (anitya, i. e. temporal) and "non-pervasive" (atijüpin, i. e. subject to spatial limita- 
tions). Therefore it would seem appropriate to surmise that, even though it is not stated ex- 
plicitly in the Kdrikii, the implicit view therein is that time and space obtain only within the 
empirical world, and not in the underlying reality composed of or characterised by the gunas 
in their dormant state. 
Having come this far we can now formulate the problem that exists concerning the gunas' 
relation to time and space. One aspect of the problem is that, if the gunas are qualities (or 
10IabdajnidnlnupolT vaslu inyo vikalpah // 
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properties, powers, etc. ), then they must be qualities of some entity (for how could a quality 
exist in abstraction from any entity? ); and the sort of entity that possesses qualities must exist 
temporally (in the case of all entities, both physical and mental) or both temporally and spa- 
tially (in the case of physical, i. e. "external", entities). Think, for example, of the so-called 
primary qualities postulated by Locke: namely, solidity, extension, shape, mobility, number, 
and texture. It is evident that each of these can be instantiated only in time, and it is certainly 
arguable that all of them, with the exception of number, at least implies the presence of space 
as well. Therefore time (as a minimal condition) and space (in certain cases) must either co- 
incide with or "precede" the existence of qualities. If it were to be accepted, a la 
Vijrlänabhiksu's claim, that the gunas are substances rather than qualities, the problem would 
not thereby be avoided; for how could three substances possibly be distinguished from one 
another in the absence of spatiotemporal dimensions? As Schopenhauer has pointed out, "time 
and space are the principium individuationis" (1974a: 148; cf. 1966 t: 112 f. ); which is not to 
say that they are necessary preconditions for existence per se-for if that were so then time 
and space themselves would be precluded from existing-but that they are the principles that 
enable anything to be a thing at all, i. e. to be distinguished from the world in general. Thus it 
is far from clear that three things, namely the gunas, can intelligibly be posited as existing 
"prior to" time and space and as being the source thereof. And it is presumably for reasons 
such as this that Vijfiänabhiksu asserts the "eternal" existence of space and time, as aspects of 
prakrti alongside sattva, rajas and tamas. 
Another aspect of the problem, which is really implicit in what has already been said, con- 
cerns the notion of the gunas as "process". The ways in which the gunas are said to relate to 
one another-namely, "subjugation, support, generation, and intercourse" (SK 12)-are sug- 
gestive of processes, which must of course take place over a period of time . 
31 This proces- 
sional nature of the gunas is recognised by several interpreters, and is reflected in, for exam- 
ple, Larson's preferred translation of triguna as "tripartite constituent process" (see esp. 
Larson 1987: 65 ff. ). Again, then, the gunas cannot intelligibly be conceived to interact inde- 
pendently of time. And even the notion of their remaining dormant until somehow animated 
by the presence of purusa is not adequate to get round the problem, since any transition from 
dormancy to activity, or from potentiality to actuality, can happen only in time. Indeed, the 
notion of dormancy or latency itself implies temporal duration, for it can be meaningful only 
31 Sanat Kumar Sen begs to differ on this point: "the mere idea of alteration or transformation need not 
necessarily include the concept of time" (1968: 410-11). If he had bothered to explain how change can be 
considered to occur independently of time then there might be some grounds for taking his assertion seri- 
ously, but as no such explanation is given, the assertion looks to me very shaky indeed. 
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in opposition to activity, which must be a genuine possibility for whatever the notion is ap- 
plied to. (In a similar way, temporal duration is implicit in the concept of immutability, as it is 
only over a period of time that something can be held to remain unchanged. ) 
These problems are significant, but it is not necessary that they be resolved here in order 
for the interpretation of the gunas that I have proposed in this section to be accepted, or at 
least taken seriously. For the problems associated with space and time (and substance and cau- 
sality for that matter) are ones that have troubled, and continue to trouble, every genuine at- 
tempt at a metaphysical theory. If we take Kant as an example, we see that part of his project 
for setting metaphysics upon a firmer footing was to reinterpret space and time as "forms of 
sensible intuition" and, as such, as being contributions brought to experience by the experienc- 
ing subject rather than as having any subject- and experience-independent existence (CPuR 
A22/B36 ff. ). I mention this here partly because, in my view (which I shall elaborate in the 
next chapter), the Sämkhya concept of äkä a amounts to something analogous to this 
"subjectivization" of space (and possibly time). But those who hold space and time to be real 
and independent of our forms of intuition can easily poke the finger at Kant and ask: If sen- 
sibility is a capacity for receiving sensory information, or "sense-matter", (which seems to be 
among the claims made in the opening passage of the Transcendental Aesthetic), then from 
where if not from outside itself is such matter received? If it be affirmed that it is indeed re- 
ceived from outside, then some kind of spatial relation prior to the engagement of the relevant 
form of intuition (i. e. space) has thereby been admitted. And with regard to the other form of 
intuition (time), does not the attribution of this form to the manifold of sense-matter not imply 
a process, which in turn implies the prior existence of time? 32 These problems are very similar 
to those touched upon in the last few paragraphs above, and I suspect that they, or their near 
cousins, are among the most enduring and complex of all philosophical issues. Thus we ought 
not to be surprised if clear and decisive solutions do not immediately spring forth from texts 
as laconic as the Sümkhyakurikü and Yogastitra. 33 
I still maintain that "necessary conditions of manifestation" comes closest to expressing the 
meaning of the gunas in Sämkhya and Yoga; and in the next chapter I shall argue, among 
32 On this latter point see, for example, Kitcher (1990: 140): "The various activities that are described in 
the [Transcendental] Deduction's account of how the mind influences (or might influence) what we know can 
only be understood temporally. They are processes and so take time. According to the [Transcendental] Aes- 
thetic, however, the mind's activities produce time. So they cannot take place in time. " 
"The difficulty associated with space and time is highlighted by the fact that different philosophers have 
proposed widely diverging and mutually incompatible theories about them. With respect to claims about 
"time", for example, Morris Lazerowitz has commented that "The differences between these claims are so 
startling as to incline one to suppose that philosophers are talking about altogether different things, that they 
are using the word `time' in different senses, rather than that they are using the word in the same sense and 
are advancing different theories about the nature of what is denoted by it" (1968: 141). 
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other things, that "condition" should here just as in Kant's critical philosophy-be under- 
stood in the sense of something's having logical priority over something else, and not, as in 
the cosmogonic interpretation of S: ºmkhya metaphysics, in the sense of temporal priority. 
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IIE CLASSICAL EXPOSITION of the manifestations of prakrti occurs in the portion of the 
Sümkhyakärikü beginning at kärikii 22 and ending at kärikä 38. It is in this portion that 
the twenty-three "created" (vikrh) principles are named and defined (albeit in most cases with 
extreme brevity), and their order of creation is set forth. The names of these principles arc 
well known, and their functions have received a copious amount of attention in the secondary 
literature. However, what remains very dimly understood, and hence a source of continuing 
agitation and bewilderment to scholars, is the nature of the relations bet wween the principles 
and, connected with this, the reason for the order in which they are presented being as it is. 
Radhakrishnan expresses this agitation when he remarks that "It is difficult to understand the 
precise significance of the Särnkhya account of evolution, and we have not seen any satisfac- 
tory explanation as to why the different steps of evolution are what they are" (1927 II: 274). 
He can see no logic in the nature or order of the principles, and concludes that these things 
must be the result of "historical accidents" rather than any process of deduction on the part of 
Sämkhya philosophers (ibid. ). 
In this chapter I shall argue that the kind of bemusement exhibited by Radhakrishnan in the 
passage just quoted inevitably arises if one assumes at the outset that the schema of principles 
represents a cosmogonic narrative. Through the lens of such an assumption, the schema cannot 
but appear to be the arbitrary figment of a mythic imagination. The Sdrpkhya account offers 
no explanation of why mahat/buddhi should be considered the first product of the unmanifest 
ground, nor of how it comes to give rise to egoity, which in turn gives rise either directly or 
indirectly to the other twenty-one principles. Moreover, when each of the principles is re- 
garded as singular, material and cosmological, it becomes impossible to conceive of how they 
relate to individual organisms and to human beings in particular. 
After discussing the standard way in which the supposedly "evolutionary" schema is gen- 
erally interpreted, I shall present an alternative reading, according to which the emergent 
principles are seen as necessary conditions of experience, and the order that they are enumer- 
ated in represents, not the temporal sequence in which they successively emerge, but the order 
of logical priority in what amounts to a transcendental phenomenological analysis (i. e. an 
analysis of the a priori factors that make experience possible). I shall then claim further that 
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this alternative, non-realist and non-cosmogonic, interpretation succeeds where others have 
failed in enabling us to make sense of the relation between the metaphysical schema of 
Sämkhya and Yoga on the one hand and the soteriological praxis of these darganas on the 
other. 
COSMOS AND PSYCHE 
In response to the problem alluded to above concerning how, if the manifest principles are 
cosmological, they can be held to relate to individual sentient persons, it has been assumed by 
some interpreters that the principles must be both cosmological and psychological. Rad- 
hakrishnan again exemplifies this position well: 
Buddhi, as the product of prakrti and the generator of aharfmkära, is different from buddhi which 
controls the processes of the senses, mind and ahamkära. If the former is identified with the latter, 
the whole evolution of prakrti must be regarded as subjective, since the ego and the non-ego are 
both the products of buddhi. This ambiguity is found in the other products of prakrti also. (1927 
ir: 268) 
Radhakrishnan has clearly discounted in advance the possibility that "the whole evolution of 
prakrti must be regarded as subjective, " for he does not give it a second thought. It would, af- 
ter all, conflict with the presupposition that a mind-independent physical reality in some way 
derives from the more obviously psychosensory principles. Rather than question this presup- 
position, Radhakrishnan prefers to posit two buddhis and two aharpkäras, and presumably 
(since he considers the same "ambiguity" to exist in them all) two of each of the other princi- 
ples as well. 
Ian Whicher appears to share this twofold conception of the manifest principles, while 
adding that the cosmic aspect must have ontological priority over the psychological one be- 
cause the former "turns [... ] into the psychological" when it is falsely identified with (by 
purusa). "It would", says Whicher, "be a grave mistake to assert, as does S. Dasgupta, that the 
cosmic and individual buddhi for example, have the same ontological status" (1998a: 71). 
However, while claiming that the principles in their psychological aspect "have no ontological 
reality, " Whicher does not enlighten us as to what sort of thing a "cosmic" intellect might 
possibly be. Statements that "Mlahat or cosmic knowing is the first created essence of prakrti, 
as real as prakrti herself' (ibid. ) may sound very grand, but in the absence of an explanation 
of "cosmic knowing" they really amount to little more than metaphysical hyperbole of the 
most vacuous kind. 
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The notion of cosmic-psychological polarity is conspicuously absent from the original 
texts. Neither the Sainkh)yakärikü nor the Yogasütra anywhere speak of a cosmic and a psy- 
chological buddhi; they speak merely of one (kind of) buddhi (or cilia in the case of the 
Yogasütra). And the same applies to the other manifest principles. It is my view that all of 
these principles have a decidedly psychological-or, more precisely (as I shall argue later in 
this chapter), phenomenological-flavour, and that to interpret them and their relations in a 
coherent manner we need to reject the "cosmic" dimension altogether. Of course, the Särpkhya 
account can be read-and is perhaps most naturally and straightforwardly read-as a cosmog- 
ony. But this only goes to highlight one of the difficulties associated with deciphering a 
largely esoteric text such as the Sümkhyakürikü: ' the most literal reading will in certain places 
also be the most philosophically plausible, while in other places it will be highly dubious. In 
these latter cases a more sophisticated interpretive approach is required in order to access the 
underlying meaning. There is, of course, never any guarantee that the intended meaning has 
been uncovered, but if alternative interpretations are possible, and-all other factors being 
equal-one of these is relatively philosophically coherent while its rivals end in unavoidable 
muddles, then it is my view that we should favour the most coherent. 
"VERTICAL" AND "HORIZONTAL" ONTOLOGIES 
Wilhelm Halbfass, in contrasting SAipkhya ontology with that of Vai9esika, has proposed a 
distinction between "vertical" and "horizontal" ontologies. "Both of these systems present 
elaborate lists of world constituents", lie says. 
However, the Sdmkhya does so in a "vertical" manner; that is, in an enumeration of successive 
stages (i. e., the primeval "nature, " prakrti, and its twenty-three evolutes). 
The Vaigesika, on the other hand, is the most representative case of a "horizontal" enumeration 
and classification of world constituents. It lists its cosmic factors and "categories" of reality not as 
successive stages in a scheme of evolution, but in a horizontal, synchronic arrangement. which 
includes, however, certain structures of dependence and subordination. (Halbfass 1992: 48-39; 
my underscoring) 
This statement by Halbfass accurately represents the standard interpretations of Sämkhya and 
Vaigesika, but I wish to contend that it misses the underlying meaning of the Särnkhya 
schema. The part of the statement that I have highlighted is supposed to refer to the Vai9esika 
ontology. I do not wish to dispute that it fairly describes that system's approach. I do, how- 
ever, wish to argue that it should also be seen as applying to the Sätnkhya schema %%hen that 
By referring to the Säinkh)yakdrikä as "esoteric", I mean merely that it was composed primarily for the 
education of initiated disciples and is thus likely to present certain interpretive difficulties for non-initiates. 
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schema is properly understood. It would, of course, be foolish to claim that the Samkhyakürikü 
"lists its cosmic factors [... ] in a horizontal, synchronic arrangement". Clearly it does not; and 
I would add that (as I have said above) I do not regard the "cosmic" reading of the principles 
as tenable in any case. What I think can legitimately be claimed, however, is that, although the 
Sünrkhyakürikü presents its list of principles in an ostensibly diachronic and (in large measure) 
"vertical" manner, the nature of the principles in this list and of their relations with one an- 
other can best be understood in "horizontal, synchronic" terms. 
Before I go on to explain why I think this is so, it should be noted that Halbfass was not the 
first to describe Sdrpkhya metaphysics in terms of a "vertical"/"horizontal" analogy. The anal- 
ogy was also used by van Buitenen, only with the difference that he held that Sämkhya's 
metaphysical schema-or "description of world evolution"-was partially vertical and par- 
tially horizontal (1957a: 16). 2 Van Buitenen's point is that the descent from prakrti to buddhi 
and then to ahamkära is a case of "vertical evolution", whereas "From the ahamkura on this 
pattern is abandoned: its evolution becomes a ramification" (ibid. ). The eleven indriyas 
("powers", "capacities")-comprising the five sensory capacities, the five action capacities, 
and manas-are all derived from ahamkära, as are the five tanmätras, from which come (in 
"vertical" fashion this time) the five elemental forms (bhütas). "[T]he function of the 
ahamküra in the evolution process is much more complicated than those of pradhäna and 
mahün", notes van Buitenen. "By itself it creates the whole phenomenal world, not in succes- 
sive evolutions, but immediately; it is the father of the world but its ways are mysterious" 
(ibid. ). Although van Buitenen's account of the Sämkhya schema preceded Halbfass's, it nev- 
ertheless seems to me to be the more accurate of the two. Still, however, I would say that its 
accuracy lies only in its ability to describe how the manifest principles are presented in the 
Sümkhyakürikd. It does not take us very far towards a comprehension of the underlying 
meaning of the relevant passages. 
My interpretation of the so-called "world evolution" goes further than both Halbfass's and 
van Buitenen's, for it proposes that the sequence concerned does not portray a process of 
"evolution", and neither is it immediately related to the "world", i. e. to a supra-subjective (or 
"external") realm of spatiotemporal entities. The sequence is, rather, a symbolic or analogical 
exposition of the psychosensory factors that make experience of such a world possible, the 
2 Van Buitenen's vertical-horizontal model has subsequently been adopted by other interpreters. Cf., for 
example, Larson (1979: 179): "The emergence or evolution of the sixteen [i. e. the ten indriyas plus manas, 
and the five tanmätras] [... ] Is not 'vertical. ' It is, rather, 'horizontal'-i. e., ahamkara becomes or is trans- 
formed into mind, senses, subtle elements, etc. " 
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order of the sequence's members being an indication, not of the respective positions of their 
emergence in time, but of their logical status in relation to their fellows. 
THE ORDER OF EMERGENCE 
As a way to begin exploring why I find the interpretation just stated more plausible than the 
"evolutionary" model, let us consider what is said about the transition from unmanifest to 
manifest prakrti at Säinkhyakürikü 22: 
From prakrti, mahat; from that, ahamkära; and from that, the group of sixteen; from five of those 
3 sixteen, the five bhütas. 
In most translations of this kärikä the respective translators tend to insert additional words to 
explain, or at least provide some information about, the nature of the relations between the 
various principles mentioned. The following extracts from three existing translations exem- 
plify this point (underscoring has been added by myself): 
From Prakriti issues Mahat [... ]; from this [... ] issues Self-consciousness (Ahankära), from which 
proceeds the set of sixteen; from five of these sixteen, proceed the five gross elements. (Jhi 1896: 
61) 
From Primal Nature proceeds the Great One [... ], thence individuation, [etc. ]. (Suryanarayana 
Sastri 1948: 46) 
From prakrii (emerges the great one (mahar); from that comes self-awareness (ahamkira); 
[etc. ]. (Larson 1979: 262-63) 
Thus, although the original kärikä tells us nothing, or virtually nothing, about the relations 
concerned, it has commonly been assumed that they involve an "issuing" ("outgoing, egress, 
outflow" (Webster's: 1201)), a "procession", or an "emergence" of some kind. Since, how- 
ever, the relation between unmanifest and manifest prakrti must, by definition, also be ac- 
knowledged to be one of manifestation (or appearing as), we are obliged by such translations 
as those just quoted to understand manifestation as being equivalent to "issuing", 
"proceeding", or "emerging". The problem here can be explained as follows. In normal usage, 
"manifestation" need not imply any ontological distinction between that which manifests and 
the manifestation (appearance) of that thing; that is, when we say that something was not, but 
now is, manifest, we do not thereby assert that the thing itself has changed, but rather assert 
that something has changed in the relation between that thing and ourselves (as perceivers or 
knowers). It is this fact that has enabled philosophers such as Kant to speak of the appearance 
3 prakrter mahö, ns lato'haddras lasn: äd ganal ca p4aa'akah / lasmad api pclas`akat paflcabhyah pai ca 
b/zätüni 11 
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(or manifestation) of a thing on the one hand, and the thing-in-itself on the other, as being two 
aspects of the same thing; the former aspect being the thing as considered in relation to a 
cognising subject and the latter being the same thing as considered independently of such a 
subject. It follows from this philosophical usage that "manifestation" need not imply any tem- 
poral relation between the thing-in-itself and the thing-as-manifest. We can talk of some- 
thing's becoming manifest-which expression does imply temporal duration-but we can also 
(if we regard the Kantian terminology as legitimate) talk of a thing's being manifest and of its 
still being (at the same time) "itself', and thus of its having a manifest and an unmanifest as- 
pect which co-exist simultaneously. What the assumption that the relation between prakrti and 
its manifest modes involves "issuing" (etc. ) does is to effectively preclude any application of 
the Kantian understanding of manifestation, i. e. manifestation as simultaneous and non- 
transformative. Instead we are obliged to interpret the relation in terms of some kind of pro- 
ductive or, as we have seen already, evolutionary process. 
One has to tread exceedingly carefully here, for there does exist textual evidence which 
suggests that the author of the Sümkhyakürikü did indeed conceive the relation between un- 
manifest and manifest prakrti as involving an "emergence" (or, as we will see, a "surgence"). 
Two of the key terms in this context are parindma and sarga. Although the former term occurs 
only once in the Sümkhyak«rikü, this occurrence is significant. (It is, in fact, far more preva- 
lent in the Yogasi7tra, wherein it appears eleven times, and was touched upon in Chapter 4 
when I discussed Yogasütra 4.14. ) The most literal translation ofparindma would be "bending 
around", but generally it is rendered more helpfully as "transformation" or "modification". In 
kärikä 16 it occurs (as parinüniata, "transformable") as part of a description of unmanifest 
prakrti. The unmanifest (avyakta) is said there to be "the source (or `cause', kürana) [of all 
manifest things], operating due to the combination of the three gunas, transformable 
(parinämata) like flowing water (salilavat) due to the specific [nature] of each of these gunas 
that underly it. s4 The simile of "flowing water" (or "fluidity") is also highly pertinent to the 
other term we are interested in here, namely sarga, which is etymologically cognate with the 
English word "surge" (via the Latin surgere, "to rise up", from which we also get "source" 
(cf. Partridge 1966: 683)). At kdrikä 21 occurs the expression api samyogas tatkrtah sargah. 
This has commonly been translated as "from this union proceeds creation", ' but since 
samyogas (= samyogali) is in the nominative, not the ablative, case, a more accurate rendering 
4 karanam asty avyaktam pravarlale trigunalah samudayac ca / parinümatah salilavat pratiprali- 
g: «u7 rayaviiesat 11 
AS 1896: 60. Cf. Surynarayana Sastri 1948: 45 (and Larson 1979: 262): "from this (association) creation 
proceeds. " 
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would be: "that conjunction indeed is creation, surgcnce" (emphasis added), the conjunction 
in question being that of purusa and prakrti. In any case, taking into account karik5 16, the 
meaning of the present passage would seem to be that, when in conjunction with purusa, 
prakrti is modified or transformed in such a way that it "swells" or "surges forth" as a formal 
or manifest creation, which creation, as we learn in the subsequent kArikä, comprises the 
twenty-three manifest principles. 
Now, what I have just given is a literal interpretation; but what I wish to claim is that sarga 
ought to be understood metaphorically as standing for the manifestation (or appearance) of 
prakrti-which exists simultaneously with unmanifest prakrti as its knowable facade-and not 
for its "real transformation" from one state to another. My view is supported by such passages 
as kärikä 2, where it is stated that the best method of eradicating the threefold dissatisfaction 
(duhkha) referred to in kärikd I is to acquire "special knowledge" or "discerning awareness" 
(vijiranra) of (the differences between) "the manifest, the unmanifest, and the knower. " I take 
this to imply that the manifest and unmanifest aspects of prakrti co-exist and can, as the result 
of diligent practice (i. e. yoga practice, abhyüsa), be distinguished from one another. Of 
course, someone who holds that unmanifest prakrti is an infinite reservoir of matter (cf., for 
example, Larson's "undifferentiated plenitude of being" (1979: 12,167)) might contend that 
such a reservoir could give rise to any number of real finite entities without diminishing its 
own existence, and that the co-existence of unmanifest and manifest prakrti can thus be ac- 
counted for without the need to adopt my "dual aspect" interpretation. And this is where it 
becomes necessary to remind ourselves of the flimsiness and wrong-headedness of the claim 
that prakrti is a material principle 6 Attention has already been given (in Chapter 5 above) to 
pral: rti in itself, and to its three "strands", so let us now consider its manifest principles and 
ask whether any of them seem to be material evolutes of some primordial material principle. 
The first enumerated principle is, as we know, mahat, otherwise known as buddhi. As was 
noted in Chapter 4, buddhi is defined as adhyavasüya (SK 23), which term is also associated 
with perception (SK 5), and may be translated as "ascertainment" or "discernment". Buddhi is 
said to have a süttvika (light, positive) and a tümasa (dark, negative) aspect, the former com- 
prising "virtue (dharma), knowledge Ui äna), non-attachment (viraga), and masterfulness 
(aisharya)", and the latter comprising the opposites of these (SK 23). These various mental 
6 Radhakrishnan exhibits an awareness of the problem I am discussing when he remarks that in spite of 
the things to which prakrti gives rise, its substance is in no way diminished. The source of becoming is not 
exhausted by the things produced. No material thing can act without exhausting some of its latcnt energy. It Is 
thus difficult to regard prakrli as purely material in nature" (1927 it: 274; emphasis added). Regrettably, 
however, Radhakrishnan does not follow up this doubt, and therefore opens up a vast hole in his interprcta- 
tion of Sarpkhya and Yoga without attempting to fill it in. 
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qualities or dispositions are referred to later in the text as badvas (SK 40,43,52), a term 
whose meaning is very broad, and which can denote any "being" or "state of being". In the 
context of Särpkhya philosophy the bhävas seem to play a role similar to the samsküras and 
viüsanüs of Yoga, both of which latter terms refer to mental traits or habitual modes or patterns 
of response (or perhaps psychic traces that impel such responses). In the case of the bhävas, 
samskdras and väsands, there are certain types of these mental factors which are to be culti- 
vated, and others which are to be eradicated; but eventually all of them, whether ostensibly 
positive or negative, must be left behind if the soteriological goal of purusa's aloneness 
(kaivalya) is to be realised (SK 67-68). In Yoga one of the principal expressions applied to the 
mental state in which all samskäras have been pacified or dissolved is "seedless-" (nirbija-) 
samädhi (YS 1.51; 3.8), which reflects the fact that samskäras are regarded as seeds of misi- 
dentification. 
What emerges from the above points is that buddhi is best regarded as encompassing a 
range of mental states, dispositions and capacities, although it is most particularly associated 
with discerning awareness, or, in other words, with intentional (object-directed) conscious- 
ness, as distinct from the "pure" consciousness with which purusa is identified. ' Taking all of 
its various associations into account, the common translation of buddhi as "intellect" is not 
inappropriate (although perhaps "intellection" or "discernment" would be better8 ), which is 
why it may come as some considerable surprise that a great many interpreters of Särnkhya and 
Yoga nevertheless regard buddhi (along with all the other principles) as "material". 9 If one is 
to regard something that is patently mental as also being material, then it would be not merely 
helpful, but an absolute necessity, to explain the sense in which one is using these terms; for 
in western philosophy "mental" and "material" (or "mind" and "matter") have traditionally 
been defined in opposition to one another. Although modern physicalists have on occasions 
said things such as "the mind is the brain" (e. g. Dennett 1991: 33), on the whole they are more 
careful to stipulate that mental phenomena can be reduced to neurophysiological phenomena 
7Christian Lassen's Latin translation of the Sümkhyakarikä, it may be noted, renders adhyavasaya (by 
which term buddhi is defined) as intentio (cited in Davies 1894: 56). [Lassen's work was first published at 
Bonn in 1832. ] 
' Mohanty has noted that, while "modern speech is characterized by fixed parts [... ], in ancient tongues 
the same word could do the work of a noun, adjective, verb and adverb. The word cit, for example, may 
equally well mean-in Vedic Sanskrit-to know, knowing, knower, knowledge and knowingly" (1993: 130). 
In view of this fact we should not be too quick to judge that buddhi denotes a process or activity (such as 
discerning something) and not a faculty or capacity. However, in the overall context of the transcendental 
phenomenological reading of Samkhya metaphysics that I shall be developing in this chapter, it is the 
"activity" aspect which makes most sense. 
9"In the system of Kapila, everything connected in function with sensuous objects is as material as the 
objects themselves, being equally an emanation from Prakrti" (Davies 1894: 18). Cf. ibid., p. 17 fn. 3: 
"Modern science, like the system of Kapila, makes intellect a mere form of matter. " 
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(and hence to matter), or that, although states of intentional consciousness exist, they "arc 
realized in the neurophysiology of the brain" (Searle 1983: 15; original emphasis). As we saw 
in the last chapter, however, those who adopt a materialist interpretation of prakiti tend to fall 
very far short of explaining what they mean by "matter" or "material", and consequently end 
up using apparently paradoxical expressions to refer to certain of pralgti's manifestations, 
such as "mental material principles" (Jacobsen 1999: 225), without giving us any good reason 
to regard these expressions as anything other than nonsensc. 10 
Turning now to the second enumerated principle, ahamkära, we find that it is tersely de- 
fined as abhimäna (SK 24), which can denote self-conceit and pride or the mere having of a 
thought of oneself. " As was noted in Chapter 1 above, van Buitenen has proposed an interest- 
ing theory that the notion of ahamkära has its origin "in the ancient upanisadic speculations on 
a self-formulating, self-creating primordial personality" (1957a: 21), whose very verbal 
ejaculation "aham! " ("I! ") constitutes his self formulation, which in turn constitutes the cos- 
mos (1957a: 19). If interpreted with a realist bias this equivalence bet%veen self-formulation 
and universal creation sounds bizarre, and can be regarded only as an extravagant creation 
myth. Van Buitenen himself notes (ibid. ) that the distinction "between macrocosmos and mi- 
crocosmos" seems to be absent in the ancient texts to which he is referring (principally early 
portions of the Brhad. Up and the sixth chapter of the ClOid Up), but he does not take what 
would seem to be the obvious next step,, %tihich is to regard the "macrocosmic" (i. e. cosmogo- 
nic) story as a mythopoetic exposition of an essentially idealist notion, namely that the indi- 
viduation of the subject does not merely coincide with the emergence or manifestation of the 
world but is, rather, its logical precondition. 12 In my view it is this latter insight that underlies 
the Sarpkhya claim that from ahamkära (or due to its existence) "the rolling forth (pravartate) 
of the twofold surge (sarga, i. e. manifestation) [occurs], " comprising on the one hand the ten 
"capacities" (indriyas) plus the organising aspect of mind (nianas), and on the other hand the 
1°Jacobsen's full statement is, to me at least, simply unintelligible: "Sdmkhya and Yoga are, one could 
say, materialistic on the top (but not in the ordinary sense), and bottom, i. e., the ultimate material principle 
and gross material things such as water and air are non-conscious, and mental in the middle, i. e., buddhi and 
aha, nkära are mental material principles. " 
""The ordinary sense of both words (i. e., abhintana and aha» nkara) is pride and the technical import is 
the pride or conceit of individuality" (Colebrooke (in Colebrooke and Wilson 1837: 91), quoted in Chennake- 
savan 1980: 24). 
'2This point, or one very similar to it, was persuasively made, before Kant and long before Schopenhauer, 
by Rousseau, who, as Safranski has noted, "compared the 'sensation of self and the 'perception' of the ex- 
ternal world, and arrived at the conclusion that an individual could `have' a sensation only if he entered into 
the sensation of self; and since perceptions brought home what existed outside, while at the same time exist- 
ing only in the medium of the sensation of the self, it followed that without a sensation of self there was no 
existence. Or the other way about: the sensation of self produced existence" (Safranski 1989: 110; cf. Rous- 
seau 1763, bk 4). Cf. Schopenhauer: "the necessity or need of knowledge in general arises from the plurality 
and separate existence of beings, from individuation" (1966 u: 274; original emphasis). 
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five "measures of that" (tannmatras) (SK 24). 13 Whether this interpretation is or is not ac- 
cepted, however, it can hardly be denied that one would have to perform some extraordinary 
contortions with the concept of matter in order to define the notion of individuation (i. e. one's 
self-conception or self-formulation)-which ahamküra is fairly uncontroversially supposed to 
stand for-as a material principle. 
We come now to the indriyas and manas. The ten indriyas are divided into two sets of five. 
The first set, named buddhindriyas (literally, "awareness-" or "discernment-capacities"), com- 
prises "seeing (caksus), hearing (. trotra), smelling (ghrüna), tasting (rasana), and touching 
(tvac)" (SK 26). Several translators-including Davies (1894: 61), Jhä (1896: 66), Sury- 
anarayana (1948: 51), and Larson (1979: 264)-misleadingly take the passage just quoted to 
refer to sensory organs ("eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin"). 14 But the emphasis in the original 
text is not upon organs, nor even, to be precise, upon the senses (i. e. the sensory capacities or 
faculties such as the faculty of sight, and so on), but is, rather, upon the types of sensation 
themselves, i. e. (as I have tried to make clear by my choice of words in the translation) the 
phenomenological events of seeing, hearing, smelling, etc. 
The second set of indriyas, named "action capacities" (karnmendriyas), comprises "speaking 
(väc), clasping (püni), foot (päda), anus (päyu), and `under-part' (upastha, i. e. genitalia)" 
(ibid. ). Here the terminology is less precise than in the case of the buddhindriyas. Väc and 
püni could be translated as vocal and manipulative faculties respectively, or simply as "hand" 
in the case of püni; and the terms for the remaining three karmendriyas do not really warrant 
being translated as anything other than the names of particular organs. At kärikä 28, however, 
the karmendriyas are characterised in terms of their functions or modes of operation (vrtti), 
which are, respectively, "speaking (vacana), grasping (üdana), wandering (viharana), excret- 
ing (utsarga), and intense pleasure (ünanda). " 5 And in the same kärikä the activity of the 
buddhindriyas is said to consist in "mere awareness" (ülocana-mütra), which implies that 
these indriyas are not particular sensations but are, rather, the conditions of (the five types of) 
sensation as such. Nevertheless, whether we take them to be sensations, or the conditions of 
(or capacities to have) sensations, it is again clear that the buddhindriyas are in no obvious 
sense material entities, and I think the same can be said of the karmendriyas. 
"3SK 24 reads in full: abhimüno'hamküras tasmdd dvividhah pravartate sargah / ekädafiaka( ca ganas 
lanmdtralº pailcakas" caiva // 
'4 To be fair to Larson, he did later adopt the more accurate English terms ("seeing", etc. ) that I have used 
in my translation of the passage (e. g. Larson 1987: 49); but the erroneous terms are used in both existent edi- 
tions of his translation of the Sdmkhyakizrika. 
15 lt is noteworthy that the function of the genitals is characterised in terms of sexual pleasure, for inter- 
preters still tend to assume that procreation is what these organs primarily stand for in the Sämkhya system 
(e. g. Larson 1987: 49). 
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Manas is defined as being the essence (ätmaka) of both sets of indriyas (and thus as being 
an indriya itself) and as samkalpaka, which can be translated as "resolve" or "decision" (SK 
27). For etymological reasons, manas is normally translated simply as "mind"; but this is 
misleading, for in Sämkhya philosophy it evidently stands for a specific aspect of what is very 
loosely referred to in English as "the mind". Davies, for example, acknowledges this fact 
when he notes that "The Latin mens and our mind correspond to it [manas] in origin but not in 
meaning" (1894: 63); but then, unduly influenced by some very unhelpful assumptions, he 
offers the following misguided contrast between manas and the western concept of mind: 
In our Western philosophy, mind is usually considered as an expression for the rational faculties 
of the soul, and as opposed to matter; but in the view of Kapila [i. e. classical S3rpkhya], it is not a 
part of the soul, but is itself a form of matter from a material source (Prakriti). (Ibid.; my under- 
scoring) 
There are too many problems with this statement to go into them all, but central among them 
is the implicit conflation of the western notion of "soul", as a thing that can have "faculties" 
(whether rational or of any other kind), with the purusa of Sämkhya, which latter notion is 
usually associated with non-complexity (and hence with an absence of faculties). If such a 
conflation had not been made, the proposal that manas "is not a part of the soul" would be tol- 
erable, but the ambiguity that surrounds Davies' use of "soul" seriously detracts from his in- 
tended meaning. My main reason for quoting the passage, however, is not to pick faults with 
Davies alone, but to re-emphasise a more general point, namely how the pervasive assumption 
of prakrti's materiality can generate unwarranted claims that are both interpretively and philo- 
sophically dubious. In the present case, this assumption generates the claim that manas, al- 
though by definition mental, is nevertheless "a form of matter". 
Manas is widely understood to be an organising faculty, in which sensations are collected 
and arranged into perceptual experiences (Davies calls it "the sensorium commune" (1894: 
63)). This, in my view, is a valid interpretation, and one which gives due emphasis to 
Sämkhya's insistence on the active and constructive role of the mind in the generation of ex- 
perience. What is not so commonly emphasised, however, is the status of manas as the instiga- 
tor of the various types of action represented by the karmendriyas, and the close correspon- 
dence that this aspect of manas has with the western philosophical notion of will or volition. 16 
This meaning of manas is not elaborated in the Sünrkliykürikä itself, but the use of the term 
16Radhakrishnan speaks of manas as "suggesting alternative courses of action and carrying out the de- 
crees of the will through the organs of action", but not as the will itself (1927 u: 269-70). Davies, meanwhile, 
denies that Sämkhya "attributed volition to any form of matter [i. e. any form of prakrtij" (1894: 56). 
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sarnkalpaka in its definition strongly implies it. '7 Some interpreters have associated buddhi, 
rather than manas, with will, and Jhä even uses "will" as a direct translation of buddhi (1896: 
62); 18 while, contrariwise, others have identified manas with intellect (e. g. Zimmer 1953: 317, 
321 fn. 45). It is not crucial that we resolve this minor confusion here. The important thing is 
to acknowledge the decidedly non-physical nature of manas. 
It may be noted at this point that Särpkhya has a collective term for the three aspects of the 
mind that have so far been mentioned, those being buddhi, ahamkära and manas. The term is 
antahkarana, meaning literally "inner instrument", and this is distinguished from the "outer" 
(bähya) instrument, which comprises the five kinds of sensation and five modes of action (SK 
33). Together these "inner" and "outer" aspects form what is known simply as the 
"instrument" (karana, SK 32). The outer instrument is related to "present time" 
(sdnipratakäla), whereas the inner instrument is related to the "three times" (trikala), which I 
(along with traditional commentators such as Gaudapäda and Väcaspati) take to mean that the 
mind, in addition to being in the present, can remember the past and anticipate the future, 
whereas sensation and action are restricted to the present alone (SK 33). The terms "inner" and 
"outer" are presumably meant to denote, not spatial relations, but the fact that the operations 
of the former-namely, discernment (buddhi), egoity (ahamkära), and sensory synthesis and 
volition (manas)-are experienced as intra-mental, while sensations and actions are experi- 
enced as being, respectively, received from and performed upon supposedly extra-mental ob- 
jects. (I say "supposedly" because there is nothing in the Sümkhyakürikü to indicate explicitly 
that empirical objects are in reality exterior to the mind. ) One further metaphor that could be 
mentioned here concerning the relation between the inner and outer instruments occurs at 
kärikä 35, where it is said that 
Since buddhi, together with the other [two] inner instruments, is immersed in (avagähate) all ob- 
jects, therefore this threefold instrument is the chamber (dvärin) and the remaining ones [i. e. the 
ten indriyas, or possibly just the five buddhindriyas] are the doors (dvdras). 19 
In this translation I have followed Suryanarayana's suggestion (1948: 66-67) that, contrary to 
the opinion of most other translators, what dvürin refers to is "that to which channels lead" 
and not a "warder", "gate-keeper" or "door-keeper" (cf. e. g. Davies 1894: 71; Jhä 1896: 76; 
Larson 1979: 266; but also MW: 504). The metaphor seems to be intended to represent the 
idea that sensations are the "doorways" through which knowledge of external objects is con- 
"Cf. MW (p. 1126, under "Sam-kalpa"): "conception or idea or notion formed in the mind or heart, (esp. ) 
will, volition, desire, purpose, definite intention or determination or decision or wish for [... ). " 
1$ Larson, on the other hand, hedges his bets by referring to buddhi as "`will' or `intellect"' (1979: 263). 
19santahkarana buddhih sarva{n visayam avagahate yasmat / tasmüt trividha{n karanam dvari dvärani 
Jesüni 11 
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veyed to the cognising mind, but again it makes no definitive claim regarding the ontological 
status of the "external objects" themselves. 
I noted earlier that the five "measures of that" (tanmütras) are among the principles to "roll 
forth" from ahamkära, the others being the indriyas and manas, which have just been dis- 
cussed. The doctrine that the tanmätras derive from the mental phenomenon of "egoity", or 
depend upon it in some intimate way, is extremely significant, and it causes immense difficul- 
ties for any imputation of realism to Sämkhya. Or, rather, it ought to cause such difficulties, 
but all too often these are glossed over by interpreters who make the realist assumption. 20 
Such interpreters generally assume that the tanmätras are "material essences", which somehow 
"generate the five gross elements" (Larson 1987: 50), and that these gross elements (bhütas) 
in turn constitute macroscopic physical entities. 21 
The problem here ought to be obvious: on the one hand the tanmätras are held to give rise 
to physical objects, which are real in the sense of being mind-independent; and yet, on the 
other hand, the tanmätras are themselves derived from a mental principle, namely aharpkära, 
thus making them and anything that follows from them thoroughly dependent upon (and pos- 
sibly, in some sense, constituted by) the mind! This would seem, as long as the realist as- 
sumption is clung onto, to be an irresolvable paradox; and in my view its credibility as a valid 
interpretation of the Sämkhya position needs to be seriously questioned. Rather than letting 
this paradox cast doubt upon their cherished realist assumption, however, the majority of in- 
terpreters have invoked what has now become a bulwark of the standard interpretation, 
namely the concept of "subtle matter". This expression, and its synonyms such as "subtle 
substance", "subtle material", and so forth, has become ubiquitous within the secondary litera- 
ture on Sämkhya and Yoga, and is commonly applied to all the manifest principles except the 
bhütas (which are described instead as "gross" or "coarse" matter), and occasionally to un- 
manifest prakrti and the gunas themselves. A smattering of qotations will suffice to illustrate 
the point: 
[Buddhi] is material, but of the subtlest form of matter. (Davies 1894: 17-18) 
[Buddhi] is regarded as the subtle substance of all mental processes. It is the faculty by which we 
distinguish objects and perceive what they are. The functions of buddhi are ascertainment and 
decision. (Radhakrishnan 1927 tt: 267) 
20 One interpreter who finds himself unable to gloss over them is Frauwallner, who, while going along 
with the overall realist interpretation of Sämkhya, regards the doctrine of the tanmätras as utterly baffling, and 
announces "that no valid ground is found in the [Sämkhya] system to make its introduction [... ] appear intel- 
ligible" (1973 r 272). Such statements, in my view, say far more about the inadequacies of the particular in- 
terpretive approach concerned than about the Sämkhya material itself. 
21 Cf. Davies (1894: 19): "From Ahaºikära [... ] proceed the five subtle elements (lanmatra) which are the 
primary forms or essences of gross material things". 
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With the co-operation of rajas [aharnkära dominated by tamas] is transformed into subtle matter, 
vibratory, radiant and instinct with energy, and the tanmätras of sound, touch, colour, taste and 
smell arise. (Ibid.: 271) 
The world develops according to certain laws out of primitive matter, which first produces those 
subtile substances of which the internal organs of all creatures are formed, and after that brings 
forth the gross matter. (Garbe 1899: 10) 
[A tanmätra is] undifferentiated and causal stuff and is just subtle or psychic matter. (K. C. Bhat- 
tacharyya 19561: 175) 
[T]he gunas are non-intelligent subtle substances [... ]. (Dasgupta 1922: 259) 
From this selection of passages an impression can be gleaned of the kinds of ambiguities and 
confusions that the concept of subtle matter gives rise to. In the first of the two quotations 
from Radhakrishnan, for example, it is far from clear what is meant by the phrase "the subtle 
substance of all mental processes. " It could mean that the principle being described (i. e. bud- 
dhi) is some kind of mental substance or "mind-stuff' which constitutes mental phenomena. 
But in the next two sentences we learn that it is a "faculty" with specific "functions", which 
description seems incompatible with buddhi's being a constitutive substance. After all, a 
faculty might be said to belong to a thing that is composed of a certain substance, but I cannot 
see how a faculty can be a substance, however "subtle" it is assumed to be. Then, from Garbe, 
we get the claim that, according to Sämkhya, prakfti "produces" certain "subtile substances" 
and then goes on to "[bring] forth the gross matter"; but he neglects to point out (at least in 
this passage) the crucial fact that the so-called gross matter is supposed (on the realist view, to 
which Garbe generally subscribes) to derive from or evolve out of the subtle substances. It is 
understandable why one might be tempted to downplay this fact, especially if one is inclined, 
like K. C. Bhattacharyya for example, to treat "subtle" as equivalent to "psychic"-for how 
could psychic (i. e. mental) entities be the material source of "gross" ones? -but this is no ex- 
cuse for sloppy thinking and sloppy interpretive descriptions. 
Some other scholars have been far less reserved about admitting that, on their reading, real 
physical entities must be held by Sämkhya to be the end-products of the same chain of evolu- 
tion to which belong "intellect", "egoity", "sensations", etc. Again, however, they have tended 
to mask the obviously mental nature of these latter principles by referring to them as "subtle" 
rather than "mental", and have used this term "subtle"-sometimes with amazing repetitive- 
ness-to imply that the evolutionary chain is a graded continuum from unmanifest prakrti at 
one end to the bhütas (interpreted as physical particles) at the other, with no sudden and in- 
explicable leap from mental stuff to material stuff. Sen Gupta is one such interpreter, and the 
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following passage illustrates not only her "gradual evolution" theory but also the over- 
zealousness with which the term "subtle" can sometimes be used: 
According to Sänkhya, the evolutionary change means gradual change from more subtle to less 
subtle. Prakrti is the subtlest of all the constitutive principles of the world. So, the first evolute 
should be such which is less subtle than Prakrti but more subtle than the succeeding categories. 
This is possible only if saliva guna becomes the predominating guna in the first category. 
(Subtlety can be generated in a category merely by increasing the sattva gurºa. ) (Sen Gupta 
1982: 98)22 
The word "subtle" derives from the Latin subtilis, "finely woven, " and has a range of 
meanings, including "delicate, elusive [... ], imperceptible, intangible [... ], [and] refined" 
(Webster's: 2281). The expression "subtle matter" is not unheard of in western philosophy. 
Descartes, for example, uses it to denote "particles of indefinite smallness" that are produced 
by the collision of "violently agitated" matter with "other bodies" (1985 t: 258). 23 But none of 
this helps us very much in trying to make sense of passages such as the one just quoted from 
Sen Gupta. 
I do not mean to imply by my remarks above that "subtle" should be banished from the in- 
terpretive literature on Sämkhya. It is in fact the most appropriate translation of the Sanskrit 
term süksma, with which it may share some remote etymological ancestry, 24 and sa4ina 
(along with sauksnzya, "subtlety") is certainly made use of in the Sämkhyakärikü (at SK 7,8, 
37, and 39) and in the Yogasütra as well (at YS 1.44,45; 2.10,50; 3.25,44; and 4.13). Indeed, 
when discussing kärikä 8 in the last chapter we saw prakrti's "subtlety" (sauksmya) being 
given as a reason for its imperceptibility; and it would be fair to infer from this-since prakrti 
is known via its manifest modes-that these modes are held to be (as Sen Gupta says) "less 
subtle" than unmanifest prakrti. Furthermore, Sen Gupta is right to draw a connection between 
a thing's "subtlety" and the extent to which the quality of sattva prevails in that thing, al- 
though I don't think the relation is quite as straightforward as she implies it to be. The paren- 
thetical remark that she makes at the end of the passage quoted above suggests that sattva is 
somewhat analogous to a chemical constituent that can be added to or subtracted from an en- 
22Cf. P. 102 of the same work: "Evolutionary passage, according to the Samkhya-school, is simply the 
passage from the subtle to the gross. After the emergence of the gross elements, the process of evalution [sic) 
stops in the sense that the püncabhautic changes are simply changes from gross to more gross. " Balbir Singh 
adopts a similar continuum model to that of Sen Gupta, but without such a saturating application of the term 
"subtle": "At every stage the evolutes display their continuity with those of the preceding stage, so that there 
is no break, discontinuity, or gap" (1976: 132). 
2' The expression "subtle matter" does not actually occur in this passage (i. e. Principles of Philosophy 
111.52), but Descartes notes elsewhere (1985 t: 322 [Description of the Hunian Body and of All its Functions 
IV]) that what the description applies to can be called "subtle matter". 
24Monier-Williams considers the most likely verbat root of süksn: a to be siv, "to sew" (see entries under 
"sakshma" and "Süci" in MW: 1240 and 1241), which indicates a close semantic and possibly etymological 
parallel with the Latin subirlis. 
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tity in order to increase or decrease its level of "subtlety". If this were the case, however, then 
that which is most "subtle" of all-namely unmanifest prakrti itself-would contain the high- 
est proportion of sattva; and yet, as is generally agreed, prakrti in itself comprises the three 
gunas in a state of perfect equilibrium. 
In my view the link between subtlety and sattva resides in the notion of "purification", 
which is invoked more explicitly in Yoga than in Sämkhya, but which can nevertheless be 
considered to pervade the soteriological dimension of both systems. In the Yogasütra the term 
sattva appears to be used as a synonym of buddhi, and on two occasions the "purity (. tuddhi) 
of sattva" is referred to (YS 3.35,55). In a sense, the expression "purity of sattva" is pleonas- 
tic, for sattva can itself stand for clarity and purity; 25 but when sattva is used in place of bud- 
dhi, then what is meant by its "purification" is presumably the cultivation of the ethical dis- 
cipline, perceptual acuity and alertness that the Yoga system as a whole is intended to bring 
about. 
"Subtlety" enters into the picture when we consider the kinds of things that can become 
objects of knowledge for the "purified" or "cultivated" buddhi. The advanced stages of Yoga 
practice are said to allow "subtle objects" (saksma-vfsayas) to be the focus of sustained 
meditation (YS 1.44), and since "the unmanifest (aliriga) is the ultimate object of subtlety" (YS 
1.45), it may be inferred that the expression "subtle objects" here encompasses all, or most, of 
the manifest principles. 26 There are, of course, outstanding questions, such as how buddhi 
could become a meditative "object" if buddhi is itself the medium through which meditation 
occurs; but to try to resolve such questions here would take us too far off our main track. The 
immediate point to be made is that Sen Gupta's claim, that increasing sattva increases sub- 
tlety, would be expressed more precisely if one were to say that, by means of the cultivation of 
the quality of purity, for which sattva (in most contexts) stands, increasingly difficult-to- 
comprehend (and hence "subtle") aspects of the psychosensory apparatus are revealed to con- 
sciousness. This way of expressing the claim gives due weight, in my opinion, to the epistemo- 
logical implications of "subtle", and rightfully detracts from the ontological emphasis that is 
normally read into the term. In other words, "subtle" should be taken primarily to denote 
something about the object to be known in relation to the knower, not about the object as it is 
in itself. 
25 Hence Whicher's appalling neologism "sattvification" (1998a: 122, and passim). Cf. Chapple's 
"subtilization" (1996: 122-23). 
26 Vyäsa counts the tanmätras, ahamkära, lingamatra, and alinga among the subtle objects, thereby appar- 
ently excluding manas, the ten indriyas, and the five bhütas (YBh 1.45). Exclusion of the bhütas is under- 
standable, since it is generally in opposition to them (qua "gross" or sthüla) that "subtle" objects are defined; 
but there seems to be no good reason to leave out manas and the indriyas. 
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Now let us return to the issue that prompted the above discussion of the term "subtle", 
which is that of how something physical (namely the bhütas, and the macroscopic entities that 
they are held by many interpreters to constitute) can derive from something mental (namely 
ahaipkära). The standard account-according to which ahaipkära itself is in some peculiar 
sense "material", as are the tanmätras which form the bridge between it and the bhütas-is in 
my view, for reasons already given, incoherent. 27 My alternative to this account involves a 
radical recasting of the tanmätras and bhntas as, no longer "subtle" and "gross" matter, but 
modes of sensory content and perceptual forms of physical objects respectively. A useful way 
of approaching an explanation of what I mean by these two expressions will be to consider 
how the five tanmätras are traditionally understood. 
The tanmätras are not individually named in the Sümkhyakarikü itself, but there is a con- 
sensus among the Sanskrit commentaries that the group of five comprises sound (fabda), 
contact (sparla), form (rjTpa), taste (rasa), and smell (gandha) (see e. g. Gaudapäda, 
Vacaspati, and other traditional commentaries on SK 38). There should, therefore, be nothing 
controversial about my referring to the tanmätras as the f ive modes of sense-content, for that is 
precisely what they would seem to be. 28 What is at odds with the standard interpretation, 
however, is my view that the tanmätras can be understood as merely sense-content, and that 
there is no reason for them to be the kinds of "material essences" that Larson and others have 
assumed them to be. 29 Expressions such as "subtle element" and "primary element" are ex- 
tremely common as translations of tanm«tra, 30 and these can be justified by references to (a 
small number of) commentarial sources. Vyäsa, for example, distinguishes three grades of 
objects to be "grasped" in meditation, the first of which is bhüta-silksma ("subtle element" or, 
slightly more literally, "subtle being"), and the other two of which are "gross support" (sthfüla- 
älambana) and "worldly divisions" (visva-bheda, i. e. macroscopic objects) (YBh 1.41). The 
translation "subtle element" does not conflict with my interpretation of the tanmätras, as long 
as (qua sensory content) it is understood to mean a constitutive element of sensations and not 
27 The already-given reasons I have in mind here are: (a) the fact that ahamkära is almost universally ac- 
cepted to be the concept of self (or the event of ascribing such a concept to oneself), and hence cannot coher- 
ently be formulated as a material cause; and (b) the confusion that arises from regarding the tanmätras and 
bhotas as real (in the sense of being mind-independent) while at the same time holding them to be derived 
from ahamkära. 
28 The term "sense-data" would also be legitimate here, although since this term has become associated 
with a much-criticised epistemological approach (promoted in the twentieth century by Bertrand Russell, 
amongst others), I shall try to avoid unnecessary confusion by sticking with terms such as "sense-content". 
29"[The tanmatras] are [... ] subtle, material essences or presuppositions with which perceptual and motor 
functioning correlate and through which certain aspects of the material world become differentiated" (Larson 
1987: 50). 
30 Cf. MW (p. 434): "a rudimentary or subtle element"; Woods (1914: 91,148-49, and passim): "fine 
element"; Eliade (1969: 21): "the five `subtle' (potential) elements, the genetic seeds of the physical world. " 
161 
Metaphysics and Soteriology in Classical Sümkhya and Yoga 
of physical entities; which understanding differs significantly from the common view that the 
tanmätras physically constitute-or "give rise to" "[b]y a process of condensation" (Eliade 
1969: 21)-the bhütas, which in turn physically constitute the entire external world, including 
our own bodies. 31 My view of the relation between the tanmätras and bhütas is, however, 
somewhat different, as I shall explain below. 
As in the case of the tanmätras, the bhütas, though not individually named in the 
Sümkhyakürikd, are universally agreed to be the five elements, namely: earth (prthivi or ksiti); 
water (ap); fire (tejas); air (vayu or niarut); and üküsa (or vyonian), which is normally trans- 
lated these days as "space" (the older translation of "ether" having become outdated) (again, 
cf. commentaries on SK 38). The realist view-according to which the elements are physical 
atoms-has been adhered to by the majority of interpreters. Dasgupta typifies it when he as- 
serts that "All gross things are formed by the collocation of the five atoms of ksiti, ap, tejas, 
marut, and vyoman. The difference between one thing and another is simply this, that its col- 
location of atoms or the arrangement or grouping of atoms is different from that in another" 
(1922: 255). Normally it is implied that these atoms are, on their own, too small to be per- 
ceived, and hence that they are only "gross" in the sense that they are the constitutive elements 
of perceptible entities. There are, however, certain scholars who believe the bhütas themselves 
to be perceptible. K. C. Bhattacharyya, for example, says with regard to Yoga that it "holds 
that bhüta emerges out of tanmätra in the form of perceivable sthüla ['gross', physical] atoms 
in the first instance, out of which again sthüla complex objects emerge as immanent parinämas 
[transformations]" (1956 1: 243; emphasis and square brackets added). 
Whether the bhütas are perceptible or imperceptible, however, the view that takes them to 
be physical atoms is, I think, irredeemably flawed. For one thing, it requires us to ignore the 
fact that there are said to be only five bhütas, and instead postulates an indefinite number, al- 
beit divided into five types. But then, even if we allow the number five to refer to types rather 
than individuals, it remains far from clear why atomic particles should be referred to as 
"earth", "water", "fire", "air", and-most puzzling of all-"space". Notwithstanding extrava- 
gant and ad hoc theories which have interpreted ükasa, for example, as a "proto-atom" 
(whatever that might be), 32 it must be admitted that, if the bhüta doctrine does concern atoms, 
'1 "[T]hese tanmatras give rise to atoms (paramünu) and molecules (sthülabhulani; literally, `dense mate- 
rial particle'), which in turn give birth to vegetable organisms (vriksa) and animal organisms (darira). Thus 
man's body, as well as his `states of consciousness' and even his `intelligence, ' are all creations of one and 
the same substance" (Eliade 1969: 21). 
32 "Aka a corresponds in some respects to the ether of the physicists and in others to what may be called 
proto-atom (protyle)" (B. N. Seal, quoted in Dasgupta 1922: 253 fn. 1). 
162 
The Emergence of the Manifest Principles 
then the names given to these atoms are either extremely tenuously symbolic or else coin- 
pletely arbitrary. 
But let us consider the names of the bhütas a little more closely. What, for instance, could 
be meant by referring to something as "earth"? Surely earth, or soil, in the literal sense is 
something complex, composed of numerous and varied constitutive parts. Prthivf can also be 
understood, however, as "earth" in the sense of the ground upon which we stand-i. e. some- 
thing hard, solid, dense. Thus, might not the first bhüta stand for solidity or hardness? And, 
similarly, ap might be understood as liquidity or fluidity rather than simply H2O; tejas as light 
or heat; and vayu as gaseousness. Having stepped aside from the assumption of atomism, 
when we come to äküsa there is no need to think of it as anything other than space, although if 
we recall Sümkhyasütra 2.12 (discussed in Chapter 5 above) then we might wish to regard it 
as covering time as well. 33 
What I am proposing here is that the first four bhütas can be most intelligibly understood, 
not as atoms, but as forms of physical objects, and that the fifth-äkäga-can be regarded as 
the form of space (or forms of space and time), which is of course a necessary precondition for 
each of the others. By "forms of physical objects" I mean, essentially, the forms taken by 
physical objects in our experience, and do not mean to imply that the objects concerned are 
independent of that experience. 
There is nothing especially novel about this kind of phenomenological interpretation of the 
bhütas. In Abhidharma Buddhism, where four bhütas (or niahäbhütas) are typically referred 
to-these being the same as in Sämkhya, only with 5k5 9a left out-it is fairly widely accepted. 
Herbert Guenther, for example, speaking of the Buddhist mahäbhütas, notes that "There are 
four such `great elementary qualities': earth-, water-, fire-, and air-basis" (1974: 146), 34 and 
adds the following interesting remarks: 
Their names have been derived from the `objects' which common-sense assumes, although the 
Buddhists never had the association of objects in our sense of the word. `Earth' is the symbolic 
expression for all that is solid and able to carry a load, `water' for all that is fluid and cohesive, 
`fire' for all that is light and moving. (Ibid. )" 
33 Dasgupta explicitly rejects this line of interpretation, insisting that "solidity, liquidity and gaseousness 
represent only an impermanent aspect of matter" (whereas the bhütas are the constituents of matter per se) 
(1924: 166). Having assumed Sämkhya to be staunchly realist, however, he could only consider solidity, etc., 
in terms of mind-independent states of physical entities, and thus was not in a position to comment upon the 
kind of phenomenologically-oriented interpretation that I am proposing. 
34 In a footnote Guenther cites the following passages from traditional Buddhist works: Buddhaghosa's 
Atthasalini 4.3; Vasubandhu's Abhidharniakosa 1.12; and Asanga's Abhidharmasamuccaya, p. 3 (no biblio- 
graphical details are given concerning the editions of these works that have been used). 
35 Cf. Gethin (1986: 36): "What is clear [... ] is the extent to which the early Buddhist account of rüpa [the 
collective term for the mahäbhütas] focusses on the physical world as experienced by a sentient being-the 
terms of reference are decidedly body-endowed-with-consciousness (savinnanaka käya)" (my square brack- 
ets). 
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Nor am I the first to spot that this interpretive approach is equally applicable to Sämkhya. 
Jajneswar Ghosh did something very similar in his introductory essay to Aranya 1977. Of the 
bhütas, in addition to the other manifest principles, suggests Ghosh, "it must be said that they 
are not extramental, since it is inconceivable, for instance, how a thing may be hard or soft 
without being felt as such" (1977: 7). The point here is the straightforwardly antirealist one 
that the qualities of objects cannot legitimately be imputed to any real external entity; they can 
be so imputed only to the objects as experienced, i. e. within and not without the mind or con- 
sciousness. 36 Ghosh is certainly on the right lines, in my opinion, but he does not finish the 
job of providing a coherent nonrealist account of how each of the manifest principles relates 
to the others. To provide such an account would, of course, be a highly ambitious project, and 
would necessarily involve the kind of imaginative "constructive effort" that K. C. Bhattach- 
aryya refers to (1956 t: 127). In the remaining part of this chapter I will not attempt to give a 
complete account-for to do so would effectively involve an elaboration of the Sümkhykürika 
in its entirety-but I shall go further than Ghosh in presenting a non-realist interpretation of 
the manifest principles we have been discussing, which will take us some way towards an ex- 
planation of the relations between them in terms of conditionality or dependence rather than 
material causality. 
THE ANALYSIS OF EXPERIENCE 
If we consider, as our starting-point, the question "What are the necessary preconditions for 
the arising of experience? ", then it can be shown that the principles of Sämkhya and Yoga 
metaphysics flow forth as a logical response to this question. Although the question itself is 
not stated explicitly in the classical texts, there is nothing arbitrary or inapposite about the 
suggestion that it represents a key entry-point into the metaphysical schema; for the fact that 
the soteriological orientation of Sämkhya and Yoga is founded upon the need to transcend 
suffering and dissatisfaction (duhkha, SK 1; YS 2.16), combined with the analysis of experi- 
ence as inherently dissatisfactory (YS 2.15) and rooted in misperception (avidyü, YS 2.24), 
necessitates that the sources of experience be disclosed and impeded, which in turn implies 
the asking of the very question I have posed. 
36 An interesting discussion of the mental origin of the forms of phenomena occurs in Kant's Inaugural 
Dissertation of 1770 (section 4): "Objects do not strike the senses by their form. In order, therefore, that the 
various impressions from the object acting on the sense may coalesce into some whole of representation, 
there is required an inner principle of the mind through which in accordance with stable and innate laws that 
manifold may take on some form" (quoted in Kemp Smith 1992: 87). 
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One might suppose that the two most fundamental conditions of experience are a subject 
and an object, and in a sense this is indeed so. The Sämkhya analysis is a little more subtle, 
however, for it notes that the concept of an experiencing subject already presupposes certain 
prior conditions, and it is essentially these conditions of the possibility of being a subject that 
constitute, in my view, the metaphysical schema of Sämkhya and Yoga. The first condition is 
consciousness itself, or a "transcendental subject" abstracted from all specific experiential 
episodes. This is purusa. A further condition is something that can "bring forth" or "procreate" 
phenomena and present them to this transcendental subject. This is prakrti. 37 The twenty-three 
principles that constitute the manifest aspect of prakrti are derived from a detailed synchronic 
analysis of experience itself; they are, in other words, what underlies experience in general. 
The unmanifest aspect of prakrti, with its three strands, is the irreducible foundation of these 
underlying factors; it is that which must be presupposed in each of them. 
Although, on my interpretation, the Sämkhya analysis of experience is synchronic, it is de- 
signed to bring out relations of logical priority and subordination between certain of the con- 
stitutive factors, and this explains why these factors are presented as though in a diachronic 
sequence. Buddhi-or mahat, "the great"-is the logically first manifest principle because it 
stands for the very possibility of intentional consciousness. Buddhi is awareness of something 
considered in abstraction from any particular object of awareness. 8 Ahamkära-the concept 
of egoity or self-formulation-is logically dependent upon buddhi because selfhood or ipseity 
can be defined and recognised only in relation to that which is not-self, and hence only in the 
presence of intentional consciousness; intentional consciousness being that which brings forth 
the phenomenal "other" or object (literally, "thrown against"). One could, of course, protest 
that the bringing forth of an object itself requires a self or subject, and that therefore it makes 
no sense to prioritise buddhi over aharpkära. Ahamkära is not, however, the metaphysical self; 
it is merely (as I have tried to emphasise already) the principle of self-individuation. The 
authentic self is purusa, although purusa cannot know itself to be that self, since, independ- 
ently of phenomena, the contrast between self and not-self cannot arise. 
37Jadunath Sinha tries to make a similar point: "According to the Samkhya-Yoga, perception depends 
upon two metaphysical conditions. In the first place, it implies the existence of an extra-mental object. In the 
second place, it implies the existence of the self (purusa)" (1958 v 124). His mistake is the one with which 
we are familiar from Chapter 4, i. e. that of conflating the purusa-prakrti relation with the mind-world rela- 
tion. (Prakrti, whether considered in its manifest or unmanifest aspect, is not "an extra-mental object"! ) 
38 Cf. Zimmer (1953: 320): "Buddhi comprises the totality of our emotional and intellectual possibilities. " 
K. C. Bhattacharyya comes close to appreciating this point when he states that "buddhi is the manifest as 
such" (1956 t: 274), but this statement fails to capture the intentional relatedness that, in my view, underlies 
the notion of buddhi. 
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"Rolling forth" (pravarlate) from aharnkära is the "twofold surgence" (dvividhah [... ] 
sarga/i) of the ten indriyas plus manas on the one hand, and the five tanmätras on the other 
(SK 24). I take this to mean that the notion of egoity is a necessary precondition for one's 
having sensations (buddlzindriyas) and performing actions (karmendriyas), and for being re- 
ceptive to the sensory data (tannüätras) that constitute the objectual content of sensations, 
which is a point that has already been hinted at above (p. 153). We might note here the Kan- 
tian point that, strictly speaking, having a concept of self need not-indeed, ought not-be 
taken to imply that there is a "sense of egoity", i. e. some mysterious feeling of being a self. 
The concept of an ego or self has no empirical content, but is, as Kant maintains, merely the 
fundamental presupposition or "vehicle" underlying all concepts and experiences (CPuR 
A338-44/13396-402). Egoity might be characterised as the appropriation of perceptual and 
conceptual experiences as "mine". Experiences are had, and are accompanied by what Kant 
calls the "I think" (which notion is based on Descartes's cogilo); and this is very much what I 
take the Stimkhyakarikü to be referring to when it defines ahamkära as "the thought of [being] 
a self' (abhinn na, SK 24). 
At kärikd 34 the following statement is made concerning the relation between the indriyas 
and the tanmätras: 
Of these [i. e. the ten indriyas], the five buddhindriyas have specific and nonspecific objects [i. e. 
the bhütas and tanmätras]. Speaking manifests (bhavau) sound-phenomena [alone], whereas the 
remaining [karmendriyas] [manifest] all five [types on phenomena. 39 
The assertion that the buddhindriyas have specific (visesa) and nonspecific (avisesa) objects 
requires some consideration. There is no problem in assuming that the terms visesa and 
avi. (esa refer to the bhfitas and tanmätras respectively, because at kärikä 38 it is in precisely 
these terms that the bhütas and tanmätras are defined. The statement remains, however, am- 
biguous. One interpretation would be that there are two distinct kinds of sensory object, one 
"specific" (i. e. comprising the bhütas) and the other "nonspecific" (i. e. comprising the 
tanmätras). An alternative interpretation, meanwhile, would be that every object is constituted 
by the two kinds of elements, namely specific and nonspecific. It is this second interpretation 
that seems to me most plausible in view of my understanding of the bhütas as objectual 
"forms" and of the tanmätras as modes of sense-content. The five tanmätras-i. e. sound, tac- 
tility, visual image, flavour, and odour-ought not, in my view, to be regarded as objects in 
themselves; rather, they constitute the content of sensory objects. 40 It would, for example, be 
39 buddhrndriyani tesa, n pafica vifiecavLsesavisayani / vag bhavari fabdavi (ayci Iesuni iu panca vidayanf ii 
40 Digambarji et al. seem to approximate this view when they define tanmairä as "the matter of which the 
Bhatas are said to be forms, the imperceptible matter of the perceptible material existence" (1989: 25). From 
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impossible to experience a mere sound without its being a sound of a particular kind, or a vis- 
ual image "as such" without its being a particular visual image. This is why I reject the first 
interpretation of kärikä 34 that I mentioned above. The tanmätras cannot be sensory objects, 
because they are, in fact, features of sensory objects that, under analysis, have been abstracted 
from the objects themselves. In order to be experienced (as sensation) something must com- 
prise both a nonspecific element-say, tactility or "feel" (sparia) or visual appearance 
(rüpa)-and a specific form-say, hardness/solidity (prihivil) or luminosity (tejas). This is the 
point that I take the first distich of kärikä 34 to be making. 
It should be noted that even the so-called "specific objects"-or, to be a little more precise, 
the specific elements of objects-are not specific enough to count as objects in the ordinary 
sense, i. e. as objects such as stones, or trees, or cats, or tables. Hardness combined with touch, 
for example, does not make a stone, although hardness and touch are both features of a sen- 
sory experience that we might ordinarily describe as "touching a stone". Thus, although I 
have, in my translation of kärikä 34, adopted the standard practice of translating vi. fesa- 
avisesa-visayüni as "specific and nonspecific objects", we should be careful to note that what 
is really being spoken about are relatively specific and nonspecific components of sensory 
objects, and that by "sensory object" here is meant, not a physical object or entity, but, in ef- 
fect, the sensation itself. When we speak in English of an experience such as touching a stone, 
we might say that the stone felt hard, or that I had the sensation of hardness. Whilst, under 
most circumstances, these two ways of speaking may be understood as equivalent statements, 
under closer inspection we see that the former attributes hardness to the stone whereas the 
latter attributes it to the sensation. I think that this same ambiguity-or something very close 
to it-exists in Sanskrit, and is responsible for the fact that kärikä 34 refers to specific and 
nonspecific objects of sensation, when in fact an expression such as "specific and nonspecific 
components of sensations" would be equally valid. There is, therefore, no support for the view 
that Sämkhya takes a realist attitude to physical entities to be gained from this kärikä. 
When it comes to the second distich of kärikä 34, I have translated visayd and visayüni as 
"phenomena" rather than "objects" because the phrase "speaking manifests sound- 
phenomena" is both less cumbersome, and in my view closer to the sense, of vag blravati 
dabdavitayü than would be an expression such as "speaking has sound-objects as its manifes- 
tation", but the difference is fairly minor. I reject, incidentally, translations such as Larson's 
other statements that they make, however, it would appear that they are using "matter" in a realist sense here, 
to mean something physically real, rather than merely the content of sensations. (For example, referring to 
ahamkära, the tanmätras and the bhütas, they say: "They are all matter in the sense in which we understand 
this word today" (ibid. ), which presumably means the sense in which mainstream science understands it. ) 
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"Speech only has sound as its object" (1979: 266), since this causes an unnecessary confusion. 
We might say that hearing has sound as its object, or that speech produces sound, but it seems 
nonsensical to say that speech has sound as its object. Similarly, I do not see any sense in 
saying of the remaining karmendriyas-namely, grasping, walking, excreting, and engaging in 
sexual activity-that they have as their objects sound, touch, visual appearance, taste, and 
odour (i. e. the five tanmätras). While it seems reasonable to describe speech as "manifesting" 
sound-the relevant verb here being bhavati, which can also mean "exists; is; becomes" 
(Killingley 1997: 234)-the other karmendriyas do not, it must be admitted, relate to the 
tanmätras in quite such an obvious way. They can, however, be held to involve these five 
modes of sensory content, at least in the case of someone whose five senses are all in working 
order. One might quibble that grasping, walking and excreting do not directly involve sound, 
taste or smell; but if we think of the karmendriyas more generally-as simply varieties of 
physical activity-then it becomes more plausible to see them as intimately associated with 
sense-content, even if the precise nature of the relationship remains undefined. 
Although a great deal more could be said about each of the manifest principles-or 
"conditioning factors of experience" as we can now call them-I think the above account is 
sufficient to substantiate my claim that the metaphysical schema presented in the 
Sdmkhyakürikd is most coherently interpreted as a synchronic analysis of the necessary con- 
ditions of experience rather than as a diachronic cosmogony. 41 One further question that 
might be asked, and upon which I shall offer some thoughts in the next section, is: "What use 
is such an analysis to Sämkhya and Yoga-how does it fit into the broader soteriological ori- 
entation of these darganas? " 
THE SOTERIOLOGICAL RELEVANCE OF 
THE METAPHYSICAL SCHEMA 
The question of how metaphysics and soteriology are related in Sämkhya and Yoga has cer- 
tainly bemused a number of interpreters who have given it anything approaching the degree of 
attention it deserves. We saw early on in this chapter that Radhakrishnan found it "difficult to 
4I J. N. Mohanty seems to have had a similar idea, for he remarks in one place that "an Indian philosopher 
(... j may turn to western philosophy in order to make sense of some obscure doctrine in Indian thought. For 
example, one may make sense of the Samkhya order of evolution by invoking some parts of Kantian episte- 
mology" (2001: 86-87). He makes the remark, however, merely en passanl and does not follow it up. Braj 
Sinha, too, recognises that "Sarimkhya-Yoga is primarily an attempt at a transcendental analysis of the facts of 
human experience" (1983: 17), but he limits his study to time and temporality (comparing the Sämkhya-Yoga 
conception with that of Abhidharma Buddhism), and does not provide a general account of the metaphysical 
principles. 
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understand the precise significance of the Sämkhya account of evolution" (1927 u: 274). Lar- 
son expresses a similar point, but with a little more specificity: 
On the one hand, we are told that buddhi, aha, nkcära, mans, the senses, etc. evolve or emerge 
one after another. At the same time we are told that the Ii, iga[*] transmigrates from life to life. 
[... ] fTlhe theory of evolution has very little to do with the problem of salvation, since in any 
given life, evolution is already accomplished before that particular life begins. [... ] Clearly the 
exposition of the Sumkhyakarikä on this point leaves much to be desired. (1979: 196; my under- 
scoring. The linga is said at SK 40 to comprise "mahat, etc., down to [and including] the subtle", 
which is generally taken to mean all of the manifest principles except the bhQtas) 
It would be harsh not to have some sympathy for Larson in his state of bewilderment, but if he 
is looking for the soteriological significance of a metaphysical schema to be spelt out in black 
and white, then a dense and cryptic document produced by an esoteric branch of Indian phi- 
losophy such as the Sägikhyakärikü is hardly the place to find it. What the interpretation of 
such a document requires is a degree of familiarity with the discipline of Yoga, i. e. with sus- 
tained introspective meditation and the states of awareness that result from it. As I noted in the 
Introduction, I do not wish to claim for myself access to any secret and authoritative knowl- 
edge in this regard, but I have gained enough experience of the theoretical and practical as- 
pects of Yoga to understand that the principal purpose of this discipline is to engender a state 
of consciousness in which identification with all phenomenal processes has been relinquished 
and the phenomenal processes themselves have withered away (due, as it were, to their supply 
of nourishment having been suspended). Perhaps a brief summary of the rationale behind 
Yoga practice would be helpful here. 
Roughly speaking, an object-whether it be a visual one such as a symbolic diagram 
(yantra) or an auditory one such as a mantra-is concentrated upon incessantly until single- 
pointed attention (dharand) is achieved (YS 3.1). Such attention may endure for some time, 
which state is generally referred to as meditation (dh)üna, YS 3.2), before the distinction be- 
tween the meditating subject and the object meditated upon dissolves and a state of mental 
"absorption" (samüdhi) ensues, in which the "object alone" (artha-mütra) is said to "shine 
forth" (nirbhäsa) (YS 3.3, cf. 1.43). In my experience, limited as it may be, the state of initial 
absorption is not the terminus ad quem of Yoga, nor is it claimed to be such in the Yogasütra 
and other traditional texts. Rather, it is the terminus a quo for a deeper level of enquiry and 
self-understanding. 
What can, on occasions, happen next is that the object itself fades away, leaving the mind 
in a state of pleasant emptiness; and, despite the cessation of ordinary discursive mental activ- 
ity, it is possible within this very state of (relative) tranquillity, to achieve certain kinds of in- 
sight into, or knowledge about, the nature of the mind and its operations. According to various 
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passages in the Yogasfitra, there are several distinct stages or levels of samädhi (or samüpatti), 
and some of these are held to involve an awareness of the ordinarily imperceptible (i. e. 
"subtle") aspects of the "seen" (drya, i. e. prakrti). 42 One pole of the discipline of Yoga in- 
volves holding these aspects (or whatever the object of meditation may be) steady, the practice 
of this stabilisation being known as abhyüsa (YS 1.13). The other pole is vairägya, the non- 
attachment to or dissociation from the object of knowledge; or, in other words, the cultivation 
of the inner knowingness that, in the case of each psychosensory aspect that becomes present 
to awareness, I (as transcendental self or pure consciousness) am not that (cf. YS 1.15-16). 
Such knowingness is prefigured in the famous Upanisadic utterance nett net! (na-iti na-iti), 
"not this, not this" (see e. g. Brhad. Up 11.3.6; 111.9.26; IV. 2.4; etc. ), and is given expression at 
Sümkliyakürika 64 as purusa's awareness that "I am not (na-asmi), not mine (na nie), not `I' 
(na-aham). " Larson interprets this latter passage as buddhi's assertion that "I am not 
(conscious); (consciousness) does not belong to me; the `I' is not (conscious)" (1979: 274), 
but this is to turn the meaning of the kärikä upside-down. There are, admittedly, significant 
difficulties attached to any ascription of knowledge-even a merely negative, dissociative 
kind of knowledge-to a transcendental principle such as purusa; for it seems paradoxical to 
suggest that transcendental consciousness can "know" itself to be distinct from the very cog- 
nitive apparatus that, under normal circumstances, make knowledge possible. But this is the 
sort of problem that inevitably arises in connection with attempts to describe mystical (i. e. 
supra-ratiocinative) states of consciousness, and is far from being uniquely associated with 
Sämkhya and Yoga. Larson's alternative suggestion, it should be noted, is at least equally 
paradoxical, since it involves an essentially non-conscious principle (namely, buddhi) having 
knowledge-which can only mean becoming conscious of the fact-that it is not conscious! 
Since the goal of Samkhya and Yoga is the self-abiding or "aloneness" (kaivalya) of 
purusa, the achievement of which goal requires a cessation of purusa's false identification 
with that which is not-self (anütman, cf. YS 2.5 and 25), the knowledge of the ultimate dis- 
junction between purusa and prakrti must belong to purusa, even if in some sense that knowl- 
'2 Two main schemata of meditative absorption are presented in the Yogasatra. The first (at YS 1.17-18) 
distinguishes between cognitive (sa. nprajnltta-) samädhi and the "other" (anya) type, which is generally 
(following Vyäsa) taken to be "supra-cognitive" (asamprajilata-) samädhi. Cognitive samädhi is subdivided 
into four modes: (i) "contemplative" (vitarka); (2) "refined contemplative" (vicüra); (3) "blissful" (ananda); 
and (4) "mere egoic" (asmila, literally "1-am-ness"). The second schema refers to samädhi "with seed" (sabya, 
YS 1.46) and "without seed" (nirbja, IS 1.51), the former type being subdivided (at YS 1.42-44) into (i) 
"absorption with contemplation" (savitarka-samapatti), (2) "- without contemplation" (nirvitarka-samapatti), 
(3) "with refined contemplation" (savicara-samdpatti), and (4) "- without refined contemplation" (nir icara- 
sanrwpartl). The two schemata, though differing in certain respects, share the basic structure of a system of 
gradual progression. 
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edge can only arise via (i. e. by means of) purusa's association with buddhi 43 The aforemen- 
tioned passage in kärikä 64 is, in my view, an attempt to represent the dawning of puruýa's 
disidentification with experience itself. It is, so to speak, the "last gasp" of experience-i. e. of 
subject-object duality-before the "seer" (drastr/purusa, defined as "mere seeing" 
(drfimätra), YS 2.20) "abides in its own nature" (YS 1.3). 
Taking the above discussion of Yoga discipline into account, then, I can see two main in- 
terpretive options concerning the soteriological relevance of Sämkhya's metaphysical schema. 
One is that it constitutes a report of meditative experience, i. e. an exposition of the insights 
gained into the nature of the mind and its processes during states of samädhi. A second pos- 
sibility is that the schema was devised in advance of meditative experience via a process of 
transcendental analysis, analogous to that used by Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason. As 
Kant impressively demonstrated, it is possible to enquire into the necessary conditions of ex- 
perience by means of reason alone, and to construct an elaborate schema of a priori principles 
without the need for introspective verification. In the case of Sämkliya, the schema could have 
been rationally constructed and then utilised as a tool or "map" for the meditating yogin. 
This idea of the practical use of metaphysical schemata is not a new one. As was noted in 
Chapter 2, Feuerstein talks of "ontogenetic models" as "originally and primarily maps for 
meditative introspection, intended to guide the yogin in his exploration of the terra incognita 
of the mind" (1980: 117). However, so entrenched is Feuerstein in his view that Sätpkhya is 
wholly "rationalistic" while Yoga eschews such methods and relies exclusively "on first-hand 
evidence (pratya4a)" (ibid. ) that he fails to consider the possibility that a model, though ra- 
tionally-devised, may nevertheless perform an instructive or guiding role in meditation. \Vhen, 
therefore, he asserts that "These `maps' are records of internal experiences rather than purely 
theoretical constructions" and "are descriptive rather than explanatory" (ibid. ), we are let 
wondering how a system such as Sämkhya, with its "pronouncedly formalistic and rationalis- 
tic basis" (ibid.: 113), was able to come up with a metaphysical scherna which so closely 
parallels that of Yoga. 
There is, in my view, no need to drive a wedge between the two interpretive options I have 
outlined. It is perfectly tenable, and indeed highly likely, that reason and introspection have 
been mutually reinforcing devices in the history of Sämkhya and Yoga, and that the respective 
Another crucial kärikä in this regard is number 37, where it is said that, due to buddhi's being respon- 
sible for "bringing about" (sädhayati) all experience. it is thus also buddhi that "discloses (vi. finasri) the sub- 
tle [difference] in (antara, i. e. between) pradhana and purusa. " Larson translates vifiinasri as "distinguishes" 
(1979: 267), thereby implying'that buddhi is the subject of knowledge. Davies, similarly, renders it as 
"discriminates" (1894: 72). Other possible translations, however, such as "exposes" (Jhl 1896: 77), "reveals" 
(Suryanarayana Sastri 1948: 68), and my "discloses" may be taken to represent buddhi merely as the medium 
of knowledge, not its possessor. 
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schemata of these systems are both descriptive and explanatory. They describe, in what is evi- 
dently a highly abstracted and abbreviated manner, observations made through sustained in- 
wardly-oriented contemplation; and, at the same time, they are supported at certain points by 
arguments that appeal to the rational proclivities of the student or would-be adherent of the 
system, who has perhaps yet to enjoy the "first-hand evidence" that will later (if the "map" is 
followed correctly) verify the teachings. 
In this chapter, then, we have looked in some detail at the metaphysics of Särnkhya and 
Yoga, and I have proposed what I consider to be a more credible alternative to the common 
cosmogonic interpretation of the metaphysical principles (which now turn out to be transcen- 
dental conditions of experience). In the next (penultimate) chapter our attention will be fo- 
cused upon the eschalos of these systems, namely "aloneness" (kaivalya), and I shall argue 
that, while interpretations that impute realism to Sämkhya and Yoga run into intractable diffi- 
culties when they try to explain this final destination, the non-realist interpretative line that I 
have taken leads to more satisfactory results. 
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Freedom frone Experience 
[L]ife cannot be an end in itself, [... ] the true purpose of our existence lies beyond it. 
(Schopenhauer 1974b u: 347) 
S nMKIIYA AND YOGA are not concerned with philosophy for its own sake. Like virtually all 
classical systems of thought in India, they were devised with a soteriological purpose in 
mind. This purpose is the attainment of release or liberation (moksa, mukti) from mundane 
existence, such existence being held, again by most Indian systems, to be inherently and irre- 
deemably dissatisfactory. 
The soteriological telos of Sämkhya and Yoga has, I hope, been an underlying presence 
throughout this study, for it certainly warrants being taken into account throughout the inter- 
pretive process. In this chapter I want to focus a little more sharply upon that telos, or artha 
("end", "purpose"), referred to in both the Sämkhyakdrikü and the Yogasatra as kaivalya, 
which term translates literally as "aloneness" or "solitariness". In particular I wish to enquire 
into how the vision of this goal and the aspiration to achieve it cohere with the aspects of the 
Sämkhya and Yoga philosophies that have been discussed so far. I shall be proposing that the 
real ist-cosmogon ic interpretation of these darganas has no way of accounting for kaivalya, 
and that any attempt to explain it that begins from the realist assumption regarding the mani- 
festations of prakrti can result only in confusion. 
There is a sense, of course, in which kaivalya is radically inexplicable by any theory, for it 
does not fall within the domain of conceptual thought. Perhaps the greatest paradox, or at least 
irony, of Sämkhya and Yoga, and of other essentially mystical soteriologies, is their claim that 
the liberation of the person involves, in effect, forsaking everything that marks one out as a 
person in the first place, including body, mind, memory, and intentional consciousness itself. 
Notwithstanding this ultimately supra-rational orientation, however, it is not the case that 
anything goes when it comes to discussing kaivalya. It remains, I think, possible to distinguish 
between more and less plausible accounts, the main criterion for doing so being the extent to 
which any particular account succeeds in positioning kaivalya in relation to the philosophies 
as integral wholes. This is not to say that the interpretation should be fudged in order to make 
it compatible with other elements in the systems. Close attention must be given to the texts at 
all times, and any inconsistencies pointed out. But a reasonable interpretive starting- 
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point-indeed, probably the only genuinely workable starting-point-is to assume a high level 
of integrity on the parts of the systems concerned, and, from that basis, to piece them together 
in a way that utilises the light from one element to illuminate others. 
As was noted towards the end of the previous chapter, the metaphysical schema of 
Sämkhya and Yoga represents the conditioning factors of experience, which have to be sys- 
tematically disidentified with in the process of disclosing one's authentic identity. I shall ar- 
gue in this chapter that, despite a number of important conceptual difficulties, the most appro- 
priate way of interpreting the soteriological goal of these darganas is as a state of 
consciousness that has been stripped of all experiential content, and of any possibility of a 
resuscitation of phenomenal engagement, the need for such engagement having been entirely 
transcended. 
THE CENTRAL INTERPRETIVE PROBLEM OF KAIVALYA 
The central problem regarding the interpretation of kaivalya in Sämkhya and Yoga for anyone 
who accepts the realist assumption is as follows. Kaivalya, according to both dar§anas, in- 
volves the cessation of mental activity. This is made explicit in the Yogasütra, where the very 
definition of yoga is given as "the cessation (nirodha) of mental activities (citta-vrtti)" (YS 
1.2), and it is implied in the Sümkhyakarikä by the fact that kaivalya is there said to be at- 
tained upon purusa's "split with the body" (sarlra-bheda) and the "retreat from activity 
(vinivrtta) of pradhäna, " whose purpose (artha) has been accomplished (SK 68). Not only, 
then, does the mind cease to operate, but the entire world of ostensibly physical objects dis- 
solves, leaving only an unmanifest, and thus no longer active, prakrti, plus of course the now 
solitary purusa, which abides purely "in its own nature (svarüpa)" (YS 1.3). Since the attain- 
ment of kaivalya by one individual does not entail or engender the dissolution of the mental 
activities of other individuals, nor of the world those others experience, there would seem to 
be something about that dissolution that is particular to the kaivalyin alone (cf. YS 2.22). 
The realist interpreter faces a dilemma. If the manifestations of prakrti are really independ- 
ent of purusa, as he supposes, then how can it be the case that they cease or dissolve for the 
kaivalyin? One of two things must be implied. Either (a) the manifestations do not really dis- 
solve at all, but merely disappear from the "view" or "awareness" of the liberated purusa; the 
purusa has, as it were, withdrawn its gaze from them and become enclosed or absorbed within 
its own being ("it contemplates itself' (Eliade 1969: 93)). Or (b) the manifestations were not 
independent after all, but were critically dependent upon an absence of self-knowledge on the 
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part of purusa, and hence when that self-knowledge arises the manifestations no longer exist 
in relation to that purusa, even though they do for others. 
Each of these interpretive options is accompanied by serious difficulties, and this is per- 
haps why most interpretations tend not to be very explicit when it comes to the issue of 
kaivalya. The first option [a] entails that kaivalya consists in a divestment of knowledge-a 
self-imposed exile or hibernation from reality-in which purusa remains cut off from a world 
that continues to operate in its absence. This would be perfectly compatible with the negative 
aspect of the goal of Sämkhya and Yoga, i. e. the escape from the distress (duhkha) that satu- 
rates worldly existence. But it would hardly concur with the positive aspect, which is ex- 
pressed in the many proclamations to the effect that the path that leads from enthralment to 
emancipation is one of increasing discriminative knowledge and awareness, not a shielding of 
oneself from that which is real and true. It would also contradict assertions that it is the mani- 
festations of prakrti that withdraw or retreat from view, and not purusa who blocks them out. 
The withdrawal is referred to as pratiprasava (YS 4.34), a "return to the original state" (MW: 
668) or "flowing back to the source"; or as prakrtilaya (SK 45), the "dissolution of [or into] 
prakrti"; neither of which terms suggest that the manifestations in fact continue more or less as 
they are, only without being "seen" by purusa. In the poetic imagery of I9varakrsna's text, it is 
the tender and bashful (sukumüra) prakrti who, having performed her dance for purusa, "never 
again enters into purusa's sight" (SK59-61). 
What we therefore tend to find in the interpretive literature are vague and unelaborated 
statements about kaivalya's being a "pure isolation or abstraction [... ] from matter" (Davies 
1894: 48), which leave us unsure whether, once such a state has been attained, material ob- 
jects are supposed to continue existing or not. Their continuing existence might be implied in 
Larson's description of kaivalya as "a kind of pure, translucent emptiness which transcends 
everything in the manifest and unmanifest world" (1979: 208), but again it is left unexplicit 
whether this transcendence leaves the manifest world unscathed. 
A further kind of hedging in this interpretive area is to speak of kaivalya's involving the 
cessation of the relation between purusa and prakrti without specifying whether this cessation 
necessitates the discontinuance of manifest objects. Keith, for example, makes this move 
when he notes that "the connection of spirit with matter terminates with the withdrawal of 
spirit into a condition of absolute freedom, which must, however, at the same time be absolute 
nonentity" (Keith 1949: 99). The free purusa may indeed be in a state of "nonentity" from the 
standpoint of our ordinary mundane existence, just as this latter existence must be absolute 
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nonentity from the standpoint of the free purusa. 1 There is (or should be) no question that the 
two spheres are rent asunder in kaivalya, but there is a question of whether-or, rather, in 
what sense-this rending coincides with the obliteration of prakrti's manifest aspect; and this 
question remains unaddressed by statements about the termination of the relation (or 
"connection"). 
There is general agreement (except in rare cases such as Ian Whicher-see next section) 
that, in kaivalya, experience has been obliterated: "It is the enstasis of total emptiness, " as Eli- 
ade puts it, "without sensory content or intellectual structure, an unconditioned state that is no 
longer `experience' (for there is no further relation between consciousness and the world) but 
`revelation" (1969: 93). But-to reiterate the crucial question with regard to realism-what 
we wish to know is: In the absence of the "relation between consciousness and the world", 
does there remain any objective (real, independent) world at all? Feuerstein, for one, proposes 
in certain places that there does. His boldest (we might say most reckless) assertion to this ef- 
fect comes in his commentary on Yogasütra 2.22. He translates the sutra itself as follows: 
Although [the seen] has ceased [to exist] for [the yogin whose] purpose has been accomplished, it 
has nevertheless not ceased [to exist altogether], since it is common-experience [with respect to 
all] other [beings]. (Feuerstein 1979a: 74; Feuerstein's brackets) 
Feuerstein then supplies the following assessment of the sutra: 
This aphorism is as plain a refutation of mentalism as one can expect. The world is not a mere 
thought product which dissolves upon liberation. Objects are external to the mind and have their 
independent existence which is not affected by the event of Self-realisation. Emancipation is an 
individual achievement which abolishes man's false organismic identity and re-locates him into 
the Self. With the destruction of the consciousness complex the possibility of perceiving the ex- 
ternal world, or perceiving the world externally, is likewise eliminated. But this absence of em- 
pirical perception does not conjure away the universe. It remains as real as before and continues 
to be experienced by those who erroneously identify not with the transcendental Self but with the 
phenomenal consciousness of a particular organism in space and time. Without this ontological 
assumption of the reality of the objective universe the emancipation of the very first liberated be- 
ing would, logically, have entailed the annihilation of the cosmos and, by further implication, it 
would also have meant the emancipation of all other beings. (Ibid. ) 
The sutra provides a "refutation of mentalism" (by which expression I take Feuerstein to mean 
a denial of idealism) only if one has already assumed that the Yoga position is realist. If this 
assumption has not been made, then the sutra could very well be read as an affirmation of 
idealism, since it emphasises the dependence of the "seen" (manifest pralcrti, drsya) upon the 
"seer" (purusa, drastr). What I wish to draw attention to here, however, is Feuerstein's asser- 
tion that, "With the destruction of the consciousness complex the possibility of perceiving the 
'Cf. Schopenhauer 1966 1: 411-12, which passage will be discussed briefly in the final section of this 
chapter. 
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external world [... ] is likewise eliminated" even though the world "remains as real as before". 
Feuerstein uses "consciousness" as a translation of cilia (preferring "SeIP' for purusa, as can 
be seen in the above commentary); and thus by "consciousness complex" lie probably means 
the cognising components of prakrti (i. e. the thirteenfold instrument (karana) as it is called at 
SK 32). Its dissociation from purusa-or, as Feuerstein puts it, its "destruction"-would of 
course render external perception (and any kind of experience or cognition) impossible; and 
therefore this "destruction" establishes an unbridgeable gap between purusa and the "external 
world" (which world Feuerstein elsewhere refers to as the "surface structure" of prakrti as 
distinct from the "deep structure", which is the psychosensory constitution of the empirical 
self (1980: 29)). Purusa has, in effect, been separated from the "real world", and hence its lib- 
eration involves a kind of voluntary ignorance, which, as I have already intimated, is in stark 
contradiction to the overall gnostic orientation of Yoga and Sämkhya. 
Let us now give a little further attention to the second interpretive option [b] that I outlined 
above, viz. the view that the manifestations of prakrti are not independent of purusa and hence 
do in fact dissolve in relation to the liberated purusa, though not for others. It might be pre- 
sumed that this view entails the abandonment of the realist assumption and would therefore be 
unacceptable to any interpreter who holds that assumption. This would indeed be the case if 
such interpreters were consistent in their understanding of the relation between "manifest 
prakrti" on the one hand and the "manifest world" on the other. The fact that they are not 
consistent on this point, however, enables the claim that manifest prakrti does dissolve 
(disintegrate, demanifest, etc. ) to be combined either with an insinuation that this dissolution 
does not include the "manifest world" or with a noncommittal silence about the fate of this 
world. Feuerstein's distinction, which I mentioned in the last paragraph, between the "deep 
structure" and "surface structure" of prakrti allows him, as we have seen, to speak of "the de- 
struction of the consciousness complex" (i. e. manifest prakrti as "deep structure") while af- 
firming the unbroken endurance of the "external world" (manifest prakrti as "surface struc- 
ture"). 
Thus we see that what 1 have referred to as two interpretive options can in fact be merged 
into one, but only by employing the disingenuous strategy of distinguishing two structural 
modes of manifest pralqti. The strategy is disingenuous because it flagrantly ignores the fact 
that, according to any interpretation of Yoga and Sämkhya metaphysics (including the real- 
ist-cosmogonic one), the objects that populate the "external world" derive from those which 
constitute the cognising personality (or "consciousness complex" in Feuerstein's expression). 
The sense in which they so "derive" may be a matter of contention, but the fact that the 
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"surface structure" of objects could not exist without the "deep structure" of the psychosen- 
sory apparatus is undisputed. This fact ought to rule out any assertion that, for Sämkhya and 
Yoga, the objects we ordinarily perceive can continue to exist once kaivalya has been attained, 
and ought, furthermore, to make it patently clear that the perceived objects are, according to 
these darganas, merely appearances for us, without (as a Buddhist might say) any "inherent 
existence" (svabhüva). 
It is, in short, impossible to square any claim that in kaivalya the yogin's mind and/or body 
dissolves or merges into unmanifest prakrti with the view that material objects exist independ- 
ently of their being cognised. Thus, when Feuerstein says, at the beginning of his commentary 
on Yogasütra 4.34, that, "Upon Self-realisation, the primary-constituents of Nature [i. e. the 
gunas] [... ] cease to vibrate in the pattern characteristic of the yogin's body and mind complex 
and become resolved into the unmanifest core (prakrti pradhüna = aliriga)" (1979a: 145; 
Feuerstein's rounded parentheses, my square brackets), we are entitled to wonder what has 
happened to the mind-independent objects that he referred to earlier. We might wonder the 
same thing when Sen Gupta (who, as we saw in Chapter 4, is firmly in favour of a realist in- 
terpretation) states that, "As soon as citta gets merged in the gu? zas, the vital function too stops 
automatically and the yogi is separated forever from the body" (1982: 139), or when Eliade 
remarks that "Intellect (buddhi), having accomplished its mission, withdraws, detaching itself 
from the purusa and returning into prakrtr"' (1969: 93). 
It would seem fair to conclude, then, that the real ist-cosmogon ic interpretation of Sämkhya 
and Yoga stands no chance of presenting an intelligible account of kaivalya, and this is indeed 
the conclusion that I will draw. Before we can be sure of this, however, there is one further 
realist interpretive option that ought to be considered, which is based upon a radical and 
somewhat renegade re-reading of some key tenets of the Yoga system. 
IAN WHICHER'S VIEW OF KAIVALYA AS "EMBODIED LIBERATION" 
I noted at the beginning of the last section that the central problem for the realist interpretation 
of kaivalya is how to account for the fact that, according to Sämkhya and Yoga, the cessation 
of mental activities coincides with (or immediately precipitates) a dissolution of manifest en- 
tities, when those entities are supposed by the realist to exist independently of any experience 
of them. We have so far considered approaches that either skirt the issue or, in blatant contra- 
diction of the texts, baldly declare that despite the dissolution of the psychosensory aspects of 
manifest prakrti the "external world" persists. In recent years, however, a third approach has 
been articulated, in embryonic form by Christopher Chapple (see esp. 1996) and more fully by 
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Ian Whicher (1995,1997,1998a, 1998b, and elsewhere). Essentially the approach involves a 
tentative (in the case of Chapple) or surprisingly forthright (in the case of Whicher) denial 
that kaivalya-as understood in classical Yoga-forecloses the possibility of mental activity 
and experience of an objective physical reality. 
It should be noted at the outset that both Chapple and Whicher draw a distinction between 
Sämkhya and Yoga with regard to the goal of these darganas. Chapple holds that there is only 
"a slightly different interpretation of liberation" between the two systems (1996: 124), and 
that it amounts to little more than a matter of emphasis, with Yoga tending to place greater 
stress than Sämkhya upon "the need for ongoing purification both on the path and at the pe- 
nultimate phase of the quest for liberation" (p. 132). Whicher, on the other hands, regards the 
difference as more significant. He concurs with the common view that, for Sämkliya, kaivalya 
involves a total separation of purusa and prakrti (1998a: 58), but makes the curious assertion 
that Yoga, far from wanting to separate them, in fact "seeks to `unite' these two principles by 
correcting a misalignment between them, thereby properly aligning them, bringing them 
`together' through a purification and illumination of consciousness leading to the permanent 
realization of intrinsic being, that is, authentic identity. " "Moreover, " Whither continues, 
"[... ] Patanjali's Yoga darsana can be seen to embrace a maturation and full flowering of hu- 
man nature and identity, a state of embodied liberation-one that incorporates a clarity of 
awareness with the integrity of being and action" (1998a: 4; my underscoring). This is curious 
indeed, and hence it is fair to wonder what textual justification Whicher brings forth in sup- 
port of this highly contentious interpretation, and also what exactly he might mean by such 
phrases as "embodied liberation" and "integrity of being and action". (From here I shall focus 
on Whicher's rather than Chapple's position, since it is the more explicit and radical of the 
two. ) 
Whicher's interpretation of classical Yoga appears to be largely constructed upon a trans- 
lation of Yogasütra 1.2 that is unique to himself. The sutra, which has already been referred to 
in this chapter, reads: yoga. citta-vrtti-nirodha? z; and Whicher translates this as "Yoga is the 
cessation of [the misidentification with] the modifications of the mind" (1998a: 1, cf. 1995: 
47). The expression inserted in brackets by Whicher is fundamental to his interpretation, and 
yet he does not attempt to justify its inclusion. Rather, he asserts it and then proceeds to exam- 
ine the entire Yoga dargana in the light of this assertion, as though his translation of the 
aforementioned sutra were uncontroversial. It is, however, extremely controversial, for it al- 
lows Whicher to claim that the goal of Yoga is not to induce the cessation of mental activities 
or "modifications of the mind" (citta-vrtti) themselves, but consists merely in the cessation of 
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misidentification with those activities. The implication of Whicher's translation of this crucial 
sutra is therefore that mental activities (states, perceptions, thoughts) can continue after the 
attainment of Yoga's goal, albeit in the absence of any misidentification with those activities 
or the mind itself. 
The practice of inserting bracketed expressions into translations of the Yogasatra (and 
similar Indian texts) is extremely common among scholars, the justification being that without 
such insertions the meanings of the sutras concerned would be either highly opaque, unneces- 
sarily ambiguous, or entirely unintelligible. The practice should, however, be treated with ex- 
treme caution, both by the translator and by the reader, for the risk of imposing a meaning 
upon the text that was unintended in the original is significant. When a sutra is perfectly intel- 
ligible without any amendments then the insertion of additional wording is superfluous at best, 
and misleading at worst. Now, in the case of Yogasi7tra 1.2, the sutra provides a definition of 
yoga as citta-vrtti-nirodha. Whicher, reasonably, translates the latter expression as "the cessa- 
tion of the modifications of the mind, " but then completely changes its meaning by inserting 
"[the misidentification with]" after "the cessation of". 
In accordance with his general emphasis on misidentification, Whicher's vision of the goal 
of Yoga is one in which the yogin is liberated from a false sense of identity but not from the 
world as such. "[K]aivalya", says Whicher, "in no way presupposes the destruction or nega- 
tion of the personality of the yogin, but is an unconditional state in which all the obstacles or 
distractions preventing an immanent and purified relationship or engagement of person with 
nature and spirit (purusa) have been removed" (1998a: 277). The issue of identity is deeply 
confused here, for it would appear that the yogin "engages" with purusa, which is not at all the 
same as being purusa. Indeed, to engage with something precludes one's being that thing. 
Since, on most accounts, kaivalya consists in purusa's realising itself, it seems far from clear 
that, in Whicher's version, the yogin's misidentification has been entirely eradicated. Whicher 
adds to the confusion by asserting that nirodha ("cessation") need not "imply being rooted in a 
conception of oneself that abstracts from one's identity as a social, historical, and embodied 
being" (1998a: 291). Contrary to this interpretation, I think it is glaringly obvious that Yoga 
proposes a methodological strategy of renunciation, which involves the relinquishment of 
identification with precisely the social, historical, and bodily characteristics that Whicher 
mentions. 
There is, it should be noted, a precedent for the conception of an embodied state of libera- 
tion within Sämkhya and Yoga, but it occurs in the Sümkhyakürikü rather than the Yogasütra. 
Kärikä 67 refers to a state in which "direct knowledge" (samyagjnüna) has been attained and 
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yet bodily existence continues due to the impulsion of sanisküras, these being the impressions 
from past experiences that are retained in the mind unconsciously (allegedly over several life- 
times) until the appropriate opportunity arises for them to manifest as mental activity. The 
simile used at kärikä 67 is that of a potter's wheel, which continues to spin for a while due to 
its momentum even after the pot has been thrown. 3 Once the samskäras have manifested and 
thereby extinguished themselves, however, the body dies and kaivalya is instantiated, which 
state is "both singular (aiküntika) and conclusive (ütyantika)" (SK 68). 
Although no reference is made in the Yogasütra to an intermediate state of enlightened 
embodiment that precedes the final separation from corporeal existence in kaivalya, there is no 
reason to suppose that the view of classical Yoga is significantly different to that of classical 
Sämkhya; and, as we have seen, this view is that embodiment lasts only as long as there are 
psychic impulses engendering activity, and that once the state of supreme awareness has been 
achieved these psychic impulses dry up, thereby precipitating disembodiment. 
That both Sämkhya and Yoga conceive kaivalya to be a disembodied state is, I think, 
clearly evident from the classical texts. A body, being part of the physical environment, is 
thoroughly dependent upon the manifestation of prakrti; and, as the Yogasütra and 
Sümkhyakdrikä insist, purusa's aloneness coincides with the return of prakrti and its three 
constituents to their original unmanifest homeostasis, their purpose having been fulfilled (YS 
4.34, SK 68). Whicher gives his own particular (and implausible) twist to this sense of the 
modifications of the gunas coming to an end: "This ending, it must be emphasized, does not 
mark a definitive disappearance of the gurias from purusa's view", he says. Rather, the gunas 
continue to operate, producing experience in the form of vrttis; and the sole difference be- 
tween the yogin's new state and that which preceded kaivalya is that he now no longer identi- 
fies with those vrttis: "Now the yogin's identity (as purusa), disassociated from ignorance, is 
untouched, unaffected by qualities of mind, uninfluenced by the vrttis constituted of the three 
gunas" (1998a: 277). In support of his view, Whicher cites Swämi Hariharänanda Aranya's 
comment that in the state of cessation (nirodha) the gunas "do not die out but their unbalanced 
activity due to non-equilibrium that was taking place ... only ceases on account of the cessa- 
tion of the cause (avidyü or nescience) which brought about their contact" (Aranya 1963: 123, 
quoted in Whicher 1998a: 380 n. 97; Whicher's ellipsis). Aranya's statement, however, is 
merely a reiteration of the familiar view that, by "cessation of the gunas, " is meant not their 
complete annihilation but, rather, their abiding in a state of perfect equanimity. This equanim- 
2 Cf. YS 3.18: "From immediate apperception of samskäras [comes] knowledge of previous births. " 3 Cf. Maitr. Up 2.6: "By him [Prajapati] thus driven, this body goes round and round like the wheel 
(driven) by the potter" (trans. Radhakrishnan 1978: 803; Radhakrishnan's parentheses, my square brackets). 
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ity of the gunas is the unmanifest (avyakta) condition of prakrti, and thus, contrary to 
Whicher's denial, precisely does "mark a definite disappearance of the gu? 2as from purusa's 
view", and hence a definitive end to experience. 
Whicher asks, rhetorically, how, if kaivalya is a disembodied and non-experiential state, 
there could "be anyone around to articulate that it even exists". 4 The question is a pertinent 
one, but it has been dealt with by the Särnkhya and Yoga traditions. In the Sümkhyasütra and 
its commentaries, for example, one who has attained the state wherein perfect discrimination 
(viveka) is enjoyed and yet the "wheel" (cakra) still spins is referred to as a jivanmukta, one 
who is "liberated in life". It is in this state, prior to forsaking the cogitating mind and organic 
body for good, that the sage is able to furnish his students with illuminating teachings (SS 
3.78-83). Such claims, of course, raise a dozen questions for every one they answer. How, for 
example, if the liberated sage is merely waiting for the wheel impelled by past actions to stop 
spinning can he initiate the new actions that instructing students would involve? But we can- 
not expect to address such questions here. The immediate issue is the exegetical one of how 
the Sämkhya and Yoga traditions account for the existence of teachings that are attributed to 
enlightened sages, and I think this has been covered. 
We can, then, in my view leave aside the proposal that kaivalya amounts merely to a 
"purification", as opposed to a total cessation, of phenomenal existence. Now we can begin to 
investigate whether there might, in the absence of the realist assumption, be a more satisfac- 
tory way of interpreting the soteriological goal of Sämkhya and Yoga. 
ALONENESS AND MISPERCEPTION 
First, perhaps, we should address the question of whether kaivalya means the same in the 
Yogasütra as it does in the Sümkhyakürika. I don't think much needs to be said about this, for 
there seems to me to be no valid reason for supposing that there is any significant difference 
between the two texts in this regard. In every instantiation of the term it can be read as denot- 
ing the state in which all mental activity (and hence all activity of any kind whatsoever) has 
ceased and purusa abides alone, in its "own nature" (svarüpa), which is consciousness (cetana 
(SK 55), citL akti (YS 4.34)) or "mere seeing" (drsintütra, YS 2.20). Some important discrep- 
ancies and tensions do exist concerning the notion of kaivalya, and these will come to light in 
the course of the following discussion. They are, however, common to both Sämkhya and 
Yoga, and hence cannot be held up as exemplifying differences between the two systems. 
'Personal correspondence via e-mail, 25 April 2002. Cf. Whicher's published remark that, "If Patarijali's 
perception of the world of forms and differences had been destroyed or discarded, how could he have had 
such insight into Yoga and the intricacies and subtle nuances of the unenlightened state? " (1998a: 291). 
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Chapple is right to note that there is a difference of emphasis in the Yogasatra as compared 
with the Sümkhyakürikü (Chapple 1996: 124). The latter text makes it appear that, once the 
appropriate level of self-knowledge has been attained, then it is just a matter of allowing the 
remaining samskäras to run their natural course in order for kaivalya to supervene upon their 
exhaustion (SK 67-68). The Yogasütra, meanwhile, emphasises the need for sustained medi- 
tative discipline, and the active replacement of mental seeds of misidentification and compul. 
sion by seeds of profound insight as a prelude to the state of "seedless" (nirbija) samädhi (YS 
1.50-51). This difference of emphasis flows naturally, however, from the overall difference of 
orientation between the two texts, the Yogasütra being primarily concerned with practical in- 
struction and the S«mkhyakarikü with metaphysical (or transcendental phenomenological) 
categorisation. It need not, therefore, be assumed to represent a divergence in either soteri- 
ological doctrine or practice. 
My main purpose in this section is to highlight some key problems stemming from the im- 
portant notions of misperception (avidyä, viparyaya) and liberation (kaivalya, vimoksa) as 
they relate to purusa. As a way of approaching these problems, however, it will be useful to 
provide a brief overview of the various occurrences of the term kaivalya in the Sämkhyakürikü 
and Yogasütra respectively. 
The term appears four times in the Sümkhyakarikü, and five in the Yogasütra. On two oc- 
casions in the former text the conjunct expression kaivalyürtha occurs, referring to the "sake 
(or `end', artha) of aloneness (kaivalya)" (SK 17,21), and this may reasonably be regarded as 
synonymous with purusasyürtha and purusürtha (the "sake of purusa"), which occur at 
kärikäs 36 and 63 respectively, and with virnokrärtha (the "sake of release"), at kärikäs 56 and 
58. Activity, or process, in general (pravrtti) is said to be for the sake of kaivalya (SK 17), as 
is the very "communion" (samyoga) of purusa and prakrti which initiates that activity (SK 21). 
The communion just referred to is also for the purpose of purusa's "seeing" prakrti 
(darsandrtha, SK 21), but it is fair to assume that this is a subordinate purpose to that of 
purusa's final liberation, since prakrti can be "seen" only insofar as she is active, and activity, 
as has just been noted, is for the sake of kaivalya. A similar dual purpose is mentioned in the 
Yogasütra, where the "seen", characterised by the three Bunas, serves the "purpose of experi- 
ence (bhoga) and liberation (apavarga)" (YS 2.18). Here again, however, experience ought to 
be understood as auxiliary and not ultimate, for everything that is experienceable must even- 
tually be recognised as dissatisfactory (dul: kha, YS 2.15, cf. SK 55). 
At Yogasatra 2.25 it is stated that the "aloneness of seeing" (drseli kaivalyani) results from 
the "non-manifestation" or "non-existence" (ablzüva) of samyoga, which "non-existence" in 
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turn results from the non-existence or cessation of avidyä, about which I shall say more 
shortly. Sutra 3.50, meanwhile, declares that kaivalya is due to non-attachment to even the 
"vision of the otherness of sattva and purusa", this vision having been referred to in the pre- 
ceding sutra. Thus kaivalya is not regarded as a state of discriminative knowledge; even the 
knowledge of purusa's non-identity with sattva, which can here be taken to refer to the puri- 
fied aspect of mind (buddhi, cilia), must be relinquished. Sutra 3.55 adds that kaivalya con- 
sists in the "sameness of purity of sattva and purusa"; which is a little incongruous, since one 
might have supposed (a) that nothing could attain to an equivalence of purity with a principle 
so utterly non-phenomenal as purusa, and (b) that, in the absence of sarpyoga, buddhi or citta 
would have completely demanifested along with all the other modes of manifest prakrti, and 
that it would thus be unnecessary and inappropriate to speak of its "purity". It could, however, 
be that it is precisely the unmanifest condition of buddhi that is meant by its "purity"; and that 
insofar as both principles can be described as unmanifest-all mental content having been dis- 
continued-buddhi and purusa can be said to share the same (or at least an analogous) level of 
purity. 
Looking to the Sümkhyakärikd again, kaivalya features among the principal characteristics 
of purusa, the others being (according to SK 19) "witnessing (süksitva), [... ] equanimity 
(mädhyasthya), seer-ness (drastrtva, i. e. awareness), and inactivity (akartrbhüva). " This in- 
clusion of kaivalya suggests that "aloneness" is purusa's inherent or natural state, and hence 
that the soteriological goal consists in a reclamation or realisation of that natural state rather 
than a change from one condition to another. The notion that it is prakrti alone that undergoes 
activity and transformation, and that purusa-being essentially independent of spatiotemporal 
conditions-never enters into genuine involvement with her, is reinforced by certain other 
statements in the text. At kärikä 60 it is said that, while prak ti, "endowed with qualities 
(gunavatj, proceeds to serve his purpose in various ways without benefit to herself, pumsah 
(i. e. purusa), being without qualities, performs no active role. " And at kärikä 62 we find the 
following apparently unequivocal pronouncement: 
Surely, then, no-one is bound, no-one released, nor indeed is anyone transmigrating (samsarati, 
literally "wandering"). Prakrti in its several abodes (adraya, i. e. manifest forms) is transmigrating, 
bound, and released. s 
The situation appears to be clear: purusa undergoes no change whatsoever, while prakrti 
transmigrates from one lifetime to another in a state of bondage until she is finally released. 
3 tasmdn na badhyate'ddha na mucyale näpi samsarati kascit / samsarati badhyate mucyate ca nand raya 
prakrtil: // 
184 
Freedom from Experience 
This, however, brings us to one of the crucial difficulties that I wish to draw attention to here. 
For if it is prakrti that is released, then in what sense does she act "for the sake of purusa"? 
In order for prakrti's activity to be both purposeful and "for another's sake" (SK 17,60), 
purusa must have a purpose to be fulfilled; and this in turn necessitates that purusa must un- 
dergo a transition from a state of unfulfilment to one of fulfilment-however that fulfilment is 
conceived. The raison d'etre of the whole metaphysical schema is purusa's liberation, and 
thus if it were really the case that prakrti's activity serves to bring about only her own release, 
the system would collapse. And yet, at the same time, we can see how tempting it is to deny 
that a supremely transcendent principle such as purusa has any purposes whatsoever. 
The situation has therefore become far from clear; and since it would appear that the author 
of the Sämkhyakürikü was himself wavering between two contradictory accounts of purusa's 
status, it is doubtful that any interpretive effort will be able to resolve the contradiction. Eliade 
displays an awareness of the problem when he writes that 
There is something of a paradox in the way in which S3rnkhya and Yoga conceive the situa- 
tion of Spirit (purusa); though pure, eternal, and intangible, Spirit nevertheless consents to be as- 
sociated, if only in an illusory manner, with matter; and, in order to acquire knowledge of its own 
mode of being and "liberate" itself, it is even obliged to make use of an instrument created by 
prakrti (in this case, intelligence). Doubtless, if we view things in this way, human existence ap- 
pears to be dramatic[*] and even meaningless. If Spirit is free, why are men condemned to suffer 
in ignorance or to struggle for a freedom they already possess? If purusa is perfectly pure and 
static, why does it permit impurity, becoming, experience, pain, and history? (1969: 31-32. 
*Presumably meaning "a mere performance") 
The problem expressed here is not, however, unique to Sämkhya and Yoga. Indeed, some- 
thing very close to it tends to infect a large number of systems of metaphysics and soteriology, 
both in India and elsewhere. The essential problem is as follows. If one postulates an abso- 
lutely perfect, and thus unalterable, principle as the true identity of the sentient inhabitants of 
the manifest universe, then-whether that principle be called brahman, purusa, God, the One 
or anything else-the task of explaining how we, as ostensibly imperfect and patently alter- 
able individuals, came to misidentify ourselves with our sullied minds and corruptible bodies 
becomes a logical impossibility. For, as soon as the notion of the perfect principle's 
"forgetting" or "mistaking" itself is admitted, then the perfection of that principle has been 
radically and unrestorably compromised. If, by way of a defensive ploy, it is then suggested 
that no ontological imperfection has been admitted, merely an epistemic one, this cannot sal- 
vage the original position; for no concept of ontological perfection worthy of the name can 
contain within it the possibility of ignorance or self-delusion. 
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It is, no doubt, for reasons such as this that Siddhartha Gautama, the reputed founder of 
Buddhism, maintained a majestic silence with regard to highly abstruse metaphysical ques- 
tions, and urged his followers to pursue practical methods of alleviating their suffering in 
preference to getting hung up on abstract theory. 6 Nondualist philosophies, on the other hand, 
have tended to double their difficulties by proposing that the perfect principle is not only the 
true identity of sentient beings, but is the source of all manifest phenomena as well. Propo- 
nents of nondualism are obliged to hold that the supreme principle, despite its inherent immu- 
tability, was somehow able to project out of itself a phenomenal veil, which it then mistook 
for its own true self. Due to the precarious and untenable nature of this assertion, it is usually 
not stated so explicitly, but is clouded and hedged by delegating responsibility for the manifes- 
tation of the world and the self-misunderstandings of sentient creation to a second principle, 
generally referred to in Advaita Vedänta for example as mäyä ("creative illusion") or avidyä 
("false knowledge", "misperception"). 7 This second principle-at least when referred to as 
mäyä-ends up playing a role very similar to that of the prakrti of Sämkhya and Yoga, and 
thus seriously undermines the original claim of nondualism. 
8 
In classical Sämkhya and Yoga the term mayd, though employed by certain commenta- 
tors, 9 does not appear in the primary texts. The notion of a fundamental and primordial error 
underlying the way we, as empirical subjects, experience ourselves and the world is, however, 
extremely prominent in both systems. And it is to this notion of erroneous perception that I 
now wish to direct the discussion. 
In the Yogasütra the "field" (ksetra) from which all other mental afflictions (kletas) grow 
is said to be avidyä (YS 2.4), and the five main afflictions together constitute the "root" (nu la) 
of all action (YS 2.12). Avidya is defined as "seeing eternality, purity, delight, and essentiality 
in [that which is characterised by] temporality, impurity, distress, and inessentiality" (YS 
2.5). 10 It is thus claimed to be the source of the conjunction between the seer and the seen (YS 
2.24), which conjunction becomes "unmanifest" or "non-existent" (abadva) upon the cessa- 
tion of avidya; and this cessation is equated with the "aloneness of seeing" (drseji kaivalyam, 
6The classic illustration of the Buddha's anti-metaphysical approach occurs in the Majjhimanikaya 
1.483-88 (the passage dealing with the "inexpressibles" (Pali: avyäkata)). See e. g. Warren 1915: 123-28. For 
further references see Murti 1960: 36 fn. 2. 
'The application of the terms maya and avidyü in the Advaita Vedanta tradition is far from consistent. In 
some instances the two terms appear to be used interchangeably, while in others mäya may be taken to denote 
empirical reality as perceived under the influence of avidyä. Even within the works commonly attributed to 
Bankara there is a lack of consistency on this point (see Potter 1981: 79). 
$ Potter, paraphrasing the view of Sacchidanandendra Sarasvati, notes that "avidya in Samkara is superim- 
position, whereas mayca is equivalent to prakrd or nämarüpa" (Potter 1981: 79). 
9See e. g. GBh 22: "prakrti, pradhäna, brahman, avyakla, bahudhütmaka, and maya are synonyms 
(paryýiyas). " 
°anitya uciduhkhanütmasu nityafucisukhatmakhyätir avidyd 1/ 
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YS 2.25). The term avidyü is not used in the Sümkhyakürikü, although its synonym aji ana is 
implied as one of the four tämasa modes of buddhi at kärikä 23. '1 At kdrikä 47, however, the 
"five misapprehensions" (pafica-viparyaya) are referred to as being among the fifty compo- 
nents of the "phenomenal effusion" (pratyaya-sarga, SK 46); and although these five misap- 
prehensions are not named in the kärikä, they are understood by certain commentators to be 
equivalent to the five klegas of Yoga, and hence would include avidyä as the most important 
of the five (see esp. TK 47 and YV 1.8). 12 
Both the Yogasütra and Sürnkhyakürikü agree that the coming together or confusion of 
purusa and prakrti is in some sense an act of misapprehension-a mistaking of one thing for 
another. "Due to that conjunction (sanryoga)", says kärikä 20, "the lic ga, though non- 
conscious (acetana), appears as though it were conscious; and although agency is of the 
gunas, the detached one (uddsina, i. e. purusa) appears as though active. " And since it is this 
very conjunction that initiates the "surgence" of manifest prakrti, it is clear that the emergence 
of the preconditions of experience-and hence the very arising of phenomenal reality it- 
self-is predicated upon a primordial error, and that all experience is consequently rooted in 
and impregnated with misunderstanding. It is for this reason that Whicher's contention that 
experience can continue in the absence of sarpyoga and avidyä must be a misinterpretation. 
Samyoga is the necessary precondition of experience, and avidyä is, in turn, the precondition 
of samyoga. Therefore, when avidyä is eradicated, the momentum which once gave rise to 
"birth, life, and experience" (YS 2.13) can no longer be generated, and hence when the still 
existent psychic impulses (samsküras) have been exhausted-that's it. End of story. 
Of course, if read in terms of a temporal narrative, then the fundamental role of avidya 
would be absolutely nonsensical; for its being the cause of sarpyoga would necessitate that a 
misapprehension could precede the existence (or at least the manifest existence) of that which 
is misapprehended, namely the modes of manifest prakrti. If, however, we again, as in Chapter 
6 above, adopt a synchronic interpretive standpoint, then avidyä can be viewed not as a tempo- 
ral and causal precedent, but as a logical precondition of experience. It cannot rightly be 
translated as "ignorance, " for this latter term implies something wholly negative. ' Avidyä has 
"I say "implied" rather than "mentioned" because the tämasa modes of buddhi are not named directly, 
but are referred to as the "opposite" of the sättvika modes, these latter being "righteousness (dharnia), knowl- 
edge (jnäna), non-attachment (virago), and masterfulness (aisvarya)". 
'2 Cf. Ghosh's summary of Aranya's Samkhyatattvaloka, verse 34, in Aranya (1977: xii): "Viparyaya is the 
reproduction in consciousness of a thing as other than what it is. To assume that the mind, sense-organs and 
the body constitute the Self is the fundamental viparyaya. " 
'3 Cf. Matilal (1985: 321): "My main objection against both `nescience' and `ignorance' [as translations of 
avidyd] is that they express a predominantly negative meaning: `lack of knowledge' or `absence of knowl- 
edge'. " 
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a positive aspect insofar as it facilitates the coming into being of the conditions of experience, 
and thus of the empirical world itself; but since, due to this very fact, experience is always a 
kind of delusion ("like mäyü", YBh 4.13), avidyä is to be overcome and replaced by its oppo- 
site (vidyä, jnüna, genuine knowledge), which is "the establishment of the power of awareness 
(citi. takti) in its own nature" (YS 4.34; cf. 1.3). 
A synchronic approach does not, however, resolve the problem of what or whom avidyä is 
to be attributed to. If there are only two co-ultimate principles that logically precede manifest 
existence, namely purusa and prakrti, then avidyä must belong to one of these two. It cannot 
belong to prakrti, since prakrti, being nonconscious, cannot rightly be said to be in a state of 
knowledge or of non-knowledge. And thus we are forced again to accept that purusa can be 
afflicted by delusion. 
Some interpreters have tried to blur the issue by referring to the owner of avidyä as "the 
yogin" or "the mind", or by using ambiguous turns of phrase that leave the identity of the 
subject thoroughly obscure. When Whicher, for example, informs us that "In the ordinary con- 
sensus reality of empirical existence the sense of self misidentified with any aspect of prakrti 
thinks that it is the seer" (1998a: 279; my underscoring), who, precisely, is doing the misiden- 
tifying? And how can a "sense of self" think anything at all, let alone "that it is the seer"? 
Similarly, when Feuerstein describes avidyä (which he translates as "nescience") as "a funda- 
mental category error which regards the Self as other than what it really is" (1979a: 63), the 
grammatical structure of the sentence implies that "the Self' (purusa) is regarded "as other 
than what it really is" by "a fundamental category error". Such nonsense cannot, of course, be 
what Feuerstein intended, but in any case the original statement cleverly avoids the issue of 
who regards purusa in this way. Later in the same passage Feuerstein asserts that "we are all 
born in ignorance of our true nature and with the natural tendency of establishing our identity 
outside ourselves" (ibid., original emphasis). And so the answer to my query would seem to be 
obvious: it is we who regard purusa "as other than what it really is"! But who are we? Surely, 
if our true self is purusa, then each of us is purusa. Indeed, it is utterly tautologous to say so. 
And thus it is purusa who mistakenly regards itself "as other than what it really is. " This is the 
only logical conclusion. 
The question of who is afflicted by avidyä is equivalent to that of who is liberated, for lib- 
eration is liberation from dissatisfactoriness (dulikha), and hence from avidya-and hence, 
needless to say, from experience as such. If it is purusa that is liberated, then it must also be 
purusa that was under the influence of avidya, or who succumbed to the kind of misidentifica- 
tion for which avidyä stands. This is obviously problematic, for if purusa is pure, transcenden- 
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tal consciousness, then it is hardly the sort of thing that can move from a condition of afflic- 
tion to one of liberation. For reasons such as this, the one who attains kaivalya is, as in the 
case of the subject of avidyä, commonly referred to in ambiguous terms, as "the yogin" or "the 
wise one", etc. When purusa is, at the same time, maintained to be eternally perfect, a paradox 
arises; for it is self-contradictory to claim that the yogin (who misidentifies himself with the 
empirical personality) is identical to purusa but that purusa never misidentifies itself. The 
ambiguous terminology, however, mischievously disguises this paradox, enabling the inter- 
preter to regard the yogin and purusa as identical and as non-identical according to the particu- 
lar explanatory requirements of the moment. 14 
But the incongruities do not end there. I mentioned in Chapter 4 that there are two serious 
difficulties associated with the concept of purusa. One of these is the apparent requirement 
that it be regarded as susceptible to misperception, which has just been discussed. The second 
is its notorious characterisation as multiple. 
PURU$A AND MULTIPLICITY 
The doctrine of purusa's multiplicity has been one of the major targets of opponents and crit- 
ics of the Sämkhya system in both traditional debates and modern scholarship. The classical 
statement of the doctrine comes in Sürnkhyakürikä 18, which reads as follows: 
Due to various patterns of birth, death, and capacities, and to the disjunction of activities, purusa's 
multiplicity (bahutva) is established; and also due to contrariety of the three gunas. '5 
Essentially what we have here is the claim that, because sentient beings are born and die at 
different times, and because they exhibit different qualities and capacities and perform differ- 
ent activities while they are alive, they must each be regarded as a distinct self or conscious- 
ness. Although there is no such explicit statement of the doctrine in the Yogasütra, it is cer- 
tainly implied at sutra 2.22, where the activities of prakrti are said to have ceased in relation to 
one whose "end is fulfilled" (krtürtha) but not to have ceased entirely, due to their 
'Merely one among many examples of this tendency occurs in a passage from Ghosh (1977: 36), where 
"the wise among us" are said to seek "freedom from the excrescence of a limited personality" and "the Divin- 
ity in them, the Purusa, who as the ultimate revealer of all appearance is certainly beyond the appearances 
called pleasure and pain. " The identity of "the wise" becomes even more uncertain when Ghosh adds that, 
"since His [i. e. purusa's) conjunction with Prakrti, which results in transitory shows, is maintained by confu- 
sion between Him and the empirical ego, they cultivate clearness of insight (samprajiuina) that they may at- 
tain an effective knowledge of the difference between the two (vivekakhyüii). " I would add simply that, if "the 
wise among us" are not really "empirical ego(s)", then they must be purusas, and hence their discovery of 
"the Divinity in them" is nothing other than puru%a's self-discovery (which fact remains unstated in Ghosh's 
ambiguous account). 
'5jananamaranakaranünüm pratiniyanu7d ayugapal pravrllel ca / pururabahunvam siddhim 
traigunyaviparyayäc caiva If 
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"commonality" (südhdranatva, i. e. their continuing in relation to others). Vyäsa's commentary 
on this sutra distinguishes between the "proficient" (kusala) purusa, whose end has been ful- 
filled, and the "non-proficient" purusas, for whom the "seen" continues to act; and some such 
distinction seems to follow unavoidably from the sutra itself. 16 
Traditional criticisms of the doctrine have focused largely upon its apparent contradiction 
of . sruti, i. e. principally the Upanisadic utterances to the effect that all selves are ultimately 
one (see e. g. S`ahkara's BSBh 11.1.2). An attempt to counter such criticisms was made in the 
SaTkhyasütra on the grounds that scriptural references to the nonduality (advaita) of the 
purusa, or ütman, ought to be understood as indicating qualitative and not numerical identity 
(SS 1.154). However unconvincing it may seem, this is the only defence open to Sämkhya if it 
is to try to align its doctrine of many selves with the received and lauded teachings of the 
Upanisads. The latter scriptures nowhere give any suggestion of a distinction between qualita- 
tive and numerical identity, but this is perhaps to their own detriment; for unless the plurality 
of empirical subjects is to be denied (which denial could lead only to solipsism) the claim that 
the supreme being (brahman, paramütman) is identical to the "living" or "embodied" self 
(diman, jivätman) must involve such a distinction. 
Among modern scholars who have attacked the "many purusas" doctrine, one of the least 
forgiving is Keith, who writes at one place that "These spirits if examined are clearly nothing 
but abstractions of the concept of subject, and are philosophical absurdities, since in the ab- 
stract there can be but one subject and one object, neither, of course, being anything without 
the other" (1949: 60). 17 The point is a valid one: there is undoubtedly something absurd about 
the notion of a multiplicity of abstract subjects, existing independently of time and space, and 
unoccupied by any content whatsoever. Indeed, it is for reasons such as this that, in the west- 
ern philosophical tradition, Leibniz's conception of an infinity of dimensionless "monads" is 
generally regarded as little more than a historical curiosity. On the other hand, however, I sus- 
pect that Keith has been too quick to underestimate the profoundly problematic nature of the 
subject-matter being dealt with here. On the face of it he is right to highlight the fact that the 
"number and individuality" of conscious individuals "are conditioned by the possession of a 
16Feuerstein's declaration that he is "inclined to read this sutra in the spirit of the pre-classical tradition 
where krla-artha also denotes the person who has become the Self' (1980: 23) misses the point. Despite his 
choice of the expression "become the Self'-as opposed to, say, "realised one's true nature as the Self'-l 
doubt whether Feuerstein would demur that the person concerned was in fact already the "Self', and had 
simply not yet realised it. The situation is therefore equivalent to the "many purusas" view, for if the Self can 
be realised by one person without such an event initiating the immediate realisation of all other persons, and 
yet those other persons are all equally "the Self', then that Self must be admitted to be multiple. 
'7 Cf. Deussen (1919: 245): "What philosophical mind can admit this thought? [i. e. the multiple purusas 
doctrine. ] The knowing subject is in me (aham brahma asmi) and nowhere else, for everything beside me is 
object, and for this very reason not subject. " 
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different objective content in consciousness; " and that "if this were removed there would re- 
main nothing at all, or at most the abstract conception of subject, which could not be a multi- 
tude of individual spirits" (ibid.: 88). But if we consider that the very notion of a multiplicity 
of sets of objective content itself presupposes a multiplicity of conscious domains in which 
those sets can manifest, then, I think, we begin to glimpse the kind of conceptual terrain into 
which the Sämkhya philosophers were venturing. 
Larson tries to excuse, or explain away, the "many purusas" doctrine by asserting that "it is 
hardly likely that the Särpkhya teachers were thinking of the plurality of consciousnesses as a 
set of knowable entities to be counted. They were thinking, rather, of a plurality of intellects 
through which the disclosure of contentless consciousness occurs" (1987: 80). Larson is 
probably at least partially correct here, for it is certainly the case that the individuatedness of 
self or consciousness cannot be appreciated in isolation from the intentional or experiential 
mode of consciousness for which buddhi ("intellect" in Larson's translation) stands. What I 
think he underplays, however, is the phenomenologically-rooted nature of the doctrine, which 
I shall now say a little more about. 
Phenomenologically-speaking, we, as conscious subjects, are constantly being pulled in 
two directions. The relationship between our inmost subjectivity and the empirical world is a 
kind of Wittgensteinian duck-rabbit: 18 I can see myself as the "duck" of individuated being, 
inhabiting a world comprised of myriad entities, some of which appear to be conscious in 
ways that resemble myself; or as the "rabbit" of transcendental consciousness-what Witt- 
genstein himself, in his earlier work, refers to as "the philosophical self' or "metaphysical 
subject". This latter self is "not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with 
which psychology deals, but rather [... ] the limit of the world-not a part of it" (1974: 70 
[5.641]). But I cannot see-understand, know-myself to be the duck and the rabbit at the 
same time. 
For a further perspective upon the same self-experiential conundrum, let us take note of the 
following passage from Edmund Husserl's Cartesian Meditations: 
I, the reduced "human Ego" ("psychophysical" Ego), am constituted [... ) as a member of the 
"world" with a multiplicity of "objects outside me". But I myself constitute all this in my "psyche" 
and bear it intentionally within me. If perchance it could be shown that everything constituted as 
part of my peculiar ownness, including then the reduced "world", belonged to the concrete es- 
sence of the constituting subject as an inseparable internal determination, then, in the Ego's self- 
explication, his peculiarly own world would be found as "inside" and, on the other hand, when 
running through that world straightforwardly, the Ego would find himself as a member among its 
"externalities" and would distinguish between himself and "the external world". (1977: 99) 
1' The duck-rabbit is a famous example of an image that can be viewed as two distinct things, but not si. 
multaneously. Wittgenstein attributes it to Jastrow's Fact and Fable in Psychology, and includes it in his 
Philosophical Investigations (2001 [1953]: 165-66). 
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The two contradictory descriptions of purusa that are presented in the Sümkhyakärikd corre- 
spond in certain important respects to the two aspects of egoity identified by Husserl. The in- 
dividuated purusa of kärikä 18 is analogous to Husserl's "`psychophysical' Ego"- 
"constituted [... ] as a member of the `world' [... ]"-while the pure self or consciousness of 
kärikä 19 ("witnessing [... ], aloneness, equanimous, seer-ness, and inactive") is more like 
what Husserl in many other passages calls the "transcendental ego" (e. g. 1977: 23). Of course, 
purusa cannot in any respect be said to "constitute" the world of objects, but it can be regarded 
(albeit loosely and analogically) as the arena within which objects are constituted. It stands for 
the sheer possibility of anything's appearing as an object, whereas prakrti is that which shows 
itself as the conditioning factors of experience. Consequently, purusa might be said to "bear 
[the `world'] intentionally within [itself)", as Husserl says of his constituting ego. 
What should not be lost sight of, however, is the fact that Sämkhya and Yoga seem to at- 
tach a far more literal sense, than does Husserl, to the notion of "purity" in relation to self and 
consciousness. For Husserl, "pure consciousness" ("transcendental consciousness", 
"transcendental subjectivity", etc. ) is merely ordinary consciousness as viewed in terms of 
phenomena alone. It is still marked by the same objective content; the only difference between 
it and ordinary consciousness being that the "natural attitude" has been suspended, this natural 
attitude consisting in the assumption that objects of experience are exemplaries of a real world 
that lies outside consciousness (cf. Smith 2003: 25). It is "pure" merely in the sense that its 
contents are no longer tainted by any "prejudice" concerning their ontological status (cf. ibid.: 
19). Similarly, the pure, or "transcendental", ego is not an experienceless ego, but is merely 
the ego as considered in terms of its containing its intentional objects rather than being itself 
just another entity within the (trans-egoic) world. For Sämkhya and Yoga, meanwhile, pure 
consiousness is not arrived at merely by means of an attitudinal shift. More than being just the 
context in which experience can occur, it is also that which remains when all phenomenal 
content is removed. It is, or can be, a state of being in which the transcendental self or con- 
sciousness is neither drawn out of itself into a world of mental and physical events, nor even 
constitutes the boundary around those events, but abides instead solely in its own nature, as 
consciousness (awareness, "seeing") alone. In this sense of "pure consciousness", it is not 
only ontological prejudices that have been stripped away, but experience itself. I shall discuss 
this point further in the next section. 
To sum up the present section it can be noted that, contrary to certain interpreters, I do not 
hold that the multiple purusa doctrine can be explained away, or that it can easily be brought 
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into harmony with the doctrine of a pure, dimensionless and non-engaged self. Rather, I 
maintain that these two conceptions of self perpetually and awkwardly rub up against one an- 
other in Sämkhya and Yoga; and that this awkwardness, far from exposing some disastrous 
weakness in the two darganas, in fact points up a genuine and inordinately intractable antago- 
nism at the heart of what it is to be a conscious subject. Of course, we cannot be sure that the 
proponents of the classical systems were fully alert to this antagonism, for insofar as they 
make no direct reference to it, the impression is given that the descriptions of purusa at, for 
example, Sümkhyakürikü 18 and 19 are to be regarded as perfectly compatible. Whether these 
proponents were or were not aware of the full extent of the difficulty, however, I consider that 
anyone's ridiculing and disparaging the conception of purusa advanced in Sämkhya and Yoga 
without thoroughly thinking through the issues involved amounts to doing these systems a 
great disservice. 
CONSCIOUSNESS WITHOUT CONTENT 
The concept of "pure consciousness" is, as was noted briefly in Chapter 4, highly controver- 
sial within western philosophy. The so-called "continental" stream of modern European phi- 
losophy has been strongly influenced by the phenomenological philosophy of Husserl and his 
predecessors such as Franz Brentano, who tended to define consciousness in terms of inten- 
tionality-19 Indeed, members of the phenomenological movement commonly, following 
Husserl himself, read the doctrine of the essential intentionality of consciousness back into the 
history of philosophy. As James Edie, for example, puts it: "most historical philosophers have 
acknowledged the intentionality of consciousness in the sense that all consciousness is con- 
sciousness of something, that consciousness is a self-transcending process oriented toward 
objects other than and outside itself' (1987: 7; original emphasis). Defining consciousness as 
necessarily intentional, i. e. object-oriented, inevitably rules out the possibility of pure con- 
sciousness in the way that this expression-or its Sanskrit equivalents (such as dr. timätra, YS 
2.20)-is used within Sarpkhya and Yoga and comparable soteriological traditions. 
In the Anglo-American analytic stream of philosophy, meanwhile, the philosophy of mind 
has tended to be dominated by physicalist and functionalist approaches. Physicalism identifies 
mental states with brain states, or gives to mental states, at most, the status of being 
"supervenient" upon neurophysiological states (see e. g. Kim 1984), while functionalism holds 
'9"Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the scholastics of the Middle Ages called the in- 
tentional (and also mental) inexistence[*] [... ] of an object [... ] and what we would call, although in not en- 
tirely unambiguous terms, the reference to a content, a direction upon an object" (Brentano 1960: 50). *NB: 
For Brentano, "inexistence" means "existence in [something]", not "non-existence". 
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mental states to be "constituted by their causal relations to one another and to sensory inputs 
and behavioural outputs" (Block 1995: 189). Neither approach, therefore, has anything of in- 
terest to say about the phenomenological dimension of mental states; and, consequently (and 
even more importantly for our present study), since neither of them is interested in phenom- 
ena, they are both incapable of so much as formulating the possibility of a state of conscious- 
ness that, though devoid of phenomenal content, is yet not equivalent to unconsciousness. 
While, on physicalist and functionalist assumptions, the existence of consciousness of any 
kind independently of the complex neurophysiological processes of the organic body is un- 
thinkable, this is not a view shared by the Indian systems with which we are concerned. 
Sämkhya and Yoga declare, not only that the state of pure consciousness that they seek is one 
in which the factors that bring physical objects (including the human body) into formal exis- 
tence have receded into an unmanifest condition, but that the final goal of human life (and of 
manifest existence in general) involves both a decisive split with the "body" (sarira) and the 
spatiotemporal detachment (but certainly not annihilation) of consciousness itself. 
Within the area of research that deals with mysticism and mystical experiences the issue of 
pure consciousness has been a significant bone of contention for many years, and especially 
since the late 1970s. 2° On one side of the debate are the proponents of what has become char- 
acterised broadly as "constructivism" or "contextual ism", according to which both the post 
hoc reports of mystical experiences and, crucially, the experiences themselves are 
"constructed" ("defined", "conditioned", "mediated", etc. ) by the culturally-derived concepts, 
beliefs, and expectations of the experiencing mystic. 2' On the other side of the debate are 
those who propose an "anti-constructivist" or "decontextualist" view, which has been labelled 
more positively by Robert Forman as "perennial psychology" (and is not, according to him, to 
be identified with the "perennial philosophy" of an earlier generation of thinkers (Forman 
1998: 3 ff. )). 
Forman and others argue that, although the constructive factors cited by constructivists do 
indeed play an important role in ordinary (non-mystical) experience, there is a particular cate- 
gory of human experience that transcends such factors because it supervenes upon the 
"forgetting" or "letting go" of cognitive operations. "[T]he key process in mysticism is not 
like a construction process", writes Forman, "but more like one of unconstructing. Meditative 
procedures encourage one to gradually lay aside and temporarily cease employing language 
20 i. e. since the publication of Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, edited by Steven Katz (1978). 21 See e. g. Steven Katz (1978: 33): "these images, beliefs, symbols, and rituals define, in advance, what 
the experience [the mystic] wants to have, and which he then does have, will be like" (original emphasis). 
"The notion of unmediated experience seems, if not self-contradictory, at best empty" (ibid.: 26). 
194 
Freedom fronen Experience 
and concepts" (1998: 7). Such procedures can, Forman claims, lead eventually to a conscious 
state that is so contrary to ordinary modes of experience that the very term "experience" 
barely seems applicable. This latter issue led Forman to coin the expression "pure conscious- 
ness event", which he defines as "a wakeful though contentless (non intentional) conscious- 
ness" (1990: 8). 
Both sides in the debate over mystical experience have had specific things to say about 
Särpkhya and Yoga. Forman uses the notion of kaivalya in these systems as an illustrative ex- 
ample of what he means by "pure consciousness event". What is encountered as a result of the 
process of "relinquishing mental activities" that these systems advocate is, says Forman, "not 
something acquired from outside, learned, or even thought, for these would all be elements 
[... ] within prakrti. Rather, what is encountered in kaivalya is purusa, which is inherent 
within the self itse f' (1998: 11). The use of terms such as "encounter" as substitutes for 
"experience" do not, of course, eradicate the problem of an implied intentionality. An 
"encounter" requires duality just as much as an "experience" does; and hence Forman's de- 
scription of kaivalya as an encounter with purusa is highly problematic, since who would it be 
who does the encountering, if not purusa itself? 
Later in the same essay Forman struggles to find an appropriate vocabulary with which to 
refer to the kind of knowledge that is arrived at in the state of pure consciousness. Having 
briefly outlined "knowledge-by-acquaintance" (i. e. the sort of knowledge that I claim to have 
when I declare, for example, that "I know Mrs Smith") and "knowledge-about" (as in "I know 
that Delhi is the capital of India", etc. ), Forman notes that neither of these epistemic modes 
can meet the task at hand. 22 He then suggests, instead, "knowledge-by-identity" as a more 
suitable expression to delineate the state of knowing oneself to be consciousness, although he 
nevertheless repeatedly slips into talking of it as though it were the knowledge that I am 
aware. 23 There is, of course, a major difference between knowing "that I am and have been 
aware" and knowing oneself as awareness (or as consciousness). The former kind of knowl- 
edge is perfectly compatible with our everyday pre-mystical understanding of ourselves as 
individuated psychophysical entities-and, moreover, necessarily implies the presence of 
some knowledge-content-whereas the latter involves at least a radical shift of self-identity 
22 Forman probably derives the distinction from William James's treatment of it (1950 [1890]: 221 f. ), al- 
though James himself disclaims any originality on his own part, noting that "Most languages express the dis- 
tinction" (p. 221). Bertrand Russell promoted the notion of this distinction in his essay "Knowledge by Ac- 
quaintance and Knowledge by Description" (1917). 
23 "The knowledge that I am aware [... ] is not a matter of language, nor does it stand on the back of prior 
experiences. I just know directly and without complex reasoning that I am and have been aware. And I know 
it simply by virtue of being aware" (1998: 22; Forman's italics, my underscoring). 
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and, arguably, a complete abandonment of anything whatsoever that could be called an 
"understanding" or "knowledge" of oneself or of anything else. 
In contrast with Forman, Steven Katz refuses to admit the possibility of consciousness 
without content, and thus asserts that "it is in appearance only that such activities as yoga pro- 
duce the desired state of `pure' consciousness" (1978: 57). "Properly understood, " he contin- 
ues, yoga 
is not an unconditioning or deconditioning of consciousness, but rather it is a reconditioning of 
consciousness, i. e. a substituting of one form of conditioned and/or contextual consciousness for 
another, albeit a new, unusual, and perhaps altogether more interesting form of condi- 
tioned-contextual consciousness. (Ibid. ) 
In support of this assertion Katz notes that the various traditions of yoga each have particular 
conceptions of their soteriological goal, and that since these conceptions differ from one an- 
other the experiences determined by them (for on Katz's view the concepts must determine the 
experience24) must also be different. Katz's assumption here seems to be twofold. Firstly, in 
line with his overall epistemology, he is assuming that the results of yoga practice are in all 
cases determined by the conceptual formulation of the goal. Secondly he is assuming that he, 
or any other suitably qualified researcher, can adequately comprehend the goal of a yoga 
school or tradition from textual descriptions alone. This twofold assumption furnishes Katz 
with the confidence to state, for example, that "in Upanishadic Hinduism yoga is practised in 
order to purify the individual `soul' and then to unite it with Brahman or, as later represented 
in the Bhagavad Gita, with Krishna" (ibid. ) as though it were obvious what such terms as 
"soul" (which Katz is using here as a translation of ütman), brahman, and krsna denote. For if 
the meaning of such terms is not immediately perspicuous then what justification can there be 
for declaring (a) that these terms refer to intentional objects and (b) that the intentional objects 
themselves are at variance to those referred to by different terms (or even by the same terms) 
in other traditions? 
The fact is, however, that the meanings of the metaphysical terms concerned is a matter of 
dispute, both within and between the Indian traditions and among researchers from outside 
those traditions, and there is therefore no basis upon which to assert the nature and idiosyn- 
crasy of a conceptualised goal simply by referring to a set of key terms that appear in textual 
24 At one place Katz suggests that the relation between "experience" and "beliefs" is reflexive-i. e. that 
"beliefs shape experience, just as experience shapes belief' (1978: 30)-but elsewhere he tends to exclusively 
prioritise the causal role of beliefs (concepts, expectations, etc. ). See e. g. p. 46 of the same article: "mystical 
experience is `over-determined' by its socio-religious milieu: as a result of his process of intellectual accul- 
turation in its broadest sense, the mystic brings to his experience a world of concepts, images, symbols, and 
values which shape as well as colour the experience he eventually and actually has. " 
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descriptions, which descriptions are themselves often highly poeticised and/or dense and 
aphoristic. I agree with Katz that, in order to understand-or get anywhere close to under- 
standing-the mystical proclamations of religio-philosophical schools we have to take account 
of the background philosophies of each school concerned. I disagree, however, that it is le- 
gitimate to assume from the outset that the background philosophy of any particular school 
wholly determines the nature and content-rather than merely the pre- and post-experiential 
interpretations-of its soteriological outcomes. It might well be the case that in many in- 
stances the soteriological outcome is "mediated", "shaped", etc. by theoretical factors, but 
Katz nowhere argues for this being so in all instances-he merely assumes it. 25 
For the purposes of the present study, the question of whether the combined theoretical and 
practical technologies of Sämkhya and Yoga really result in a state of pure consciousness is in 
fact secondary. Indeed, it is a question that can be adequately addressed only by means of 
first-hand experimentation with the proposed techniques, and by diligent psychological (and 
possibly psychophysiological) evaluation of such experiments. 26 The primary issue here is the 
hermeneutic one of whether the soteriological goal of Sämkhya and Yoga as formulated in the 
classical texts can be best (most accurately) defined as a state of pure consciousness-or as 
something else. Katz's position on this issue is not to deny that pure consciousness is the state 
aspired to by those who follow the procedures of Yoga, but, rather, to rule out on epistemo- 
logical grounds the possibility of such aspirations being met (see 1978: 57, already quoted). 
His position is therefore highly inconsistent. On the one hand he advises researchers to treat 
the theoretical components of mystical traditions as evidence of the uniqueness and culture- 
specific nature of the experiences they engender, while on the other hand-when coming 
across theoretical accounts that speak of a contentless or pure state of consciousness, which is 
nevertheless not unconsciousness-he declares that such accounts are inadmissable as evi- 
dence of the results actually achieved because, since they conflict with his own "contextual 
thesis", they must be epistemologically defective? ' 
ZS When, for example, Katz says that "in order to understand mysticism it is not just a question of studying 
the reports of the mystic after the experiential event but of acknowledging that the experience itself as well as 
the form in which it is reported is shaped by concepts" (1978: 26), the acknowledgment concerned has no 
philosophical basis beyond Katz's repeated assertion of epistemological constructivism; and an assertion, no 
matter how many times or with what degree of dogmatic fervour it is repeated, does not amount to an argu- 
ment. 
26 A vast quantity of research data already exists on this topic. A useful summary and assessment of which 
are provided by Shear and levning 1999. 
1It might be noted here that Katz's own aptitude for correctly interpreting the claims of Sämkhya and 
Yoga is shown to be extremely dubious by his statement that the former of these two systems "understands 
the goal to be the perfection of the soul which does not lead to any form of unio myslica but rather to a 
splendid self-identity which, like God's perfection, is self-contained and isolated" (1978: 57-58; my under- 
scoring). An endnote to this statement invites the reader to "see R. C. Zaehner, Hinduism (New York, 1962; 
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The fact, then, that Katz regards proponents of Yoga as having profoundly misunderstood 
their own experiences need not imply the hermeneutic invalidity of describing the goal of 
Sdrpkhya and Yoga (as conceived from within the systems themselves) as a state of pure con- 
sciousness. The argument between Katz and Forman concerns the possibility of attaining pure 
consciousness; and this, though an extremely interesting issue in itself, is, as I have said, not 
what concerns us here. 
There is, however, no getting away from the fact that the notion of pure consciousness is 
highly abstruse and problematic. Indeed, "consciousness" of any kind has tended to elude any 
fully satisfactory definition, and many philosophers have balked at the attempt. As John 
Dewey once noted, 
Consciousness can neither be defined nor described. We can define or describe anything only by 
the employment of consciousness. It is presupposed, accordingly, in all definitions and all at- 
tempts to define it must move in a circle. (1886: 2) 
Since consciousness is not a thing-or, at least, if it is a thing, then it is a thing most unlike 
any other-it is impossible to have a clear conception of it independently of its phenomenal 
content. When one tries to think of consciousness in itself, it recedes inexorably away from 
one's cognitive grasp. Like a dog trying to catch its own tail, we cannot quite get hold of it no 
matter how quickly we run. Or, to use another metaphor, commonly found in Buddhist writ- 
ings: just as the blade of a sword cannot cut itself, so it is impossible for consciousness to ob- 
serve itself (cf. e. g. Wallace 1998: 67). Devoid of content, it would seem to possess no feature 
which could distinguish it from nothingness; and yet, since consciousness itself-or, if one 
refuses to call it such, then whatever it is that makes phenomenal consciousness possible-is 
presupposed in all experience, all knowledge, all conception, it is evidently not absolutely 
nothing. Jean-Paul Sartre, though hardly a mystic himself, refers to consciousness, when 
"purified of the P' (and hence of all contents whatsoever), as "quite simply a first condition 
and an absolute source of existence" (1957: 106). And since it is this that we are talking 
about-the first condition of conscious (or manifest, or phenomenal) existence-then, if we 
are to call it something, "pure consciousness" surely serves the purpose at least as well as any 
other term. 
Schopenhauer, who certainly did have a mystical streak in him, talks of the "abolition of 
the will" as an event in which "the world melt[s] away", leaving "before us only empty noth- 
ingness" (1966 t: 411-12). But he is careful to note that it is "for all who are still full of the 
Oxford, 1966), pp. 94 ff. ", which would seem to suggest that Katz is not in fact familiar with the primary 
Samkhya material. (The reference to Zaehner would also account for Katz's rendering of purusa as "soul". ) 
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will" that it is nothing, and that "conversely, to those in whom the will has turned and denied 
itself, this very real world of ours with all its suns and galaxies, is-nothing" (ibid.: 412). This 
point is very apt, for Schopenhauer's notion of the abolition or denial of the will is, as far as it 
is possible to tell in these matters, highly reminiscent of the relinquishing of activities, desires 
and habits that precipitates the transition from egoic or personal consciousness to supra- 
personal "pure" or "absolute" consciousness in Särpkhya and Yoga. And just as in Schopen- 
hauer's account, the transition consists in a shift so radical and decisive that it marks, not a 
mere alteration of perspective within phenomenal existence, but a complete perspectival re- 
versal; or, one could say, a transcendence of perspectivity itself. 
Owing to the absolute otherness of the reality that is arrived at, certain exponents of mysti- 
cal soteriologies have opted to hold back from committing themselves to any metaphysical 
position concerning its ultimate nature. The Buddha's original emphasis upon bringing an end 
to distress and dissatisfaction (Pali: dukkha), as distinct from offering positive descriptions of 
the transcendent state, is the prime example in this respect. 28 In the case of Sämkhya and 
Yoga, however, I do not see how it can be denied that they conceive the final state to be one of 
pure consciousness. 9 Purusa, or drastr, is almost invariably referred to in ways that implicitly 
or explicitly identify it as consciousness, and its "aloneness" is thus the ground, or essence, of 
consciousness-or consciousness "in itself'-vacated by all phenomenal content. 30 This, in 
my view, is the most plausible reading of, for example, Yogasütra 1.2-3, where the "cessation 
of mental activities" is said to enable "the seer (drastr) [to] abide in its own nature"; and of 
sutra 4.34, where kaivalya is defined as the "returning-to-the-source of the qualities (gunas), 
devoid of [any further] purpose for purusa; or the establishment of the own-nature of con- 
sciousness-power (citisakti). " The same point is echoed in Sümkhyakürikýi 68, according to 
which the "inactivity of pradhäna, due to the fulfilment of its purpose, [facilitates] the attain- 
ment of aloneness, which is both singular and conclusive. " The end towards which all experi- 
ence is directed has been achieved, and its conditioning factors have dissolved into their un- 
manifest ground. All that remains is purusa, that which stood behind experience as its witness 
and was shrouded thereby, and which now stands naked and totally alone. 
28 See e. g. the famous First Sermon, where the third enobling truth concerns the "cessation of dukkha" 
rather than the attainment of something positive (Samyutlanikäya 5.420, in e. g. Thomas 1927: 87-88). 
29I am far from alone in taking this view, as the following remarks illustrate: "all we can assert of it [i. e. 
the liberated self] is that it is contentless consciousness, not consciousness of itself or of object" (K. C. Bhat- 
tacharyya 1956 t: 196); "The ultimate mystical experience in Sarpkhya-Yoga results from the final elimination 
of all concepts, all thinking, all words, all feeling, all memory, and all perception. What is left, properly 
termed innate, is consciousness. It is not self-conscious and not symbolically conscious just consciousness 
itself' (Pflueger 1998: 69-70). 
70 I say "almost invariably" because SK 18 (discussed in the previous section above) constitutes an impor- 
tant exception. 
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na vUänämi yad ivedam asmi (I know not that which truly I am) 
(Rgveda-samhild 1.164.37)' 
THE SOTERIOLOGICAL PROJECT of Sämkhya and Yoga-of escaping all forms of dissatisfac- 
tion, aggravation and distress, both physical and psychological-is a radical and ambi- 
tious one. In common with most other Indian soteriologies, these systems regard the source of 
dissatisfaction as a kind of self-misunderstanding, which consists in falsely identifying with 
aspects of reality that are susceptible to change, decay and death. Consequently, the path to 
release involves a systematic disidentification with those impermanent and inherently mutable 
aspects. On this point the various schools and sub-schools of Vedänta, Buddhism, and Jain- 
ism, as well as the Nyäya and Vaigesika darganas-and, of course, Sdmkhya and Yoga-can 
agree. And parallel, or closely analogous, lines of thinking can be discerned in many non- 
Indian traditions, such as Daoism, Neoplatonism, Gnosticism, Sufism, and the Kabbalah. The 
cleavages between these systems and traditions appear when one begins to consider, firstly, 
who or what it is that can be counted as one's true being, and secondly, the nature of the rela- 
tion between that being and the world in general. Each of the schools of thought just men- 
tioned, both Indian and non-Indian, has as its stated aim the "realisation" of the answer to 
these issues through an intrapsychic revelation; and this is to be engendered by means of sus- 
tained and often extremely arduous self-discipline, involving adherence to strict ethical codes 
and, in most cases, the diligent practice of intense concentrative meditation techniques. In the 
study of systems such as Sämkhya and Yoga, this practical context should never be lost sight 
of, for it is out of the soil of this spiritually-oriented quest that the philosophy grows. Once the 
soteriological thrust is forgotten, then the philosophy collapses into ungrounded and dogmatic 
assertions, which appear whimsical and arbitrary. 
But a soteriological practice cannot exist, of course, without an accompanying model, a 
conceptual framework within which the practice can be formulated and directed. It is probably 
out of the need for such models that many of the earliest known traditions of philosophy 
throughout the world emerged. For Sämkhya and Yoga this is almost certainly the case; and 
My translation. Sanskrit text obtained from <http: //www. srivaishnava. org/scripts/veda/rv/rvbookl. htm> 
[accessed 22 February 2004]. 
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hence what we have before us when we read the Süinkhyakdrika and Yogasi7tra are not self- 
contained philosophical treatises, but are, rather, collections of heuristic statements, gathered 
together for the purpose of guiding initiated seekers along the path that is intended to lead to 
their own "realisation" or "revelation" of an ultimately inexpressible truth (or "state of being", 
if one prefers ontological to epistemological metaphors). 
In this study I have been keen to ground my interpretations in the primary texts themselves 
whilst at the same time endeavouring to penetrate through the textual surface to the underlying 
significance, which is always a soteriological significance. If one remains at the level of the 
merely literal meaning, and does not take the subcutaneous purpose and context into account, 
then one ends up-as, in my view, has all-too-frequently happened in Sämkhya and Yoga 
scholarship-with a pile of incoherent speculations which hardly deserve the appellation of 
philosophy. 
When, however, the context is taken seriously at every stage, then something far more in- 
teresting-indeed, deeply fascinating-emerges. When considered in the light of introspective 
meditation, the metaphysical schema presented in classical Sämkhya ceases to be a mere 
string of spuriously connected cosmological curiosities, and starts to look far more like a so- 
phisticated and integrated analysis of the principal factors that give rise to experience. Owing 
to the laconic nature of the classical descriptions, it is impossible to be certain precisely how 
each of the factors was conceived, but, roughly speaking, the schema can be taken to comprise 
(as was noted in Chapter 6) the following items: discerning perceptual awareness or inten- 
tionality (buddhi); egoity (aharnkara); synthesis of sensations and volitional direction of bod- 
ily actions (manas); the five modes of sensory perception (buddhindriyas); five kinds of ex- 
ternally-oriented action (karmendriyas); five types of sensory content (tanmatras); and five 
forms of sensible objects (bhütas). None of these are, themselves, external to what would in 
western philosophical parlance be called the experiencing subject; and hence, contrary to the 
received view of modern Sämkhya exegesis, the schema contains no implication of realism, 
and especially not of the kind of crude physical realism that is so often attributed to it. 
I have sought, for the purpose of clarifying certain points and distinctions (as many modern 
interpreters, both western and Indian, do), to draw comparisons between aspects of Säipkhya 
and Yoga philosophy on the one hand, and the ideas of western philosophers on the other. 
Particularly useful has been the notion of a transcendental analysis of experience, that was 
developed by Kant in his later writings, and which has proved to be extremely influential 
within western philosophy ever since. While arguing that the realist interpretation of Sämkhya 
and Yoga is thoroughly misguided, I have, however, been careful not to claim that these In- 
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interpretation of that idealism could be agreed upon! ). This is principally because I agree with 
Edward Conze that, since Kant was engaged in a very different style of philosophy, and with 
very different intentions, to those of any "pre-Macaulayan" Indian thinker, it is simply inap- 
posite to assume that the answers arrived at bear any significant correlation to one another 
(1967: 231-32, quoted in Larson 1987: 641 n. 83). Sämkhya and Yoga show no sign of being 
interested in the question of what ontological status the objects of our outer experience ought 
to be accorded; and hence to refer to their position as either antirealist or positively idealist 
would be to impose an inappropriate emphasis upon that position. 
Despite the assumptions of numerous commentators, beginning with Vyäsa, that the 
Yogasütra contains an attempt to refute idealism, my own examination of the relevant sutras 
(in Chapter 4), and of classical Yoga and Sämkhya as a whole, has not convinced me that this 
is the case. Indeed, I have found nothing to suggest that these systems are incompatible with 
idealism, and my view that the principles of manifest prakrti can best be understood as condi- 
tioning factors of experience implies that the objectual contents of experience are ideally con- 
structed and not mind-independent entities. The doctrine that purusa's presence is necessary 
for the manifestation of the conditioning factors themselves is a more explicit affirmation of 
idealism, which fact has been recognised by some scholars. But it is idealism of a peculiar 
sort, and therefore I have taken the view that it would be misleading to call it idealism at all. It 
is true that purusa is held to be necessary for the manifestation of prakrti, but the manifesta- 
tion of prakrti is not uncomplicatedly the manifestation of the empirical world. It is, as I have 
noted above, the emergence of the conditions of experience. There is, admittedly, a sense in 
which these conditions simply are experience, for together they constitute experience. But 
they constitute experience in general, not any particular experiences, and hence it remains the 
case that no perspicuous statement is made regarding the relation between the complex of 
conditioning principles and the world of particularised objects. 
In the work of phenomenologists such as Edmund Husserl (who has been referred to in the 
last chapter), the question of the ontological status of the objects of experience is "bracketed" 
or "put out of play" as part of the process of phenomenological "reduction" or epochd. This 
"bracketing" enables the components of experience to be treated as merely phenomenological 
items without any presumption being made about their having, or not having, an existence in- 
2See e. g. Balbir Singh (1976: 140): "Särhkhya [... ] believes the mere presence of purusa 
(samnidhyamälra) to be enough for prakrti to start its evolutionary process. This [... ] shows that all Indian 
systems are directly or indirectly committed to idealism, despite the appearance, in some cases, to the con- 
trary. In very unequivocal terms it means that the world exists because the spirit exists, and depends on it for 
both its evolution and its dissolution. " 
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dependently of the experiential episode they constitute. 3 In the case of Särrmkhya and Yoga 
there is also a kind of "bracketing" of the ontological question going on, but it does not appear 
to be so much a chosen philosophical strategy as a mere disregarding of the issue. 
Whether intended or not, however, the ignoring of the relation between the manifest prin- 
ciples (or analysed constituents of experience-in-general) on the one hand, and the actual ob- 
jects of experience on the other, allows Sämkhya and Yoga to concentrate upon the relation 
that is of primary importance to them. This is the relation between the manifest principles and 
something even more fundamental to our true nature; indeed, something ultimately fundamen- 
tal, which, due to its lying behind all conceptual and perceptual understanding, evades clear 
conceptualisation itself. As we have seen, it is generally called purusa ("person, " "self, " 
"man") in Sämkhya, and often drastr ("seer") in Yoga; but such terms should not, I think, be 
taken too rigidly. They strike me as being more like approximations of, or gestures towards, 
the intended target rather than definite encapsulations of it. As I have argued in the last chap- 
ter, what I consider it to be that is being gestured towards is that which is left of consciousness 
when all phenomena are removed. The claim that something does remain in such a situation is, 
of course, a metaphysical one; but it is a claim about a metaphysical item that is so utterly dis- 
continuous with anything else one can think of, that no sooner has one begun to talk about it 
than one's words start to jar and rebel against the sense that is being imputed to them. Literal, 
prosaic, speech is simply not up to the task; and neither, in the last analysis, is poetry. Yet 
poetic allegories and metaphors are the best tools that language can provide; 4 and thus it is not 
surprising that we find these in abundance in the Sämkhyakürikd, especially in its latter verses, 
where purusa is likened to a spectator who sees, yet remains unaffected by, the performance of 
prakrti (SK 61,66). Purusa or dram "in itself' I have likened to "pure consciousness"; which 
is a troublesome concept, but again, probably among the best that language can come up with 
in the present circumstances. 
A central question, broached in Chapter 7 but about which more could be said here, is: 
What exactly do the proponents of Sämkhya and Yoga mean when they say, as they do fre- 
quently, that prakrti acts "for the sake of purusa" or "for the sake of (purusa's) liberation"? 
The meaning of such statements is rarely, if ever, queried in the interpretive literature, and 
hence it would seem to have been taken for granted that the meaning is obvious. But if taken 
literally the statements concerned contain a huge and in no way obviously justified assump- 
3A very readable account of the phenomenological method of "reduction" is provided by A. D. Smith 
(2003: 18 ff. ); cf. e. g. Husserl 1931, sect. 32. 
4Cf. Schopenhauer (1974b t: 212): "in general it is not granted to us to comprehend the deepest and most 
hidden truths other than in figures and similes. " 
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tion, which is that experience per se is goal-oriented; i. e. it all happens for a reason, with a 
specific end in view. 
I have discussed in the last chapter the key problem associated with the goal itself, namely 
that either (a) purusa is eternally disengaged from phenomenal reality, and thus has no need of 
"liberation", or (b) purusa becomes engaged through misidentifying itself with the conditions 
of that reality, and thus must be the sort of thing that can make perceptual errors (and hence is 
not quite the "pure consciousness" that we thought it was). But from neither of these interpre- 
tive options does it immediately follow that the totality of experience-or, more precisely, the 
activity that gives rise to the totality of experience-should be for the purpose of purusa's lib- 
eration; and in the case of option [a] in particular, since purusa is already "liberated", such a 
claim would be meaningless. 
I do not wish to pretend that these kinds of difficulties can be easily ironed out, or swept 
under the carpet. I suspect that they might not be solvable, but this would be no great surprise. 
Indeed, it would be far more surprising if Sämkhya and Yoga were found to contain no philo- 
sophical imperfections whatsoever. All I have tried to do in this study is to present the most 
plausible and coherent exposition of the textual sources that I can muster, and I do not claim to 
have tidied up every loose end. But, to return to the matter of what is meant by activity's being 
for purusa's sake: it is, of course, the case that, within the overall framework of the Särnkhya 
and Yoga systems, liberation could not be realised without experience; for it is only by disi- 
dentifying with experience, and with the conditions thereof, that purusa can escape being 
pulled into the world of suffering. There is thus a sense in which activity as such is indispen- 
sable to the pre-liberated purusa, and to that extent can be said to be for purusa's sake. This 
interpretation has the advantage of not implying-as some interpretations mighty-that prakrti 
has it all planned out, so to speak, i. e. that every experiential episode is merely a part of an 
unfolding process that leads inexorably to a predetermined outcome. Yet again, however, the 
notion of a "pre-liberated" purusa causes serious problems here, conflicting as it does with the 
notion of purusa's being eternal in the atemporal sense-i. e. completely independent of time, 
and thus capable of having neither a pre- nor a post-liberated state. 
A further interpretive possibility that in my view is worth pondering, is that expressions 
such as "for the sake of purusa" might be intended merely, or primarily, to emphasise the phe- 
nomenological point that-since nothing can manifest independently of conscious- 
ness-events, objects, experiences, thoughts, etc. are thus in every instance for us, or, to be 
s In particular I'm thinking here of the tendency, prevalent within the Theosophical Society and similar 
groups, to enlist (albeit selectively) Sämkhya concepts in order to bolster their own "grand plan" cosmological 
theories (see e. g. Blavatsky 1888 c 247,256). 
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more exact, for me, not as a psychophysical complex but as unalloyed consciousness itself. In 
this sense prakrti is always the servant of purusa, and owes "her" entire manifest existence to 
"him" (the symbolic framework of Särnkhya and Yoga scrapes uncomfortably against modern 
sexual-political sensibilities-but it is far from being unique among spiritual traditions in this 
respect). Indeed, one of the alternative terms for prakrti is sva, meaning "one's own" or 
"oneself" (cf. Latin sui), just as one of the synonyms ofpurusa is svämin, the "self-possessor" 
or "owner" (YS 2.23). The empirical world and its conditioning factors belong to purusa. 
Whether purusa needs them is a qucastio vexata to which there seems to be no consistent re- 
sponse. 
The fundamental dualism at the heart of Sämkhya and Yoga is often taken to be the great- 
est weakness and inadequacy of these systems. Indeed, it has been held up as an illustration of 
their failure to achieve a fully "philosophical" understanding of reality 6 I, on the other hand, 
see dualism as their greatest strength, and as an indication of the triumph of their philosophi- 
cal predilections over the solely mystical drive towards spiritual monism and the religious de- 
mand for a divine governing power. The authors of the Sürnkhyakürikü and Yogasütra appear 
not to be very concerned whether their teachings are, or are not, perfectly consonant with 
those of the so-called "heard" or "received" wisdom (sruti), contained in the Vedic canon and 
more particularly in a select number of Upanisads. The Vedanta darSana, with its myriad 
branches and sub-branches, has expended countless words and man-hours in the attempt to 
read into the Upanisads a consistent set of doctrines. However, the Upanisads, being works 
largely of mystical poetry rather than systematic philosophy, strenuously resist such attempts 
at systematisation and make them appear utterly ridiculous. 7 
Ironically, some interpreters have imputed a superior status to Yoga over Sämkhya on the 
grounds that, whereas the latter system is "merely" rational in its approach, Yoga is founded 
upon immediate intuitions of an underlying metaphysical reality. As I have made clear in 
Chapter 2, there is no warrant for such claims. They are built upon idle fantasy, and perhaps 
upon the scholarly urge to draw and exaggerrate distinctions where no significant differences 
exist. The philosophies of Särpkhya and Yoga are, as I have acknowledged, firmly embedded 
within a soteriological project, which is directed ultimately towards a transcendence of ra- 
tional thought and the flowering of mystical (supra-rational) revelation. But up until the point 
6 See e. g. Deussen, who claims that "monism is the natural standpoint of philosophy, and wherever dual- 
ism has appeared in its history it has always been the consequence of antecedent stress and difficulty, and as it 
were a symptom of the wane of the philosophising spirit", and that "the dualism of [... ] Sänkhya" is "to be 
conceived as the consequence of a natural disintegration of the doctrine of the Upanishads" (1919: 244-45). 
7The following words of caution from van Buitenen are apt here: "It is always difficult to prove one's 
case by calling on the upanisads as witnesses: they are at once too willing and too evasive" (1957a: 21). 
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of that final revelation, rational philosophy is not abandoned, and nor is it compromised in 
order to align its insights more neatly with the supposedly unerring proclamations of 
Upanisadic sages. The doctrine of metaphysical dualism is justified not on the basis of ipse 
dixit-"thus it was said in this or that Upanisad"-but, rather, upon the basis that (a) experi- 
ence is an undeniable fact, and (b) for experience to occur there must be at least two things 
present. A single undifferentiated principle is simply not enough to explain the possibility of 
experience, which is why so-called "nondualist" systems invariably sidestep any attempt to 
philosophically validate their central metaphysical claim, and resort instead to mere dogmatic 
assertion (whether it be their own or that of some "infallible" scripture). 8 The two "things" or 
"principles" in question-namely purusa and prakrti-have typically been characterised as 
subject and object, or self and world, which labels have allowed interpreters to assume on be- 
half of Sämkhya and Yoga an inflexible realist stance concerning empirical objects. But as I 
have shown (particularly in chapters 4 and 6), this is an overly crude representation of the 
Sämkhya and Yoga dualism. It is not the experiencing subject and the world "out there" that 
these systems are keen to distinguish between; it is, rather (and far more subtly and sophisti- 
catedly), the pure transcendental ground of consciousness on the one hand, and the transcen- 
dental ground of phenomena on the other. Purusa is not straightforwardly "the subject", just as 
prakrti is not straightforwardly "the object" (or even the "world-ground"--a la Feuerstein). 
Yet they are what, in combination, make subjectivity and hence objectivity possible. They are, 
to use the Kantian terminology that I consider to be so helpful here, the co-ultimate conditions 
of the subject-object relation. 
Monistic systems are incapable of accounting for experience. Modern versions of physical- 
ism, for example, have a great deal to say about the neurophysiological correlates of phe- 
nomenal consciousness, but nothing whatsoever to say about the experiences themselves, be- 
cause experiences are simply not "physical" in any meaningful sense. Meanwhile, 
"anomalous" or "neutral" monism-according to which physical and mental facts can be re- 
duced to some more primordial, yet unknown (or unknowable), substance-is merely an at- 
tempt to retain the facade of philosophical respectability that monism is supposed by many to 
possess while simultaneously admitting the substance-dualist's point that mental things and 
physical things constitute two radically dichotomous kinds of reality. It therefore suspends 
8The philosophical incoherence of nondualism has been noted by Frits Staal: "there are certain meta- 
physical theories that can be said to be unintelligible in the sense that they try to point at what cannot be un- 
derstood. Understanding requires duality, for example, if not multiplicity. Accordingly, in such philosophies 
as the Advaita Vedanta, according to which reality is nondual, reality cannot be understood" (1975: 4). 
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philosophising in favour of wishful thinking. 9 And, finally, absolute idealism, or mental mo- 
nism, by reducing even the ground of phenomena to the transcendental ego (or mind, or spirit, 
etc. ), thereby forecloses the possibility of an encounter between those two things, which en- 
counter is of course necessary for experience to happen. Such a monism, if it is not to deny 
experience any existence at all (which would hardly be a sustainable or credible position), is 
obliged to posit the spontaneous emergence of phenomena either out of nothing (as "mere ap- 
pearances" with no ontological foundation) or out of something that is, in its essence, utterly 
non-phenomenal, i. e. the transcendental ego; neither of which positions amounts to anything 
more than the construction of a myth. 
Classical Sämkhya and Yoga appear to have seen the pitfalls associated with monism and 
to have resisted its seductive lure. If experience exists-which it evidently does, since its de- 
nial cannot even be coherently formulated-then there must be (a) something that appears and 
(b) something to which or in which the appearance takes place. According to Sämkhya and 
Yoga, that which appears must have formal existence (sattva), activity (rajas), and limitation 
(camas), and does not manifest directly as objects, but as the twenty-three "manifest princi- 
ples" (which might better be referred to as "principles of manifestation") that together bring 
forth the objects of experience. I can see no failing or weakness here; only a highly perceptive 
and surprisingly philosophically advanced analysis of the factors that make experience possi- 
ble. 
The principles of manifestation exist only so long as the source of consciousness (purusa) 
misidentifies with them. This misidentification is said to be "beginningless" (anadi, e. g. YBh 
2.22), and presumably this is because it does not describe an historical event, but is intended 
to explicate the situation in which we find ourselves here and now. One feels sensations and 
responds to them as though it were really oneself that had been affected by them; and yet in 
quieter, more contemplative, moments one understands that those felt sensations merely arise 
and then dissolve away, like ripples upon the surface of a pool of water. "I, " in my true es- 
sence, have undergone no change. Similarly, when performing an action, I imagine that "I" am 
doing it, to serve some purpose, to satisfy some desire that I take to be mine; yet if I slow 
down, pause, consider what it is I'm doing more carefully, I start to see that it is part of an 
extended and interconnected web of impulses, events, and reactions to events, none of which 
9The phrase "neutral monism" is due to Bertrand Russell (1954), while "anomalous monism" was coined 
more recently by Donald Davidson (1980, essay 11). The concepts, and respective defences of them, that 
Russell and Davidson advance are, needless to say, not identical; but this is not the place to discuss them at 
length. Cf. Galen Strawson (1994: 96-97): "I take it ['neutral monism'] to be the view that although the uni- 
verse is indeed composed of one fundamental kind of stuff, this stuff is neither mental nor physical. Or rather, 
it is neither mental nor physical as we currently understand these terms. " 
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are genuinely initiated by my inner contemplative self. The desires and impulses, rather, 
emerge from some deep, dark reservoir, and the action begins to take place even before I have 
consciously acknowledged the need to perform it. If both the desire, or will, and the action 
itself precede my awareness of them, how can they really be mine? 
Once the sensations, actions, desires, and-more inwardly still-the thoughts, and the con- 
cepts those thoughts comprise, have been disidentified with, such concepts, thoughts, desires, 
etc. do not disappear immediately; they continue to whirl around as though perpetually gen- 
erating their own momentum, and I repeatedly get drawn back into that cascading torrent of 
phenomena (pratyaya-sarga). However, through continual practice-through sitting still, 
regulating and intermittently suspending the respiratory rhythm, attending to a specific mental 
object in order to reduce the manifold of phenomena to the barest minimum; and, having let 
go of the mental object, observing detachedly the inner space that remains, a little less clut- 
tered than before-the degree of centredness, of stability, incrementally increases, and the 
whirling torrent becomes a steady flow. And I can well imagine that, eventually, it may be- 
come a mere trickle, and then a drip; and then-nothing (I can imagine) at all. 
This is the practice of yoga, and it is given theoretical expression in the philosophies of the 
Yoga and Sämkhya darganas. There is not a germ of realism in it. The thoughts and sensations, 
etc., are, admittedly, not constituted by the ultimate self, but neither do they exist independ- 
ently of it. With the dawning of the inner knowingness of non-identity with the manifest prin- 
ciples comes the twilight of the principles themselves. Their unmanifest ground (avyakta) re- 
mains, and hence is real. But insofar as it is unmanifest it has no bearing upon the purity of 
purusa's aloneness. The manifest principles have gone-since they were crucially dependent 
upon purusa's misidentification with them-and thus also gone is any hint of phenomenal ex- 
istence. This is why the imputation of realism to these systems is thoroughly mistaken, and, 
indeed, pernicious. And, correspondingly, it is why I refer to the much needed corrective that 
is provided in this study of their metaphysics and soteriology as a nonrealist interpretation of 
classical Sämkhya and Yoga. 
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Appendix A 
The Text of the Sä»tkliyakärikä 
B ELow is the complete Sanskrit text, totalling seventy-two distiches, of the Sümkhyakärikü 
in both Devanägar and Roman script, plus a new translation into English by mYself. ' 
There is at present no critical edition of the Sarnkhyakürikü, but differences between the avail- 
able editions are extremely minor. In some instances I have mentioned discrepancies between 
different editions in footnotes, although it should not be assumed that every such discrepancy 
has been noted. In preparing this appendix I have consulted all the editions and translations of 
the Sümkhyakärika that are listed under "Primary Sources" in the Bibliography, and of these I 
have given most attention to the respective editions and translations by Jhä (1896), Sury- 
anarayana Sastri (1948), and Larson (1979). 1 have also benefitted greatly from the assistance 
of Monier-Williams' monumental Sanskrit-English Dictionary and also the Glossary of the 
Saiikhyakürika by Digambarji et al. (1989). 
I considered also including in this appendix a full translation of the Yogasütra, but decided 
against it on the following two grounds. Firstly, although the Yogastura is certainly a work of 
enormous importance for this study, it is not as systematic and coherent a text as is the 
Sümkhyakdrikä. For this reason an understanding of the passages from the Yogasütra that are 
quoted in the foregoing chapters of this study will not, in my view, be significantly enhanced 
by the inclusion of a translation of the text as a whole. In the case of the Sümkhyakürikü, how- 
ever, the more systematic and progressive nature of its structure increases the usefulness of 
being able to read its verses within their broader context. Secondly, the textual format known 
as the sutra is terse to the point of obscurity, and many passages require an accompanying 
commentary in order for any sense to be made of them. In view of this fact, by merely provid- 
ing my own translation of the Yogasütra I would not necessarily be clarifying for the reader 
anything concerning the meaning of the text, but would be adding just another more-or-less 
opaque version of it to the numberless editions that exist already. The kärikü format in which 
the Sämkhyakärikd is composed is also apophthegmatic, but far less stringently so than that of 
the sutra; and the text is therefore more capable of standing on its own without the support of 
a verse-by-verse commentary. I could, of course, have translated the Yogasütra with a com- 
'The editions of Surynarayana Sastri and Larson include a seventy-third kärikä, even though, since it ap- 
pears only in the commentary of Mähara, it is likely to have been added by Mähara himself. I have, in any 
case, included this extra kärikä in footnote 28. 
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mentary alongside it, but such a project would have been unduly extravagant for a mere ap- 
pendix. 
I freely admit that any translation will contain certain biases in favour of the translator's 
own particular interpretation of the original text. By being aware of this fact throughout the 
process of translation, however, I hope that I have avoided any serious distortions which 
might, had I been less alert, have slipped in. The inclusion of the original text will, in any 
event, make it easier for scholars of Sanskrit to detect any deficiencies in my translation. I 
have endeavoured to keep bracketed interpolations in the translation to a minimum, and the 
relatively brief elaborations of the text that I provide in footnotes are not intended to constitute 
anything approaching a full explanation. Inevitably this will leave the meaning of some 
kärikäs far from obvious. But my purpose here is principally to supplement the interpretive 
investigation that makes up the main body of this study, and not to either duplicate or try to 
surpass that investigation with an extensive exegesis. 
The font that I have used for the Devanägari script is, for the most part, the one known as 
xdvng. Its range of characters to represent conjunct consonants is not fully comprehensive, 
and hence, in the case of "W (i. e. Ei + 9), I have used the Shusha font, and in other places I 
have resorted to slightly unconventional forms of conjunction. These should not, however, 
detract from the overall legibility of the text. 
THE SA4IKHYAK4RIK4 IN DEVANAGARI AND ROMAN SCRIPT, 
AND IN ENGLISH TRANSLATION 
drstavad änudravikah sa by 
aviIuddhiksaydtilayayuktah / 
tad viparitah freydn vyaktüvyaktajnavynändt 
'iii SgTýii S cf II II // 2 // 
dul: khatraydbhighütaj jUnüsü tad apaghütake 
helau / 
drste sd 'parthü cen naiküntätyantato 'bhüvüt 
// i// 
Due to the affliction of threefold oppression, 
the inquiry into its removal [arises]; [if said 
to be] pointless because obvious [means ex- 
ist], this is not so, for such means are neither 
singularly directed nor conclusive. 
2 
- ýi ýrfrfý: I 
cTk 
fill : N' 441 tN Iii 1 1ý 11 Z II 
The heard [method] is like the obvious, as it 
is conjoined with impurity, corruption, and 
excess. The superior and opposite of that 
[comes] from the discrimination of the mani- 
fest, the unmanifest, and the knower. 
3 
5,21 ; bei wb 
miilaprakrtir avikrtir mahad ndyüh 
prakrtivikrtayal: sapta / 
sodasakas tu viküro na prakrtir na vikrtili 
purusa? z /13 /l 
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Root-procreativity (mülaprakrti) is uncre- 
ated; the seven-"the great" (niahal) and the 
others-are productive and produced; the 
sixteen, meanwhile, are [merely] produced; 




Q 414 fq f: pqI arrý u` u 
drstam anumänam üptavacanam ca 
sarvapramünasiddhatvät / 
trividham pramänam istam prameyasiddhih 
pramänäd dhi /14 /l 
The attainment of knowledge is based on 
[certain] ways of knowing; the accepted 
ways are three-perceiving, inferring, and 
reception of verbal testimony-as these 





prativisayädhyavasdyo drstam trividham 
anumänam ükhyätam / 
tal lingalingipürvakam üptasrutir iptavacanam 
tu 1/ 5 1/ 
Perceiving is the discernment of particular 
objects; inference, which is said to be three- 
fold, is the tracing of the mark-bearer from 
its indicating mark; reception of verbal tes- 
timony, meanwhile, is reception of sruti. 
6 
sdmünyatas tu drstät atindriyänüm pratTtir2 
anumdnät/ 
tasmad api casiddham paroksam dganrüt siddham 
// 6 // 
Inference by analogy ascertains what is be- 
yond the sense-capacities; and what is unac- 
complishable even by that is established by 
verbal testimony. 
'Some editions have prasiddhir in place of 
pratftir. Both terms can have the sense of 
"ascertaining" or "accomplishing". 
atidürät sämTpyüt indriyaghütc7n 
mano'navasthimät / 
sauksmyüd vyavadhündt abhibhavät 
samünabhihärüc ca // 7 /l 
[Something may be imperceptible] due to: 
remoteness, closeness, sensory impairment, 
instability of mind, subtlety, obscuration, 
suppression, similarity with something else. 
8 
aa 
rfc9 -rr ucu 
sauksm}"ät lad anupalabdhir näbadvdt käryatas 
lad upalabdhe/i / 
mahad üdi tac ca küryant prakrtisarüpam 
virüpam ca 118 /l 
The non-apprehension of that [i. e. prakrti] is 
due to subtlety, not non-existence; it is ap- 
prehended by means of its effects. Its ef- 
fects-mahat and the others-are both with 
and without the nature (rüpa) of prakrti. 3 
9 
i FiII' fl 
asad akara{: dd updddnagraha{zät 
sarvasambhaväbhavdt/ 
iaktasya. akyakara{rat küranabhävdc ca sat 
karyam 119 // 
The [formally] existent [must be] an effect 
due to: 4 the non-causation of non-being; the 
3 Cf. my discussion of rºüpa at p. 127 fn. 10. 
4 For an account of my interpretation of this 
kärikä, see pp. 129-30. As a general point, it should 
be noted that the use of the ablative case can be 
ambiguous: its meaning can be either that (a) the 
existence of the proposition's subject "is due to" (or 
"is caused by", etc. ) such-and-such factors, or (b) 
"due to" such-and-such factors we must logically 
infer that the subject exists. The first of these senses 
has an ontological emphasis, whereas the second has 
an epistemological one. In this kärikä I have insinu- 
ated that the latter emphasis is primary by inserting 
the expression "must be". It is my view that this 
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apprehension of a material cause; the non- 
production of everything [from everything]; 
the possibility of causation [only] from that 
which is capable; and the nature of the cause. 
10 
IN HNIPAW-ilW fir1 
RTq-qW ' c;:: 4- Tt IIýo11 
helumad anityam avyüpi sakriyam anekam 
ä. (ritam lirigam / 
sävayavam paratantrani vyaktagz viparTtam 
avyaktam 11 10 // 
13 
V :1 ID a 
; rte a? U 9: A ifi4tl 1-4 14ýft ift: u ýý n 
sattvam laghu prakasakam 4tam upastambhakam 
calam ca rajah / 
guru varanakam eva tamal: praa<pavac cärthato 
vrttil: 1113 /l 
Sawa is light and illuminating; rajas is im- 
pelling and moving; Lamas is heavy and de- 
limiting; and their purpose is to function like 
a lamp. 
The manifest is caused, temporal, spatially 
limited, active, non-singular, dependent, a 
cipher, composite, conditioned; the unmani- 
fest is the opposite. 
11 
NII-IHMN faW: i 
wRý ffvrrrq; r aka zur a Trr; [ u kU u 
trigunam aviveki visaya/z sümünyam acetanam 
prasavadharmi/ 
vyaktarn tathä pradhanam tad viparitas tathü ca 
puman // 11 // 
The manifest as well as pradhäna (i. e. the 
unmanifest) are tripartite, undiscriminated, 
objectual, universal, non-conscious, produc- 
tive; and puman (i. e. purusa, the self) is the 
opposite of these. 
12 




gu{iäh /112 // 
Of the nature of gladness, perturbation, and 
stupefaction; serving to illuminate, activate, 
and restrain; the strands (gunas) subjugate, 
support, generate, and combine with one an- 
other. 
epistemological emphasis is to be regarded as pri- 
mary also in subsequent kärikäs, such as 15-19, 
although I have in most instances retained at least a 
degree of ambiguity in the translation in order to 
better reflect the original text. 
14 
517Z7 II ý ell 
avivekyüdeli siddhis5 traigunyät tad 
viparyayübhavat / 
karanagunütmakatvat küryasyi7vyaktam api 
siddham // 14 /l 
Undiscriminatedness and the other [qualities] 
are established due to the tripartition, and to 
the non-existence [of the three gunas] in the 
opposite of that. The unmanifest is estab- 
lished [as having the same nature as the 
manifest] due to the guna-nature of the effect 
being also that of the cause. 
15 
iP T9t vfPrrýrýr :i 
bhedänüm parimdnüt samanvayüt . taktitali6 
pravrttes ca / 
karanaküryavibhägad avibadgad vaisvari7pyasya 
// 15 // 
Due to: the finitude of differentiated 
[objects], homogeneity, the procession from 
potency, the distinction between cause and 
effect, and the undivided form of the 
world-7 
'Some editions read avivekyddili siddhas; cf. 
Suryanarayana Sastri 1948: 33. 
6Jhä's edition (1896: 33) has käryatali 
("effective-ness") in place of saktitah ("potency"). 
7 This kärikä does not stand on its own but must 
be read in conjunction with that which follows. 
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16 
f w: vI fI 
gfruI Id: 0911-4q a 
tasmüc ca viparyrisdt siddham saksitvam asya 
purusasya / 
kaivalyanr mcidhyasthyagz drastrivam 
akartrbhäv& call 19 // 
II II 
küranam asty avyaktam pravartate trigunatah 
samudayäc ca / 
pari zamatal: salilavat pratipratigundfraya- 
visesüt ll 16 // 
-the unmanifest is the cause, productive 
due to the combination of the three gunas, 
and transformable fluidly in accordance with 
the specific residing place of the various 
gunas. 
17 
114 1 11 ýls II 
samghätaparärthatvdt trigulzddiviparyayüd 
adisthänüt / 
puruso'sti bhoktrbhävät kaivalyürthant pravrttefi 
ca // 17 // 
Purusa exists due to: ' composites [being] for 
another's sake, the opposite of the three 
gu«ias etc., [the need for] a controller, [the 
need for] an enjoyer, and the process [being] 
for the purpose of aloneness. 
18 
c 
ii p ii 
jananamaranakaranünäm pratiniyamüd 
ayugapat pravrttefi ca / 
purusabahutvan: siddham traigunyaviparyayäc 
caiva // 18 // 
Due to various patterns of birth, death, and 
capacities, and to the disjunction of activi- 
ties, purusa's multiplicity is established; and 
also due to contrariety of the three gunas. 
19 
ý441 
r II 4°, 11 
$Or: "must be supposed to exist" (see fn. 4 
above). 
And thus, due to [its being] the opposite [of 
prakrti], the witnessing, aloneness, equa- 
nimity, awareness, and inactivity of purusa is 
established. 
20 
a aýrra 1ý: 11 Roll 
tasmät tat samyogüd acetanam cetan ävad iva 
liAigam / 
gu{ºakartrtve ca tathd karteva bhavaty udüsinali 
20H 
Due to the conjunction of those [two, i. e. 
purusa and prakrti] the non-conscious liºiga 
appears as though conscious, and similarly, 
owing to the activity of the gunas, the non- 
engaged appears as though active. 
21 
v FT gr -T iTvr r 
, 
fq r : ý'r: II U 
purusasya darfiandrtham kaivalyürtham tathü 
pradhünasya / 
patigvandhavad ubhayor api samyogas tatkrtah 
sargalt // 21 // 
For the purpose of perceiving pradltüna, and 
for the purpose of purusa's aloneness, the 
two [come together] like the blind and the 
lame; that conjunction is the creative surge. 9 
22 
ý's, rte: i 
i1ý: rfý uýýu 
prakrter mahä; ns tato'hankaras tasmäd gana. ca 
sodatakah l 
tasmüd api sodafakät pmicabh}yali paflca bhülüni 
//22// 
Despite its etymological proximity, "surge" 
does not quite convey the full sense of sarga. The 
latter term often does have the sense of flowing, 
spewing forth, emerging, and so on, but it can also 
have the sense of a realm of existence (cf. SK 53, 
54). 
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From prakrti [comes1° ] the great; from that, 
egoity; and from that, the group of sixteen; 
again, from five of those sixteen, the five 
elements. 
23 
ruf' jk4 ýfi ' f4 7M kV4TI- i 
adhyavasäyo buddhir dharmo jnünant virago 
aiivaryam / 
sdttvikam etad rüpam tümasam asmäd 
viparyastam 1123 /l 
Buddhi is discernment, its lucid (süttvika) 
form [comprising] dharma, knowledge, non- 
attachment, [and] masterfulness, and its 
darkened (tümasa) form [comprising] the 
opposite. 
ments, " which is opaque (tümasa), the 






// 26 /% 
Sense-capacities is the term for seeing, 
hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching; 






abhimüno'hatikäras tasmäd dvividhalz 
pravartate sargalt / 
ekddalakal ca ganas tanmatrapancaka. J caiva 
/124 // 
The thought of self is egoity; from that, a 
twofold surgence proceeds, namely the group 
of eleven and the five tanmätras. 
25 
:I 
süttvika eküdalaka/i pravartate vaikrtüd 
aharikürüt / 
bhi7tüdes tanmätrah sa tümasah tayasüd 
ubhayam 1125 /l 
The lucid (sättvika) eleven proceed from the 
modified egoity; from the source of the ele- 
10 The fact that prakrIi is in the ablative case indi- 
cates that "the great" (mahat) is in a relation of de- 
pendence upon it, although the nature of the 
dependence is not made explicit. Therefore, the in- 
terpolated "comes" should not, in my view, be nec- 
essarily assumed to denote material causation. The 
same applies to the relations between the other 
"productive" and "produced" manifest principles. 
RT-C-4 a TTTqRTFT 
U 3II 
ubhayütmakam atra manah sarikalpakam 
indriyam ca südharmyüt / 
gunaparinümavidesdn ndnütvam bdhyabhedü. t ca 
// 27 // 
In this regard, of the essence of both is mind 
(manas), which is synthesis and is, due to its 
similarity, a capacity. Variousness and exter- 
nal differences are due to the specific modi- 
fications of the gunas. 
28 
výIiI1 nýGu 
dabdädisu pancandm ülocanamütram isyate 
vrttih l 
vacanadünaviharanotsargdnanda. I ca pancänüm 
/1281/ 
The operation (vrtti) of the five [sense- 
capacities] is held to be bare awareness of 
sound and so forth; speaking, grasping, 
walking, excreting, and [sexual] pleasure are 
[the operations of] the five [action- 
capacities]. 
11 It would appear that "source of the elements" 
(bhütddi) is either an epithet of ahainküra or an 
aspect thereof. 
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29 
1 
fi 1411'- r Arnrrzrr 4TW: T-PT It ýý, 11 
svülaksanyam vrttis trayasya salsa bhavaty 
asamänyä / 
sdmänyakara{iavrttilt prdnüdyd väyavali parka 
1129/1 
Each of the three12 is distinguished by its 
own operation, which manifests differently 
[from those of the other two]. Their common 
operation consists in the five vital currents, 
[namely] präna and the others. 13 
30 
t 11141-4 ý -ý ifr: II you 
yugapac catustayasya tu vrttih kramasaf ca tasya 
nirdistü / 
drste tathüpy adrste trayasya tatpürvikü vritih 
// 30 // 
The operation of the four14 with regard to 
what is present to perception is both instan- 
taneous and progressive; while in the case of 
what is imperceptible, the operation of the 
three is preceded by that [i. e. by the percep- 
tion of a present object]. 
31 
sviim svam pratipadyante parasparakütahetuküm 
vrttim / 
purusürtha eva hetur na kenacit kdryate kara{tam 
// 31 // 
The respective operations are performed in 
cooperation with one another from a com- 
12 It is almost certainly the three members of the 
"inner instrument" (antahkara{: a) that are being 
referred to here (cf. kärikä 33 below), namely bud- 
dhi, ahainkära, and manas. Larson thinks that "the 
three" denotes "the buddhi, ahainkära and senses" 
(1979: 265), but I can see no basis for this view. 
13 According to classical Indian physiology there 
are five main currents or winds which service differ- 
ent regions of the body. These are usually called, 
respectively: präna, apüna, samäna, uddna, vyüna. 
14 "The four" here is generally agreed to stand 
for "the three" of the preceding karikä plus any one 
of the sense-capacities. 
mon impulse, the sole end being that of 
purusa; nothing else activates the instrument. 
32 
a ýrrýrýr wry- a II II 
karmºaiºº trayodadavidham 
tadüharanadhdra{raprakalakaram 
küryanº ca tasya daiadhühüryanº dhüryanº 
praka yanº ca Il 32 II 
The instrument, comprising thirteen parts, 's 
is grasping, holding, and illuminating; and its 
object (karya), which is tenfold, 16 is grasped, 
held, and illuminated. 
33 
: fegvz[ izyrwr arm Wzmzr 
Im 1 4. -X ci CA 1 arm u 3ý n 
antahkaranam trividham daiadhä bähyans 
trayasya visayäkhyam / 
sümpratakülant bähyant trika/am übhyantarant 
karanam // 33 // 
The inner instrument is threefold, the outer is 
tenfold [and] is held to be the domain of the 
three; " the outer [operates in] the present 
moment [alone], the [inner] instrument in all 
three times. '3 
'' The thirteen parts are "the three" mentioned at 
kärikäs 29 and 30 plus the sense-capacities and ac- 
tion-capacities (cf. SK 33). 
16 i. e. the five tanmürras plus the five Maws. 
Larson asserts that "tenfold" is here "relating to the 
five senses and the five actions" (1979: 266), which 
assertion is presumably based on the fact that, in the 
following karikä, the tenfold "outer instrument" 
appears to comprise the sense- and action-capacities. 
Larson's view is untenable, however, since the 
sense- and action-capacities have already been in- 
cluded within the thirteenfold instrument, with 
which the tenfold object is here being contrasted. 
"I have given here a fairly literal translation of 
the phrase rrayasya v4ayäkhyam. Some other 
translators (e. g. Suryanarayana Sastri and Jha) try to 
make better sense of it by taking it to mean that the 
outer instrument makes objects known to the inner 
instrument. This may be a correct interpretation, but 
it rec1uires some manipulation of the original text. 
What seems to be meant here is that sensations 
and actions are always present occurrences whereas 
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34 a- - fafýrýr qW: ,. j[uýsn 
4T1 ýTfý TATT7-7 I 
WnMfiT X1T ii91k Fj Uf 
114 ell 
buddhindriydni tesäM panca videsüvidesvisayüni / 
vagbhavati dabdavisayü desäni tu pan"cavisayüni 
// 34 // 
Of these, the five sense-capacities have spe- 
cific and non-specific objects; 19 the voice 
manifests sound-phenomena whereas the 
other remaining [action-capacities] have [all] 
five modes of phenomena. 2° 
35 
: q)(utr : 9$ f4 (4 li 14 1 9ý ZR: ITTF i 
r(i f wni ik Ft rrrfur rn 4x n 
säntalhkaranü buddhil: sarvam visayam 
avagähate yasmdt / 
tasmät trividham karanam dväri dvüräni Sesüni 11 
35 // 
Because buddhi along with the other inner 
instruments apprehends all objects, the three- 
fold instrument is the chamber, the rest being 
the doorways. 
36 
c º- graft fý nýýu 
ete pradtpakalpdli parasparavilaksanü 
gunavisesäh / 
krtsnam purusasydrtham prakü. fya buddhau 
prayacchanli 1136 // 
These specifications of the gunas, distinct 
from one another, present the whole [world] 
to buddhi, illuminating it like a lamp for the 
sake of puruca. 
37 
A-r ufT ak: i 
"inner" mental phenomena can concern the past (in 
memories) and the future (in anticipation) as well. 
19The "specific" objects are the bhatas and the 
"non-specific" are the lanmätras (cf. SK 38). 
"In other words, the other four action-capacities 
involve the manifestation or production of all five 
modes of sensory content (tanmälras). 
sarvani praty upabhogam yasmüt purusasya 
sädhayati buddhili / 
saiva ca viginasti puna/z pradhänapurusäntaram 
süksmam 113711 
[This is] because buddhi gives rise to every 
particular enjoyment of the purusa and, fur- 
thermore, discloses the subtle difference 
between pradhüna and purusa. 
38 
. 1- v or: i 
tanmütrüny avisesült tebhyo bhütüni panca 
pancabhyah/ 
ete smrtd visesäiz Süntä ghoräS ca madhd s' ca 
// 38 /% 
The modes of sensory content (tanmütras) 
are non-specific; from these five [come] the 
five elements; these are regarded as specific, 
and as tranquil, disturbing, and delusive. 
39 
9Tuldr4-I vFkf? - w N* W: FT: 
t -i- fir: rý-irr %4; 1140.11 
süksmä matüpitrjali saha prabhütais tridhü 
vis`esüh syuh / 
süksmäs tesüm niyatäh mütüpitrjä nivartante 
/139/I 
Subtle, born of mother and father, and ele- 
mental are the three specific types; of these, 
the subtle are permanent, [whereas those] 
born of mother and father are corruptible. 2' 
40 
JýIei--m ci 
? fý f v*i- -. -f- r- n 6o n 
pürvotpannam asaktam niyatam 
mahadüdisiüksmaparyantam / 
santsarati nirupabhogam badvair adhiväsitam 
lirigam // 40 // 
The liriga is already existent, unrestricted, 
permanent, comprising "the great" and the 
21 It would appear that what is being referred to 
in this kärikä are three aspects of a person: the 
"subtle" (or mental), the physical body, and the 
"elemental" (or the forms of perceptual objects). 
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rest, down to the subtle; 22 wandering without 
enjoyment, endowed with dispositions 
(bhavas). 
41 
f PZTTrf facer 'qNT ¬ i-qT i 
1frf flT N 1t-4r4 fir 11 `ýu tir 
citram yathäsrayam rte sthdnvädibhyo vind yathü 
chayü / 
tadvad vinä vifesair na tisthati nirdfrayam 
1 irigam 1141 // 
Just as there is no picture without a support 
and no shadow without a post or suchlike, so 
the liriga does not exist without the support 
of the specific. 
amari f4v4urf ter: it << n 
dharmena gamanam ürdhvam gamanam 
adhastüd bhavaty adharmena / 
jnünena cäpavargo viparyayydd i; +yate bandnah 
// 44 // 
By means of virtue (dharma) there is move- 
ment upwards, by means of non-virtue 
(adharma) there is movement downwards; 
by means of knowledge liberation is attained, 
and bondage is due to the opposite. 
45 
ý 11141 It A 1114 : iT 
grrnrý i 
zf 11 all 
42 
aýa -" 




prakrter vibhutvayogän natavad vyavatisthate 
lirigam // 42 /l 
This liriga, motivated for the sake of purusa, 
by means of the association of causes and 
effects, and due to its connection with the 
manifestness of prakrti, performs like a 
dancer. 
43 
tiftf m . 4m: Alzftn ýyirtl irr: i 
W: -11 -N N U1: -: b 141-4 u-r T: n (4 u 
sämsiddhikal ca badväh prükrtikd vaikrtä ca 
dharmadyüh / 
drstah karanafrayinah käyä rayinafi ca 
kalalddyäli // 43 // 
The dispositions, [namely] dharrna and the 
rest, both natural and acquired, are perceived 
to abide in the instrument, and the embryo 
and so forth abide in the object (or effect, 
kärya). 
44 
22 In this instance "the subtle" would seem to de- 
note the lanmälras. 
vairügät prakrtilayah samsdro bhavati rüjasdd 
rügat/ 
ailvarydd avighütah viparyaydt tadviparydsalt 
//45 // 
Prakrti's dissolution occurs as a result of 
non-attachment, wandering2' is due to at- 
tachment, which is impulsive; removal of 
obstructions is due to masterfulness, the re- 
verse of that is due to the opposite. 
46 
RT twit N 44 f4 1 ýrf fr 
eya pratyayasargo 
viparyaydtaktitustisiddhyäkhyah l 
gwiavaisamyavimardät tasya ca bhedis tu 
pailcal t 1/ 46 // 
This is the effusion (sarga) of mental phe- 
nomena (pratyaya), comprising delusion, 
weakness, contentment, and excellence; and 
these are divided into fifty kinds according to 
the respective imbalance of the genas. 
47 
ýr7a P TgVq-ar *1 
fqft: u «s it 
pahca viparyayabhedä bhavanty alaktil ca 
karanavaikalyüt / 
21 "Wandering" is a fairly literal translation of 
samsära. It should be understood to mean 
"wandering through life, and from one lifetime to 
another". It implies rebirth. 
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astavindatibhedü tustir navadhästadhd siddhih 
//47// 
51 
: 37IT: s$-ý T: 414 NN1 (11 " 04 : a There are five kinds of delusion, and twenty- 
eight kinds of weakness due to defects in the 
instrument; contentment is ninefold, excel- 
lence eightfold. 
48 
szf4 : ýY rfý* r: i 
Cl IN Q) sr rrw-r ii 6c n 
bhedas lamaso'stavidhal: mohasya ca da(avidho 
mahämohali / 
tämisro'städa. fadhd tathd bhavaty andhatämisrah 
#48 // 
There are eight kinds of dullness, and also of 
perplexity, ten kinds of great perplexity; de- 




; R-'T= airr u 6ý. n 
eküdaýendriyavadhdli saha buddhivadhair 
asaktir uddistü / 
saptada. Sa vadha buddher viparyayät 
tustisiddhfnäm 1/ 49 11 
Impairments to the eleven capacities24 along 
with buddhi are said to constitute weakness; 
impairments to buddhi are seventeen, due to 
the opposites of contentment and excellence. 
50 
writ fei 4 Rift 77-v 9v u}s1 r: 11 va 11 
ädhydtmikäl catasrah prakrty 
upüddnakälabhägyrtkhydh / 
bähyü visayoparamät panca nava 
tustayo'bhimatälz // 50 // 
Nine modes of contentment are distin- 
guished; four are internal, concerning re- 
spectively disposition (or natural consti- 
tution, prakrti), acquisition, time, and for- 
tune; five are external, due to abstinence 
from [sensory] objects. 
24 i. e. the five buddhindriyas, five karmendriyas, 
plus manas. 
; r* af sItf : rsT-: uxýa 
ühali s`abdo'dhyayanam duhkhavighatas trayali 
sukrtprüptih / 
dänam ca siddhayostau siddhelt pürvo'iikusas 
trividhal: // 51 // 
The eight ways of attaining excellence are: 
reasoning, [reception ofJ verbal instruction, 
study, eradication of the threefold distress, 
friendliness, and generosity; the previous 
three25 are hindrances to excellence. 
52 
F -9T fk rr 1. i cri i 
f urýr :ýffr: 
uxýn 
na vinä badvair lingam na vina lingena bhävanir 
vrttili / 
1irigakhyo bhäväkhyal: tasmäd dvividhali 
pravartate sargalt 1152 /l 
Without the dispositions (bhüvas) the liAiga 
cannot operate, and without the liriga the 
dispositions cannot operate; therefore a dual 
effusion proceeds, distinguishable as linga 
and disposition. 
53 
P-f Yý irr ýrafý i 
: 4r ': :n k4 n 
astavikalpo daivas tairyagyona. ( ca pancadha 
bhavati / 
mdnusakal caikavidhali samüsato bhautikah 
sargalt 1153 // 
There are eight varieties of divine beings and 
five of [non-human] natural beings; mankind 
is singular; such, in brief, is the elemental 
realm (sarga). 
54 
rc cT: wk: 
: IIY(II 
ürdhvam sattvavi älas tamovisülas ca mülatah 
sargalt 
/ 
25 i. e. delusion (viparyaya), weakness (a. akIi), 
and contentment (lusti). 
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madhye rajovildlo brahmädistambaparyanta/i 
// 54 // 
The upper realm is pervaded by luminosity 
(sattva), and the base is pervaded by opacity 
(tanias); the middle is pervaded by activity 
(rajas); [such is the case] from Brahma down 
to a blade of grass. 
58 
3 it ''""' i` 
yxvfzr fkuriý II II 
autsukyanivrtryarthant yathd kriydsu pravartate 
lokah / 
purusasya vimoksürthant pravartate tadvad 




tatra jarümara{zakrtan: dul: kham prrrpnoti 
cetanalh purusal: / 
1irigasyavinivrites tasmäd dulikham svabhüvena 11 
55 // 
Purusa, consciousness, acquires there the 
suffering created by decay and death until its 
deliverance from the linga; hence one's own 
nature is associated with suffering. 
56 
atdTtý 
ä*-T3ýf T: 11XcII 
ity esa prakrtikrto 
mahadddivifiesabhütaparyantah / 
pratipurusavimoksürthant svärtha iva parärtha 
ürambhalt 1156 // 
This prakrti-creation, from the great down to 
the specific elements, is for the sake of the 
liberation of each purusa, for the other's 
benefit as though for its own. 
57 
11 N; fi al N Nn irr TfW: A'1TRW uYn 
vatsavivrddhinimittam ksirasya yathd pravrttir 
ajflasya / 
purusavimo4animittan: tathä pravrttih 
pradhdnasya /157 // 
Just as the profusion of unknowing (ajiia) 
milk brings about the nourishment of the 
calf, so the profusion of pradhüna brings 
about the liberation of puruca. 
Just as [in] the world actions are performed 
for the purpose of removing [i. e. fulfilling] a 
desire, so does the unmanifest perform for 
the purpose of the liberation of purusa. 
59 
g ýrrýrý x-T, r ýf 14 fafýaý-ý :uxý, u 
raiigasya dariayitvü nivartate nartakt yathd 
nrtyüt / 
puruyasya tathatmünam prakülya vinivartale 
prakrtili // 59 // 
Just as, having displayed herself before the 
gaze of the audience, the dancer desists from 
dancing, so prakrti desists, having mani- 
fested herself to purura. 
60 
au Eo u 
nünüvidhair upüyair upaküriny anupakarinah 
pumsah / 
gunavarya gunasya salas lasydrlham apärlhakam 
carali // 60 // 
She, being endowed with the gunas, moves 
without any benefit [to herself] for the sake 
of pugisa (i. e. puruca), who, being without 
gunas, does not reciprocate. 
61 
fr: I rý rfa ýr ýf f'ý i 
zrt fzfi 1; 1* ii cu 
prakrteli sukumürätaranr na kificid astiti me matir 
bhavati / 
yd drstüsmiti punar na darianam upaiti 
purusasya 1/ 61 // 
In my view there is no-one more tender than 
prakrti, who, saying "I have been seen, " 
never again comes into puruca's sight. 
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62 65 
m:; n7 waftv ;T ljý ; TrFT ý tr fý wkF[ iý -7 N 111 X fl 14 11-14 TF7 ýl 1,1 * 'A NN IMT[ I 
ýfrtfýw-qk ijý w ; rr; iT-TzTwTfw: nýRn 
tasmän na badhyate'ddhü na mucyate näpi 
samsarati kadcit / 
samsarati badhyate mucyate ca nändrrayü 
prakrtili // 62 // 
WqiN' 4 ZO 44 Fir :': u: 11 ýYn 
tena nivrttaprasavdm arlhavasät sap- 
tariipavinivrt1am / 
prakrtim pa yati puruca? z preksakavad avasthita? t 
svacchah27 1/65 /l 
No-one, then, is bound, nor released, nor 
wanders; it is prakrti, in its various abodes 
(älrayü), that wanders, and is bound and re- 
leased. 
63 
Tk: rfi? a: 
ýaav, r Afj- uýýn 
rüpaili saptabhir eva tu badhnäty ätmänam 
ntmand prakrtilt / 
saiva ca purusdrtham prati vimocayaty 
ekarüpena 1163 // 
Prakrti binds herself by herself with the use 
of seven forms; and, for the sake of each 
purusa, liberates herself by means of one 
form. 26 
64 
aC Vr vý 
UV (II 
Then purusa, abiding [in itself] like a specta- 
tor, sees prakrti, who has returned to inac- 
tivity and retreated from the seven forms due 
to her purpose being complete. 
66 
Ufa- rsfv94t: slr 11 ýýu 
drstü mayety upekyaka ekah drstahamity upar- 
amaty anyü / 
sati samyoge pi tayoli prayojanam ndsti sargasya 
// 66 // 
"I have seen her, " says the spectating one; "I 
have been seen, " says the other, desisting; 
although the two remain in conjunction, 
there is no initiation of [further] surgence. 
67 
rirrT? 1Tcýi II ý, ý9 II 
evam tattväbhyüsün ndsmi na me näham ity samyagji anddhigamüd 
aparilesam / dharmädindmaküranaprýiptau / 
aviparyayäd viluddhani kevalam utpadyate tistati sanjsküravaSüt cakrabhramivad 
jnrnam 1164 /l dhrtafarirah l/ 67 /l 
Thus, from the assiduous practise of that- 
ness, the knowledge arises that "I am not, " 
"not mine, " "not I"; which [knowledge], be- 
ing free of delusion, is complete, pure, and 
singular. 
Z6 The eight "forms" (rüpas) here are usually as- 
sumed to be "dispositions" (bhüvas). It strikes me as 
being at least equally likely, however, that they are 
the modes of prakrti divided into the following 
categories: (i) avyakta (the unmanifest); (2) buddhi; 
(3) ahamküra; (4) manas; (5) buddhlndri yas; (6) 
karmendriyas; (7) tanmätras; and (s) bhütas. It is 
when forms (2)-(s) dissolve into (1) that liberation 
occurs. This interpretation would also make more 
sense of SK 65. 
Due to the attainment of perfect knowledge, 
virtue (dharma) and the rest have no impel- 
ling cause; [nevertheless, ] the endowed body 
persists owing to the momentum of impres- 
sions, like a potter's wheel. 
68 
ATS 
r II ý, ý II 
27 There is considerable disagreement among the 
early commentaries over what the final word in this 
kärikä should be. GBIº and Jayamangald read svas- 
Iha? z ("self-abiding") whereas STV has susthah 
("well-placed"). I have here followed the TK and YD 
with svacchah. 
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prapte darirabhede caritärthatvät 72 
pradhdnavinivrttau / 
aikantikam atyantikam ubhayam kaivalyam 
T" ZM&0: "R4 'dZrI--Af'q I 
apnoti fl 68 // 33 N 4k iI: IN II %9?. II 
Pradhäna being inactive, her purpose having saptatydm kilo ye'rthds te'rthdh krtsnasya 
been fulfilled, [purusa], upon separating sayiIantrasya / 
from the body, attains aloneness (kaivalya), akhyüyiküvirahitült paravüdavivarjitd. ' capi 
which is both singular and conclusive. // 72 // 
69 
'-T ýa rýrýrýr i v"I 
purusürthajnünam idam guhyam paramarsi{rd 
samükhyütam / 
sthityutpattipralaydl cintyante yatra bhütünäm 
//69// 
The topics of the seventy [verses] are indeed 
those of the entire "sixty doctrines" 
(sastitantra), though excluding illustrative 
stories and the consideration of opposing 
views. 28 
This esoteric knowledge of purusa's goal, 
examining the existence, arising, and disso- 
lution of entities, has been expounded by the 
highest sage. 
70 
*fnf4výf1ar14 97 aa trTF 
u son 
etatpavitram agryam munir üsuraye'nukampayü 
pradadaul 
dsurir api pancaYikhäya Lena ca bahudhü krtagz 
tantram /170 /l 
The quiet monk first passed on this supreme 
means of purification, compassionately, to 
Asuri; Asuri, again, to Panca§ikha, and by 
him the teaching was widely distributed. 
71 
fu: i 
Jisyaparamparaydgatam i varakrsnena caitad 
äryübhih / 
samksiptam dryamatinü samyag vUrldya 
sfddhdntam 1171 /l 
Communicated via a tradition of disciples, 
this has been thoroughly expounded in üryü 
metre by the noble-minded Igvarakrsna, at- 
tainer of ultimate knowledge. 
"An extra kdrikä that appears in Mäthara's 
commentary reads: "Thus the content of this con- 
densed exposition (. fiastra) is not deficient, and is 
like an image of the great body of teachings (tantra) 
reflected in a mirror" (tasmüt samdsa-dretan 
£dstram idam nfrthataf ca parihTnam / tantrasya ca 




Diagramatic Representation of the Metaphysical Schema 
of Classical Sämkhya 
A. With Sanskrit Terms Only 
(i) purusa (2) prakrti I pradhäna / avyakta 
I 
(3) mahat / buddhi 
(4) ahamkära 
(5) manas (16-2o) tanmi tras 
(6-10) buddhindriyas 
(11-15) karmendriyas (21-25) bhütas 
B. According to the Standard Interpretation 
(i) self / consciousness 
Vertical lines represent relations 
of material causation 




i (5) mind (16-20) subtle lelements (6-10) sense-capacities 
(i 1-1s) action-capacities (21-25) gross elements 
C. According to the Interpretation Proposed in This Study 
(i) self / consciousness (2) unmanifest ground of phenomena 
(3) discernment 
Vertical lines represent 
relations of conditionality (4) egoity 
(5) synthesising mind (I6-2o) sense-contents 
(6-lo) sensations 
(ii-is) externally-oriented actions (21-25) forms of perceptual objects 
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(In English alphabetical order) 
abadva non-being, non-existent; unmani- 
fest (cf. asat) 
abhimdna the thought of (being a) self 
(cf. ahamküra) 
ab/tyäsa sustained practice, applying one- 
self to a task 
adhyavasäya discernment, ascertainment 
(syn. buddhi) 
advaila nondual, nondualism 
ahmnkdra "I-maker", egoity (cf. abhi- 
mäna) 
aisvarya (possessing the qualities) of 
i§vara; masterfulness 
ajnäna non-knowledge, ignorance 
(cf. avidyü, viparyaya) 
dkäsa space 
aliitga unmarked, unmanifest (syn. 
avyakta) 
anädi beginningless 
ilnanda intense pleasure, bliss 
attanta unending, infinite, eternal (syn. 
nitya) 
anätntan not-self; inessential 
anitya non-eternal, temporal 
antalikarapa inner instrument, comprising 
buddhi, ahamkära and manas 
attugraha "pulling up"; grace; providence 
anusäsana exposition 
dtiviksiki philosophical enquiry 
ap water; liquidity 
aparigraha "not grasping around", non- 
covetousness 
apavarga liberation, fulfilment (syn. 
kaivalya, moksa) 
dranyaka "of the forest"; teachings com- 
posed by/for forest-dwelling ascetics 
(third part of gruti) 
artha object; purpose, sake 
asmnprajitdta supra-cognitive 
asat formally non-existent; unmanifest 
(cf. abhäva) 
astätiga eight-limbed, eightfold 
ästika orthodox 
ättnan self, essence, essential nature 
avidyyä misperception; false knowledge 
(cf. ajiiüna, viparyaya) 
avikrti uncreated, unmanifested 
avisesa non-specific, unparticularised 
avyakia unmanifest (syn. aliliga) 
bd1tya(-karat: a) outer instrument, com- 
prising the ten indriyas 
b/Makli devotion 
bhäsya commentary, exegesis 
badra being, existent; disposition, psycho- 
logical characteristic 
bheda piercing, splitting, separation 
bhoga experience, enjoyment 
bhoktr enjoyer, empirical subject 
bI: üta being, element; form 
bija seed (of mental processes and patterns 
of behaviour; syn. samskdra); monosyl- 
labic mantra 
brahman: ultimate ground, absolute prin- 
ciple 
brähntana ritual ceremony; instructional 
text for the performance of rituals 
(second part of gruti); person who per- 
forms them 
buddhi discernment, intellection (syn. 
adhyavasaya, mahat) 
buddliindriya sense-capacity; sensation 
cakra wheel; energy centre where two or 
more nädis conjoin or intersect 
cetas, cetana consciousness 
cit, citi consciousness, awareness 
citisakti consciousness-power 
citta mind; thinking 
cittan0tra mind-only, consciousness-only 
("idealist" view associated with 
Yogäcära Buddhism) (syn. vy änavüda) 
dardana vision, viewpoint, seeing; philo- 
sophical system (cf. düstra, ! antra) 
dhärand holding, fixing; concentration 
dharnta order; righteousness, virtue 
dh -dna meditation, intense contemplation 
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dii space; place 
driqtr seer 
drastrtva "seer-ness", consciousness, 
awareness 
drei seeing 
rlrsintdtra seeing alone, mere seeing; 
awareness 
ddrsya the seen, seeable 
duhkha distress, dissatisfactoriness 
guiia strand, quality, constituent; condi- 
tion of manifestation 
guru heavy; spiritual preceptor 
hatha forceful, strong, vigorous 
hirafiyagarbha golden germ/seed 
indriya capacity, power; general term for 
the five buddhindriyas and five karmen- 
driyas 
ika, iivara lord, master, deity (cf 
aiivarya) 
jila knower (syn. puruca) 
ji: äna knowledge, cognition 
kaivalya aloneness, solitariness, absolute- 
ness (cf. kevala) 
käla time 
kara! ia instrument, capacity; the antah- 
and bähya-karana combined 
kärikä distich, stanza 
karman action, work, deed 
karmendriya action-capacity; activity 
karupd compassion 
kärya effect; manifestation 
kevala alone, absolute, singular (cf, 
kaivalya) 
kleta affliction; mental defect 
kriyn activity 
kunibhaka retention (of breath, präna) 
(syn. pranüyäma) 
kupi af, kupdalini(-saki: ) "that-which-is- 
coiled"; serpent power 
mahat the great (syn. buddhi) 
nianas synthesising aspect of mind 
mantra sacred sound or thought; recited 
(audibly or inaudibly) as an object of 
meditation 
n: nyd creative power; illusion 
moksa, mukti, vinioka release, liberation 
(syn. apavarga, kaivalya) 
müla root, foundation, base 
näai channel, flow; conduit of präna 
nirbija without seed, i. e. without 
samskäras 
nirguº: a without qualities, unmanifest 
nirodha cessation 
nitya eternal (ambiguously: everlasting or 
atemporal) (syn. ananta) 
niyama restraint 
päda chapter, part (lit. foot, leg) 
parii: änia "bending around"; transforma- 
tion, modification 
pradhdna that which is primal or funda- 
mental (syn. prakrti) 
prajnä insight, knowledge 
prakäsa shining forth, illumination 
prakrti that which creates or manifests 
(syn. pradhüna) 
prakrtilaya dissolution of (or into) prakrti 
prdpa breath; vital energy 
prandyäma extended retention of präna; 
breath-holding (syn. kumbhaka) 
pratiprasava return to the source or origi- 
nal state 
pratyaya mental content, phenomenon 
pravacana pronouncement, verbal presen- 
tation 
pravrtti engagement, activity 
pp/riet earth; solidity 
purusa self; person 
rajas activity, energy 
rüpa form; nature; appearance 
laghu light (not heavy) 
liiiga cipher, sign; comprosite of the mani- 
fest principles from buddhi to the 
tanmätras (i. e. excluding only the five 
bhütas) 
Iii: gamätra mere mark (syn.? mahat) 
sabda word, language, speech, sound 
sdksin witness, witnessing 
Sakti power, energy; feminine pole of the 
supreme principle, esp. as conceived in 
Tantrism 
saniddhi, sanräpatti mental absorption 
228 
Glossary of Key Sanskrit Terms 
smnhitd collection (of teachings or man- 
tras); first part of gruti 
samkalpa resolve, determination, idea 
samkhyä number 
sdmkhya counting, enumeration; philo- 
sophical system 
samnyäsa renunciation 
samprajnäta cognitive, with cognition 
samskära unconscious or preconscious 
mental content (such as a memory); 
cause of habit-patterns (cf. bkja, väsanä) 
samyoga confusion; conjunction; com- 
munion (esp. of purusa and prakrti) 
sarga surgence, effusion; manifestation 
Barfra body 
sastitantra "sixty doctrines"; name of an 
ancient Sämkhya text (or of several such 
texts) 
sdstra doctrine; system of philosophy 
(syn. tantra; cf darsana) 
sat formally existent, manifest 
satkdrya "a formally-existent [entity] is an 
effect" 
saliva being-ness, existence; capacity to 
manifest (in the YS, syn. buddhi) 
sättvika possessing the quality of sattva 
Lila nature, character 
sphota spurt, burst, erupt 
sphotaväda theory that the meaning of a 
word "bursts forth" in the mind (rather 
than being conveyed via its linguistic 
correlate) 
sruti "that which is heard", revealed doc- 
trine; traditionally divided into four 
categories: samhitä, brähmana, 
äranyaka, and upanisad 
sthiti steadiness, stability 
sthüla gross, coarse; perceptible 
silksn: a subtle; imperceptible 
sünya devoid of manifest content, empty 
sutra thread; aphoristic statement 
sva one's own, oneself 
svämin self-possessor, owner 
lamas darkness; limitation 
tdntasa possessing the quality of tamas 
tatttnätra "that-alone"; sense-content or 
-datum 
tantra doctrine (syn. süstra); text (lit. 
warp, loom) 
tattva "that-ness", essence; principle 
lejas fire; heat, light 
lraigui{y'a three-stranded (cf. guna) 
trigulla three strands (cf guna) 
rlpani! ad "sitting near to"; esoteric scrip- 
ture; fourth part of gruti 
vac voice, speech, speaking 
vairägy'a, virdga non-attachment, dispas- 
sion (lit. "without colour") 
vdsand memory trace (cf. sa, p. küra) 
vastu object; entity (cf art/ia, visa ya) 
vaidika Vedic, i. e. belonging to, or in con- 
formity with, the Vedas 
vdyu air, wind; gaseousness 
vela knowledge, vision; sometimes used 
synonymously with £ruti, while at other 
times denoting merely the samhitä por- 
tion 
vedäula "end of the Veda"; collective 
term for the Upanisads; philosophical 
systematisation of Upanisadic teachings 
vyi1äna special knowledge, discernment; 
consciousness 
viji'räuavdda consciousness(-only) view; 
"idealism" (esp. associated with 
Yogäcära Buddhism) (syn. ciltamütra) 
vikalpa intuition without an objective ba- 
sis; imaginative conception 
vikrli created, manifested 
vimoksa (see mo%a) 
viparyaya opposite, inversion; misappre- 
hension (cf. ajildna, avid)yä) 
visaya object, phenomenon, manifest en- 
tity (cf. art ha, vastu); domain 
visesa special, specific, differentiated 
viveka discrimination, discernment 
vivekakbydti discriminating vision 
vivekin discerning one 
vrtti whirl, turning; activity; mental activ- 
ity; subcommentary 
vyakta manifest 
yatrtra device; symbolic diagram 
yoga union; soteriological discipline 
yogiti practitioner of yoga; one who has 
attained some degree of soteriological 
insight 
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